Signed-off-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4a1f2071a6028a761bbe7efee20e9654851b51f0)
Signed-off-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit a8bd8f22aac2c223e85e318dba7af8b64052b053)
Signed-off-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7cabbec2eaf5aefd3751c635c12556eca590f506)
Signed-off-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 532701e3cce9d15e95166ee7c24cd1e4af51fcc4)
Signed-off-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 740e704bd68a6b618b62336ba1583c0edeb82d6f)
Signed-off-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit bdab834dfad55776155915f7ec410b5a192406fa)
Signed-off-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit e4afb211fe32f2aa92cc903df948874046f60305)
Signed-off-by: Christof Schmitt <cs@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Björn Jacke <bjacke@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Björn Jacke <bjacke@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Nov 15 19:55:07 UTC 2023 on atb-devel-224
vfs_gpfs: Move vfs_gpfs_fstatat to nfs4_acls.c and rename function
All stat DAC_CAP_OVERRIDE code is being moved to nfs4_acls.c to allow
reuse. Move the vfs_gpfs_fstatat function and rename it to the more
generic name nfs4_acl_fstat.
vfs_gpfs: Move vfs_gpfs_lstat to nfs4_acls.c and rename function
All stat CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE code is being moved to nf4_acls.c to allow
reuse. Move the vfs_gpfs_lstat function and rename to the more generic
name nfs4_acl_lstat.
vfs_gpfs: Move vfs_gpfs_fstat to nfs4_acls.c and rename function
All stat DAC_CAP_OVERRIDE code is moving to nfs4_acls.c to allow reuse.
Move the vfs_gpfs_fstat function and rename to the more generic name
nfs4_acl_fstat.
vfs_gpfs: Move vfs_gpfs_stat to nfs4_acls.c and rename function
All stat DAC_CAP_OVERRIDE code is moving to nfs4_acls.c to allow reuse
by other file system modules. Also rename the function to the more
generic name nfs4_acl_stat.
vfs_gpfs: Move stat_with_capability to nfs4_acls.c and rename function
All stat CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE code is moving to nfs4_acls.c to allow reuse
by other filesystem modules. Also rename the function to the slightly
more precise name stat_with_cap_dac_overide.
AT_EMTPY_PATH does not exist on AIX. Address this by implementing an
override for fstat. Implement the new override function in nfs4_acls.c
since all stat functions with DAC_CAP_OVERRIDE will be moved there to
allow reuse by other filesystems.
Signed-off-by: Christof Schmitt <cs@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Ralph Böhme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Nov 8 18:42:13 UTC 2023 on atb-devel-224
Ralph Boehme [Thu, 16 Nov 2023 09:50:32 +0000 (10:50 +0100)]
smbd: fix close order of base_fsp and stream_fsp in smb_fname_fsp_destructor()
VFS modules like streams_xattr use the function fsp_is_alternate_stream() on the
fsp to determine in an fsp is a stream, eg in streams_xattr_close(). If
fspo->base_fsp is arlready set to NULL, this won't work anymore.
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Nov 16 18:31:17 UTC 2023 on atb-devel-224
Ralph Boehme [Wed, 20 Sep 2023 21:21:44 +0000 (14:21 -0700)]
s3: smbd: Ignore fstat() error on deleted stream in fd_close().
In the fd_close() fsp->fsp_flags.fstat_before_close code path.
If this is a stream and delete-on-close was set, the
backing object (an xattr from streams_xattr) might
already be deleted so fstat() fails with
NT_STATUS_NOT_FOUND. So if fsp refers to a stream we
ignore the error and only bail for normal files where
an fstat() should still work. NB. We cannot use
fsp_is_alternate_stream(fsp) for this as the base_fsp
has already been closed at this point and so the value
fsp_is_alternate_stream() checks for is already NULL.
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Oct 10 09:39:27 UTC 2023 on atb-devel-224
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 97e4aab1a6e2feda7c6c6fdeaa7c3e1818c55566)
Autobuild-User(v4-18-test): Jule Anger <janger@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(v4-18-test): Mon Oct 23 09:52:22 UTC 2023 on atb-devel-224
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 70586061128f90afa33f25e104d4570a1cf778db)
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 498542be0bbf4f26558573c1f87b77b8e3509371)
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7f8b15faa76d05023c987fac2c4c31f9ac61bb47)
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0c329a0fda37d87ed737e4b579b6d04ec907604c)
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3be190dcf7153e479383f7f3d29ddca43fe121b8)
Signed-off-by: Michael Adam <obnox@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Christof Schmitt <christof.schmitt@us.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Oct 17 04:16:29 UTC 2023 on atb-devel-224
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwenke <mschwenke@ddn.com> Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Martin Schwenke <martins@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Sep 21 00:46:50 UTC 2023 on atb-devel-224
Andrew Bartlett [Tue, 12 Sep 2023 00:28:49 +0000 (12:28 +1200)]
CVE-2023-42670 s3-rpc_server: Strictly refuse to start RPC servers in conflict with AD DC
Just as we refuse to start NETLOGON except on the DC, we must refuse
to start all of the RPC services that are provided by the AD DC.
Most critically of course this applies to netlogon, lsa and samr.
This avoids the supression of these services being the result of a
runtime epmapper lookup, as if that fails these services can disrupt
service to end users by listening on the same socket as the AD DC
servers.
Andrew Bartlett [Tue, 12 Sep 2023 07:01:03 +0000 (19:01 +1200)]
CVE-2023-42669 s3-rpc_server: Disable rpcecho for consistency with the AD DC
The rpcecho server in source3 does have samba the sleep() feature that
the s4 version has, but the task architecture is different, so there
is not the same impact. Hoever equally this is not something that
should be enabled on production builds of Samba, so restrict to
selftest builds.
Andrew Bartlett [Tue, 12 Sep 2023 06:59:44 +0000 (18:59 +1200)]
CVE-2023-42669 s4-rpc_server: Disable rpcecho server by default
The rpcecho server is useful in development and testing, but should never
have been allowed into production, as it includes the facility to
do a blocking sleep() in the single-threaded rpc worker.
Andrew Bartlett [Tue, 8 Aug 2023 05:58:27 +0000 (17:58 +1200)]
CVE-2023-4154: Unimplement the original DirSync behaviour without LDAP_DIRSYNC_OBJECT_SECURITY
This makes LDAP_DIRSYNC_OBJECT_SECURITY the only behaviour provided by
Samba.
Having a second access control system withing the LDAP stack is unsafe
and this layer is incomplete.
The current system gives all accounts that have been given the
GUID_DRS_GET_CHANGES extended right SYSTEM access. Currently in Samba
this equates to full access to passwords as well as "RODC Filtered
attributes" (often used with confidential attributes).
Rather than attempting to correctly filter for secrets (passwords) and
these filtered attributes, as well as preventing search expressions for
both, we leave this complexity to the acl_read module which has this
facility already well tested.
The implication is that callers will only see and filter by attribute
in DirSync that they could without DirSync.
The aim here is to document the expected (even if not implemented)
SEARCH_FLAG_RODC_ATTRIBUTE vs SEARCH_FLAG_CONFIDENTIAL, behaviour, so
that any change once CVE-2023-4154 is fixed can be noted.
Andrew Bartlett [Tue, 8 Aug 2023 02:30:19 +0000 (14:30 +1200)]
CVE-2023-4154 dsdb/tests: Add test for SEARCH_FLAG_RODC_ATTRIBUTE behaviour
SEARCH_FLAG_RODC_ATTRIBUTE should be like SEARCH_FLAG_CONFIDENTIAL,
but for DirSync and DRS replication. Accounts with
GUID_DRS_GET_CHANGES rights should not be able to read this
attribute.
Andrew Bartlett [Mon, 7 Aug 2023 23:18:46 +0000 (11:18 +1200)]
CVE-2023-4154 dsdb/tests: Speed up DirSync test by only checking positive matches once
When we (expect to) get back a result, do not waste time against a potentially
slow server confirming we also get back results for all the other attribute
combinations.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
(cherry picked from commit 2c02378029fff6636b8f19e45af78b265f2210ed)
CVE-2023-4154 libcli/security: prepare security_descriptor_acl_add() to place the ace at a position
Often it is important to insert an ace at a specific position in the
ACL. As a default we still append by default by using -1, which is the
generic version of passing the number of existing aces.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
(cherry picked from commit c3cb915a67aff6739b72b86d7d139609df309ada)
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
(cherry picked from commit 9d8ff0d1e0b2ba7c84af36e1931f5bc99902a44b)
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
(cherry picked from commit 4627997ddae44265ad35b3234232eb74458c6c34)
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
(cherry picked from commit 9ea06aaf9f57e3c7094553d9ac40fb73057a9b74)
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
(cherry picked from commit a1109a9bf12e020636b8d66fc54984aac58bfe6b)
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
(cherry picked from commit 8411e6d302e25d10f1035ebbdcbde7308566e930)
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8b4e6f7b3fb8018cb64deef9b8e1cbc2e5ba12cf)
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
(cherry picked from commit b29793ffdee5d9b9c1c05830622e80f7faec7670)
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2e5d08c908b3fa48b9b374279a331061cb77bce3)
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
(cherry picked from commit 82d2ec786f7e75ff6f34eb3357964345b10de091)
Ralph Boehme [Tue, 1 Aug 2023 11:04:36 +0000 (13:04 +0200)]
CVE-2023-4091: smbd: use open_access_mask for access check in open_file()
If the client requested FILE_OVERWRITE[_IF], we're implicitly adding
FILE_WRITE_DATA to the open_access_mask in open_file_ntcreate(), but for the
access check we're using access_mask which doesn't contain the additional
right, which means we can end up truncating a file for which the user has
only read-only access via an SD.
Andrew Bartlett [Tue, 12 Sep 2023 00:28:49 +0000 (12:28 +1200)]
CVE-2023-42670 s3-rpc_server: Strictly refuse to start RPC servers in conflict with AD DC
Just as we refuse to start NETLOGON except on the DC, we must refuse
to start all of the RPC services that are provided by the AD DC.
Most critically of course this applies to netlogon, lsa and samr.
This avoids the supression of these services being the result of a
runtime epmapper lookup, as if that fails these services can disrupt
service to end users by listening on the same socket as the AD DC
servers.
Andrew Bartlett [Tue, 12 Sep 2023 07:01:03 +0000 (19:01 +1200)]
CVE-2023-42669 s3-rpc_server: Disable rpcecho for consistency with the AD DC
The rpcecho server in source3 does have samba the sleep() feature that
the s4 version has, but the task architecture is different, so there
is not the same impact. Hoever equally this is not something that
should be enabled on production builds of Samba, so restrict to
selftest builds.
Andrew Bartlett [Tue, 12 Sep 2023 06:59:44 +0000 (18:59 +1200)]
CVE-2023-42669 s4-rpc_server: Disable rpcecho server by default
The rpcecho server is useful in development and testing, but should never
have been allowed into production, as it includes the facility to
do a blocking sleep() in the single-threaded rpc worker.
Andrew Bartlett [Tue, 8 Aug 2023 05:58:27 +0000 (17:58 +1200)]
CVE-2023-4154: Unimplement the original DirSync behaviour without LDAP_DIRSYNC_OBJECT_SECURITY
This makes LDAP_DIRSYNC_OBJECT_SECURITY the only behaviour provided by
Samba.
Having a second access control system withing the LDAP stack is unsafe
and this layer is incomplete.
The current system gives all accounts that have been given the
GUID_DRS_GET_CHANGES extended right SYSTEM access. Currently in Samba
this equates to full access to passwords as well as "RODC Filtered
attributes" (often used with confidential attributes).
Rather than attempting to correctly filter for secrets (passwords) and
these filtered attributes, as well as preventing search expressions for
both, we leave this complexity to the acl_read module which has this
facility already well tested.
The implication is that callers will only see and filter by attribute
in DirSync that they could without DirSync.
The aim here is to document the expected (even if not implemented)
SEARCH_FLAG_RODC_ATTRIBUTE vs SEARCH_FLAG_CONFIDENTIAL, behaviour, so
that any change once CVE-2023-4154 is fixed can be noted.
Andrew Bartlett [Tue, 8 Aug 2023 02:30:19 +0000 (14:30 +1200)]
CVE-2023-4154 dsdb/tests: Add test for SEARCH_FLAG_RODC_ATTRIBUTE behaviour
SEARCH_FLAG_RODC_ATTRIBUTE should be like SEARCH_FLAG_CONFIDENTIAL,
but for DirSync and DRS replication. Accounts with
GUID_DRS_GET_CHANGES rights should not be able to read this
attribute.
Andrew Bartlett [Mon, 7 Aug 2023 23:18:46 +0000 (11:18 +1200)]
CVE-2023-4154 dsdb/tests: Speed up DirSync test by only checking positive matches once
When we (expect to) get back a result, do not waste time against a potentially
slow server confirming we also get back results for all the other attribute
combinations.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
(cherry picked from commit 2c02378029fff6636b8f19e45af78b265f2210ed)
CVE-2023-4154 libcli/security: prepare security_descriptor_acl_add() to place the ace at a position
Often it is important to insert an ace at a specific position in the
ACL. As a default we still append by default by using -1, which is the
generic version of passing the number of existing aces.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
(cherry picked from commit c3cb915a67aff6739b72b86d7d139609df309ada)
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
(cherry picked from commit 9d8ff0d1e0b2ba7c84af36e1931f5bc99902a44b)
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
(cherry picked from commit 4627997ddae44265ad35b3234232eb74458c6c34)
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
(cherry picked from commit 9ea06aaf9f57e3c7094553d9ac40fb73057a9b74)
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
(cherry picked from commit a1109a9bf12e020636b8d66fc54984aac58bfe6b)
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
(cherry picked from commit 8411e6d302e25d10f1035ebbdcbde7308566e930)
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8b4e6f7b3fb8018cb64deef9b8e1cbc2e5ba12cf)
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
(cherry picked from commit b29793ffdee5d9b9c1c05830622e80f7faec7670)
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2e5d08c908b3fa48b9b374279a331061cb77bce3)
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
(cherry picked from commit 82d2ec786f7e75ff6f34eb3357964345b10de091)
Ralph Boehme [Tue, 1 Aug 2023 11:04:36 +0000 (13:04 +0200)]
CVE-2023-4091: smbd: use open_access_mask for access check in open_file()
If the client requested FILE_OVERWRITE[_IF], we're implicitly adding
FILE_WRITE_DATA to the open_access_mask in open_file_ntcreate(), but for the
access check we're using access_mask which doesn't contain the additional
right, which means we can end up truncating a file for which the user has
only read-only access via an SD.