From: ZhengYuan Huang Date: Fri, 8 May 2026 08:59:10 +0000 (+0800) Subject: ocfs2: validate inline xattr header before ibody lookups X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=bef1006da49c91e8e154223d3005829a394f8f78;p=thirdparty%2Flinux.git ocfs2: validate inline xattr header before ibody lookups Patch series "ocfs2: validate inline xattr header consumers". Corrupt i_xattr_inline_size can move the computed inode-body xattr header outside the dinode block. Several OCFS2 paths then trust xh_count or xattr entry geometry from that unchecked header. The reported KASAN splat hits the ibody lookup path: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ocfs2_xattr_find_entry+0x37b/0x3a0 ocfs2_xattr_ibody_get() ocfs2_xattr_get_nolock() ocfs2_calc_xattr_init() The same unchecked header derivation also exists in the outside-value probe, ibody remove, inline refcount attach, and inline reflink paths. This series factors the existing ibody list validation into a shared helper and then converts the remaining inline-header consumers one at a time. Patch layout: 1. validate ibody get/find and reuse the helper in ibody list 2. validate the outside-value probe 3. validate ibody remove 4. validate inline refcount attach 5. validate inline reflink This patch (of 5): [BUG] mknodat() can read past the end of a dinode block when ACL inheritance walks a corrupted inode-body xattr header. Another report shows the same unchecked lookup later faulting in the VFS open path after create returns a garbage status. KASAN: use-after-free in ocfs2_xattr_find_entry+0x37b/0x3a0 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:1078 Read of size 2 at addr ffff88801c520300 by task syz.0.10/360 Trace: ... ocfs2_xattr_find_entry+0x37b/0x3a0 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:1078 ocfs2_xattr_ibody_get fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:1178 [inline] ocfs2_xattr_get_nolock+0x2ee/0x1110 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:1309 ocfs2_calc_xattr_init+0x716/0xac0 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:628 ocfs2_mknod+0x935/0x2400 fs/ocfs2/namei.c:333 ocfs2_create+0x158/0x390 fs/ocfs2/namei.c:676 vfs_create fs/namei.c:3493 [inline] vfs_create+0x445/0x6f0 fs/namei.c:3477 do_mknodat+0x2d8/0x5e0 fs/namei.c:4372 __do_sys_mknodat fs/namei.c:4400 [inline] __se_sys_mknodat fs/namei.c:4397 [inline] __x64_sys_mknodat+0xb6/0xf0 fs/namei.c:4397 ... Another report: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfff3e40ec0 RIP: 0010:__d_entry_type include/linux/dcache.h:414 [inline] RIP: 0010:d_can_lookup include/linux/dcache.h:429 [inline] RIP: 0010:d_is_dir include/linux/dcache.h:439 [inline] RIP: 0010:path_openat+0xe2f/0x2ce0 fs/namei.c:4134 Trace: ... do_filp_open+0x1f6/0x430 fs/namei.c:4161 do_sys_openat2+0x117/0x1c0 fs/open.c:1437 __x64_sys_openat+0x15b/0x220 fs/open.c:1463 ... [CAUSE] ocfs2_xattr_ibody_list() already validates the inline xattr size and entry count, but ocfs2_xattr_ibody_get() and ocfs2_xattr_ibody_find() still derive the inline header directly from di->i_xattr_inline_size and then trust xh_count. A corrupted inline size or entry count can therefore move the computed header outside the dinode block before get/find start walking it. That can either make ocfs2_xattr_find_entry() dereference xs->header->xh_count outside the block or make ocfs2_xattr_get_nolock() bubble a garbage status back through ocfs2_calc_xattr_init() into the create/open path. [FIX] Factor the existing ibody header geometry checks into a shared helper. Use it in ocfs2_xattr_ibody_get() and ocfs2_xattr_ibody_find(), and have ocfs2_xattr_ibody_list() reuse the same helper instead of open-coding the validation. Reject corrupt ibody metadata with -EFSCORRUPTED before the lookup path can walk bogus xattr geometry or return a garbage status. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260508085914.61647-1-gality369@gmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260508085914.61647-2-gality369@gmail.com Signed-off-by: ZhengYuan Huang Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi Cc: Jia-Ju Bai Cc: Zixuan Fu Cc: Mark Fasheh Cc: Joel Becker Cc: Junxiao Bi Cc: Changwei Ge Cc: Jun Piao Cc: Heming Zhao Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton --- diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c b/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c index 86cfd4c2adf9..3a5a17cdcf7e 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c @@ -950,6 +950,41 @@ static int ocfs2_xattr_list_entries(struct inode *inode, return result; } +static int ocfs2_xattr_ibody_lookup_header(struct inode *inode, + struct ocfs2_dinode *di, + struct ocfs2_xattr_header **header) +{ + u16 xattr_count; + size_t max_entries; + u16 inline_size = le16_to_cpu(di->i_xattr_inline_size); + + if (inline_size > inode->i_sb->s_blocksize || + inline_size < sizeof(struct ocfs2_xattr_header)) { + ocfs2_error(inode->i_sb, + "Invalid xattr inline size %u in inode %llu\n", + inline_size, + (unsigned long long)OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_blkno); + return -EFSCORRUPTED; + } + + *header = (struct ocfs2_xattr_header *) + ((void *)di + inode->i_sb->s_blocksize - inline_size); + + xattr_count = le16_to_cpu((*header)->xh_count); + max_entries = (inline_size - sizeof(struct ocfs2_xattr_header)) / + sizeof(struct ocfs2_xattr_entry); + + if (xattr_count > max_entries) { + ocfs2_error(inode->i_sb, + "xattr entry count %u exceeds maximum %zu in inode %llu\n", + xattr_count, max_entries, + (unsigned long long)OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_blkno); + return -EFSCORRUPTED; + } + + return 0; +} + int ocfs2_has_inline_xattr_value_outside(struct inode *inode, struct ocfs2_dinode *di) { @@ -975,39 +1010,13 @@ static int ocfs2_xattr_ibody_list(struct inode *inode, struct ocfs2_xattr_header *header = NULL; struct ocfs2_inode_info *oi = OCFS2_I(inode); int ret = 0; - u16 xattr_count; - size_t max_entries; - u16 inline_size; if (!(oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_INLINE_XATTR_FL)) return ret; - inline_size = le16_to_cpu(di->i_xattr_inline_size); - - /* Validate inline size is reasonable */ - if (inline_size > inode->i_sb->s_blocksize || - inline_size < sizeof(struct ocfs2_xattr_header)) { - ocfs2_error(inode->i_sb, - "Invalid xattr inline size %u in inode %llu\n", - inline_size, - (unsigned long long)OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_blkno); - return -EFSCORRUPTED; - } - - header = (struct ocfs2_xattr_header *) - ((void *)di + inode->i_sb->s_blocksize - inline_size); - - xattr_count = le16_to_cpu(header->xh_count); - max_entries = (inline_size - sizeof(struct ocfs2_xattr_header)) / - sizeof(struct ocfs2_xattr_entry); - - if (xattr_count > max_entries) { - ocfs2_error(inode->i_sb, - "xattr entry count %u exceeds maximum %zu in inode %llu\n", - xattr_count, max_entries, - (unsigned long long)OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_blkno); - return -EFSCORRUPTED; - } + ret = ocfs2_xattr_ibody_lookup_header(inode, di, &header); + if (ret) + return ret; ret = ocfs2_xattr_list_entries(inode, header, buffer, buffer_size); @@ -1200,8 +1209,9 @@ static int ocfs2_xattr_ibody_get(struct inode *inode, return -ENODATA; xs->end = (void *)di + inode->i_sb->s_blocksize; - xs->header = (struct ocfs2_xattr_header *) - (xs->end - le16_to_cpu(di->i_xattr_inline_size)); + ret = ocfs2_xattr_ibody_lookup_header(inode, di, &xs->header); + if (ret) + return ret; xs->base = (void *)xs->header; xs->here = xs->header->xh_entries; @@ -2726,12 +2736,14 @@ static int ocfs2_xattr_ibody_find(struct inode *inode, xs->xattr_bh = xs->inode_bh; xs->end = (void *)di + inode->i_sb->s_blocksize; - if (oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_INLINE_XATTR_FL) - xs->header = (struct ocfs2_xattr_header *) - (xs->end - le16_to_cpu(di->i_xattr_inline_size)); - else + if (oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_INLINE_XATTR_FL) { + ret = ocfs2_xattr_ibody_lookup_header(inode, di, &xs->header); + if (ret) + return ret; + } else { xs->header = (struct ocfs2_xattr_header *) (xs->end - OCFS2_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_xattr_inline_size); + } xs->base = (void *)xs->header; xs->here = xs->header->xh_entries;