From: Amir Mohammad Jahangirzad Date: Tue, 31 Mar 2026 23:21:13 +0000 (+0330) Subject: io_uring/cancel: validate opcode for IORING_ASYNC_CANCEL_OP X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=85a58309c0d5b5f5a4b65658312ceaf2c34c9bbf;p=thirdparty%2Fkernel%2Flinux.git io_uring/cancel: validate opcode for IORING_ASYNC_CANCEL_OP io_async_cancel_prep() reads the opcode selector from sqe->len and stores it in cancel->opcode, which is an 8-bit field. Since sqe->len is a 32-bit value, values larger than U8_MAX are implicitly truncated. This can cause unintended opcode matches when the truncated value corresponds to a valid io_uring opcode. For example, submitting a value such as 0x10b will be truncated to 0x0b (IORING_OP_TIMEOUT), allowing a cancel request to match operations it did not intend to target. Validate the opcode value before assigning it to the 8-bit field and reject values outside the valid io_uring opcode range. Signed-off-by: Amir Mohammad Jahangirzad Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260331232113.615972-1-a.jahangirzad@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- diff --git a/io_uring/cancel.c b/io_uring/cancel.c index 65e04063e343b..5e5eb9cfc7cd6 100644 --- a/io_uring/cancel.c +++ b/io_uring/cancel.c @@ -156,9 +156,16 @@ int io_async_cancel_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe) cancel->fd = READ_ONCE(sqe->fd); } if (cancel->flags & IORING_ASYNC_CANCEL_OP) { + u32 op; + if (cancel->flags & IORING_ASYNC_CANCEL_ANY) return -EINVAL; - cancel->opcode = READ_ONCE(sqe->len); + + op = READ_ONCE(sqe->len); + if (op >= IORING_OP_LAST) + return -EINVAL; + + cancel->opcode = op; } return 0;