From: Joseph Sutton Date: Wed, 16 Feb 2022 22:11:53 +0000 (+1300) Subject: CVE-2022-32745 s4/dsdb/util: Use correct value for loop count limit X-Git-Tag: samba-4.14.14~85 X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=7c8427e5d2f247921ab44996829acfed1f5f2360;p=thirdparty%2Fsamba.git CVE-2022-32745 s4/dsdb/util: Use correct value for loop count limit Currently, we can crash the server by sending a large number of values of a specific attribute (such as sAMAccountName) spread across a few message elements. If val_count is larger than the total number of elements, we get an access beyond the elements array. Similarly, we can include unrelated message elements prior to the message elements of the attribute in question, so that not all of the attribute's values are copied into the returned elements values array. This can cause the server to access uninitialised data, likely resulting in a crash or unexpected behaviour. BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15008 Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton --- diff --git a/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/util.c b/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/util.c index 405febf0b3d..14947746837 100644 --- a/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/util.c +++ b/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/util.c @@ -1546,7 +1546,7 @@ int dsdb_get_expected_new_values(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, v = _el->values; - for (i = 0; i < val_count; i++) { + for (i = 0; i < msg->num_elements; i++) { if (ldb_attr_cmp(msg->elements[i].name, attr_name) == 0) { if ((operation == LDB_MODIFY) && (LDB_FLAG_MOD_TYPE(msg->elements[i].flags)