From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2017 02:22:28 +0000 (-0700)
Subject: ipv4: provide stronger user input validation in nl_fib_input()
X-Git-Tag: v3.10.107~73
X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=7dbfa253c3832f4107ce019d026c7892b7d7ec1a;p=thirdparty%2Fkernel%2Fstable.git

ipv4: provide stronger user input validation in nl_fib_input()

commit c64c0b3cac4c5b8cb093727d2c19743ea3965c0b upstream.

Alexander reported a KMSAN splat caused by reads of uninitialized
field (tb_id_in) from user provided struct fib_result_nl

It turns out nl_fib_input() sanity tests on user input is a bit
wrong :

User can pretend nlh->nlmsg_len is big enough, but provide
at sendmsg() time a too small buffer.

Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
---

diff --git a/net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c b/net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c
index 4556cd25acde2..017b4792cd447 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c
@@ -957,7 +957,8 @@ static void nl_fib_input(struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	net = sock_net(skb->sk);
 	nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
-	if (skb->len < NLMSG_HDRLEN || skb->len < nlh->nlmsg_len ||
+	if (skb->len < nlmsg_total_size(sizeof(*frn)) ||
+	    skb->len < nlh->nlmsg_len ||
 	    nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(*frn))
 		return;