Tomas Mraz [Mon, 22 Mar 2021 08:51:52 +0000 (08:51 +0000)]
check_chain_extensions: Do not override error return value by check_curve
The X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT flag enables additional security checks of the
certificates present in a certificate chain. It is not set by default.
Starting from OpenSSL version 1.1.1h a check to disallow certificates with
explicitly encoded elliptic curve parameters in the chain was added to the
strict checks.
An error in the implementation of this check meant that the result of a
previous check to confirm that certificates in the chain are valid CA
certificates was overwritten. This effectively bypasses the check
that non-CA certificates must not be able to issue other certificates.
If a "purpose" has been configured then a subsequent check that the
certificate is consistent with that purpose also checks that it is a
valid CA. Therefore where a purpose is set the certificate chain will
still be rejected even when the strict flag has been used. A purpose is
set by default in libssl client and server certificate verification
routines, but it can be overriden by an application.
Affected applications explicitly set the X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
verification flag and either do not set a purpose for the certificate
verification or, in the case of TLS client or server applications,
override the default purpose to make it not set.
CVE-2021-3450
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Chenglong Zhang [Mon, 22 Mar 2021 07:29:28 +0000 (15:29 +0800)]
Fix missing INVALID_EXTENSION
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14639)
Richard Levitte [Sat, 20 Mar 2021 08:09:40 +0000 (09:09 +0100)]
ASN1: Reset the content dump flag after dumping
When encountering a badly coded item, the DER printer (ASN1_print_dump())
sets a flag to ensure that an additional hex dump of the offending content
is printed as part of the output. Unfortunately, this flag is never reset,
which means that all following items are printed with the extra hex dump,
whether they are faulty or not.
Resetting the flag after hex dumping ensures that only the faulty contents
are printed with the additional hex dump.
Fixes #14626
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14627)
Matt Caswell [Thu, 18 Mar 2021 10:22:51 +0000 (10:22 +0000)]
Add a missing RUN_ONCE in rand_lib.c
Some of the callbacks in rand_lib.c were being invoked without the
RUN_ONCE for that file being called. We add it during rand_pool_new
which should cover all cases.
Fixes #7870
Fixes #11144
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14603)
Pauli [Wed, 17 Mar 2021 02:23:52 +0000 (12:23 +1000)]
apps: fix coverity 966560: division by zero
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14586)
Benjamin Kaduk [Wed, 24 Feb 2021 21:38:25 +0000 (13:38 -0800)]
Check ASN1_item_ndef_i2d() return value.
Return an error instead of trying to malloc a negative number.
The other usage in this file already had a similar check, and the caller
should have put an entry on the error stack already.
Note that we only check the initial calls to obtain the encoded length,
and assume that the follow-up call to actually encode to the allocated
storage will succeed if the first one did.
Fixes: #14177 Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14308)
Mark [Wed, 24 Feb 2021 13:14:08 +0000 (14:14 +0100)]
Fix filename escaping in c_rehash
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14301)
jwalch [Fri, 19 Feb 2021 18:02:27 +0000 (13:02 -0500)]
Fix an integer overflow in o_time.c
If input offset_sec is sufficiently large (> INT32_MAX * SECS_PER_DAY, which is possible for a long on 64-bit platforms), then the first assignment contains an overflow.
I think leaving offset_hms as an int is still safe.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14252)
The incorrect code is in #ifdef branch that is normally
not compiled in.
Signed-off-by: Zhang Jinde <zjd5536@163.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12968)
John Baldwin [Sat, 21 Nov 2020 01:07:35 +0000 (17:07 -0800)]
Use CRIOGET to fetch a crypto descriptor when present.
FreeBSD's current /dev/crypto implementation requires that consumers
clone a separate file descriptor via the CRIOGET ioctl that can then
be used with other ioctls such as CIOCGSESSION.
Matt Caswell [Fri, 22 Jan 2021 16:50:11 +0000 (16:50 +0000)]
Fix rsa_test to properly test RSA_SSLV23_PADDING
We test all three cases:
- An SSLv2 only client talking to a TLS capable server
- A TLS capable client talking to an SSLv2 only server
- A TLS capable client talking to a TLS capable server (should fail due
to detecting a rollback attack)
Matt Caswell [Fri, 22 Jan 2021 16:38:50 +0000 (16:38 +0000)]
Fix the RSA_SSLV23_PADDING padding type
This also fixes the public function RSA_padding_check_SSLv23.
Commit 6555a89 changed the padding check logic in RSA_padding_check_SSLv23
so that padding is rejected if the nul delimiter byte is not immediately
preceded by at least 8 bytes containing 0x03. Prior to that commit the
padding is rejected if it *is* preceded by at least 8 bytes containing 0x03.
Presumably this change was made to be consistent with what it says in
appendix E.3 of RFC 5246. Unfortunately that RFC is in error, and the
original behaviour was correct. This is fixed in later errata issued for
that RFC.
This has no impact on libssl for modern versions of OpenSSL because
there is no protocol support for SSLv2 in these versions. However
applications that call RSA_paddin_check_SSLv23 directly, or use the
RSA_SSLV23_PADDING mode may still be impacted. The effect of the original
error is that an RSA message encrypted by an SSLv2 only client will fail to
be decrypted properly by a TLS capable server, or a message encrypted by a
TLS capable client will fail to decrypt on an SSLv2 only server. Most
significantly an RSA message encrypted by a TLS capable client will be
successfully decrypted by a TLS capable server. This last case should fail
due to a rollback being detected.
Thanks to D. Katz and Joel Luellwitz (both from Trustwave) for reporting
this issue.
Matt Caswell [Wed, 10 Feb 2021 16:36:57 +0000 (16:36 +0000)]
Test that X509_issuer_and_serial_hash doesn't crash
Provide a certificate with a bad issuer and check that
X509_issuer_and_serial_hash doesn't crash.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 55869f594f052561b11a2db6a7c42690051868de)
Matt Caswell [Wed, 10 Feb 2021 16:10:36 +0000 (16:10 +0000)]
Fix Null pointer deref in X509_issuer_and_serial_hash()
The OpenSSL public API function X509_issuer_and_serial_hash() attempts
to create a unique hash value based on the issuer and serial number data
contained within an X509 certificate. However it fails to correctly
handle any errors that may occur while parsing the issuer field (which
might occur if the issuer field is maliciously constructed). This may
subsequently result in a NULL pointer deref and a crash leading to a
potential denial of service attack.
The function X509_issuer_and_serial_hash() is never directly called by
OpenSSL itself so applications are only vulnerable if they use this
function directly and they use it on certificates that may have been
obtained from untrusted sources.
CVE-2021-23841
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8130d654d1de922ea224fa18ee3bc7262edc39c0)
Benjamin Kaduk [Wed, 27 Jan 2021 20:19:08 +0000 (12:19 -0800)]
Remove unused 'peer_type' from SSL_SESSION
This field has not been used since #3858 was merged in 2017 when we
moved to a table-based lookup for certificate type properties instead of
an index-based one.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13991)
Richard Levitte [Fri, 5 Feb 2021 14:00:17 +0000 (15:00 +0100)]
configdata.pm: Better display of enabled/disabled options
The options listed in the array @disablables are regular expressions.
For most of them, it's not visible, but there are a few.
However, configdata.pm didn't quite treat them that way, which meant
that the few that are visibly regular expressions, there's a
difference between that and the corresponding the key in %disabled,
which is never a regular expression.
To correctly display the enabled and disabled options with --dump,
we must therefore go through a bit of Perl gymnastics to get the
output correct enough, primarly so that disabled features don't look
enabled.
Fixes #13790
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14081)
Jay Satiro [Fri, 5 Feb 2021 08:42:06 +0000 (03:42 -0500)]
NOTES.WIN: fix typo
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14078)
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14029)
Tim Hitchins [Wed, 20 Jan 2021 11:35:33 +0000 (11:35 +0000)]
Fix typo in crl2pkcs documentation
Fixes #13910
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13911)
Matt Caswell [Wed, 6 Jan 2021 17:03:44 +0000 (17:03 +0000)]
Ensure SRP BN_mod_exp follows the constant time path
SRP_Calc_client_key calls BN_mod_exp with private data. However it was
not setting BN_FLG_CONSTTIME and therefore not using the constant time
implementation. This could be exploited in a side channel attack to
recover the password.
Since the attack is local host only this is outside of the current OpenSSL
threat model and therefore no CVE is assigned.
Thanks to Mohammed Sabt and Daniel De Almeida Braga for reporting this
issue.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13889)
Todd Short [Wed, 2 Sep 2020 20:57:46 +0000 (16:57 -0400)]
Fix -static builds
Pull in check from #10878
Move disabling of pic, threads and statics up higher before they
are checked.
Fixes #12772
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12773)
anupamam13 [Mon, 2 Nov 2020 12:20:11 +0000 (17:50 +0530)]
Fix for negative return value from `SSL_CTX_sess_accept()`
Fixes #13183
From the original issue report, before this commit, on master and on
1.1.1, the issue can be detected with the following steps:
- Start with a default SSL_CTX, initiate a TLS 1.3 connection with SNI,
"Accept" count of default context gets incremented
- After servername lookup, "Accept" count of default context gets
decremented and that of SNI context is incremented
- Server sends a "Hello Retry Request"
- Client sends the second "Client Hello", now again "Accept" count of
default context is decremented. Hence giving a negative value.
This commit fixes it by adding a check on `s->hello_retry_request` in
addition to `SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)`, to ensure the counter is moved
only on the first ClientHello.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13297)
Matt Caswell [Thu, 10 Dec 2020 10:36:23 +0000 (10:36 +0000)]
Ensure DTLS free functions can handle NULL
Our free functions should be able to deal with the case where the object
being freed is NULL. This turns out to not be quite the case for DTLS
related objects.
Fixes #13649
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13655)
This fix is identical to one of the changes made in 3405db9, which I
discovered right after taking a quick stab at fixing this.
CLA: trivial
Fixes #7878
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13757)
Ingo Schwarze [Thu, 4 Jun 2020 22:30:00 +0000 (00:30 +0200)]
Fix NULL pointer access caused by X509_ATTRIBUTE_create()
When X509_ATTRIBUTE_create() receives an invalid NID (e.g., -1), return
failure rather than silently constructing a broken X509_ATTRIBUTE object
that might cause NULL pointer accesses later on. This matters because
X509_ATTRIBUTE_create() is used by API functions like PKCS7_add_attribute(3)
and the NID comes straight from the user.
This bug was found while working on LibreSSL documentation.
Reviewed-by: Theo Buehler <tb@openbsd.org>
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12052)
Richard Levitte [Thu, 17 Dec 2020 20:55:07 +0000 (21:55 +0100)]
GitHub CI: Add 'check-update' and 'check-docs'
'check-update' runs a 'make update' to check that it wasn't forgotten.
'check-docs' runs 'make doc-nits'. We have that as a separate job to
make it more prominent.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13701)
Rich Salz [Wed, 16 Dec 2020 15:32:20 +0000 (10:32 -0500)]
Document OCSP_REQ_CTX_i2d.
This is a backport of the documentation from #13620.
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13691)
Define B_ENDIAN on PowerPC because it is a big endian architecture. With
this change the BN* related tests pass.
Fixes: #12199 Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12371)
Matt Caswell [Tue, 3 Nov 2020 15:51:23 +0000 (15:51 +0000)]
Test that we can negotiate TLSv1.3 if we have an SNI callback
If an SNI callback has been set then we may have no certificuates suitable
for TLSv1.3 use configured for the current SSL_CTX. This should not prevent
us from negotiating TLSv1.3, since we may change the SSL_CTX by the time we
need a suitable certificate.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13305)
Matt Caswell [Tue, 3 Nov 2020 14:01:46 +0000 (14:01 +0000)]
Modify is_tls13_capable() to take account of the servername cb
A servername cb may change the available certificates, so if we have one
set then we cannot rely on the configured certificates to determine if we
are capable of negotiating TLSv1.3 or not.
Fixes #13291
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13305)
Nan Xiao [Tue, 8 Dec 2020 04:35:31 +0000 (12:35 +0800)]
Fix typo in OPENSSL_malloc.pod
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13632)
Matt Caswell [Thu, 12 Nov 2020 14:55:31 +0000 (14:55 +0000)]
Complain if we are attempting to encode with an invalid ASN.1 template
It never makes sense for multi-string or CHOICE types to have implicit
tagging. If we have a template that uses the in this way then we
should immediately fail.
Thanks to David Benjamin from Google for reporting this issue.
Matt Caswell [Thu, 12 Nov 2020 11:58:12 +0000 (11:58 +0000)]
Check that multi-strings/CHOICE types don't use implicit tagging
It never makes sense for multi-string or CHOICE types to use implicit
tagging since the content would be ambiguous. It is an error in the
template if this ever happens. If we detect it we should stop parsing.
Thanks to David Benjamin from Google for reporting this issue.
x509_vfy.c: Restore rejection of expired trusted (root) certificate
The certificate path validation procedure specified in RFC 5280 does not
include checking the validity period of the trusted (root) certificate.
Still it is common good practice to perform this check.
Also OpenSSL did this until version 1.1.1h, yet
commit e2590c3a162eb118c36b09c2168164283aa099b4 accidentally killed it.
The current commit restores the previous behavior.
It also removes the cause of that bug, namely counter-intuitive design
of the internal function check_issued(), which was complicated by checks
that actually belong to some other internal function, namely find_issuer().
Moreover, this commit adds a regression check and proper documentation of
the root cert validity period check feature, which had been missing so far.
Fixes #13471
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13585)
Stuart Carnie [Sat, 4 Jul 2020 18:41:43 +0000 (11:41 -0700)]
Configuration: darwin64-arm64-cc for Apple silicon
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12369)
Ard Biesheuvel [Tue, 24 Nov 2020 16:33:31 +0000 (17:33 +0100)]
aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl: avoid 32-bit lane assignment in CTR mode
ARM Cortex-A57 and Cortex-A72 cores running in 32-bit mode are affected
by silicon errata #1742098 [0] and #1655431 [1], respectively, where the
second instruction of a AES instruction pair may execute twice if an
interrupt is taken right after the first instruction consumes an input
register of which a single 32-bit lane has been updated the last time it
was modified.
This is not such a rare occurrence as it may seem: in counter mode, only
the least significant 32-bit word is incremented in the absence of a
carry, which makes our counter mode implementation susceptible to these
errata.
So let's shuffle the counter assignments around a bit so that the most
recent updates when the AES instruction pair executes are 128-bit wide.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13571)
ihsinme [Wed, 25 Nov 2020 19:09:33 +0000 (22:09 +0300)]
Update bio_ok.c
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13515)
Return immediately on matched cipher. Without this patch the code only breaks out of the inner for loop, meaning for a matched TLS13 cipher the code will still loop through 160ish SSL3 ciphers.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit d93bded6aa2852e681de2ed76fb43c415687af68)
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13280)
PAC pointer authentication signs the return address against the value
of the stack pointer, to prevent stack overrun exploits from corrupting
the control flow. However, this requires that the AUTIASP is issued with
SP holding the same value as it held when the PAC value was generated.
The Poly1305 armv8 code got this wrong, resulting in crashes on PAC
capable hardware.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13256)
André Klitzing [Wed, 18 Mar 2020 15:04:06 +0000 (16:04 +0100)]
Allow to continue on UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE
This unifies the behaviour of a single certificate with
an unknown CA certificate with a self-signed certificate.
The user callback can mask that error to retrieve additional
error information. So the user application can decide to
abort the connection instead to be forced by openssl.
This change in behaviour is backward compatible as user callbacks
who don't want to ignore UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE will
still abort the connection by default.
CLA: trivial
Fixes #11297
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11359)
Romain Geissler [Fri, 2 Oct 2020 00:07:32 +0000 (00:07 +0000)]
Fix aarch64 static linking into shared libraries (see issue #10842 and pull request #11464)
Cherry-pick of https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13056 for branch 1.1.1. Tested against
the release 1.1.1h
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13218)
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13193)
xuyunjia [Sun, 18 Oct 2020 15:33:54 +0000 (23:33 +0800)]
resolve defects: reverse_inull; row[DB_exp_date] referenced before checking
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13170)
Matt Caswell [Thu, 15 Oct 2020 10:40:18 +0000 (11:40 +0100)]
Add a CHANGES entry for the SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH change
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13136)
In most places this is what is passed. All these places occur server side.
However there is one client side call of this security operation and it
passes a DH object instead. This is incorrect according to the
definition of SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, and is inconsistent with all of the other
locations.
Our own default security callback, and the debug callback in the apps,
never look at this value and therefore this issue was never noticed
previously. In theory a client side application could be relying on this
behaviour and could be broken by this change. This is probably fairly
unlikely but can't be ruled out.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13136)
Yury Is [Mon, 12 Oct 2020 23:28:26 +0000 (02:28 +0300)]
syscall_random(): don't fail if the getentropy() function is a dummy
Several embedded toolchains may provide dummy implemented getentropy()
function which always returns -1 and sets errno to the ENOSYS.
As a result the function SSL_CTX_new() fails to create a new context.
Fixes #13002
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13112)
Benny Baumann [Thu, 1 Oct 2020 23:06:12 +0000 (01:06 +0200)]
Avoid memory leak of parent on allocation failure for child structure
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13055)
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