From: Hitendra Prajapati Date: Mon, 8 Dec 2025 07:05:05 +0000 (+0530) Subject: openssh: fix CVE-2025-61984 X-Git-Tag: 2022-04.32-kirkstone~2 X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=7ca0c7a4d17c707658669e255689ecd4183c7e9b;p=thirdparty%2Fopenembedded%2Fopenembedded-core.git openssh: fix CVE-2025-61984 ssh in OpenSSH before 10.1 allows control characters in usernames that originate from certain possibly untrusted sources, potentially leading to code execution when a ProxyCommand is used. The untrusted sources are the command line and %-sequence expansion of a configuration file. Note: openssh does not support variable expansion until 10.0, so backport adapts for this. Reference: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-61984 Upstream-Status: Backport from https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/35d5917652106aede47621bb3f64044604164043 Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman --- diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2025-61984.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2025-61984.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..aee237e507 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2025-61984.patch @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +From 35d5917652106aede47621bb3f64044604164043 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "djm@openbsd.org" +Date: Thu, 4 Sep 2025 00:29:09 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] upstream: Improve rules for %-expansion of username. + +Usernames passed on the commandline will no longer be subject to +% expansion. Some tools invoke ssh with connection information +(i.e. usernames and host names) supplied from untrusted sources. +These may contain % expansion sequences which could yield +unexpected results. + +Since openssh-9.6, all usernames have been subject to validity +checking. This change tightens the validity checks by refusing +usernames that include control characters (again, these can cause +surprises when supplied adversarially). + +This change also relaxes the validity checks in one small way: +usernames supplied via the configuration file as literals (i.e. +include no % expansion characters) are not subject to these +validity checks. This allows usernames that contain arbitrary +characters to be used, but only via configuration files. This +is done on the basis that ssh's configuration is trusted. + +Pointed out by David Leadbeater, ok deraadt@ + +OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e2f0c871fbe664aba30607321575e7c7fc798362 + +CVE: CVE-2025-61984 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/35d5917652106aede47621bb3f64044604164043] +Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati +--- + ssh.c | 11 +++++++++++++++-- + 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c +index 82ed15f..d4e2040 100644 +--- a/ssh.c ++++ b/ssh.c +@@ -634,6 +634,8 @@ valid_ruser(const char *s) + if (*s == '-') + return 0; + for (i = 0; s[i] != 0; i++) { ++ if (iscntrl((u_char)s[i])) ++ return 0; + if (strchr("'`\";&<>|(){}", s[i]) != NULL) + return 0; + /* Disallow '-' after whitespace */ +@@ -655,6 +657,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + struct ssh *ssh = NULL; + int i, r, opt, exit_status, use_syslog, direct, timeout_ms; + int was_addr, config_test = 0, opt_terminated = 0, want_final_pass = 0; ++ int user_on_commandline = 0, user_was_default = 0, user_expanded = 0; + char *p, *cp, *line, *argv0, *logfile, *host_arg; + char cname[NI_MAXHOST], thishost[NI_MAXHOST]; + struct stat st; +@@ -995,8 +998,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + } + break; + case 'l': +- if (options.user == NULL) ++ if (options.user == NULL) { + options.user = optarg; ++ user_on_commandline = 1; ++ } + break; + + case 'L': +@@ -1099,6 +1104,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + if (options.user == NULL) { + options.user = tuser; + tuser = NULL; ++ user_on_commandline = 1; + } + free(tuser); + if (options.port == -1 && tport != -1) +@@ -1113,6 +1119,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + if (options.user == NULL) { + options.user = p; + p = NULL; ++ user_on_commandline = 1; + } + *cp++ = '\0'; + host = xstrdup(cp); +@@ -1265,8 +1272,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + if (fill_default_options(&options) != 0) + cleanup_exit(255); + +- if (options.user == NULL) ++ if (options.user == NULL) { ++ user_was_default = 1; + options.user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name); ++ } + + /* + * If ProxyJump option specified, then construct a ProxyCommand now. +-- +2.50.1 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_8.9p1.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_8.9p1.bb index 780ece8999..6ba85712b3 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_8.9p1.bb +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_8.9p1.bb @@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PV}.tar file://CVE-2025-26465.patch \ file://CVE-2025-32728.patch \ file://CVE-2025-61985.patch \ + file://CVE-2025-61984.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "fd497654b7ab1686dac672fb83dfb4ba4096e8b5ffcdaccd262380ae58bec5e7"