From: Matt Caswell Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2025 13:49:16 +0000 (+0000) Subject: Remove dead EVP_aes_*() code X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=d4c1efccaba935b1cc67071c3b9323b892a32c72;p=thirdparty%2Fopenssl.git Remove dead EVP_aes_*() code Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz Reviewed-by: Neil Horman (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/29446) --- diff --git a/.clang-format b/.clang-format index 18b8466ab23..46564bf2c0f 100644 --- a/.clang-format +++ b/.clang-format @@ -1132,6 +1132,9 @@ TypeNames: # OpenSSL uses macros extensively. Tell clang-format about them. TypenameMacros: ['LHASH_OF', 'STACK_OF'] StatementMacros: + - "BLOCK_CIPHER_generic" + - "BLOCK_CIPHER_custom" + - "BLOCK_CIPHER_generic_pack" - "DECLARE_AES_EVP" - "DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS" - "DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS_attr" diff --git a/crypto/evp/e_aes.c b/crypto/evp/e_aes.c index 748df92baae..8560a84dda8 100644 --- a/crypto/evp/e_aes.c +++ b/crypto/evp/e_aes.c @@ -29,2353 +29,15 @@ #include "crypto/aes_platform.h" #include "evp_local.h" -typedef struct { - union { - OSSL_UNION_ALIGN; - AES_KEY ks; - } ks; - block128_f block; - union { - cbc128_f cbc; - ctr128_f ctr; - } stream; -} EVP_AES_KEY; - -typedef struct { - union { - OSSL_UNION_ALIGN; - AES_KEY ks; - } ks; /* AES key schedule to use */ - int key_set; /* Set if key initialised */ - int iv_set; /* Set if an iv is set */ - GCM128_CONTEXT gcm; - unsigned char *iv; /* Temporary IV store */ - int ivlen; /* IV length */ - int taglen; - int iv_gen; /* It is OK to generate IVs */ - int iv_gen_rand; /* No IV was specified, so generate a rand IV */ - int tls_aad_len; /* TLS AAD length */ - uint64_t tls_enc_records; /* Number of TLS records encrypted */ - ctr128_f ctr; -} EVP_AES_GCM_CTX; - -typedef struct { - union { - OSSL_UNION_ALIGN; - AES_KEY ks; - } ks1, ks2; /* AES key schedules to use */ - XTS128_CONTEXT xts; - void (*stream)(const unsigned char *in, - unsigned char *out, size_t length, - const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2, - const unsigned char iv[16]); -} EVP_AES_XTS_CTX; - -#ifdef FIPS_MODULE -static const int allow_insecure_decrypt = 0; -#else -static const int allow_insecure_decrypt = 1; -#endif - -typedef struct { - union { - OSSL_UNION_ALIGN; - AES_KEY ks; - } ks; /* AES key schedule to use */ - int key_set; /* Set if key initialised */ - int iv_set; /* Set if an iv is set */ - int tag_set; /* Set if tag is valid */ - int len_set; /* Set if message length set */ - int L, M; /* L and M parameters from RFC3610 */ - int tls_aad_len; /* TLS AAD length */ - CCM128_CONTEXT ccm; - ccm128_f str; -} EVP_AES_CCM_CTX; - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB -typedef struct { - union { - OSSL_UNION_ALIGN; - AES_KEY ks; - } ksenc; /* AES key schedule to use for encryption */ - union { - OSSL_UNION_ALIGN; - AES_KEY ks; - } ksdec; /* AES key schedule to use for decryption */ - int key_set; /* Set if key initialised */ - int iv_set; /* Set if an iv is set */ - OCB128_CONTEXT ocb; - unsigned char *iv; /* Temporary IV store */ - unsigned char tag[16]; - unsigned char data_buf[16]; /* Store partial data blocks */ - unsigned char aad_buf[16]; /* Store partial AAD blocks */ - int data_buf_len; - int aad_buf_len; - int ivlen; /* IV length */ - int taglen; -} EVP_AES_OCB_CTX; -#endif - -#define MAXBITCHUNK ((size_t)1 << (sizeof(size_t) * 8 - 4)) - -/* increment counter (64-bit int) by 1 */ -static void ctr64_inc(unsigned char *counter) -{ - int n = 8; - unsigned char c; - - do { - --n; - c = counter[n]; - ++c; - counter[n] = c; - if (c) - return; - } while (n); -} - -#if defined(AESNI_CAPABLE) -#if defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) -#define AES_GCM_ASM2(gctx) (gctx->gcm.block == (block128_f)aesni_encrypt && gctx->gcm.ghash == gcm_ghash_avx) -#undef AES_GCM_ASM2 /* minor size optimization */ -#endif - -static int aesni_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, - const unsigned char *iv, int enc) -{ - int ret, mode; - EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY, ctx); - const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8; - - if (keylen <= 0) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); - return 0; - } - mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_mode(ctx); - if ((mode == EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE || mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) - && !enc) { - ret = aesni_set_decrypt_key(key, keylen, &dat->ks.ks); - dat->block = (block128_f)aesni_decrypt; - dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ? (cbc128_f)aesni_cbc_encrypt : NULL; - } else { - ret = aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &dat->ks.ks); - dat->block = (block128_f)aesni_encrypt; - if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) - dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f)aesni_cbc_encrypt; - else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE) - dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f)aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks; - else - dat->stream.cbc = NULL; - } - - if (ret < 0) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_AES_KEY_SETUP_FAILED); - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - -static int aesni_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, size_t len) -{ - aesni_cbc_encrypt(in, out, len, &EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY, ctx)->ks.ks, - ctx->iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)); - - return 1; -} - -static int aesni_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, size_t len) -{ - size_t bl = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_block_size(ctx); - - if (len < bl) - return 1; - - aesni_ecb_encrypt(in, out, len, &EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY, ctx)->ks.ks, - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)); - - return 1; -} - -#define aesni_ofb_cipher aes_ofb_cipher -static int aesni_ofb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, size_t len); - -#define aesni_cfb_cipher aes_cfb_cipher -static int aesni_cfb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, size_t len); - -#define aesni_cfb8_cipher aes_cfb8_cipher -static int aesni_cfb8_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, size_t len); - -#define aesni_cfb1_cipher aes_cfb1_cipher -static int aesni_cfb1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, size_t len); - -#define aesni_ctr_cipher aes_ctr_cipher -static int aesni_ctr_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, size_t len); - -static int aesni_gcm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, - const unsigned char *iv, int enc) -{ - EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX, ctx); - - if (iv == NULL && key == NULL) - return 1; - - if (key) { - const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8; - - if (keylen <= 0) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); - return 0; - } - aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &gctx->ks.ks); - CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks, (block128_f)aesni_encrypt); - gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f)aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks; - /* - * If we have an iv can set it directly, otherwise use saved IV. - */ - if (iv == NULL && gctx->iv_set) - iv = gctx->iv; - if (iv) { - CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, iv, gctx->ivlen); - gctx->iv_set = 1; - } - gctx->key_set = 1; - } else { - /* If key set use IV, otherwise copy */ - if (gctx->key_set) - CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, iv, gctx->ivlen); - else - memcpy(gctx->iv, iv, gctx->ivlen); - gctx->iv_set = 1; - gctx->iv_gen = 0; - } - return 1; -} - -#define aesni_gcm_cipher aes_gcm_cipher -static int aesni_gcm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, size_t len); - -static int aesni_xts_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, - const unsigned char *iv, int enc) -{ - EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX, ctx); - - if (iv == NULL && key == NULL) - return 1; - - if (key) { - /* The key is two half length keys in reality */ - const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx); - const int bytes = keylen / 2; - const int bits = bytes * 8; - - if (keylen <= 0) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); - return 0; - } - /* - * Verify that the two keys are different. - * - * This addresses Rogaway's vulnerability. - * See comment in aes_xts_init_key() below. - */ - if ((!allow_insecure_decrypt || enc) - && CRYPTO_memcmp(key, key + bytes, bytes) == 0) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_XTS_DUPLICATED_KEYS); - return 0; - } - - /* key_len is two AES keys */ - if (enc) { - aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks); - xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f)aesni_encrypt; - xctx->stream = aesni_xts_encrypt; - } else { - aesni_set_decrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks); - xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f)aesni_decrypt; - xctx->stream = aesni_xts_decrypt; - } - - aesni_set_encrypt_key(key + bytes, bits, &xctx->ks2.ks); - xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f)aesni_encrypt; - - xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1; - } - - if (iv) { - xctx->xts.key2 = &xctx->ks2; - memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, 16); - } - - return 1; -} - -#define aesni_xts_cipher aes_xts_cipher -static int aesni_xts_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, size_t len); - -static int aesni_ccm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, - const unsigned char *iv, int enc) -{ - EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX, ctx); - - if (iv == NULL && key == NULL) - return 1; - - if (key != NULL) { - const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8; - - if (keylen <= 0) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); - return 0; - } - aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &cctx->ks.ks); - CRYPTO_ccm128_init(&cctx->ccm, cctx->M, cctx->L, - &cctx->ks, (block128_f)aesni_encrypt); - cctx->str = enc ? (ccm128_f)aesni_ccm64_encrypt_blocks : (ccm128_f)aesni_ccm64_decrypt_blocks; - cctx->key_set = 1; - } - if (iv) { - memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, 15 - cctx->L); - cctx->iv_set = 1; - } - return 1; -} - -#define aesni_ccm_cipher aes_ccm_cipher -static int aesni_ccm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, size_t len); - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB -static int aesni_ocb_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, - const unsigned char *iv, int enc) -{ - EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *octx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_OCB_CTX, ctx); - - if (iv == NULL && key == NULL) - return 1; - - if (key != NULL) { - const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8; - - if (keylen <= 0) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); - return 0; - } - do { - /* - * We set both the encrypt and decrypt key here because decrypt - * needs both. We could possibly optimise to remove setting the - * decrypt for an encryption operation. - */ - aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &octx->ksenc.ks); - aesni_set_decrypt_key(key, keylen, &octx->ksdec.ks); - if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_init(&octx->ocb, - &octx->ksenc.ks, &octx->ksdec.ks, - (block128_f)aesni_encrypt, - (block128_f)aesni_decrypt, - enc ? aesni_ocb_encrypt - : aesni_ocb_decrypt)) - return 0; - } while (0); - - /* - * If we have an iv we can set it directly, otherwise use saved IV. - */ - if (iv == NULL && octx->iv_set) - iv = octx->iv; - if (iv) { - if (CRYPTO_ocb128_setiv(&octx->ocb, iv, octx->ivlen, octx->taglen) - != 1) - return 0; - octx->iv_set = 1; - } - octx->key_set = 1; - } else { - /* If key set use IV, otherwise copy */ - if (octx->key_set) - CRYPTO_ocb128_setiv(&octx->ocb, iv, octx->ivlen, octx->taglen); - else - memcpy(octx->iv, iv, octx->ivlen); - octx->iv_set = 1; - } - return 1; -} - -#define aesni_ocb_cipher aes_ocb_cipher -static int aesni_ocb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, size_t len); -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_OCB */ - -#define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid, keylen, blocksize, ivlen, nmode, mode, MODE, flags) \ - static const EVP_CIPHER aesni_##keylen##_##mode = { \ - nid##_##keylen##_##nmode, blocksize, keylen / 8, ivlen, \ - flags | EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ - EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \ - aesni_init_key, \ - aesni_##mode##_cipher, \ - NULL, \ - sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY), \ - NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL \ - }; \ - static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \ - nid##_##keylen##_##nmode, blocksize, \ - keylen / 8, ivlen, \ - flags | EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ - EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \ - aes_init_key, \ - aes_##mode##_cipher, \ - NULL, \ - sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY), \ - NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL \ - }; \ - const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \ - { \ - return AESNI_CAPABLE ? &aesni_##keylen##_##mode : &aes_##keylen##_##mode; \ - } - -#define BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(nid, keylen, blocksize, ivlen, mode, MODE, flags) \ - static const EVP_CIPHER aesni_##keylen##_##mode = { \ - nid##_##keylen##_##mode, blocksize, \ - (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE == EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE || EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE == EVP_CIPH_SIV_MODE ? 2 : 1) * keylen / 8, \ - ivlen, \ - flags | EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ - EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \ - aesni_##mode##_init_key, \ - aesni_##mode##_cipher, \ - aes_##mode##_cleanup, \ - sizeof(EVP_AES_##MODE##_CTX), \ - NULL, NULL, aes_##mode##_ctrl, NULL \ - }; \ - static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \ - nid##_##keylen##_##mode, blocksize, \ - (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE == EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE || EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE == EVP_CIPH_SIV_MODE ? 2 : 1) * keylen / 8, \ - ivlen, \ - flags | EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ - EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \ - aes_##mode##_init_key, \ - aes_##mode##_cipher, \ - aes_##mode##_cleanup, \ - sizeof(EVP_AES_##MODE##_CTX), \ - NULL, NULL, aes_##mode##_ctrl, NULL \ - }; \ - const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \ - { \ - return AESNI_CAPABLE ? &aesni_##keylen##_##mode : &aes_##keylen##_##mode; \ - } - -#elif defined(SPARC_AES_CAPABLE) - -static int aes_t4_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, - const unsigned char *iv, int enc) -{ - int ret, mode, bits; - EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY, ctx); - - mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_mode(ctx); - bits = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8; - if (bits <= 0) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); - return 0; - } - if ((mode == EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE || mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) - && !enc) { - ret = 0; - aes_t4_set_decrypt_key(key, bits, &dat->ks.ks); - dat->block = (block128_f)aes_t4_decrypt; - switch (bits) { - case 128: - dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ? (cbc128_f)aes128_t4_cbc_decrypt : NULL; - break; - case 192: - dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ? (cbc128_f)aes192_t4_cbc_decrypt : NULL; - break; - case 256: - dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ? (cbc128_f)aes256_t4_cbc_decrypt : NULL; - break; - default: - ret = -1; - } - } else { - ret = 0; - aes_t4_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &dat->ks.ks); - dat->block = (block128_f)aes_t4_encrypt; - switch (bits) { - case 128: - if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) - dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f)aes128_t4_cbc_encrypt; - else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE) - dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f)aes128_t4_ctr32_encrypt; - else - dat->stream.cbc = NULL; - break; - case 192: - if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) - dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f)aes192_t4_cbc_encrypt; - else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE) - dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f)aes192_t4_ctr32_encrypt; - else - dat->stream.cbc = NULL; - break; - case 256: - if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) - dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f)aes256_t4_cbc_encrypt; - else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE) - dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f)aes256_t4_ctr32_encrypt; - else - dat->stream.cbc = NULL; - break; - default: - ret = -1; - } - } - - if (ret < 0) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_AES_KEY_SETUP_FAILED); - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - -#define aes_t4_cbc_cipher aes_cbc_cipher -static int aes_t4_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, size_t len); - -#define aes_t4_ecb_cipher aes_ecb_cipher -static int aes_t4_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, size_t len); - -#define aes_t4_ofb_cipher aes_ofb_cipher -static int aes_t4_ofb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, size_t len); - -#define aes_t4_cfb_cipher aes_cfb_cipher -static int aes_t4_cfb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, size_t len); - -#define aes_t4_cfb8_cipher aes_cfb8_cipher -static int aes_t4_cfb8_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, size_t len); - -#define aes_t4_cfb1_cipher aes_cfb1_cipher -static int aes_t4_cfb1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, size_t len); - -#define aes_t4_ctr_cipher aes_ctr_cipher -static int aes_t4_ctr_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, size_t len); - -static int aes_t4_gcm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, - const unsigned char *iv, int enc) -{ - EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX, ctx); - - if (iv == NULL && key == NULL) - return 1; - if (key) { - const int bits = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8; - - if (bits <= 0) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); - return 0; - } - aes_t4_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &gctx->ks.ks); - CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks, - (block128_f)aes_t4_encrypt); - switch (bits) { - case 128: - gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f)aes128_t4_ctr32_encrypt; - break; - case 192: - gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f)aes192_t4_ctr32_encrypt; - break; - case 256: - gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f)aes256_t4_ctr32_encrypt; - break; - default: - return 0; - } - /* - * If we have an iv can set it directly, otherwise use saved IV. - */ - if (iv == NULL && gctx->iv_set) - iv = gctx->iv; - if (iv) { - CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, iv, gctx->ivlen); - gctx->iv_set = 1; - } - gctx->key_set = 1; - } else { - /* If key set use IV, otherwise copy */ - if (gctx->key_set) - CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, iv, gctx->ivlen); - else - memcpy(gctx->iv, iv, gctx->ivlen); - gctx->iv_set = 1; - gctx->iv_gen = 0; - } - return 1; -} - -#define aes_t4_gcm_cipher aes_gcm_cipher -static int aes_t4_gcm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, size_t len); - -static int aes_t4_xts_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, - const unsigned char *iv, int enc) -{ - EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX, ctx); - - if (!iv && !key) - return 1; - - if (key) { - /* The key is two half length keys in reality */ - const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx); - const int bytes = keylen / 2; - const int bits = bytes * 8; - - if (keylen <= 0) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); - return 0; - } - /* - * Verify that the two keys are different. - * - * This addresses Rogaway's vulnerability. - * See comment in aes_xts_init_key() below. - */ - if ((!allow_insecure_decrypt || enc) - && CRYPTO_memcmp(key, key + bytes, bytes) == 0) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_XTS_DUPLICATED_KEYS); - return 0; - } - - xctx->stream = NULL; - /* key_len is two AES keys */ - if (enc) { - aes_t4_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks); - xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f)aes_t4_encrypt; - switch (bits) { - case 128: - xctx->stream = aes128_t4_xts_encrypt; - break; - case 256: - xctx->stream = aes256_t4_xts_encrypt; - break; - default: - return 0; - } - } else { - aes_t4_set_decrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks); - xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f)aes_t4_decrypt; - switch (bits) { - case 128: - xctx->stream = aes128_t4_xts_decrypt; - break; - case 256: - xctx->stream = aes256_t4_xts_decrypt; - break; - default: - return 0; - } - } - - aes_t4_set_encrypt_key(key + bytes, bits, &xctx->ks2.ks); - xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f)aes_t4_encrypt; - - xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1; - } - - if (iv) { - xctx->xts.key2 = &xctx->ks2; - memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, 16); - } - - return 1; -} - -#define aes_t4_xts_cipher aes_xts_cipher -static int aes_t4_xts_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, size_t len); - -static int aes_t4_ccm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, - const unsigned char *iv, int enc) -{ - EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX, ctx); - - if (iv == NULL && key == NULL) - return 1; - - if (key != NULL) { - const int bits = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8; - - if (bits <= 0) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); - return 0; - } - aes_t4_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &cctx->ks.ks); - CRYPTO_ccm128_init(&cctx->ccm, cctx->M, cctx->L, - &cctx->ks, (block128_f)aes_t4_encrypt); - cctx->str = NULL; - cctx->key_set = 1; - } - if (iv) { - memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, 15 - cctx->L); - cctx->iv_set = 1; - } - return 1; -} - -#define aes_t4_ccm_cipher aes_ccm_cipher -static int aes_t4_ccm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, size_t len); - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB -static int aes_t4_ocb_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, - const unsigned char *iv, int enc) -{ - EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *octx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_OCB_CTX, ctx); - - if (iv == NULL && key == NULL) - return 1; - - if (key != NULL) { - const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8; - - if (keylen <= 0) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); - return 0; - } - do { - /* - * We set both the encrypt and decrypt key here because decrypt - * needs both. We could possibly optimise to remove setting the - * decrypt for an encryption operation. - */ - aes_t4_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &octx->ksenc.ks); - aes_t4_set_decrypt_key(key, keylen, &octx->ksdec.ks); - if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_init(&octx->ocb, - &octx->ksenc.ks, &octx->ksdec.ks, - (block128_f)aes_t4_encrypt, - (block128_f)aes_t4_decrypt, - NULL)) - return 0; - } while (0); - - /* - * If we have an iv we can set it directly, otherwise use saved IV. - */ - if (iv == NULL && octx->iv_set) - iv = octx->iv; - if (iv) { - if (CRYPTO_ocb128_setiv(&octx->ocb, iv, octx->ivlen, octx->taglen) - != 1) - return 0; - octx->iv_set = 1; - } - octx->key_set = 1; - } else { - /* If key set use IV, otherwise copy */ - if (octx->key_set) - CRYPTO_ocb128_setiv(&octx->ocb, iv, octx->ivlen, octx->taglen); - else - memcpy(octx->iv, iv, octx->ivlen); - octx->iv_set = 1; - } - return 1; -} - -#define aes_t4_ocb_cipher aes_ocb_cipher -static int aes_t4_ocb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, size_t len); -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_OCB */ - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SIV -#define aes_t4_siv_init_key aes_siv_init_key -#define aes_t4_siv_cipher aes_siv_cipher -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SIV */ - -#define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid, keylen, blocksize, ivlen, nmode, mode, MODE, flags) \ - static const EVP_CIPHER aes_t4_##keylen##_##mode = { \ - nid##_##keylen##_##nmode, blocksize, keylen / 8, ivlen, \ - flags | EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ - EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \ - aes_t4_init_key, \ - aes_t4_##mode##_cipher, \ - NULL, \ - sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY), \ - NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL \ - }; \ - static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \ - nid##_##keylen##_##nmode, blocksize, \ - keylen / 8, ivlen, \ - flags | EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ - EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \ - aes_init_key, \ - aes_##mode##_cipher, \ - NULL, \ - sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY), \ - NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL \ - }; \ - const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \ - { \ - return SPARC_AES_CAPABLE ? &aes_t4_##keylen##_##mode : &aes_##keylen##_##mode; \ - } - -#define BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(nid, keylen, blocksize, ivlen, mode, MODE, flags) \ - static const EVP_CIPHER aes_t4_##keylen##_##mode = { \ - nid##_##keylen##_##mode, blocksize, \ - (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE == EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE || EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE == EVP_CIPH_SIV_MODE ? 2 : 1) * keylen / 8, \ - ivlen, \ - flags | EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ - EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \ - aes_t4_##mode##_init_key, \ - aes_t4_##mode##_cipher, \ - aes_##mode##_cleanup, \ - sizeof(EVP_AES_##MODE##_CTX), \ - NULL, NULL, aes_##mode##_ctrl, NULL \ - }; \ - static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \ - nid##_##keylen##_##mode, blocksize, \ - (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE == EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE || EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE == EVP_CIPH_SIV_MODE ? 2 : 1) * keylen / 8, \ - ivlen, \ - flags | EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ - EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \ - aes_##mode##_init_key, \ - aes_##mode##_cipher, \ - aes_##mode##_cleanup, \ - sizeof(EVP_AES_##MODE##_CTX), \ - NULL, NULL, aes_##mode##_ctrl, NULL \ - }; \ - const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \ - { \ - return SPARC_AES_CAPABLE ? &aes_t4_##keylen##_##mode : &aes_##keylen##_##mode; \ - } - -#elif defined(S390X_aes_128_CAPABLE) -/* IBM S390X support */ -typedef struct { - union { - OSSL_UNION_ALIGN; - /*- - * KM-AES parameter block - begin - * (see z/Architecture Principles of Operation >= SA22-7832-06) - */ - struct { - unsigned char k[32]; - } param; - /* KM-AES parameter block - end */ - } km; - unsigned int fc; -} S390X_AES_ECB_CTX; - -typedef struct { - union { - OSSL_UNION_ALIGN; - /*- - * KMO-AES parameter block - begin - * (see z/Architecture Principles of Operation >= SA22-7832-08) - */ - struct { - unsigned char cv[16]; - unsigned char k[32]; - } param; - /* KMO-AES parameter block - end */ - } kmo; - unsigned int fc; -} S390X_AES_OFB_CTX; - -typedef struct { - union { - OSSL_UNION_ALIGN; - /*- - * KMF-AES parameter block - begin - * (see z/Architecture Principles of Operation >= SA22-7832-08) - */ - struct { - unsigned char cv[16]; - unsigned char k[32]; - } param; - /* KMF-AES parameter block - end */ - } kmf; - unsigned int fc; -} S390X_AES_CFB_CTX; - -typedef struct { - union { - OSSL_UNION_ALIGN; - /*- - * KMA-GCM-AES parameter block - begin - * (see z/Architecture Principles of Operation >= SA22-7832-11) - */ - struct { - unsigned char reserved[12]; - union { - unsigned int w; - unsigned char b[4]; - } cv; - union { - unsigned long long g[2]; - unsigned char b[16]; - } t; - unsigned char h[16]; - unsigned long long taadl; - unsigned long long tpcl; - union { - unsigned long long g[2]; - unsigned int w[4]; - } j0; - unsigned char k[32]; - } param; - /* KMA-GCM-AES parameter block - end */ - } kma; - unsigned int fc; - int key_set; - - unsigned char *iv; - int ivlen; - int iv_set; - int iv_gen; - - int taglen; - - unsigned char ares[16]; - unsigned char mres[16]; - unsigned char kres[16]; - int areslen; - int mreslen; - int kreslen; - - int tls_aad_len; - uint64_t tls_enc_records; /* Number of TLS records encrypted */ -} S390X_AES_GCM_CTX; - -typedef struct { - union { - OSSL_UNION_ALIGN; - /*- - * Padding is chosen so that ccm.kmac_param.k overlaps with key.k and - * ccm.fc with key.k.rounds. Remember that on s390x, an AES_KEY's - * rounds field is used to store the function code and that the key - * schedule is not stored (if aes hardware support is detected). - */ - struct { - unsigned char pad[16]; - AES_KEY k; - } key; - - struct { - /*- - * KMAC-AES parameter block - begin - * (see z/Architecture Principles of Operation >= SA22-7832-08) - */ - struct { - union { - unsigned long long g[2]; - unsigned char b[16]; - } icv; - unsigned char k[32]; - } kmac_param; - /* KMAC-AES parameter block - end */ - - union { - unsigned long long g[2]; - unsigned char b[16]; - } nonce; - union { - unsigned long long g[2]; - unsigned char b[16]; - } buf; - - unsigned long long blocks; - int l; - int m; - int tls_aad_len; - int iv_set; - int tag_set; - int len_set; - int key_set; - - unsigned char pad[140]; - unsigned int fc; - } ccm; - } aes; -} S390X_AES_CCM_CTX; - -#define s390x_aes_init_key aes_init_key -static int s390x_aes_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, - const unsigned char *iv, int enc); - -#define S390X_AES_CBC_CTX EVP_AES_KEY - -#define s390x_aes_cbc_init_key aes_init_key - -#define s390x_aes_cbc_cipher aes_cbc_cipher -static int s390x_aes_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, size_t len); - -static int s390x_aes_ecb_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, - const unsigned char *key, - const unsigned char *iv, int enc) -{ - S390X_AES_ECB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_ECB_CTX, ctx); - const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx); - - if (keylen <= 0) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); - return 0; - } - cctx->fc = S390X_AES_FC(keylen); - if (!enc) - cctx->fc |= S390X_DECRYPT; - - memcpy(cctx->km.param.k, key, keylen); - return 1; -} - -static int s390x_aes_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, size_t len) -{ - S390X_AES_ECB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_ECB_CTX, ctx); - - s390x_km(in, len, out, cctx->fc, &cctx->km.param); - return 1; -} - -static int s390x_aes_ofb_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, - const unsigned char *key, - const unsigned char *ivec, int enc) -{ - S390X_AES_OFB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_OFB_CTX, ctx); - const unsigned char *iv = ctx->oiv; - const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx); - const int ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx); - - if (keylen <= 0) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); - return 0; - } - if (ivlen <= 0) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_IV_LENGTH); - return 0; - } - memcpy(cctx->kmo.param.cv, iv, ivlen); - memcpy(cctx->kmo.param.k, key, keylen); - cctx->fc = S390X_AES_FC(keylen); - return 1; -} - -static int s390x_aes_ofb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, size_t len) -{ - S390X_AES_OFB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_OFB_CTX, ctx); - const int ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx); - unsigned char *iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx); - int n = ctx->num; - int rem; - - memcpy(cctx->kmo.param.cv, iv, ivlen); - while (n && len) { - *out = *in ^ cctx->kmo.param.cv[n]; - n = (n + 1) & 0xf; - --len; - ++in; - ++out; - } - - rem = len & 0xf; - - len &= ~(size_t)0xf; - if (len) { - s390x_kmo(in, len, out, cctx->fc, &cctx->kmo.param); - - out += len; - in += len; - } - - if (rem) { - s390x_km(cctx->kmo.param.cv, 16, cctx->kmo.param.cv, cctx->fc, - cctx->kmo.param.k); - - while (rem--) { - out[n] = in[n] ^ cctx->kmo.param.cv[n]; - ++n; - } - } - - memcpy(iv, cctx->kmo.param.cv, ivlen); - ctx->num = n; - return 1; -} - -static int s390x_aes_cfb_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, - const unsigned char *key, - const unsigned char *ivec, int enc) -{ - S390X_AES_CFB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CFB_CTX, ctx); - const unsigned char *iv = ctx->oiv; - const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx); - const int ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx); - - if (keylen <= 0) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); - return 0; - } - if (ivlen <= 0) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_IV_LENGTH); - return 0; - } - cctx->fc = S390X_AES_FC(keylen); - cctx->fc |= 16 << 24; /* 16 bytes cipher feedback */ - if (!enc) - cctx->fc |= S390X_DECRYPT; - - memcpy(cctx->kmf.param.cv, iv, ivlen); - memcpy(cctx->kmf.param.k, key, keylen); - return 1; -} - -static int s390x_aes_cfb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, size_t len) -{ - S390X_AES_CFB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CFB_CTX, ctx); - const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx); - const int enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx); - const int ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx); - unsigned char *iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx); - int n = ctx->num; - int rem; - unsigned char tmp; - - if (keylen <= 0) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); - return 0; - } - if (ivlen <= 0) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_IV_LENGTH); - return 0; - } - memcpy(cctx->kmf.param.cv, iv, ivlen); - while (n && len) { - tmp = *in; - *out = cctx->kmf.param.cv[n] ^ tmp; - cctx->kmf.param.cv[n] = enc ? *out : tmp; - n = (n + 1) & 0xf; - --len; - ++in; - ++out; - } - - rem = len & 0xf; - - len &= ~(size_t)0xf; - if (len) { - s390x_kmf(in, len, out, cctx->fc, &cctx->kmf.param); - - out += len; - in += len; - } - - if (rem) { - s390x_km(cctx->kmf.param.cv, 16, cctx->kmf.param.cv, - S390X_AES_FC(keylen), cctx->kmf.param.k); - - while (rem--) { - tmp = in[n]; - out[n] = cctx->kmf.param.cv[n] ^ tmp; - cctx->kmf.param.cv[n] = enc ? out[n] : tmp; - ++n; - } - } - - memcpy(iv, cctx->kmf.param.cv, ivlen); - ctx->num = n; - return 1; -} - -static int s390x_aes_cfb8_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, - const unsigned char *key, - const unsigned char *ivec, int enc) -{ - S390X_AES_CFB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CFB_CTX, ctx); - const unsigned char *iv = ctx->oiv; - const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx); - const int ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx); - - if (keylen <= 0) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); - return 0; - } - if (ivlen <= 0) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_IV_LENGTH); - return 0; - } - cctx->fc = S390X_AES_FC(keylen); - cctx->fc |= 1 << 24; /* 1 byte cipher feedback */ - if (!enc) - cctx->fc |= S390X_DECRYPT; - - memcpy(cctx->kmf.param.cv, iv, ivlen); - memcpy(cctx->kmf.param.k, key, keylen); - return 1; -} - -static int s390x_aes_cfb8_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, size_t len) -{ - S390X_AES_CFB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CFB_CTX, ctx); - const int ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx); - unsigned char *iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx); - - memcpy(cctx->kmf.param.cv, iv, ivlen); - s390x_kmf(in, len, out, cctx->fc, &cctx->kmf.param); - memcpy(iv, cctx->kmf.param.cv, ivlen); - return 1; -} - -#define s390x_aes_cfb1_init_key aes_init_key - -#define s390x_aes_cfb1_cipher aes_cfb1_cipher -static int s390x_aes_cfb1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, size_t len); - -#define S390X_AES_CTR_CTX EVP_AES_KEY - -#define s390x_aes_ctr_init_key aes_init_key - -#define s390x_aes_ctr_cipher aes_ctr_cipher -static int s390x_aes_ctr_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, size_t len); - -/* iv + padding length for iv lengths != 12 */ -#define S390X_gcm_ivpadlen(i) ((((i) + 15) >> 4 << 4) + 16) - -/*- - * Process additional authenticated data. Returns 0 on success. Code is - * big-endian. - */ -static int s390x_aes_gcm_aad(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *aad, - size_t len) -{ - unsigned long long alen; - int n, rem; - - if (ctx->kma.param.tpcl) - return -2; - - alen = ctx->kma.param.taadl + len; - if (alen > (U64(1) << 61) || (sizeof(len) == 8 && alen < len)) - return -1; - ctx->kma.param.taadl = alen; - - n = ctx->areslen; - if (n) { - while (n && len) { - ctx->ares[n] = *aad; - n = (n + 1) & 0xf; - ++aad; - --len; - } - /* ctx->ares contains a complete block if offset has wrapped around */ - if (!n) { - s390x_kma(ctx->ares, 16, NULL, 0, NULL, ctx->fc, &ctx->kma.param); - ctx->fc |= S390X_KMA_HS; - } - ctx->areslen = n; - } - - rem = len & 0xf; - - len &= ~(size_t)0xf; - if (len) { - s390x_kma(aad, len, NULL, 0, NULL, ctx->fc, &ctx->kma.param); - aad += len; - ctx->fc |= S390X_KMA_HS; - } - - if (rem) { - ctx->areslen = rem; - - do { - --rem; - ctx->ares[rem] = aad[rem]; - } while (rem); - } - return 0; -} - -/*- - * En/de-crypt plain/cipher-text and authenticate ciphertext. Returns 0 for - * success. Code is big-endian. - */ -static int s390x_aes_gcm(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *in, - unsigned char *out, size_t len) -{ - const unsigned char *inptr; - unsigned long long mlen; - union { - unsigned int w[4]; - unsigned char b[16]; - } buf; - size_t inlen; - int n, rem, i; - - mlen = ctx->kma.param.tpcl + len; - if (mlen > ((U64(1) << 36) - 32) || (sizeof(len) == 8 && mlen < len)) - return -1; - ctx->kma.param.tpcl = mlen; - - n = ctx->mreslen; - if (n) { - inptr = in; - inlen = len; - while (n && inlen) { - ctx->mres[n] = *inptr; - n = (n + 1) & 0xf; - ++inptr; - --inlen; - } - /* ctx->mres contains a complete block if offset has wrapped around */ - if (!n) { - s390x_kma(ctx->ares, ctx->areslen, ctx->mres, 16, buf.b, - ctx->fc | S390X_KMA_LAAD, &ctx->kma.param); - ctx->fc |= S390X_KMA_HS; - ctx->areslen = 0; - - /* previous call already encrypted/decrypted its remainder, - * see comment below */ - n = ctx->mreslen; - while (n) { - *out = buf.b[n]; - n = (n + 1) & 0xf; - ++out; - ++in; - --len; - } - ctx->mreslen = 0; - } - } - - rem = len & 0xf; - - len &= ~(size_t)0xf; - if (len) { - s390x_kma(ctx->ares, ctx->areslen, in, len, out, - ctx->fc | S390X_KMA_LAAD, &ctx->kma.param); - in += len; - out += len; - ctx->fc |= S390X_KMA_HS; - ctx->areslen = 0; - } - - /*- - * If there is a remainder, it has to be saved such that it can be - * processed by kma later. However, we also have to do the for-now - * unauthenticated encryption/decryption part here and now... - */ - if (rem) { - if (!ctx->mreslen) { - buf.w[0] = ctx->kma.param.j0.w[0]; - buf.w[1] = ctx->kma.param.j0.w[1]; - buf.w[2] = ctx->kma.param.j0.w[2]; - buf.w[3] = ctx->kma.param.cv.w + 1; - s390x_km(buf.b, 16, ctx->kres, ctx->fc & 0x1f, &ctx->kma.param.k); - } - - n = ctx->mreslen; - for (i = 0; i < rem; i++) { - ctx->mres[n + i] = in[i]; - out[i] = in[i] ^ ctx->kres[n + i]; - } - - ctx->mreslen += rem; - } - return 0; -} - -/*- - * Initialize context structure. Code is big-endian. - */ -static void s390x_aes_gcm_setiv(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *ctx, - const unsigned char *iv) -{ - ctx->kma.param.t.g[0] = 0; - ctx->kma.param.t.g[1] = 0; - ctx->kma.param.tpcl = 0; - ctx->kma.param.taadl = 0; - ctx->mreslen = 0; - ctx->areslen = 0; - ctx->kreslen = 0; - - if (ctx->ivlen == 12) { - memcpy(&ctx->kma.param.j0, iv, ctx->ivlen); - ctx->kma.param.j0.w[3] = 1; - ctx->kma.param.cv.w = 1; - } else { - /* ctx->iv has the right size and is already padded. */ - memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, ctx->ivlen); - s390x_kma(ctx->iv, S390X_gcm_ivpadlen(ctx->ivlen), NULL, 0, NULL, - ctx->fc, &ctx->kma.param); - ctx->fc |= S390X_KMA_HS; - - ctx->kma.param.j0.g[0] = ctx->kma.param.t.g[0]; - ctx->kma.param.j0.g[1] = ctx->kma.param.t.g[1]; - ctx->kma.param.cv.w = ctx->kma.param.j0.w[3]; - ctx->kma.param.t.g[0] = 0; - ctx->kma.param.t.g[1] = 0; - } -} - -/*- - * Performs various operations on the context structure depending on control - * type. Returns 1 for success, 0 for failure and -1 for unknown control type. - * Code is big-endian. - */ -static int s390x_aes_gcm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr) -{ - S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX, c); - S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx_out; - EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out; - unsigned char *buf; - int ivlen, enc, len; - - switch (type) { - case EVP_CTRL_INIT: - ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(c->cipher); - gctx->key_set = 0; - gctx->iv_set = 0; - gctx->ivlen = ivlen; - gctx->iv = c->iv; - gctx->taglen = -1; - gctx->iv_gen = 0; - gctx->tls_aad_len = -1; - return 1; - - case EVP_CTRL_GET_IVLEN: - *(int *)ptr = gctx->ivlen; - return 1; - - case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN: - if (arg <= 0) - return 0; - - if (arg != 12) { - len = S390X_gcm_ivpadlen(arg); - - /* Allocate memory for iv if needed. */ - if (gctx->ivlen == 12 || len > S390X_gcm_ivpadlen(gctx->ivlen)) { - if (gctx->iv != c->iv) - OPENSSL_free(gctx->iv); - - if ((gctx->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) - return 0; - } - /* Add padding. */ - memset(gctx->iv + arg, 0, len - arg - 8); - *((unsigned long long *)(gctx->iv + len - 8)) = arg << 3; - } - gctx->ivlen = arg; - return 1; - - case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG: - buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c); - enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(c); - if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || enc) - return 0; - - memcpy(buf, ptr, arg); - gctx->taglen = arg; - return 1; - - case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG: - enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(c); - if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || !enc || gctx->taglen < 0) - return 0; - - memcpy(ptr, gctx->kma.param.t.b, arg); - return 1; - - case EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED: - /* Special case: -1 length restores whole iv */ - if (arg == -1) { - memcpy(gctx->iv, ptr, gctx->ivlen); - gctx->iv_gen = 1; - return 1; - } - /* - * Fixed field must be at least 4 bytes and invocation field at least - * 8. - */ - if ((arg < 4) || (gctx->ivlen - arg) < 8) - return 0; - - if (arg) - memcpy(gctx->iv, ptr, arg); - - enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(c); - if (enc && RAND_bytes(gctx->iv + arg, gctx->ivlen - arg) <= 0) - return 0; - - gctx->iv_gen = 1; - return 1; - - case EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN: - if (gctx->iv_gen == 0 || gctx->key_set == 0) - return 0; - - s390x_aes_gcm_setiv(gctx, gctx->iv); - - if (arg <= 0 || arg > gctx->ivlen) - arg = gctx->ivlen; - - memcpy(ptr, gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - arg, arg); - /* - * Invocation field will be at least 8 bytes in size and so no need - * to check wrap around or increment more than last 8 bytes. - */ - ctr64_inc(gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - 8); - gctx->iv_set = 1; - return 1; - - case EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV: - enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(c); - if (gctx->iv_gen == 0 || gctx->key_set == 0 || enc) - return 0; - - memcpy(gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - arg, ptr, arg); - s390x_aes_gcm_setiv(gctx, gctx->iv); - gctx->iv_set = 1; - return 1; - - case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD: - /* Save the aad for later use. */ - if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN) - return 0; - - buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c); - memcpy(buf, ptr, arg); - gctx->tls_aad_len = arg; - gctx->tls_enc_records = 0; - - len = buf[arg - 2] << 8 | buf[arg - 1]; - /* Correct length for explicit iv. */ - if (len < EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN) - return 0; - len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; - - /* If decrypting correct for tag too. */ - enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(c); - if (!enc) { - if (len < EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN) - return 0; - len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; - } - buf[arg - 2] = len >> 8; - buf[arg - 1] = len & 0xff; - /* Extra padding: tag appended to record. */ - return EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; - - case EVP_CTRL_COPY: - out = ptr; - gctx_out = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX, out); - - if (gctx->iv == c->iv) { - gctx_out->iv = out->iv; - } else { - len = S390X_gcm_ivpadlen(gctx->ivlen); - - if ((gctx_out->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) - return 0; - - memcpy(gctx_out->iv, gctx->iv, len); - } - return 1; - - default: - return -1; - } -} - -/*- - * Set key and/or iv. Returns 1 on success. Otherwise 0 is returned. - */ -static int s390x_aes_gcm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, - const unsigned char *key, - const unsigned char *iv, int enc) -{ - S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX, ctx); - int keylen; - - if (iv == NULL && key == NULL) - return 1; - - if (key != NULL) { - keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx); - if (keylen <= 0) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); - return 0; - } - - memcpy(&gctx->kma.param.k, key, keylen); - - gctx->fc = S390X_AES_FC(keylen); - if (!enc) - gctx->fc |= S390X_DECRYPT; - - if (iv == NULL && gctx->iv_set) - iv = gctx->iv; - - if (iv != NULL) { - s390x_aes_gcm_setiv(gctx, iv); - gctx->iv_set = 1; - } - gctx->key_set = 1; - } else { - if (gctx->key_set) - s390x_aes_gcm_setiv(gctx, iv); - else - memcpy(gctx->iv, iv, gctx->ivlen); - - gctx->iv_set = 1; - gctx->iv_gen = 0; - } - return 1; -} - -/*- - * En/de-crypt and authenticate TLS packet. Returns the number of bytes written - * if successful. Otherwise -1 is returned. Code is big-endian. - */ -static int s390x_aes_gcm_tls_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, size_t len) -{ - S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX, ctx); - const unsigned char *buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx); - const int enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx); - int rv = -1; - - if (out != in || len < (EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN)) - return -1; - - /* - * Check for too many keys as per FIPS 140-2 IG A.5 "Key/IV Pair Uniqueness - * Requirements from SP 800-38D". The requirements is for one party to the - * communication to fail after 2^64 - 1 keys. We do this on the encrypting - * side only. - */ - if (enc && ++gctx->tls_enc_records == 0) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_TOO_MANY_RECORDS); - goto err; - } - - if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, enc ? EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN : EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV, - EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN, out) - <= 0) - goto err; - - in += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; - out += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; - len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; - - gctx->kma.param.taadl = gctx->tls_aad_len << 3; - gctx->kma.param.tpcl = len << 3; - s390x_kma(buf, gctx->tls_aad_len, in, len, out, - gctx->fc | S390X_KMA_LAAD | S390X_KMA_LPC, &gctx->kma.param); - - if (enc) { - memcpy(out + len, gctx->kma.param.t.b, EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN); - rv = len + EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; - } else { - if (CRYPTO_memcmp(gctx->kma.param.t.b, in + len, - EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN)) { - OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len); - goto err; - } - rv = len; - } -err: - gctx->iv_set = 0; - gctx->tls_aad_len = -1; - return rv; -} - -/*- - * Called from EVP layer to initialize context, process additional - * authenticated data, en/de-crypt plain/cipher-text and authenticate - * ciphertext or process a TLS packet, depending on context. Returns bytes - * written on success. Otherwise -1 is returned. Code is big-endian. - */ -static int s390x_aes_gcm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, size_t len) -{ - S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX, ctx); - unsigned char *buf, tmp[16]; - int enc; - - if (!gctx->key_set) - return -1; - - if (gctx->tls_aad_len >= 0) - return s390x_aes_gcm_tls_cipher(ctx, out, in, len); - - if (!gctx->iv_set) - return -1; - - if (in != NULL) { - if (out == NULL) { - if (s390x_aes_gcm_aad(gctx, in, len)) - return -1; - } else { - if (s390x_aes_gcm(gctx, in, out, len)) - return -1; - } - return len; - } else { - gctx->kma.param.taadl <<= 3; - gctx->kma.param.tpcl <<= 3; - s390x_kma(gctx->ares, gctx->areslen, gctx->mres, gctx->mreslen, tmp, - gctx->fc | S390X_KMA_LAAD | S390X_KMA_LPC, &gctx->kma.param); - /* recall that we already did en-/decrypt gctx->mres - * and returned it to caller... */ - OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp, gctx->mreslen); - gctx->iv_set = 0; - - enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx); - if (enc) { - gctx->taglen = 16; - } else { - if (gctx->taglen < 0) - return -1; - - buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx); - if (CRYPTO_memcmp(buf, gctx->kma.param.t.b, gctx->taglen)) - return -1; - } - return 0; - } -} - -static int s390x_aes_gcm_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c) -{ - S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX, c); - - if (gctx == NULL) - return 0; - - if (gctx->iv != c->iv) - OPENSSL_free(gctx->iv); - - OPENSSL_cleanse(gctx, sizeof(*gctx)); - return 1; -} - -#define S390X_AES_XTS_CTX EVP_AES_XTS_CTX - -#define s390x_aes_xts_init_key aes_xts_init_key -static int s390x_aes_xts_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, - const unsigned char *key, - const unsigned char *iv, int enc); -#define s390x_aes_xts_cipher aes_xts_cipher -static int s390x_aes_xts_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, size_t len); -#define s390x_aes_xts_ctrl aes_xts_ctrl -static int s390x_aes_xts_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int type, int arg, void *ptr); -#define s390x_aes_xts_cleanup aes_xts_cleanup - -/*- - * Set nonce and length fields. Code is big-endian. - */ -static inline void s390x_aes_ccm_setiv(S390X_AES_CCM_CTX *ctx, - const unsigned char *nonce, - size_t mlen) -{ - ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[0] &= ~S390X_CCM_AAD_FLAG; - ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.g[1] = mlen; - memcpy(ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b + 1, nonce, 15 - ctx->aes.ccm.l); -} - -/*- - * Process additional authenticated data. Code is big-endian. - */ -static void s390x_aes_ccm_aad(S390X_AES_CCM_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *aad, - size_t alen) -{ - unsigned char *ptr; - int i, rem; - - if (!alen) - return; - - ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[0] |= S390X_CCM_AAD_FLAG; - - /* Suppress 'type-punned pointer dereference' warning. */ - ptr = ctx->aes.ccm.buf.b; - - if (alen < ((1 << 16) - (1 << 8))) { - *(uint16_t *)ptr = alen; - i = 2; - } else if (sizeof(alen) == 8 - && alen >= (size_t)1 << (32 % (sizeof(alen) * 8))) { - *(uint16_t *)ptr = 0xffff; - *(uint64_t *)(ptr + 2) = alen; - i = 10; - } else { - *(uint16_t *)ptr = 0xfffe; - *(uint32_t *)(ptr + 2) = alen; - i = 6; - } - - while (i < 16 && alen) { - ctx->aes.ccm.buf.b[i] = *aad; - ++aad; - --alen; - ++i; - } - while (i < 16) { - ctx->aes.ccm.buf.b[i] = 0; - ++i; - } - - ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.g[0] = 0; - ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.g[1] = 0; - s390x_kmac(ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b, 32, ctx->aes.ccm.fc, - &ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param); - ctx->aes.ccm.blocks += 2; - - rem = alen & 0xf; - alen &= ~(size_t)0xf; - if (alen) { - s390x_kmac(aad, alen, ctx->aes.ccm.fc, &ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param); - ctx->aes.ccm.blocks += alen >> 4; - aad += alen; - } - if (rem) { - for (i = 0; i < rem; i++) - ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b[i] ^= aad[i]; - - s390x_km(ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, 16, - ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, ctx->aes.ccm.fc, - ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.k); - ctx->aes.ccm.blocks++; - } -} - -/*- - * En/de-crypt plain/cipher-text. Compute tag from plaintext. Returns 0 for - * success. - */ -static int s390x_aes_ccm(S390X_AES_CCM_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *in, - unsigned char *out, size_t len, int enc) -{ - size_t n, rem; - unsigned int i, l, num; - unsigned char flags; - - flags = ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[0]; - if (!(flags & S390X_CCM_AAD_FLAG)) { - s390x_km(ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b, 16, ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, - ctx->aes.ccm.fc, ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.k); - ctx->aes.ccm.blocks++; - } - l = flags & 0x7; - ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[0] = l; - - /*- - * Reconstruct length from encoded length field - * and initialize it with counter value. - */ - n = 0; - for (i = 15 - l; i < 15; i++) { - n |= ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[i]; - ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[i] = 0; - n <<= 8; - } - n |= ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[15]; - ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[15] = 1; - - if (n != len) - return -1; /* length mismatch */ - - if (enc) { - /* Two operations per block plus one for tag encryption */ - ctx->aes.ccm.blocks += (((len + 15) >> 4) << 1) + 1; - if (ctx->aes.ccm.blocks > (1ULL << 61)) - return -2; /* too much data */ - } - - num = 0; - rem = len & 0xf; - len &= ~(size_t)0xf; - - if (enc) { - /* mac-then-encrypt */ - if (len) - s390x_kmac(in, len, ctx->aes.ccm.fc, &ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param); - if (rem) { - for (i = 0; i < rem; i++) - ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b[i] ^= in[len + i]; - - s390x_km(ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, 16, - ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, ctx->aes.ccm.fc, - ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.k); - } - - CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt_ctr32(in, out, len + rem, &ctx->aes.key.k, - ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b, ctx->aes.ccm.buf.b, - &num, (ctr128_f)AES_ctr32_encrypt); - } else { - /* decrypt-then-mac */ - CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt_ctr32(in, out, len + rem, &ctx->aes.key.k, - ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b, ctx->aes.ccm.buf.b, - &num, (ctr128_f)AES_ctr32_encrypt); - - if (len) - s390x_kmac(out, len, ctx->aes.ccm.fc, &ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param); - if (rem) { - for (i = 0; i < rem; i++) - ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b[i] ^= out[len + i]; - - s390x_km(ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, 16, - ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, ctx->aes.ccm.fc, - ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.k); - } - } - /* encrypt tag */ - for (i = 15 - l; i < 16; i++) - ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[i] = 0; - - s390x_km(ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b, 16, ctx->aes.ccm.buf.b, ctx->aes.ccm.fc, - ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.k); - ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.g[0] ^= ctx->aes.ccm.buf.g[0]; - ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.g[1] ^= ctx->aes.ccm.buf.g[1]; - - ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[0] = flags; /* restore flags field */ - return 0; -} - -/*- - * En/de-crypt and authenticate TLS packet. Returns the number of bytes written - * if successful. Otherwise -1 is returned. - */ -static int s390x_aes_ccm_tls_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, size_t len) -{ - S390X_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CCM_CTX, ctx); - unsigned char *ivec = ctx->iv; - unsigned char *buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx); - const int enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx); - - if (out != in - || len < (EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + (size_t)cctx->aes.ccm.m)) - return -1; - - if (enc) { - /* Set explicit iv (sequence number). */ - memcpy(out, buf, EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN); - } - - len -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + cctx->aes.ccm.m; - /*- - * Get explicit iv (sequence number). We already have fixed iv - * (server/client_write_iv) here. - */ - memcpy(ivec + EVP_CCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN, in, EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN); - s390x_aes_ccm_setiv(cctx, ivec, len); - - /* Process aad (sequence number|type|version|length) */ - s390x_aes_ccm_aad(cctx, buf, cctx->aes.ccm.tls_aad_len); - - in += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; - out += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; - - if (enc) { - if (s390x_aes_ccm(cctx, in, out, len, enc)) - return -1; - - memcpy(out + len, cctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, cctx->aes.ccm.m); - return len + EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + cctx->aes.ccm.m; - } else { - if (!s390x_aes_ccm(cctx, in, out, len, enc)) { - if (!CRYPTO_memcmp(cctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, in + len, - cctx->aes.ccm.m)) - return len; - } - - OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len); - return -1; - } -} - -/*- - * Set key and flag field and/or iv. Returns 1 if successful. Otherwise 0 is - * returned. - */ -static int s390x_aes_ccm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, - const unsigned char *key, - const unsigned char *iv, int enc) -{ - S390X_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CCM_CTX, ctx); - int keylen; - - if (iv == NULL && key == NULL) - return 1; - - if (key != NULL) { - keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx); - if (keylen <= 0) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); - return 0; - } - - cctx->aes.ccm.fc = S390X_AES_FC(keylen); - memcpy(cctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.k, key, keylen); - - /* Store encoded m and l. */ - cctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[0] = ((cctx->aes.ccm.l - 1) & 0x7) - | (((cctx->aes.ccm.m - 2) >> 1) & 0x7) << 3; - memset(cctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b + 1, 0, - sizeof(cctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b)); - cctx->aes.ccm.blocks = 0; - - cctx->aes.ccm.key_set = 1; - } - - if (iv != NULL) { - memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, 15 - cctx->aes.ccm.l); - - cctx->aes.ccm.iv_set = 1; - } - - return 1; -} - -/*- - * Called from EVP layer to initialize context, process additional - * authenticated data, en/de-crypt plain/cipher-text and authenticate - * plaintext or process a TLS packet, depending on context. Returns bytes - * written on success. Otherwise -1 is returned. - */ -static int s390x_aes_ccm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, size_t len) -{ - S390X_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CCM_CTX, ctx); - const int enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx); - int rv; - unsigned char *buf; - - if (!cctx->aes.ccm.key_set) - return -1; - - if (cctx->aes.ccm.tls_aad_len >= 0) - return s390x_aes_ccm_tls_cipher(ctx, out, in, len); - - /*- - * Final(): Does not return any data. Recall that ccm is mac-then-encrypt - * so integrity must be checked already at Update() i.e., before - * potentially corrupted data is output. - */ - if (in == NULL && out != NULL) - return 0; - - if (!cctx->aes.ccm.iv_set) - return -1; - - if (out == NULL) { - /* Update(): Pass message length. */ - if (in == NULL) { - s390x_aes_ccm_setiv(cctx, ctx->iv, len); - - cctx->aes.ccm.len_set = 1; - return len; - } - - /* Update(): Process aad. */ - if (!cctx->aes.ccm.len_set && len) - return -1; - - s390x_aes_ccm_aad(cctx, in, len); - return len; - } - - /* The tag must be set before actually decrypting data */ - if (!enc && !cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set) - return -1; - - /* Update(): Process message. */ - - if (!cctx->aes.ccm.len_set) { - /*- - * In case message length was not previously set explicitly via - * Update(), set it now. - */ - s390x_aes_ccm_setiv(cctx, ctx->iv, len); - - cctx->aes.ccm.len_set = 1; - } - - if (enc) { - if (s390x_aes_ccm(cctx, in, out, len, enc)) - return -1; - - cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set = 1; - return len; - } else { - rv = -1; - - if (!s390x_aes_ccm(cctx, in, out, len, enc)) { - buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx); - if (!CRYPTO_memcmp(cctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, buf, - cctx->aes.ccm.m)) - rv = len; - } - - if (rv == -1) - OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len); - - cctx->aes.ccm.iv_set = 0; - cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set = 0; - cctx->aes.ccm.len_set = 0; - return rv; - } -} - -/*- - * Performs various operations on the context structure depending on control - * type. Returns 1 for success, 0 for failure and -1 for unknown control type. - * Code is big-endian. - */ -static int s390x_aes_ccm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr) -{ - S390X_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CCM_CTX, c); - unsigned char *buf; - int enc, len; - - switch (type) { - case EVP_CTRL_INIT: - cctx->aes.ccm.key_set = 0; - cctx->aes.ccm.iv_set = 0; - cctx->aes.ccm.l = 8; - cctx->aes.ccm.m = 12; - cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set = 0; - cctx->aes.ccm.len_set = 0; - cctx->aes.ccm.tls_aad_len = -1; - return 1; - - case EVP_CTRL_GET_IVLEN: - *(int *)ptr = 15 - cctx->aes.ccm.l; - return 1; - - case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD: - if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN) - return 0; - - /* Save the aad for later use. */ - buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c); - memcpy(buf, ptr, arg); - cctx->aes.ccm.tls_aad_len = arg; - - len = buf[arg - 2] << 8 | buf[arg - 1]; - if (len < EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN) - return 0; - - /* Correct length for explicit iv. */ - len -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; - - enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(c); - if (!enc) { - if (len < cctx->aes.ccm.m) - return 0; - - /* Correct length for tag. */ - len -= cctx->aes.ccm.m; - } - - buf[arg - 2] = len >> 8; - buf[arg - 1] = len & 0xff; - - /* Extra padding: tag appended to record. */ - return cctx->aes.ccm.m; - - case EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_IV_FIXED: - if (arg != EVP_CCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN) - return 0; - - /* Copy to first part of the iv. */ - memcpy(c->iv, ptr, arg); - return 1; - - case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN: - arg = 15 - arg; - /* fall-through */ - - case EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_L: - if (arg < 2 || arg > 8) - return 0; - - cctx->aes.ccm.l = arg; - return 1; - - case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG: - if ((arg & 1) || arg < 4 || arg > 16) - return 0; - - enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(c); - if (enc && ptr) - return 0; - - if (ptr) { - cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set = 1; - buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c); - memcpy(buf, ptr, arg); - } - - cctx->aes.ccm.m = arg; - return 1; - - case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG: - enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(c); - if (!enc || !cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set) - return 0; - - if (arg < cctx->aes.ccm.m) - return 0; - - memcpy(ptr, cctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, cctx->aes.ccm.m); - cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set = 0; - cctx->aes.ccm.iv_set = 0; - cctx->aes.ccm.len_set = 0; - return 1; - - case EVP_CTRL_COPY: - return 1; - - default: - return -1; - } -} - -#define s390x_aes_ccm_cleanup aes_ccm_cleanup - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB -#define S390X_AES_OCB_CTX EVP_AES_OCB_CTX - -#define s390x_aes_ocb_init_key aes_ocb_init_key -static int s390x_aes_ocb_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, - const unsigned char *iv, int enc); -#define s390x_aes_ocb_cipher aes_ocb_cipher -static int s390x_aes_ocb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, size_t len); -#define s390x_aes_ocb_cleanup aes_ocb_cleanup -static int s390x_aes_ocb_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *); -#define s390x_aes_ocb_ctrl aes_ocb_ctrl -static int s390x_aes_ocb_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int type, int arg, void *ptr); -#endif - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SIV -#define S390X_AES_SIV_CTX EVP_AES_SIV_CTX - -#define s390x_aes_siv_init_key aes_siv_init_key -#define s390x_aes_siv_cipher aes_siv_cipher -#define s390x_aes_siv_cleanup aes_siv_cleanup -#define s390x_aes_siv_ctrl aes_siv_ctrl -#endif - -#define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid, keylen, blocksize, ivlen, nmode, mode, \ - MODE, flags) \ - static const EVP_CIPHER s390x_aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \ - nid##_##keylen##_##nmode, blocksize, \ - keylen / 8, \ - ivlen, \ - flags | EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ - EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \ - s390x_aes_##mode##_init_key, \ - s390x_aes_##mode##_cipher, \ - NULL, \ - sizeof(S390X_AES_##MODE##_CTX), \ - NULL, \ - NULL, \ - NULL, \ - NULL \ - }; \ - static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \ - nid##_##keylen##_##nmode, \ - blocksize, \ - keylen / 8, \ - ivlen, \ - flags | EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ - EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \ - aes_init_key, \ - aes_##mode##_cipher, \ - NULL, \ - sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY), \ - NULL, \ - NULL, \ - NULL, \ - NULL \ - }; \ - const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \ - { \ - return S390X_aes_##keylen##_##mode##_CAPABLE ? &s390x_aes_##keylen##_##mode : &aes_##keylen##_##mode; \ - } - -#define BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(nid, keylen, blocksize, ivlen, mode, MODE, flags) \ - static const EVP_CIPHER s390x_aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \ - nid##_##keylen##_##mode, \ - blocksize, \ - (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE == EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE || EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE == EVP_CIPH_SIV_MODE ? 2 : 1) * keylen / 8, \ - ivlen, \ - flags | EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ - EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \ - s390x_aes_##mode##_init_key, \ - s390x_aes_##mode##_cipher, \ - s390x_aes_##mode##_cleanup, \ - sizeof(S390X_AES_##MODE##_CTX), \ - NULL, \ - NULL, \ - s390x_aes_##mode##_ctrl, \ - NULL \ - }; \ - static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \ - nid##_##keylen##_##mode, blocksize, \ - (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE == EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE || EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE == EVP_CIPH_SIV_MODE ? 2 : 1) * keylen / 8, \ - ivlen, \ - flags | EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ - EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \ - aes_##mode##_init_key, \ - aes_##mode##_cipher, \ - aes_##mode##_cleanup, \ - sizeof(EVP_AES_##MODE##_CTX), \ - NULL, \ - NULL, \ - aes_##mode##_ctrl, \ - NULL \ - }; \ - const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \ - { \ - return S390X_aes_##keylen##_##mode##_CAPABLE ? &s390x_aes_##keylen##_##mode : &aes_##keylen##_##mode; \ - } - -#else - #define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid, keylen, blocksize, ivlen, nmode, mode, MODE, flags) \ static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \ nid##_##keylen##_##nmode, blocksize, keylen / 8, ivlen, \ flags | EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \ - aes_init_key, \ - aes_##mode##_cipher, \ NULL, \ - sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY), \ + NULL, \ + NULL, \ + 0, \ NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL \ }; \ const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \ @@ -2390,797 +52,29 @@ static int s390x_aes_ocb_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int type, int arg, void *ptr); ivlen, \ flags | EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \ - aes_##mode##_init_key, \ - aes_##mode##_cipher, \ - aes_##mode##_cleanup, \ - sizeof(EVP_AES_##MODE##_CTX), \ - NULL, NULL, aes_##mode##_ctrl, NULL \ + NULL, \ + NULL, \ + NULL, \ + 0, \ + NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL \ }; \ const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \ { \ return &aes_##keylen##_##mode; \ } -#endif - -#define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic_pack(nid, keylen, flags) \ - BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid, keylen, 16, 16, cbc, cbc, CBC, flags | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) \ - BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid, keylen, 16, 0, ecb, ecb, ECB, flags | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) \ - BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid, keylen, 1, 16, ofb128, ofb, OFB, flags | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) \ - BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid, keylen, 1, 16, cfb128, cfb, CFB, flags | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) \ - BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid, keylen, 1, 16, cfb1, cfb1, CFB, flags) \ - BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid, keylen, 1, 16, cfb8, cfb8, CFB, flags) \ - BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid, keylen, 1, 16, ctr, ctr, CTR, flags) - -static int aes_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, - const unsigned char *iv, int enc) -{ - int ret, mode; - EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY, ctx); - const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8; - - if (keylen <= 0) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); - return 0; - } - - mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_mode(ctx); - if ((mode == EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE || mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) - && !enc) { -#ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE - if (HWAES_CAPABLE) { - ret = HWAES_set_decrypt_key(key, keylen, &dat->ks.ks); - dat->block = (block128_f)HWAES_decrypt; - dat->stream.cbc = NULL; -#ifdef HWAES_cbc_encrypt - if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) - dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f)HWAES_cbc_encrypt; -#endif - } else -#endif -#ifdef BSAES_CAPABLE - if (BSAES_CAPABLE && mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { - ret = AES_set_decrypt_key(key, keylen, &dat->ks.ks); - dat->block = (block128_f)AES_decrypt; - dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f)ossl_bsaes_cbc_encrypt; - } else -#endif -#ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE - if (VPAES_CAPABLE) { - ret = vpaes_set_decrypt_key(key, keylen, &dat->ks.ks); - dat->block = (block128_f)vpaes_decrypt; - dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ? (cbc128_f)vpaes_cbc_encrypt : NULL; - } else -#endif - { - ret = AES_set_decrypt_key(key, keylen, &dat->ks.ks); - dat->block = (block128_f)AES_decrypt; - dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ? (cbc128_f)AES_cbc_encrypt : NULL; - } - } else -#ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE - if (HWAES_CAPABLE) { - ret = HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &dat->ks.ks); - dat->block = (block128_f)HWAES_encrypt; - dat->stream.cbc = NULL; -#ifdef HWAES_cbc_encrypt - if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) - dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f)HWAES_cbc_encrypt; - else -#endif -#ifdef HWAES_ctr32_encrypt_blocks - if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE) - dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f)HWAES_ctr32_encrypt_blocks; - else -#endif - (void)0; /* terminate potentially open 'else' */ - } else -#endif -#ifdef BSAES_CAPABLE - if (BSAES_CAPABLE && mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE) { - ret = AES_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &dat->ks.ks); - dat->block = (block128_f)AES_encrypt; - dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f)ossl_bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks; - } else -#endif -#ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE - if (VPAES_CAPABLE) { - ret = vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &dat->ks.ks); - dat->block = (block128_f)vpaes_encrypt; - dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ? (cbc128_f)vpaes_cbc_encrypt : NULL; - } else -#endif - { - ret = AES_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &dat->ks.ks); - dat->block = (block128_f)AES_encrypt; - dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ? (cbc128_f)AES_cbc_encrypt : NULL; -#ifdef AES_CTR_ASM - if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE) - dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f)AES_ctr32_encrypt; -#endif - } - - if (ret < 0) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_AES_KEY_SETUP_FAILED); - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - -static int aes_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, size_t len) -{ - EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY, ctx); - - if (dat->stream.cbc) - (*dat->stream.cbc)(in, out, len, &dat->ks, ctx->iv, - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)); - else if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)) - CRYPTO_cbc128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks, ctx->iv, - dat->block); - else - CRYPTO_cbc128_decrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks, - ctx->iv, dat->block); - - return 1; -} - -static int aes_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, size_t len) -{ - size_t bl = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_block_size(ctx); - size_t i; - EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY, ctx); - - if (len < bl) - return 1; - - for (i = 0, len -= bl; i <= len; i += bl) - (*dat->block)(in + i, out + i, &dat->ks); - - return 1; -} - -static int aes_ofb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, size_t len) -{ - EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY, ctx); - - int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_num(ctx); - CRYPTO_ofb128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks, - ctx->iv, &num, dat->block); - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num); - return 1; -} - -static int aes_cfb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, size_t len) -{ - EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY, ctx); - - int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_num(ctx); - CRYPTO_cfb128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks, - ctx->iv, &num, - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx), dat->block); - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num); - return 1; -} - -static int aes_cfb8_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, size_t len) -{ - EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY, ctx); - - int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_num(ctx); - CRYPTO_cfb128_8_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks, - ctx->iv, &num, - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx), dat->block); - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num); - return 1; -} - -static int aes_cfb1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, size_t len) -{ - EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY, ctx); - - if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_test_flags(ctx, EVP_CIPH_FLAG_LENGTH_BITS)) { - int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_num(ctx); - CRYPTO_cfb128_1_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks, - ctx->iv, &num, - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx), dat->block); - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num); - return 1; - } - - while (len >= MAXBITCHUNK) { - int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_num(ctx); - CRYPTO_cfb128_1_encrypt(in, out, MAXBITCHUNK * 8, &dat->ks, - ctx->iv, &num, - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx), dat->block); - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num); - len -= MAXBITCHUNK; - out += MAXBITCHUNK; - in += MAXBITCHUNK; - } - if (len) { - int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_num(ctx); - CRYPTO_cfb128_1_encrypt(in, out, len * 8, &dat->ks, - ctx->iv, &num, - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx), dat->block); - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num); - } - - return 1; -} - -static int aes_ctr_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, size_t len) -{ - int n = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_num(ctx); - unsigned int num; - EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY, ctx); - - if (n < 0) - return 0; - num = (unsigned int)n; - - if (dat->stream.ctr) - CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt_ctr32(in, out, len, &dat->ks, - ctx->iv, - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx), - &num, dat->stream.ctr); - else - CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks, - ctx->iv, - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx), &num, - dat->block); - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num); - return 1; -} +#define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic_pack(nid, keylen, flags) \ + BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid, keylen, 16, 16, cbc, cbc, CBC, flags | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) \ + BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid, keylen, 16, 0, ecb, ecb, ECB, flags | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) \ + BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid, keylen, 1, 16, ofb128, ofb, OFB, flags | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) \ + BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid, keylen, 1, 16, cfb128, cfb, CFB, flags | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) \ + BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid, keylen, 1, 16, cfb1, cfb1, CFB, flags) \ + BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid, keylen, 1, 16, cfb8, cfb8, CFB, flags) \ + BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid, keylen, 1, 16, ctr, ctr, CTR, flags) BLOCK_CIPHER_generic_pack(NID_aes, 128, 0) - BLOCK_CIPHER_generic_pack(NID_aes, 192, 0) - BLOCK_CIPHER_generic_pack(NID_aes, 256, 0) - - static int aes_gcm_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c) -{ - EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX, c); - if (gctx == NULL) - return 0; - OPENSSL_cleanse(&gctx->gcm, sizeof(gctx->gcm)); - if (gctx->iv != c->iv) - OPENSSL_free(gctx->iv); - return 1; -} - -static int aes_gcm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr) -{ - EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX, c); - switch (type) { - case EVP_CTRL_INIT: - gctx->key_set = 0; - gctx->iv_set = 0; - gctx->ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(c->cipher); - gctx->iv = c->iv; - gctx->taglen = -1; - gctx->iv_gen = 0; - gctx->tls_aad_len = -1; - return 1; - - case EVP_CTRL_GET_IVLEN: - *(int *)ptr = gctx->ivlen; - return 1; - - case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN: - if (arg <= 0) - return 0; - /* Allocate memory for IV if needed */ - if ((arg > EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) && (arg > gctx->ivlen)) { - if (gctx->iv != c->iv) - OPENSSL_free(gctx->iv); - if ((gctx->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(arg)) == NULL) - return 0; - } - gctx->ivlen = arg; - return 1; - - case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG: - if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || c->encrypt) - return 0; - memcpy(c->buf, ptr, arg); - gctx->taglen = arg; - return 1; - - case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG: - if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || !c->encrypt - || gctx->taglen < 0) - return 0; - memcpy(ptr, c->buf, arg); - return 1; - - case EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED: - /* Special case: -1 length restores whole IV */ - if (arg == -1) { - memcpy(gctx->iv, ptr, gctx->ivlen); - gctx->iv_gen = 1; - return 1; - } - /* - * Fixed field must be at least 4 bytes and invocation field at least - * 8. - */ - if ((arg < 4) || (gctx->ivlen - arg) < 8) - return 0; - if (arg) - memcpy(gctx->iv, ptr, arg); - if (c->encrypt && RAND_bytes(gctx->iv + arg, gctx->ivlen - arg) <= 0) - return 0; - gctx->iv_gen = 1; - return 1; - - case EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN: - if (gctx->iv_gen == 0 || gctx->key_set == 0) - return 0; - CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen); - if (arg <= 0 || arg > gctx->ivlen) - arg = gctx->ivlen; - memcpy(ptr, gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - arg, arg); - /* - * Invocation field will be at least 8 bytes in size and so no need - * to check wrap around or increment more than last 8 bytes. - */ - ctr64_inc(gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - 8); - gctx->iv_set = 1; - return 1; - - case EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV: - if (gctx->iv_gen == 0 || gctx->key_set == 0 || c->encrypt) - return 0; - memcpy(gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - arg, ptr, arg); - CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen); - gctx->iv_set = 1; - return 1; - - case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD: - /* Save the AAD for later use */ - if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN) - return 0; - memcpy(c->buf, ptr, arg); - gctx->tls_aad_len = arg; - gctx->tls_enc_records = 0; - { - unsigned int len = c->buf[arg - 2] << 8 | c->buf[arg - 1]; - /* Correct length for explicit IV */ - if (len < EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN) - return 0; - len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; - /* If decrypting correct for tag too */ - if (!c->encrypt) { - if (len < EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN) - return 0; - len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; - } - c->buf[arg - 2] = len >> 8; - c->buf[arg - 1] = len & 0xff; - } - /* Extra padding: tag appended to record */ - return EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; - - case EVP_CTRL_COPY: { - EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out = ptr; - EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx_out = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX, out); - if (gctx->gcm.key) { - if (gctx->gcm.key != &gctx->ks) - return 0; - gctx_out->gcm.key = &gctx_out->ks; - } - if (gctx->iv == c->iv) - gctx_out->iv = out->iv; - else { - if ((gctx_out->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(gctx->ivlen)) == NULL) - return 0; - memcpy(gctx_out->iv, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen); - } - return 1; - } - - default: - return -1; - } -} - -static int aes_gcm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, - const unsigned char *iv, int enc) -{ - EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX, ctx); - - if (iv == NULL && key == NULL) - return 1; - - if (key != NULL) { - const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8; - - if (keylen <= 0) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); - return 0; - } - do { -#ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE - if (HWAES_CAPABLE) { - HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &gctx->ks.ks); - CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks, - (block128_f)HWAES_encrypt); -#ifdef HWAES_ctr32_encrypt_blocks - gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f)HWAES_ctr32_encrypt_blocks; -#else - gctx->ctr = NULL; -#endif - break; - } else -#endif -#ifdef BSAES_CAPABLE - if (BSAES_CAPABLE) { - AES_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &gctx->ks.ks); - CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks, - (block128_f)AES_encrypt); - gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f)ossl_bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks; - break; - } else -#endif -#ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE - if (VPAES_CAPABLE) { - vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &gctx->ks.ks); - CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks, - (block128_f)vpaes_encrypt); - gctx->ctr = NULL; - break; - } else -#endif - (void)0; /* terminate potentially open 'else' */ - - AES_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &gctx->ks.ks); - CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks, - (block128_f)AES_encrypt); -#ifdef AES_CTR_ASM - gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f)AES_ctr32_encrypt; -#else - gctx->ctr = NULL; -#endif - } while (0); - - /* - * If we have an iv can set it directly, otherwise use saved IV. - */ - if (iv == NULL && gctx->iv_set) - iv = gctx->iv; - if (iv) { - CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, iv, gctx->ivlen); - gctx->iv_set = 1; - } - gctx->key_set = 1; - } else { - /* If key set use IV, otherwise copy */ - if (gctx->key_set) - CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, iv, gctx->ivlen); - else - memcpy(gctx->iv, iv, gctx->ivlen); - gctx->iv_set = 1; - gctx->iv_gen = 0; - } - return 1; -} - -/* - * Handle TLS GCM packet format. This consists of the last portion of the IV - * followed by the payload and finally the tag. On encrypt generate IV, - * encrypt payload and write the tag. On verify retrieve IV, decrypt payload - * and verify tag. - */ - -static int aes_gcm_tls_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, size_t len) -{ - EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX, ctx); - int rv = -1; - /* Encrypt/decrypt must be performed in place */ - if (out != in - || len < (EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN)) - return -1; - - /* - * Check for too many keys as per FIPS 140-2 IG A.5 "Key/IV Pair Uniqueness - * Requirements from SP 800-38D". The requirements is for one party to the - * communication to fail after 2^64 - 1 keys. We do this on the encrypting - * side only. - */ - if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx) && ++gctx->tls_enc_records == 0) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_TOO_MANY_RECORDS); - goto err; - } - - /* - * Set IV from start of buffer or generate IV and write to start of - * buffer. - */ - if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx) ? EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN : EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV, - EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN, out) - <= 0) - goto err; - /* Use saved AAD */ - if (CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(&gctx->gcm, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx), - gctx->tls_aad_len)) - goto err; - /* Fix buffer and length to point to payload */ - in += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; - out += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; - len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; - if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)) { - /* Encrypt payload */ - if (gctx->ctr) { - size_t bulk = 0; -#if defined(AES_GCM_ASM) - if (len >= 32 && AES_GCM_ASM(gctx)) { - if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm, NULL, NULL, 0)) - return -1; - - bulk = AES_gcm_encrypt(in, out, len, - gctx->gcm.key, - gctx->gcm.Yi.c, gctx->gcm.Xi.u); - gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk; - } -#endif - if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(&gctx->gcm, - in + bulk, - out + bulk, - len - bulk, gctx->ctr)) - goto err; - } else { - size_t bulk = 0; -#if defined(AES_GCM_ASM2) - if (len >= 32 && AES_GCM_ASM2(gctx)) { - if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm, NULL, NULL, 0)) - return -1; - - bulk = AES_gcm_encrypt(in, out, len, - gctx->gcm.key, - gctx->gcm.Yi.c, gctx->gcm.Xi.u); - gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk; - } -#endif - if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm, - in + bulk, out + bulk, len - bulk)) - goto err; - } - out += len; - /* Finally write tag */ - CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gctx->gcm, out, EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN); - rv = (int)(len + EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN); - } else { - /* Decrypt */ - if (gctx->ctr) { - size_t bulk = 0; -#if defined(AES_GCM_ASM) - if (len >= 16 && AES_GCM_ASM(gctx)) { - if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm, NULL, NULL, 0)) - return -1; - - bulk = AES_gcm_decrypt(in, out, len, - gctx->gcm.key, - gctx->gcm.Yi.c, gctx->gcm.Xi.u); - gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk; - } -#endif - if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt_ctr32(&gctx->gcm, - in + bulk, - out + bulk, - len - bulk, gctx->ctr)) - goto err; - } else { - size_t bulk = 0; -#if defined(AES_GCM_ASM2) - if (len >= 16 && AES_GCM_ASM2(gctx)) { - if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm, NULL, NULL, 0)) - return -1; - - bulk = AES_gcm_decrypt(in, out, len, - gctx->gcm.key, - gctx->gcm.Yi.c, gctx->gcm.Xi.u); - gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk; - } -#endif - if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm, - in + bulk, out + bulk, len - bulk)) - goto err; - } - /* Retrieve tag */ - CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gctx->gcm, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx), - EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN); - /* If tag mismatch wipe buffer */ - if (CRYPTO_memcmp(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx), in + len, - EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN)) { - OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len); - goto err; - } - rv = (int)len; - } - -err: - gctx->iv_set = 0; - gctx->tls_aad_len = -1; - return rv; -} - -#ifdef FIPS_MODULE -/* - * See SP800-38D (GCM) Section 8 "Uniqueness requirement on IVS and keys" - * - * See also 8.2.2 RBG-based construction. - * Random construction consists of a free field (which can be NULL) and a - * random field which will use a DRBG that can return at least 96 bits of - * entropy strength. (The DRBG must be seeded by the FIPS module). - */ -static int aes_gcm_iv_generate(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx, int offset) -{ - int sz = gctx->ivlen - offset; - - /* Must be at least 96 bits */ - if (sz <= 0 || gctx->ivlen < 12) - return 0; - - /* Use DRBG to generate random iv */ - if (RAND_bytes(gctx->iv + offset, sz) <= 0) - return 0; - return 1; -} -#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */ - -static int aes_gcm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, size_t len) -{ - EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX, ctx); - - /* If not set up, return error */ - if (!gctx->key_set) - return -1; - - if (gctx->tls_aad_len >= 0) - return aes_gcm_tls_cipher(ctx, out, in, len); - -#ifdef FIPS_MODULE - /* - * FIPS requires generation of AES-GCM IV's inside the FIPS module. - * The IV can still be set externally (the security policy will state that - * this is not FIPS compliant). There are some applications - * where setting the IV externally is the only option available. - */ - if (!gctx->iv_set) { - if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx) || !aes_gcm_iv_generate(gctx, 0)) - return -1; - CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen); - gctx->iv_set = 1; - gctx->iv_gen_rand = 1; - } -#else - if (!gctx->iv_set) - return -1; -#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */ - - if (in) { - if (out == NULL) { - if (CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(&gctx->gcm, in, len)) - return -1; - } else if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)) { - if (gctx->ctr) { - size_t bulk = 0; -#if defined(AES_GCM_ASM) - if (len >= 32 && AES_GCM_ASM(gctx)) { - size_t res = (16 - gctx->gcm.mres) % 16; - - if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm, in, out, res)) - return -1; - - bulk = AES_gcm_encrypt(in + res, - out + res, len - res, - gctx->gcm.key, gctx->gcm.Yi.c, - gctx->gcm.Xi.u); - gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk; - bulk += res; - } -#endif - if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(&gctx->gcm, - in + bulk, - out + bulk, - len - bulk, gctx->ctr)) - return -1; - } else { - size_t bulk = 0; -#if defined(AES_GCM_ASM2) - if (len >= 32 && AES_GCM_ASM2(gctx)) { - size_t res = (16 - gctx->gcm.mres) % 16; - - if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm, in, out, res)) - return -1; - - bulk = AES_gcm_encrypt(in + res, - out + res, len - res, - gctx->gcm.key, gctx->gcm.Yi.c, - gctx->gcm.Xi.u); - gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk; - bulk += res; - } -#endif - if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm, - in + bulk, out + bulk, len - bulk)) - return -1; - } - } else { - if (gctx->ctr) { - size_t bulk = 0; -#if defined(AES_GCM_ASM) - if (len >= 16 && AES_GCM_ASM(gctx)) { - size_t res = (16 - gctx->gcm.mres) % 16; - - if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm, in, out, res)) - return -1; - - bulk = AES_gcm_decrypt(in + res, - out + res, len - res, - gctx->gcm.key, - gctx->gcm.Yi.c, gctx->gcm.Xi.u); - gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk; - bulk += res; - } -#endif - if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt_ctr32(&gctx->gcm, - in + bulk, - out + bulk, - len - bulk, gctx->ctr)) - return -1; - } else { - size_t bulk = 0; -#if defined(AES_GCM_ASM2) - if (len >= 16 && AES_GCM_ASM2(gctx)) { - size_t res = (16 - gctx->gcm.mres) % 16; - - if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm, in, out, res)) - return -1; - - bulk = AES_gcm_decrypt(in + res, - out + res, len - res, - gctx->gcm.key, - gctx->gcm.Yi.c, gctx->gcm.Xi.u); - gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk; - bulk += res; - } -#endif - if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm, - in + bulk, out + bulk, len - bulk)) - return -1; - } - } - return (int)len; - } else { - if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)) { - if (gctx->taglen < 0) - return -1; - if (CRYPTO_gcm128_finish(&gctx->gcm, - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx), - gctx->taglen) - != 0) - return -1; - gctx->iv_set = 0; - return 0; - } - CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gctx->gcm, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx), 16); - gctx->taglen = 16; - /* Don't reuse the IV */ - gctx->iv_set = 0; - return 0; - } -} +BLOCK_CIPHER_generic_pack(NID_aes, 192, 0) +BLOCK_CIPHER_generic_pack(NID_aes, 256, 0) #define CUSTOM_FLAGS (EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 \ | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER \ @@ -3189,574 +83,24 @@ static int aes_gcm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 128, 1, 12, gcm, GCM, EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS) - BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 192, 1, 12, gcm, GCM, - EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS) - BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 256, 1, 12, gcm, GCM, - EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS) - - static int aes_xts_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr) -{ - EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX, c); - - if (type == EVP_CTRL_COPY) { - EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out = ptr; - EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx_out = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX, out); - - if (xctx->xts.key1) { - if (xctx->xts.key1 != &xctx->ks1) - return 0; - xctx_out->xts.key1 = &xctx_out->ks1; - } - if (xctx->xts.key2) { - if (xctx->xts.key2 != &xctx->ks2) - return 0; - xctx_out->xts.key2 = &xctx_out->ks2; - } - return 1; - } else if (type != EVP_CTRL_INIT) - return -1; - /* key1 and key2 are used as an indicator both key and IV are set */ - xctx->xts.key1 = NULL; - xctx->xts.key2 = NULL; - return 1; -} - -static int aes_xts_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, - const unsigned char *iv, int enc) -{ - EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX, ctx); - - if (iv == NULL && key == NULL) - return 1; - - if (key != NULL) { - do { - /* The key is two half length keys in reality */ - const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx); - const int bytes = keylen / 2; - const int bits = bytes * 8; - - if (keylen <= 0) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); - return 0; - } - /* - * Verify that the two keys are different. - * - * This addresses the vulnerability described in Rogaway's - * September 2004 paper: - * - * "Efficient Instantiations of Tweakable Blockciphers and - * Refinements to Modes OCB and PMAC". - * (http://web.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/papers/offsets.pdf) - * - * FIPS 140-2 IG A.9 XTS-AES Key Generation Requirements states - * that: - * "The check for Key_1 != Key_2 shall be done at any place - * BEFORE using the keys in the XTS-AES algorithm to process - * data with them." - */ - if ((!allow_insecure_decrypt || enc) - && CRYPTO_memcmp(key, key + bytes, bytes) == 0) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_XTS_DUPLICATED_KEYS); - return 0; - } - -#ifdef AES_XTS_ASM - xctx->stream = enc ? AES_xts_encrypt : AES_xts_decrypt; -#else - xctx->stream = NULL; -#endif - /* key_len is two AES keys */ -#ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE - if (HWAES_CAPABLE) { - if (enc) { - HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks); - xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f)HWAES_encrypt; -#ifdef HWAES_xts_encrypt - xctx->stream = HWAES_xts_encrypt; -#endif - } else { - HWAES_set_decrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks); - xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f)HWAES_decrypt; -#ifdef HWAES_xts_decrypt - xctx->stream = HWAES_xts_decrypt; -#endif - } - - HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key + bytes, bits, &xctx->ks2.ks); - xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f)HWAES_encrypt; - - xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1; - break; - } else -#endif -#ifdef BSAES_CAPABLE - if (BSAES_CAPABLE) - xctx->stream = enc ? ossl_bsaes_xts_encrypt : ossl_bsaes_xts_decrypt; - else -#endif -#ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE - if (VPAES_CAPABLE) { - if (enc) { - vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks); - xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f)vpaes_encrypt; - } else { - vpaes_set_decrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks); - xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f)vpaes_decrypt; - } - - vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key + bytes, bits, &xctx->ks2.ks); - xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f)vpaes_encrypt; - - xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1; - break; - } else -#endif - (void)0; /* terminate potentially open 'else' */ - - if (enc) { - AES_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks); - xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f)AES_encrypt; - } else { - AES_set_decrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks); - xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f)AES_decrypt; - } - - AES_set_encrypt_key(key + bytes, bits, &xctx->ks2.ks); - xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f)AES_encrypt; - - xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1; - } while (0); - } - - if (iv) { - xctx->xts.key2 = &xctx->ks2; - memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, 16); - } - - return 1; -} - -static int aes_xts_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, size_t len) -{ - EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX, ctx); - - if (xctx->xts.key1 == NULL - || xctx->xts.key2 == NULL - || out == NULL - || in == NULL - || len < AES_BLOCK_SIZE) - return 0; - - /* - * Impose a limit of 2^20 blocks per data unit as specified by - * IEEE Std 1619-2018. The earlier and obsolete IEEE Std 1619-2007 - * indicated that this was a SHOULD NOT rather than a MUST NOT. - * NIST SP 800-38E mandates the same limit. - */ - if (len > XTS_MAX_BLOCKS_PER_DATA_UNIT * AES_BLOCK_SIZE) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_XTS_DATA_UNIT_IS_TOO_LARGE); - return 0; - } - - if (xctx->stream) - (*xctx->stream)(in, out, len, - xctx->xts.key1, xctx->xts.key2, - ctx->iv); - else if (CRYPTO_xts128_encrypt(&xctx->xts, ctx->iv, in, out, len, - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx))) - return 0; - return 1; -} - -#define aes_xts_cleanup NULL +BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 192, 1, 12, gcm, GCM, + EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS) +BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 256, 1, 12, gcm, GCM, + EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS) #define XTS_FLAGS (EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV \ | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT \ | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY) BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 128, 1, 16, xts, XTS, XTS_FLAGS) - BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 256, 1, 16, xts, XTS, XTS_FLAGS) - - static int aes_ccm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr) -{ - EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX, c); - switch (type) { - case EVP_CTRL_INIT: - cctx->key_set = 0; - cctx->iv_set = 0; - cctx->L = 8; - cctx->M = 12; - cctx->tag_set = 0; - cctx->len_set = 0; - cctx->tls_aad_len = -1; - return 1; - - case EVP_CTRL_GET_IVLEN: - *(int *)ptr = 15 - cctx->L; - return 1; - - case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD: - /* Save the AAD for later use */ - if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN) - return 0; - memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c), ptr, arg); - cctx->tls_aad_len = arg; - { - uint16_t len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 2] << 8 - | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 1]; - /* Correct length for explicit IV */ - if (len < EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN) - return 0; - len -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; - /* If decrypting correct for tag too */ - if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(c)) { - if (len < cctx->M) - return 0; - len -= cctx->M; - } - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 2] = len >> 8; - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 1] = len & 0xff; - } - /* Extra padding: tag appended to record */ - return cctx->M; - - case EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_IV_FIXED: - /* Sanity check length */ - if (arg != EVP_CCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN) - return 0; - /* Just copy to first part of IV */ - memcpy(c->iv, ptr, arg); - return 1; - - case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN: - arg = 15 - arg; - /* fall through */ - case EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_L: - if (arg < 2 || arg > 8) - return 0; - cctx->L = arg; - return 1; - - case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG: - if ((arg & 1) || arg < 4 || arg > 16) - return 0; - if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(c) && ptr) - return 0; - if (ptr) { - cctx->tag_set = 1; - memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c), ptr, arg); - } - cctx->M = arg; - return 1; - - case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG: - if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(c) || !cctx->tag_set) - return 0; - if (!CRYPTO_ccm128_tag(&cctx->ccm, ptr, (size_t)arg)) - return 0; - cctx->tag_set = 0; - cctx->iv_set = 0; - cctx->len_set = 0; - return 1; - - case EVP_CTRL_COPY: { - EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out = ptr; - EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx_out = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX, out); - if (cctx->ccm.key) { - if (cctx->ccm.key != &cctx->ks) - return 0; - cctx_out->ccm.key = &cctx_out->ks; - } - return 1; - } - - default: - return -1; - } -} - -static int aes_ccm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, - const unsigned char *iv, int enc) -{ - EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX, ctx); - - if (iv == NULL && key == NULL) - return 1; - - if (key != NULL) { - const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8; - - if (keylen <= 0) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); - return 0; - } - do { -#ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE - if (HWAES_CAPABLE) { - HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &cctx->ks.ks); - - CRYPTO_ccm128_init(&cctx->ccm, cctx->M, cctx->L, - &cctx->ks, (block128_f)HWAES_encrypt); - cctx->str = NULL; - cctx->key_set = 1; - break; - } else -#endif -#ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE - if (VPAES_CAPABLE) { - vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &cctx->ks.ks); - CRYPTO_ccm128_init(&cctx->ccm, cctx->M, cctx->L, - &cctx->ks, (block128_f)vpaes_encrypt); - cctx->str = NULL; - cctx->key_set = 1; - break; - } -#endif - AES_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &cctx->ks.ks); - CRYPTO_ccm128_init(&cctx->ccm, cctx->M, cctx->L, - &cctx->ks, (block128_f)AES_encrypt); - cctx->str = NULL; - cctx->key_set = 1; - } while (0); - } - if (iv != NULL) { - memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, 15 - cctx->L); - cctx->iv_set = 1; - } - return 1; -} - -static int aes_ccm_tls_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, size_t len) -{ - EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX, ctx); - CCM128_CONTEXT *ccm = &cctx->ccm; - /* Encrypt/decrypt must be performed in place */ - if (out != in || len < (EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + (size_t)cctx->M)) - return -1; - /* If encrypting set explicit IV from sequence number (start of AAD) */ - if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)) - memcpy(out, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx), - EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN); - /* Get rest of IV from explicit IV */ - memcpy(ctx->iv + EVP_CCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN, in, - EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN); - /* Correct length value */ - len -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + cctx->M; - if (CRYPTO_ccm128_setiv(ccm, ctx->iv, 15 - cctx->L, - len)) - return -1; - /* Use saved AAD */ - CRYPTO_ccm128_aad(ccm, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx), - cctx->tls_aad_len); - /* Fix buffer to point to payload */ - in += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; - out += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; - if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)) { - if (cctx->str ? CRYPTO_ccm128_encrypt_ccm64(ccm, in, out, len, - cctx->str) - : CRYPTO_ccm128_encrypt(ccm, in, out, len)) - return -1; - if (!CRYPTO_ccm128_tag(ccm, out + len, cctx->M)) - return -1; - return (int)(len + EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + cctx->M); - } else { - if (cctx->str ? !CRYPTO_ccm128_decrypt_ccm64(ccm, in, out, len, - cctx->str) - : !CRYPTO_ccm128_decrypt(ccm, in, out, len)) { - unsigned char tag[16]; - if (CRYPTO_ccm128_tag(ccm, tag, cctx->M)) { - if (!CRYPTO_memcmp(tag, in + len, cctx->M)) - return (int)len; - } - } - OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len); - return -1; - } -} - -static int aes_ccm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, size_t len) -{ - EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX, ctx); - CCM128_CONTEXT *ccm = &cctx->ccm; - /* If not set up, return error */ - if (!cctx->key_set) - return -1; - - if (cctx->tls_aad_len >= 0) - return aes_ccm_tls_cipher(ctx, out, in, len); - - /* EVP_*Final() doesn't return any data */ - if (in == NULL && out != NULL) - return 0; - - if (!cctx->iv_set) - return -1; - - if (!out) { - if (!in) { - if (CRYPTO_ccm128_setiv(ccm, ctx->iv, - 15 - cctx->L, len)) - return -1; - cctx->len_set = 1; - return (int)len; - } - /* If have AAD need message length */ - if (!cctx->len_set && len) - return -1; - CRYPTO_ccm128_aad(ccm, in, len); - return (int)len; - } - - /* The tag must be set before actually decrypting data */ - if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx) && !cctx->tag_set) - return -1; - - /* If not set length yet do it */ - if (!cctx->len_set) { - if (CRYPTO_ccm128_setiv(ccm, ctx->iv, 15 - cctx->L, len)) - return -1; - cctx->len_set = 1; - } - if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)) { - if (cctx->str ? CRYPTO_ccm128_encrypt_ccm64(ccm, in, out, len, - cctx->str) - : CRYPTO_ccm128_encrypt(ccm, in, out, len)) - return -1; - cctx->tag_set = 1; - return (int)len; - } else { - int rv = -1; - if (cctx->str ? !CRYPTO_ccm128_decrypt_ccm64(ccm, in, out, len, - cctx->str) - : !CRYPTO_ccm128_decrypt(ccm, in, out, len)) { - unsigned char tag[16]; - if (CRYPTO_ccm128_tag(ccm, tag, cctx->M)) { - if (!CRYPTO_memcmp(tag, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx), - cctx->M)) - rv = (int)len; - } - } - if (rv == -1) - OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len); - cctx->iv_set = 0; - cctx->tag_set = 0; - cctx->len_set = 0; - return rv; - } -} - -#define aes_ccm_cleanup NULL +BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 256, 1, 16, xts, XTS, XTS_FLAGS) BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 128, 1, 12, ccm, CCM, EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS) - BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 192, 1, 12, ccm, CCM, - EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS) - BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 256, 1, 12, ccm, CCM, - EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS) - - typedef struct { - union { - OSSL_UNION_ALIGN; - AES_KEY ks; - } ks; - /* Indicates if IV has been set */ - unsigned char *iv; -} EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX; - -static int aes_wrap_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, - const unsigned char *iv, int enc) -{ - int len; - EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX *wctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX, ctx); - - if (iv == NULL && key == NULL) - return 1; - if (key != NULL) { - const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8; - - if (keylen <= 0) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); - return 0; - } - if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)) - AES_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &wctx->ks.ks); - else - AES_set_decrypt_key(key, keylen, &wctx->ks.ks); - if (iv == NULL) - wctx->iv = NULL; - } - if (iv != NULL) { - if ((len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx)) < 0) - return 0; - memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, len); - wctx->iv = ctx->iv; - } - return 1; -} - -static int aes_wrap_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen) -{ - EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX *wctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX, ctx); - size_t rv; - /* AES wrap with padding has IV length of 4, without padding 8 */ - int pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx) == 4; - /* No final operation so always return zero length */ - if (!in) - return 0; - /* Input length must always be non-zero */ - if (!inlen) - return -1; - /* If decrypting need at least 16 bytes and multiple of 8 */ - if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx) && (inlen < 16 || inlen & 0x7)) - return -1; - /* If not padding input must be multiple of 8 */ - if (!pad && inlen & 0x7) - return -1; - if (ossl_is_partially_overlapping(out, in, (int)inlen)) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPING); - return 0; - } - if (!out) { - if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)) { - /* If padding round up to multiple of 8 */ - if (pad) - inlen = (inlen + 7) / 8 * 8; - /* 8 byte prefix */ - return (int)(inlen + 8); - } else { - /* - * If not padding output will be exactly 8 bytes smaller than - * input. If padding it will be at least 8 bytes smaller but we - * don't know how much. - */ - return (int)(inlen - 8); - } - } - if (pad) { - if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)) - rv = CRYPTO_128_wrap_pad(&wctx->ks.ks, wctx->iv, - out, in, inlen, - (block128_f)AES_encrypt); - else - rv = CRYPTO_128_unwrap_pad(&wctx->ks.ks, wctx->iv, - out, in, inlen, - (block128_f)AES_decrypt); - } else { - if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)) - rv = CRYPTO_128_wrap(&wctx->ks.ks, wctx->iv, - out, in, inlen, (block128_f)AES_encrypt); - else - rv = CRYPTO_128_unwrap(&wctx->ks.ks, wctx->iv, - out, in, inlen, (block128_f)AES_decrypt); - } - return rv ? (int)rv : -1; -} +BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 192, 1, 12, ccm, CCM, + EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS) +BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 256, 1, 12, ccm, CCM, + EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS) #define WRAP_FLAGS (EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE \ | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER \ @@ -3765,9 +109,9 @@ static int aes_wrap_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, static const EVP_CIPHER aes_128_wrap = { NID_id_aes128_wrap, 8, 16, 8, WRAP_FLAGS, EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, - aes_wrap_init_key, aes_wrap_cipher, + NULL, NULL, NULL, - sizeof(EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX), + 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }; @@ -3779,9 +123,9 @@ const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_wrap(void) static const EVP_CIPHER aes_192_wrap = { NID_id_aes192_wrap, 8, 24, 8, WRAP_FLAGS, EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, - aes_wrap_init_key, aes_wrap_cipher, + NULL, NULL, NULL, - sizeof(EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX), + 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }; @@ -3793,9 +137,9 @@ const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_192_wrap(void) static const EVP_CIPHER aes_256_wrap = { NID_id_aes256_wrap, 8, 32, 8, WRAP_FLAGS, EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, - aes_wrap_init_key, aes_wrap_cipher, + NULL, NULL, NULL, - sizeof(EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX), + 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }; @@ -3807,9 +151,9 @@ const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_wrap(void) static const EVP_CIPHER aes_128_wrap_pad = { NID_id_aes128_wrap_pad, 8, 16, 4, WRAP_FLAGS, EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, - aes_wrap_init_key, aes_wrap_cipher, + NULL, NULL, NULL, - sizeof(EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX), + 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }; @@ -3821,9 +165,9 @@ const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_wrap_pad(void) static const EVP_CIPHER aes_192_wrap_pad = { NID_id_aes192_wrap_pad, 8, 24, 4, WRAP_FLAGS, EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, - aes_wrap_init_key, aes_wrap_cipher, + NULL, NULL, NULL, - sizeof(EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX), + 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }; @@ -3835,9 +179,9 @@ const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_192_wrap_pad(void) static const EVP_CIPHER aes_256_wrap_pad = { NID_id_aes256_wrap_pad, 8, 32, 4, WRAP_FLAGS, EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, - aes_wrap_init_key, aes_wrap_cipher, + NULL, NULL, NULL, - sizeof(EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX), + 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }; @@ -3847,307 +191,10 @@ const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_wrap_pad(void) } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB -static int aes_ocb_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr) -{ - EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *octx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_OCB_CTX, c); - EVP_CIPHER_CTX *newc; - EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *new_octx; - - switch (type) { - case EVP_CTRL_INIT: - octx->key_set = 0; - octx->iv_set = 0; - octx->ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(c->cipher); - octx->iv = c->iv; - octx->taglen = 16; - octx->data_buf_len = 0; - octx->aad_buf_len = 0; - return 1; - - case EVP_CTRL_GET_IVLEN: - *(int *)ptr = octx->ivlen; - return 1; - - case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN: - /* IV len must be 1 to 15 */ - if (arg <= 0 || arg > 15) - return 0; - - octx->ivlen = arg; - return 1; - - case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG: - if (ptr == NULL) { - /* Tag len must be 0 to 16 */ - if (arg < 0 || arg > 16) - return 0; - - octx->taglen = arg; - return 1; - } - if (arg != octx->taglen || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(c)) - return 0; - memcpy(octx->tag, ptr, arg); - return 1; - - case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG: - if (arg != octx->taglen || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(c)) - return 0; - - memcpy(ptr, octx->tag, arg); - return 1; - - case EVP_CTRL_COPY: - newc = (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *)ptr; - new_octx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_OCB_CTX, newc); - return CRYPTO_ocb128_copy_ctx(&new_octx->ocb, &octx->ocb, - &new_octx->ksenc.ks, - &new_octx->ksdec.ks); - - default: - return -1; - } -} - -static int aes_ocb_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, - const unsigned char *iv, int enc) -{ - EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *octx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_OCB_CTX, ctx); - - if (iv == NULL && key == NULL) - return 1; - - if (key != NULL) { - const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8; - - if (keylen <= 0) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); - return 0; - } - do { - /* - * We set both the encrypt and decrypt key here because decrypt - * needs both. We could possibly optimise to remove setting the - * decrypt for an encryption operation. - */ -#ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE - if (HWAES_CAPABLE) { - HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &octx->ksenc.ks); - HWAES_set_decrypt_key(key, keylen, &octx->ksdec.ks); - if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_init(&octx->ocb, - &octx->ksenc.ks, &octx->ksdec.ks, - (block128_f)HWAES_encrypt, - (block128_f)HWAES_decrypt, - enc ? HWAES_ocb_encrypt - : HWAES_ocb_decrypt)) - return 0; - break; - } -#endif -#ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE - if (VPAES_CAPABLE) { - vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &octx->ksenc.ks); - vpaes_set_decrypt_key(key, keylen, &octx->ksdec.ks); - if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_init(&octx->ocb, - &octx->ksenc.ks, &octx->ksdec.ks, - (block128_f)vpaes_encrypt, - (block128_f)vpaes_decrypt, - NULL)) - return 0; - break; - } -#endif - AES_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &octx->ksenc.ks); - AES_set_decrypt_key(key, keylen, &octx->ksdec.ks); - if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_init(&octx->ocb, - &octx->ksenc.ks, &octx->ksdec.ks, - (block128_f)AES_encrypt, - (block128_f)AES_decrypt, - NULL)) - return 0; - } while (0); - - /* - * If we have an iv we can set it directly, otherwise use saved IV. - */ - if (iv == NULL && octx->iv_set) - iv = octx->iv; - if (iv) { - if (CRYPTO_ocb128_setiv(&octx->ocb, iv, octx->ivlen, octx->taglen) - != 1) - return 0; - octx->iv_set = 1; - } - octx->key_set = 1; - } else { - /* If key set use IV, otherwise copy */ - if (octx->key_set) - CRYPTO_ocb128_setiv(&octx->ocb, iv, octx->ivlen, octx->taglen); - else - memcpy(octx->iv, iv, octx->ivlen); - octx->iv_set = 1; - } - return 1; -} - -static int aes_ocb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, size_t len) -{ - unsigned char *buf; - int *buf_len; - int written_len = 0; - size_t trailing_len; - EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *octx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_OCB_CTX, ctx); - - /* If IV or Key not set then return error */ - if (!octx->iv_set) - return -1; - - if (!octx->key_set) - return -1; - - if (in != NULL) { - /* - * Need to ensure we are only passing full blocks to low-level OCB - * routines. We do it here rather than in EVP_EncryptUpdate/ - * EVP_DecryptUpdate because we need to pass full blocks of AAD too - * and those routines don't support that - */ - - /* Are we dealing with AAD or normal data here? */ - if (out == NULL) { - buf = octx->aad_buf; - buf_len = &(octx->aad_buf_len); - } else { - buf = octx->data_buf; - buf_len = &(octx->data_buf_len); - - if (ossl_is_partially_overlapping(out + *buf_len, in, (int)len)) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPING); - return 0; - } - } - - /* - * If we've got a partially filled buffer from a previous call then - * use that data first - */ - if (*buf_len > 0) { - unsigned int remaining; - - remaining = AES_BLOCK_SIZE - (*buf_len); - if (remaining > len) { - memcpy(buf + (*buf_len), in, len); - *(buf_len) += (int)len; - return 0; - } - memcpy(buf + (*buf_len), in, remaining); - - /* - * If we get here we've filled the buffer, so process it - */ - len -= remaining; - in += remaining; - if (out == NULL) { - if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_aad(&octx->ocb, buf, AES_BLOCK_SIZE)) - return -1; - } else if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)) { - if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_encrypt(&octx->ocb, buf, out, - AES_BLOCK_SIZE)) - return -1; - } else { - if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_decrypt(&octx->ocb, buf, out, - AES_BLOCK_SIZE)) - return -1; - } - written_len = AES_BLOCK_SIZE; - *buf_len = 0; - if (out != NULL) - out += AES_BLOCK_SIZE; - } - - /* Do we have a partial block to handle at the end? */ - trailing_len = len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE; - - /* - * If we've got some full blocks to handle, then process these first - */ - if (len != trailing_len) { - if (out == NULL) { - if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_aad(&octx->ocb, in, len - trailing_len)) - return -1; - } else if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)) { - if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_encrypt(&octx->ocb, in, out, len - trailing_len)) - return -1; - } else { - if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_decrypt(&octx->ocb, in, out, len - trailing_len)) - return -1; - } - written_len += (int)(len - trailing_len); - in += len - trailing_len; - } - - /* Handle any trailing partial block */ - if (trailing_len > 0) { - memcpy(buf, in, trailing_len); - *buf_len = (int)trailing_len; - } - - return written_len; - } else { - /* - * First of all empty the buffer of any partial block that we might - * have been provided - both for data and AAD - */ - if (octx->data_buf_len > 0) { - if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)) { - if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_encrypt(&octx->ocb, octx->data_buf, out, - octx->data_buf_len)) - return -1; - } else { - if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_decrypt(&octx->ocb, octx->data_buf, out, - octx->data_buf_len)) - return -1; - } - written_len = octx->data_buf_len; - octx->data_buf_len = 0; - } - if (octx->aad_buf_len > 0) { - if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_aad(&octx->ocb, octx->aad_buf, octx->aad_buf_len)) - return -1; - octx->aad_buf_len = 0; - } - /* If decrypting then verify */ - if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)) { - if (octx->taglen < 0) - return -1; - if (CRYPTO_ocb128_finish(&octx->ocb, - octx->tag, octx->taglen) - != 0) - return -1; - octx->iv_set = 0; - return written_len; - } - /* If encrypting then just get the tag */ - if (CRYPTO_ocb128_tag(&octx->ocb, octx->tag, 16) != 1) - return -1; - /* Don't reuse the IV */ - octx->iv_set = 0; - return written_len; - } -} - -static int aes_ocb_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c) -{ - EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *octx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_OCB_CTX, c); - CRYPTO_ocb128_cleanup(&octx->ocb); - return 1; -} - BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 128, 16, 12, ocb, OCB, EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS) - BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 192, 16, 12, ocb, OCB, - EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS) - BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 256, 16, 12, ocb, OCB, - EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS) +BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 192, 16, 12, ocb, OCB, + EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS) +BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 256, 16, 12, ocb, OCB, + EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS) #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_OCB */