From: Dan Carpenter Date: Fri, 10 Feb 2012 08:03:58 +0000 (+0100) Subject: relay: prevent integer overflow in relay_open() X-Git-Tag: v2.6.27.62~2 X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=aa6333a71faab8a2c4cddd883e252987d19c7bcc;p=thirdparty%2Fkernel%2Fstable.git relay: prevent integer overflow in relay_open() commit f6302f1bcd75a042df69866d98b8d775a668f8f1 upstream. "subbuf_size" and "n_subbufs" come from the user and they need to be capped to prevent an integer overflow. Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau --- diff --git a/kernel/relay.c b/kernel/relay.c index b0bbf6ffd1990..2da66c54dff60 100644 --- a/kernel/relay.c +++ b/kernel/relay.c @@ -171,10 +171,14 @@ depopulate: */ static struct rchan_buf *relay_create_buf(struct rchan *chan) { - struct rchan_buf *buf = kzalloc(sizeof(struct rchan_buf), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!buf) + struct rchan_buf *buf; + + if (chan->n_subbufs > UINT_MAX / sizeof(size_t *)) return NULL; + buf = kzalloc(sizeof(struct rchan_buf), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!buf) + return NULL; buf->padding = kmalloc(chan->n_subbufs * sizeof(size_t *), GFP_KERNEL); if (!buf->padding) goto free_buf; @@ -581,6 +585,8 @@ struct rchan *relay_open(const char *base_filename, if (!(subbuf_size && n_subbufs)) return NULL; + if (subbuf_size > UINT_MAX / n_subbufs) + return NULL; chan = kzalloc(sizeof(struct rchan), GFP_KERNEL); if (!chan)