From: Evan Hunt <each@isc.org>
Date: Fri, 14 Mar 2025 00:44:49 +0000 (-0700)
Subject: Don't check DNS_KEYFLAG_NOAUTH
X-Git-Tag: v9.18.36~11^2~1
X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=4b813335672e563bd719865f9eeef6b6e5d53b30;p=thirdparty%2Fbind9.git

Don't check DNS_KEYFLAG_NOAUTH

All DNSKEY keys are able to authenticate. The DNS_KEYTYPE_NOAUTH
(and DNS_KEYTYPE_NOCONF) flags were defined for the KEY rdata type,
and are not applicable to DNSKEY.

Previously, because the DNSKEY implementation was built on top of
KEY, the NOAUTH flag prevented authentication in DNSKEYs as well.
This has been corrected.

(cherry picked from commit 5c21576f82f9f62c2e22aac920a37a4013ac3a80)
---

diff --git a/lib/dns/dnssec.c b/lib/dns/dnssec.c
index 662136db877..3fc39882814 100644
--- a/lib/dns/dnssec.c
+++ b/lib/dns/dnssec.c
@@ -194,7 +194,6 @@ dns_dnssec_sign(const dns_name_t *name, dns_rdataset_t *set, dst_key_t *key,
 	isc_result_t ret;
 	isc_buffer_t *databuf = NULL;
 	char data[256 + 8];
-	uint32_t flags;
 	unsigned int sigsize;
 	dns_fixedname_t fnewname;
 	dns_fixedname_t fsigner;
@@ -212,17 +211,6 @@ dns_dnssec_sign(const dns_name_t *name, dns_rdataset_t *set, dst_key_t *key,
 		return DNS_R_INVALIDTIME;
 	}
 
-	/*
-	 * Is the key allowed to sign data?
-	 */
-	flags = dst_key_flags(key);
-	if ((flags & DNS_KEYTYPE_NOAUTH) != 0) {
-		return DNS_R_KEYUNAUTHORIZED;
-	}
-	if ((flags & DNS_KEYFLAG_OWNERMASK) != DNS_KEYOWNER_ZONE) {
-		return DNS_R_KEYUNAUTHORIZED;
-	}
-
 	sig.mctx = mctx;
 	sig.common.rdclass = set->rdclass;
 	sig.common.rdtype = dns_rdatatype_rrsig;
@@ -385,7 +373,6 @@ dns_dnssec_verify(const dns_name_t *name, dns_rdataset_t *set, dst_key_t *key,
 	unsigned char data[300];
 	dst_context_t *ctx = NULL;
 	int labels = 0;
-	uint32_t flags;
 	bool downcase = false;
 
 	REQUIRE(name != NULL);
@@ -450,19 +437,6 @@ dns_dnssec_verify(const dns_name_t *name, dns_rdataset_t *set, dst_key_t *key,
 		break;
 	}
 
-	/*
-	 * Is the key allowed to sign data?
-	 */
-	flags = dst_key_flags(key);
-	if ((flags & DNS_KEYTYPE_NOAUTH) != 0) {
-		inc_stat(dns_dnssecstats_fail);
-		return DNS_R_KEYUNAUTHORIZED;
-	}
-	if ((flags & DNS_KEYFLAG_OWNERMASK) != DNS_KEYOWNER_ZONE) {
-		inc_stat(dns_dnssecstats_fail);
-		return DNS_R_KEYUNAUTHORIZED;
-	}
-
 again:
 	ret = dst_context_create(key, mctx, DNS_LOGCATEGORY_DNSSEC, false,
 				 maxbits, &ctx);
@@ -1687,9 +1661,7 @@ dns_dnssec_keylistfromrdataset(const dns_name_t *origin, const char *directory,
 		RETERR(dns_dnssec_keyfromrdata(origin, &rdata, mctx, &dnskey));
 		dst_key_setttl(dnskey, keys.ttl);
 
-		if (!is_zone_key(dnskey) ||
-		    (dst_key_flags(dnskey) & DNS_KEYTYPE_NOAUTH) != 0)
-		{
+		if (!is_zone_key(dnskey)) {
 			goto skip;
 		}
 
@@ -1792,11 +1764,6 @@ dns_dnssec_keylistfromrdataset(const dns_name_t *origin, const char *directory,
 		}
 		RETERR(result);
 
-		/* This should never happen. */
-		if ((dst_key_flags(privkey) & DNS_KEYTYPE_NOAUTH) != 0) {
-			goto skip;
-		}
-
 		/*
 		 * Whatever the key's default TTL may have
 		 * been, the rdataset TTL takes priority.
diff --git a/lib/dns/key.c b/lib/dns/key.c
index 0b4b3d261fb..7f496ff0862 100644
--- a/lib/dns/key.c
+++ b/lib/dns/key.c
@@ -127,9 +127,6 @@ bool
 dst_key_iszonekey(const dst_key_t *key) {
 	REQUIRE(VALID_KEY(key));
 
-	if ((key->key_flags & DNS_KEYTYPE_NOAUTH) != 0) {
-		return false;
-	}
 	if ((key->key_flags & DNS_KEYFLAG_OWNERMASK) != DNS_KEYOWNER_ZONE) {
 		return false;
 	}
diff --git a/lib/dns/zone.c b/lib/dns/zone.c
index ac4263fb466..e91c2f6bde8 100644
--- a/lib/dns/zone.c
+++ b/lib/dns/zone.c
@@ -20851,8 +20851,7 @@ add_signing_records(dns_db_t *db, dns_rdatatype_t privatetype,
 
 		result = dns_rdata_tostruct(&tuple->rdata, &dnskey, NULL);
 		RUNTIME_CHECK(result == ISC_R_SUCCESS);
-		if ((dnskey.flags & (DNS_KEYFLAG_OWNERMASK |
-				     DNS_KEYTYPE_NOAUTH)) != DNS_KEYOWNER_ZONE)
+		if ((dnskey.flags & DNS_KEYFLAG_OWNERMASK) != DNS_KEYOWNER_ZONE)
 		{
 			ISC_LIST_UNLINK(diff->tuples, tuple, link);
 			ISC_LIST_APPEND(tuples, tuple, link);