From: Vasiliy Kulikov Date: Tue, 15 Mar 2011 12:36:05 +0000 (+0100) Subject: netfilter: ip_tables: fix infoleak to userspace X-Git-Tag: v2.6.27.59~36 X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=9bbc8d2d9402b3c25fb9584000b4c8f96c3ff1bd;p=thirdparty%2Fkernel%2Fstable.git netfilter: ip_tables: fix infoleak to userspace commit 78b79876761b86653df89c48a7010b5cbd41a84a upstream. Structures ipt_replace, compat_ipt_replace, and xt_get_revision are copied from userspace. Fields of these structs that are zero-terminated strings are not checked. When they are used as argument to a format string containing "%s" in request_module(), some sensitive information is leaked to userspace via argument of spawned modprobe process. The first and the third bugs were introduced before the git epoch; the second was introduced in 2722971c (v2.6.17-rc1). To trigger the bug one should have CAP_NET_ADMIN. Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c index b56a203e56cdd..58a273d0af032 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c @@ -1276,6 +1276,7 @@ do_replace(struct net *net, void __user *user, unsigned int len) /* overflow check */ if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters)) return -ENOMEM; + tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0; newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size); if (!newinfo) @@ -1808,6 +1809,7 @@ compat_do_replace(struct net *net, void __user *user, unsigned int len) return -ENOMEM; if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters)) return -ENOMEM; + tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0; newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size); if (!newinfo) @@ -2032,6 +2034,7 @@ do_ipt_get_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, int *len) ret = -EFAULT; break; } + rev.name[sizeof(rev.name)-1] = 0; if (cmd == IPT_SO_GET_REVISION_TARGET) target = 1;