From: Yann Collet <cyan@fb.com>
Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2023 04:26:25 +0000 (-0800)
Subject: fix for v0.3 blindly ported to v0.2
X-Git-Tag: v1.5.4^2~6^2~7
X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=cfec005efd13b45433210ad8db543de3440fe2ad;p=thirdparty%2Fzstd.git

fix for v0.3 blindly ported to v0.2

in case it would be applicable here too.
---

diff --git a/lib/legacy/zstd_v02.c b/lib/legacy/zstd_v02.c
index dfaed7bb8..e09bb4a24 100644
--- a/lib/legacy/zstd_v02.c
+++ b/lib/legacy/zstd_v02.c
@@ -3066,12 +3066,19 @@ static size_t ZSTD_execSequence(BYTE* op,
     const BYTE* const litEnd = *litPtr + sequence.litLength;
 
     /* checks */
-    if (oLitEnd > oend_8) return ERROR(dstSize_tooSmall);   /* last match must start at a minimum distance of 8 from oend */
+    size_t const seqLength = sequence.litLength + sequence.matchLength;
+
+    if (seqLength > (size_t)(oend - op)) return ERROR(dstSize_tooSmall);
+    if (sequence.litLength > (size_t)(litLimit - *litPtr)) return ERROR(corruption_detected);
+    /* Now we know there are no overflow in literal nor match lengths, can use the pointer check */
+    if (oLitEnd > oend_8) return ERROR(dstSize_tooSmall);
+    if (sequence.offset > (U32)(oLitEnd - base)) return ERROR(corruption_detected);
+
     if (oMatchEnd > oend) return ERROR(dstSize_tooSmall);   /* overwrite beyond dst buffer */
     if (litEnd > litLimit) return ERROR(corruption_detected);   /* overRead beyond lit buffer */
 
     /* copy Literals */
-    ZSTD_wildcopy(op, *litPtr, sequence.litLength);   /* note : oLitEnd <= oend-8 : no risk of overwrite beyond oend */
+    ZSTD_wildcopy(op, *litPtr, (ptrdiff_t)sequence.litLength);   /* note : oLitEnd <= oend-8 : no risk of overwrite beyond oend */
     op = oLitEnd;
     *litPtr = litEnd;   /* update for next sequence */