Taylor Blau [Fri, 30 Sep 2022 20:47:00 +0000 (16:47 -0400)]
t7814: prepare for changing protocol.file.allow
Explicitly cloning over the "file://" protocol in t7814 in preparation
for merging a security release which will change the default value of
this configuration to be "user".
Taylor Blau [Fri, 30 Sep 2022 20:47:00 +0000 (16:47 -0400)]
t5537: prepare for changing protocol.file.allow
Explicitly cloning over the "file://" protocol in t5537 in preparation
for merging a security release which will change the default value of
this configuration to be "user".
Taylor Blau [Fri, 30 Sep 2022 20:47:00 +0000 (16:47 -0400)]
t5516: prepare for changing protocol.file.allow
Explicitly cloning over the "file://" protocol in t5516 in preparation
for merging a security release which will change the default value of
this configuration to be "user".
Taylor Blau [Fri, 30 Sep 2022 20:47:00 +0000 (16:47 -0400)]
t3207: prepare for changing protocol.file.allow
Explicitly cloning over the "file://" protocol in t3207 in preparation
for merging a security release which will change the default value of
this configuration to be "user".
Taylor Blau [Fri, 30 Sep 2022 20:48:56 +0000 (16:48 -0400)]
t2080: prepare for changing protocol.file.allow
Explicitly cloning over the "file://" protocol in t1092 in preparation
for merging a security release which will change the default value of
this configuration to be "user".
Taylor Blau [Fri, 30 Sep 2022 20:47:00 +0000 (16:47 -0400)]
t1092: prepare for changing protocol.file.allow
Explicitly cloning over the "file://" protocol in t1092 in preparation
for merging a security release which will change the default value of
this configuration to be "user".
Taylor Blau [Fri, 30 Sep 2022 20:48:56 +0000 (16:48 -0400)]
t2080: prepare for changing protocol.file.allow
Explicitly cloning over the "file://" protocol in t1092 in preparation
for merging a security release which will change the default value of
this configuration to be "user".
Taylor Blau [Fri, 30 Sep 2022 20:47:00 +0000 (16:47 -0400)]
t1092: prepare for changing protocol.file.allow
Explicitly cloning over the "file://" protocol in t1092 in preparation
for merging a security release which will change the default value of
this configuration to be "user".
Kevin Backhouse [Wed, 28 Sep 2022 22:53:32 +0000 (18:53 -0400)]
alias.c: reject too-long cmdline strings in split_cmdline()
This function improperly uses an int to represent the number of entries
in the resulting argument array. This allows a malicious actor to
intentionally overflow the return value, leading to arbitrary heap
writes.
Because the resulting argv array is typically passed to execv(), it may
be possible to leverage this attack to gain remote code execution on a
victim machine. This was almost certainly the case for certain
configurations of git-shell until the previous commit limited the size
of input it would accept. Other calls to split_cmdline() are typically
limited by the size of argv the OS is willing to hand us, so are
similarly protected.
So this is not strictly fixing a known vulnerability, but is a hardening
of the function that is worth doing to protect against possible unknown
vulnerabilities.
One approach to fixing this would be modifying the signature of
`split_cmdline()` to look something like:
int split_cmdline(char *cmdline, const char ***argv, size_t *argc);
Where the return value of `split_cmdline()` is negative for errors, and
zero otherwise. If non-NULL, the `*argc` pointer is modified to contain
the size of the `**argv` array.
But this implies an absurdly large `argv` array, which more than likely
larger than the system's argument limit. So even if split_cmdline()
allowed this, it would fail immediately afterwards when we called
execv(). So instead of converting all of `split_cmdline()`'s callers to
work with `size_t` types in this patch, instead pursue the minimal fix
here to prevent ever returning an array with more than INT_MAX entries
in it.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Backhouse <kevinbackhouse@github.com> Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Jeff King [Wed, 28 Sep 2022 22:52:48 +0000 (18:52 -0400)]
shell: limit size of interactive commands
When git-shell is run in interactive mode (which must be enabled by
creating $HOME/git-shell-commands), it reads commands from stdin, one
per line, and executes them.
We read the commands with git_read_line_interactively(), which uses a
strbuf under the hood. That means we'll accept an input of arbitrary
size (limited only by how much heap we can allocate). That creates two
problems:
- the rest of the code is not prepared to handle large inputs. The
most serious issue here is that split_cmdline() uses "int" for most
of its types, which can lead to integer overflow and out-of-bounds
array reads and writes. But even with that fixed, we assume that we
can feed the command name to snprintf() (via xstrfmt()), which is
stuck for historical reasons using "int", and causes it to fail (and
even trigger a BUG() call).
- since the point of git-shell is to take input from untrusted or
semi-trusted clients, it's a mild denial-of-service. We'll allocate
as many bytes as the client sends us (actually twice as many, since
we immediately duplicate the buffer).
We can fix both by just limiting the amount of per-command input we're
willing to receive.
We should also fix split_cmdline(), of course, which is an accident
waiting to happen, but that can come on top. Most calls to
split_cmdline(), including the other one in git-shell, are OK because
they are reading from an OS-provided argv, which is limited in practice.
This patch should eliminate the immediate vulnerabilities.
I picked 4MB as an arbitrary limit. It's big enough that nobody should
ever run into it in practice (since the point is to run the commands via
exec, we're subject to OS limits which are typically much lower). But
it's small enough that allocating it isn't that big a deal.
The code is mostly just swapping out fgets() for the strbuf call, but we
have to add a few niceties like flushing and trimming line endings. We
could simplify things further by putting the buffer on the stack, but
4MB is probably a bit much there. Note that we'll _always_ allocate 4MB,
which for normal, non-malicious requests is more than we would before
this patch. But on the other hand, other git programs are happy to use
96MB for a delta cache. And since we'd never touch most of those pages,
on a lazy-allocating OS like Linux they won't even get allocated to
actual RAM.
The ideal would be a version of strbuf_getline() that accepted a maximum
value. But for a minimal vulnerability fix, let's keep things localized
and simple. We can always refactor further on top.
The included test fails in an obvious way with ASan or UBSan (which
notice the integer overflow and out-of-bounds reads). Without them, it
fails in a less obvious way: we may segfault, or we may try to xstrfmt()
a long string, leading to a BUG(). Either way, it fails reliably before
this patch, and passes with it. Note that we don't need an EXPENSIVE
prereq on it. It does take 10-15s to fail before this patch, but with
the new limit, we fail almost immediately (and the perl process
generating 2GB of data exits via SIGPIPE).
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Jeff King [Wed, 28 Sep 2022 22:50:36 +0000 (18:50 -0400)]
shell: add basic tests
We have no tests of even basic functionality of git-shell. Let's add a
couple of obvious ones. This will serve as a framework for adding tests
for new things we fix, as well as making sure we don't screw anything up
too badly while doing so.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Taylor Blau [Fri, 29 Jul 2022 19:22:13 +0000 (15:22 -0400)]
transport: make `protocol.file.allow` be "user" by default
An earlier patch discussed and fixed a scenario where Git could be used
as a vector to exfiltrate sensitive data through a Docker container when
a potential victim clones a suspicious repository with local submodules
that contain symlinks.
That security hole has since been plugged, but a similar one still
exists. Instead of convincing a would-be victim to clone an embedded
submodule via the "file" protocol, an attacker could convince an
individual to clone a repository that has a submodule pointing to a
valid path on the victim's filesystem.
For example, if an individual (with username "foo") has their home
directory ("/home/foo") stored as a Git repository, then an attacker
could exfiltrate data by convincing a victim to clone a malicious
repository containing a submodule pointing at "/home/foo/.git" with
`--recurse-submodules`. Doing so would expose any sensitive contents in
stored in "/home/foo" tracked in Git.
For systems (such as Docker) that consider everything outside of the
immediate top-level working directory containing a Dockerfile as
inaccessible to the container (with the exception of volume mounts, and
so on), this is a violation of trust by exposing unexpected contents in
the working copy.
To mitigate the likelihood of this kind of attack, adjust the "file://"
protocol's default policy to be "user" to prevent commands that execute
without user input (including recursive submodule initialization) from
taking place by default.
Suggested-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Taylor Blau [Fri, 29 Jul 2022 19:21:53 +0000 (15:21 -0400)]
t/t9NNN: allow local submodules
To prepare for the default value of `protocol.file.allow` to change to
"user", ensure tests that rely on local submodules can initialize them
over the file protocol.
Tests that interact with submodules a handful of times use
`test_config_global`.
Taylor Blau [Fri, 29 Jul 2022 19:21:40 +0000 (15:21 -0400)]
t/t7NNN: allow local submodules
To prepare for the default value of `protocol.file.allow` to change to
"user", ensure tests that rely on local submodules can initialize them
over the file protocol.
Tests that only need to interact with submodules in a limited capacity
have individual Git commands annotated with the appropriate
configuration via `-c`. Tests that interact with submodules a handful of
times use `test_config_global` instead. Test scripts that rely on
submodules throughout use a `git config --global` during a setup test
towards the beginning of the script.
Taylor Blau [Fri, 29 Jul 2022 19:21:18 +0000 (15:21 -0400)]
t/t6NNN: allow local submodules
To prepare for the default value of `protocol.file.allow` to change to
"user", ensure tests that rely on local submodules can initialize them
over the file protocol.
Tests that only need to interact with submodules in a limited capacity
have individual Git commands annotated with the appropriate
configuration via `-c`.
Taylor Blau [Fri, 29 Jul 2022 19:21:06 +0000 (15:21 -0400)]
t/t5NNN: allow local submodules
To prepare for the default value of `protocol.file.allow` to change to
"user", ensure tests that rely on local submodules can initialize them
over the file protocol.
Tests that only need to interact with submodules in a limited capacity
have individual Git commands annotated with the appropriate
configuration via `-c`. Tests that interact with submodules a handful of
times use `test_config_global` instead. Test scripts that rely on
submodules throughout use a `git config --global` during a setup test
towards the beginning of the script.
Taylor Blau [Fri, 29 Jul 2022 19:20:43 +0000 (15:20 -0400)]
t/t4NNN: allow local submodules
To prepare for the default value of `protocol.file.allow` to change to
"user", ensure tests that rely on local submodules can initialize them
over the file protocol.
Tests that only need to interact with submodules in a limited capacity
have individual Git commands annotated with the appropriate
configuration via `-c`. Tests that interact with submodules a handful of
times use `test_config_global` instead. Test scripts that rely on
submodules throughout use a `git config --global` during a setup test
towards the beginning of the script.
Taylor Blau [Fri, 29 Jul 2022 19:20:28 +0000 (15:20 -0400)]
t/t3NNN: allow local submodules
To prepare for the default value of `protocol.file.allow` to change to
"user", ensure tests that rely on local submodules can initialize them
over the file protocol.
Tests that only need to interact with submodules in a limited capacity
have individual Git commands annotated with the appropriate
configuration via `-c`. Tests that interact with submodules a handful of
times use `test_config_global` instead. Test scripts that rely on
submodules throughout use a `git config --global` during a setup test
towards the beginning of the script.
Taylor Blau [Fri, 29 Jul 2022 19:20:03 +0000 (15:20 -0400)]
t/2NNNN: allow local submodules
To prepare for the default value of `protocol.file.allow` to change to
"user", ensure tests that rely on local submodules can initialize them
over the file protocol.
Tests that only need to interact with submodules in a limited capacity
have individual Git commands annotated with the appropriate
configuration via `-c`. Tests that interact with submodules a handful of
times use `test_config_global` instead. Test scripts that rely on
submodules throughout use a `git config --global` during a setup test
towards the beginning of the script.
Taylor Blau [Fri, 29 Jul 2022 19:16:10 +0000 (15:16 -0400)]
t/t1NNN: allow local submodules
To prepare for the default value of `protocol.file.allow` to change to
"user", ensure tests that rely on local submodules can initialize them
over the file protocol.
Tests that only need to interact with submodules in a limited capacity
have individual Git commands annotated with the appropriate
configuration via `-c`. Tests that interact with submodules a handful of
times use `test_config_global` instead.
Taylor Blau [Fri, 29 Jul 2022 19:13:58 +0000 (15:13 -0400)]
t/lib-submodule-update.sh: allow local submodules
To prepare for changing the default value of `protocol.file.allow` to
"user", update the `prolog()` function in lib-submodule-update to allow
submodules to be cloned over the file protocol.
This is used by a handful of submodule-related test scripts, which
themselves will have to tweak the value of `protocol.file.allow` in
certain locations. Those will be done in subsequent commits.
Taylor Blau [Thu, 28 Jul 2022 21:35:17 +0000 (17:35 -0400)]
builtin/clone.c: disallow `--local` clones with symlinks
When cloning a repository with `--local`, Git relies on either making a
hardlink or copy to every file in the "objects" directory of the source
repository. This is done through the callpath `cmd_clone()` ->
`clone_local()` -> `copy_or_link_directory()`.
The way this optimization works is by enumerating every file and
directory recursively in the source repository's `$GIT_DIR/objects`
directory, and then either making a copy or hardlink of each file. The
only exception to this rule is when copying the "alternates" file, in
which case paths are rewritten to be absolute before writing a new
"alternates" file in the destination repo.
One quirk of this implementation is that it dereferences symlinks when
cloning. This behavior was most recently modified in 36596fd2df (clone:
better handle symlinked files at .git/objects/, 2019-07-10), which
attempted to support `--local` clones of repositories with symlinks in
their objects directory in a platform-independent way.
Unfortunately, this behavior of dereferencing symlinks (that is,
creating a hardlink or copy of the source's link target in the
destination repository) can be used as a component in attacking a
victim by inadvertently exposing the contents of file stored outside of
the repository.
Take, for example, a repository that stores a Dockerfile and is used to
build Docker images. When building an image, Docker copies the directory
contents into the VM, and then instructs the VM to execute the
Dockerfile at the root of the copied directory. This protects against
directory traversal attacks by copying symbolic links as-is without
dereferencing them.
That is, if a user has a symlink pointing at their private key material
(where the symlink is present in the same directory as the Dockerfile,
but the key itself is present outside of that directory), the key is
unreadable to a Docker image, since the link will appear broken from the
container's point of view.
This behavior enables an attack whereby a victim is convinced to clone a
repository containing an embedded submodule (with a URL like
"file:///proc/self/cwd/path/to/submodule") which has a symlink pointing
at a path containing sensitive information on the victim's machine. If a
user is tricked into doing this, the contents at the destination of
those symbolic links are exposed to the Docker image at runtime.
One approach to preventing this behavior is to recreate symlinks in the
destination repository. But this is problematic, since symlinking the
objects directory are not well-supported. (One potential problem is that
when sharing, e.g. a "pack" directory via symlinks, different writers
performing garbage collection may consider different sets of objects to
be reachable, enabling a situation whereby garbage collecting one
repository may remove reachable objects in another repository).
Instead, prohibit the local clone optimization when any symlinks are
present in the `$GIT_DIR/objects` directory of the source repository.
Users may clone the repository again by prepending the "file://" scheme
to their clone URL, or by adding the `--no-local` option to their `git
clone` invocation.
The directory iterator used by `copy_or_link_directory()` must no longer
dereference symlinks (i.e., it *must* call `lstat()` instead of `stat()`
in order to discover whether or not there are symlinks present). This has
no bearing on the overall behavior, since we will immediately `die()` on
encounter a symlink.
Note that t5604.33 suggests that we do support local clones with
symbolic links in the source repository's objects directory, but this
was likely unintentional, or at least did not take into consideration
the problem with sharing parts of the objects directory with symbolic
links at the time. Update this test to reflect which options are and
aren't supported.
Helped-by: Johannes Schindelin <Johannes.Schindelin@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
* maint-2.35:
Git 2.35.4
Git 2.34.4
Git 2.33.4
Git 2.32.3
Git 2.31.4
Git 2.30.5
setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
git-compat-util: allow root to access both SUDO_UID and root owned
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
* maint-2.34:
Git 2.34.4
Git 2.33.4
Git 2.32.3
Git 2.31.4
Git 2.30.5
setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
git-compat-util: allow root to access both SUDO_UID and root owned
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
* maint-2.33:
Git 2.33.4
Git 2.32.3
Git 2.31.4
Git 2.30.5
setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
git-compat-util: allow root to access both SUDO_UID and root owned
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
* maint-2.32:
Git 2.32.3
Git 2.31.4
Git 2.30.5
setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
git-compat-util: allow root to access both SUDO_UID and root owned
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
* maint-2.31:
Git 2.31.4
Git 2.30.5
setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
git-compat-util: allow root to access both SUDO_UID and root owned
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
* maint-2.30:
Git 2.30.5
setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
git-compat-util: allow root to access both SUDO_UID and root owned
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
8959555cee7 (setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level
directory, 2022-03-02), adds a function to check for ownership of
repositories using a directory that is representative of it, and ways to
add exempt a specific repository from said check if needed, but that
check didn't account for owership of the gitdir, or (when used) the
gitfile that points to that gitdir.
An attacker could create a git repository in a directory that they can
write into but that is owned by the victim to work around the fix that
was introduced with CVE-2022-24765 to potentially run code as the
victim.
An example that could result in privilege escalation to root in *NIX would
be to set a repository in a shared tmp directory by doing (for example):
$ git -C /tmp init
To avoid that, extend the ensure_valid_ownership function to be able to
check for all three paths.
This will have the side effect of tripling the number of stat() calls
when a repository is detected, but the effect is expected to be likely
minimal, as it is done only once during the directory walk in which Git
looks for a repository.
Additionally make sure to resolve the gitfile (if one was used) to find
the relevant gitdir for checking.
While at it change the message printed on failure so it is clear we are
referring to the repository by its worktree (or gitdir if it is bare) and
not to a specific directory.
Helped-by: Junio C Hamano <junio@pobox.com> Helped-by: Johannes Schindelin <Johannes.Schindelin@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com>
Junio C Hamano [Thu, 26 May 2022 21:51:32 +0000 (14:51 -0700)]
Merge branch 'cb/path-owner-check-with-sudo'
With a recent update to refuse access to repositories of other
people by default, "sudo make install" and "sudo git describe"
stopped working. This series intends to loosen it while keeping
the safety.
* cb/path-owner-check-with-sudo:
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
git-compat-util: allow root to access both SUDO_UID and root owned
Previous changes introduced a regression which will prevent root for
accessing repositories owned by thyself if using sudo because SUDO_UID
takes precedence.
Loosen that restriction by allowing root to access repositories owned
by both uid by default and without having to add a safe.directory
exception.
A previous workaround that was documented in the tests is no longer
needed so it has been removed together with its specially crafted
prerequisite.
Helped-by: Johanness Schindelin <Johannes.Schindelin@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Junio C Hamano [Wed, 8 Jun 2022 21:27:53 +0000 (14:27 -0700)]
Merge branch 'jc/clone-remote-name-leak-fix' into maint
"git clone --origin X" leaked piece of memory that held value read
from the clone.defaultRemoteName configuration variable, which has
been plugged.
source: <xmqqlevl4ysk.fsf@gitster.g>
* jc/clone-remote-name-leak-fix:
clone: plug a miniscule leak
Junio C Hamano [Wed, 8 Jun 2022 21:27:53 +0000 (14:27 -0700)]
Merge branch 'ds/midx-normalize-pathname-before-comparison' into maint
The path taken by "git multi-pack-index" command from the end user
was compared with path internally prepared by the tool withut first
normalizing, which lead to duplicated paths not being noticed,
which has been corrected.
source: <pull.1221.v2.git.1650911234.gitgitgadget@gmail.com>
* ds/midx-normalize-pathname-before-comparison:
cache: use const char * for get_object_directory()
multi-pack-index: use --object-dir real path
midx: use real paths in lookup_multi_pack_index()
Junio C Hamano [Wed, 8 Jun 2022 21:27:52 +0000 (14:27 -0700)]
Merge branch 'ah/rebase-keep-base-fix' into maint
"git rebase --keep-base <upstream> <branch-to-rebase>" computed the
commit to rebase onto incorrectly, which has been corrected.
source: <20220421044233.894255-1-alexhenrie24@gmail.com>
* ah/rebase-keep-base-fix:
rebase: use correct base for --keep-base when a branch is given
Junio C Hamano [Wed, 8 Jun 2022 21:27:52 +0000 (14:27 -0700)]
Merge branch 'rs/commit-summary-wo-break-rewrite' into maint
The commit summary shown after making a commit is matched to what
is given in "git status" not to use the break-rewrite heuristics.
source: <c35bd0aa-2e46-e710-2b39-89f18bad0097@web.de>
* rs/commit-summary-wo-break-rewrite:
commit, sequencer: turn off break_opt for commit summary
Junio C Hamano [Wed, 8 Jun 2022 21:27:51 +0000 (14:27 -0700)]
Merge branch 'cb/ci-make-p4-optional' into maint
macOS CI jobs have been occasionally flaky due to tentative version
skew between perforce and the homebrew packager. Instead of
failing the whole CI job, just let it skip the p4 tests when this
happens.
source: <20220512223940.238367-1-gitster@pobox.com>
* cb/ci-make-p4-optional:
ci: use https, not http to download binaries from perforce.com
ci: reintroduce prevention from perforce being quarantined in macOS
ci: avoid brew for installing perforce
ci: make failure to find perforce more user friendly
Junio C Hamano [Wed, 8 Jun 2022 21:27:51 +0000 (14:27 -0700)]
Merge branch 'ab/valgrind-fixes' into maint
A bit of test framework fixes with a few fixes to issues found by
valgrind.
source: <20220512223218.237544-1-gitster@pobox.com>
* ab/valgrind-fixes:
commit-graph.c: don't assume that stat() succeeds
object-file: fix a unpack_loose_header() regression in 3b6a8db3b03
log test: skip a failing mkstemp() test under valgrind
tests: using custom GIT_EXEC_PATH breaks --valgrind tests
Junio C Hamano [Wed, 8 Jun 2022 21:27:51 +0000 (14:27 -0700)]
Merge branch 'jc/archive-add-file-normalize-mode' into maint
"git archive --add-file=<path>" picked up the raw permission bits
from the path and propagated to zip output in some cases, without
normalization, which has been corrected (tar output did not have
this issue).
source: <xmqqmtfme8v6.fsf@gitster.g>
* jc/archive-add-file-normalize-mode:
archive: do not let on-disk mode leak to zip archives
Junio C Hamano [Wed, 8 Jun 2022 21:27:51 +0000 (14:27 -0700)]
Merge branch 'jc/show-branch-g-current' into maint
The "--current" option of "git show-branch" should have been made
incompatible with the "--reflog" mode, but this was not enforced,
which has been corrected.
source: <xmqqh76mf7s4.fsf_-_@gitster.g>
* jc/show-branch-g-current:
show-branch: -g and --current are incompatible
Junio C Hamano [Thu, 26 May 2022 19:37:31 +0000 (12:37 -0700)]
http.c: clear the 'finished' member once we are done with it
In http.c, the run_active_slot() function allows the given "slot" to
make progress by calling step_active_slots() in a loop repeatedly,
and the loop is not left until the request held in the slot
completes.
Ages ago, we used to use the slot->in_use member to get out of the
loop, which misbehaved when the request in "slot" completes (at
which time, the result of the request is copied away from the slot,
and the in_use member is cleared, making the slot ready to be
reused), and the "slot" gets reused to service a different request
(at which time, the "slot" becomes in_use again, even though it is
for a different request). The loop terminating condition mistakenly
thought that the original request has yet to be completed.
Today's code, after baa7b67d (HTTP slot reuse fixes, 2006-03-10)
fixed this issue, uses a separate "slot->finished" member that is
set in run_active_slot() to point to an on-stack variable, and the
code that completes the request in finish_active_slot() clears the
on-stack variable via the pointer to signal that the particular
request held by the slot has completed. It also clears the in_use
member (as before that fix), so that the slot itself can safely be
reused for an unrelated request.
One thing that is not quite clean in this arrangement is that,
unless the slot gets reused, at which point the finished member is
reset to NULL, the member keeps the value of &finished, which
becomes a dangling pointer into the stack when run_active_slot()
returns. Clear the finished member before the control leaves the
function, which has a side effect of unconfusing compilers like
recent GCC 12 that is over-eager to warn against such an assignment.
dir.c: avoid "exceeds maximum object size" error with GCC v12.x
Technically, the pointer difference `end - start` _could_ be negative,
and when cast to an (unsigned) `size_t` that would cause problems. In
this instance, the symptom is:
dir.c: In function 'git_url_basename':
dir.c:3087:13: error: 'memchr' specified bound [9223372036854775808, 0]
exceeds maximum object size 9223372036854775807
[-Werror=stringop-overread]
CC ewah/bitmap.o
3087 | if (memchr(start, '/', end - start) == NULL
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
While it is a bit far-fetched to think that `end` (which is defined as
`repo + strlen(repo)`) and `start` (which starts at `repo` and never
steps beyond the NUL terminator) could result in such a negative
difference, GCC has no way of knowing that.
See also https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla//show_bug.cgi?id=85783.
Let's just add a safety check, primarily for GCC's benefit.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
compat/nedmalloc/nedmalloc.c: In function 'DestroyCaches':
compat/nedmalloc/nedmalloc.c:326:12: error: the comparison will always
evaluate as 'true' for the address of 'caches'
will never be NULL [-Werror=address]
326 | if(p->caches)
| ^
compat/nedmalloc/nedmalloc.c:196:22: note: 'caches' declared here
196 | threadcache *caches[THREADCACHEMAXCACHES];
| ^~~~~~
... and it is correct, of course.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Git for Windows' SDK recently upgraded to GCC v12.x which points out
that the `pos` variable might be used even after the corresponding
memory was `realloc()`ed and therefore potentially no longer valid.
Since a subset of this SDK is used in Git's CI/PR builds, we need to fix
this to continue to be able to benefit from the CI/PR runs.
Note: This bug has been with us since 2a6b149c64f6 (mingw: avoid using
strbuf in syslog, 2011-10-06), and while it looks tempting to replace
the hand-rolled string manipulation with a `strbuf`-based one, that
commit's message explains why we cannot do that: The `syslog()` function
is called as part of the function in `daemon.c` which is set as the
`die()` routine, and since `strbuf_grow()` can call that function if it
runs out of memory, this would cause a nasty infinite loop that we do
not want to re-introduce.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
Add a support library that provides one function that can be used
to run a "scriplet" of commands through sudo and that helps invoking
sudo in the slightly awkward way that is required to ensure it doesn't
block the call (if shell was allowed as tested in the prerequisite)
and it doesn't run the command through a different shell than the one
we intended.
Add additional negative tests as suggested by Junio and that use a
new workspace that is owned by root.
Document a regression that was introduced by previous commits where
root won't be able anymore to access directories they own unless
SUDO_UID is removed from their environment.
The tests document additional ways that this new restriction could
be worked around and the documentation explains why it might be instead
considered a feature, but a "fix" is planned for a future change.
Helped-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> Helped-by: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood123@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
bdc77d1d685 (Add a function to determine whether a path is owned by the
current user, 2022-03-02) checks for the effective uid of the running
process using geteuid() but didn't account for cases where that user was
root (because git was invoked through sudo or a compatible tool) and the
original uid that repository trusted for its config was no longer known,
therefore failing the following otherwise safe call:
guy@renard ~/Software/uncrustify $ sudo git describe --always --dirty
[sudo] password for guy:
fatal: unsafe repository ('/home/guy/Software/uncrustify' is owned by someone else)
Attempt to detect those cases by using the environment variables that
those tools create to keep track of the original user id, and do the
ownership check using that instead.
This assumes the environment the user is running on after going
privileged can't be tampered with, and also adds code to restrict that
the new behavior only applies if running as root, therefore keeping the
most common case, which runs unprivileged, from changing, but because of
that, it will miss cases where sudo (or an equivalent) was used to change
to another unprivileged user or where the equivalent tool used to raise
privileges didn't track the original id in a sudo compatible way.
Because of compatibility with sudo, the code assumes that uid_t is an
unsigned integer type (which is not required by the standard) but is used
that way in their codebase to generate SUDO_UID. In systems where uid_t
is signed, sudo might be also patched to NOT be unsigned and that might
be able to trigger an edge case and a bug (as described in the code), but
it is considered unlikely to happen and even if it does, the code would
just mostly fail safely, so there was no attempt either to detect it or
prevent it by the code, which is something that might change in the future,
based on expected user feedback.
Reported-by: Guy Maurel <guy.j@maurel.de> Helped-by: SZEDER Gábor <szeder.dev@gmail.com> Helped-by: Randall Becker <rsbecker@nexbridge.com> Helped-by: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood123@gmail.com> Suggested-by: Johannes Schindelin <Johannes.Schindelin@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
Originally reported after release of v2.35.2 (and other maint branches)
for CVE-2022-24765 and blocking otherwise harmless commands that were
done using sudo in a repository that was owned by the user.
Add a new test script with very basic support to allow running git
commands through sudo, so a reproduction could be implemented and that
uses only `git status` as a proxy of the issue reported.
Note that because of the way sudo interacts with the system, a much
more complete integration with the test framework will require a lot
more work and that was therefore intentionally punted for now.
The current implementation requires the execution of a special cleanup
function which should always be kept as the last "test" or otherwise
the standard cleanup functions will fail because they can't remove
the root owned directories that are used. This also means that if
failures are found while running, the specifics of the failure might
not be kept for further debugging and if the test was interrupted, it
will be necessary to clean the working directory manually before
restarting by running:
The test file also uses at least one initial "setup" test that creates
a parallel execution directory under the "root" sub directory, which
should be used as top level directory for all repositories that are
used in this test file. Unlike all other tests the repository provided
by the test framework should go unused.
Special care should be taken when invoking commands through sudo, since
the environment is otherwise independent from what the test framework
setup and might have changed the values for HOME, SHELL and dropped
several relevant environment variables for your test. Indeed `git status`
was used as a proxy because it doesn't even require commits in the
repository to work and usually doesn't require much from the environment
to run, but a future patch will add calls to `git init` and that will
fail to honor the default branch name, unless that setting is NOT
provided through an environment variable (which means even a CI run
could fail that test if enabled incorrectly).
A new SUDO prerequisite is provided that does some sanity checking
to make sure the sudo command that will be used allows for passwordless
execution as root without restrictions and doesn't mess with git's
execution path. This matches what is provided by the macOS agents that
are used as part of GitHub actions and probably nowhere else.
Most of those characteristics make this test mostly only suitable for
CI, but it might be executed locally if special care is taken to provide
for all of them in the local configuration and maybe making use of the
sudo credential cache by first invoking sudo, entering your password if
needed, and then invoking the test with:
If it fails to run, then it means your local setup wouldn't work for the
test because of the configuration sudo has or other system settings, and
things that might help are to comment out sudo's secure_path config, and
make sure that the account you are using has no restrictions on the
commands it can run through sudo, just like is provided for the user in
the CI.
For example (assuming a username of marta for you) something probably
similar to the following entry in your /etc/sudoers (or equivalent) file:
marta ALL=(ALL:ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL
Reported-by: SZEDER Gábor <szeder.dev@gmail.com> Helped-by: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood123@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
ci: use https, not http to download binaries from perforce.com
Since 522354d70f4 (Add Travis CI support, 2015-11-27) the CI has used
http://filehost.perforce.com/perforce/ to download binaries from
filehost.perforce.com, they were then moved to this script in 657343a602e (travis-ci: move Travis CI code into dedicated scripts,
2017-09-10).
Let's use https instead for good measure. I don't think we need to
worry about the DNS or network between the GitHub CI and perforce.com
being MitM'd, but using https gives us extra validation of the payload
at least, and is one less thing to worry about when checking where
else we rely on non-TLS'd http connections.
Also, use the same download site at perforce.com for Linux and macOS
tarballs for consistency.
Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
ci: reintroduce prevention from perforce being quarantined in macOS
5ed9fc3fc86 (ci: prevent `perforce` from being quarantined, 2020-02-27)
introduces this prevention for brew, but brew has been removed in a
previous commit, so reintroduce an equivalent option to avoid a possible
regression.
This doesn't affect github actions (as configure now) and is therefore
done silently to avoid any possible scary irrelevant messages.
Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Perfoce's cask in brew is meant[1] to be used only by humans, so replace
its use from the CI with a scripted binary download which is less likely
to fail, as it is done in Linux.
Kept the logic together so it will be less likely to break when moved
around as on the fly code changes in this area are settled, at which
point it will also feasable to ammend it to avoid some of the hardcoded
values by using similar variables to the ones Linux does.
In that same line, a POSIX sh syntax is used instead of the similar one
used in Linux in preparation for an unrelated future change that might
change the shell currently configured for it.
This change reintroduces the risk that the installed binaries might not
work because of being quarantined that was fixed with 5ed9fc3fc86 (ci:
prevent `perforce` from being quarantined, 2020-02-27) but fixing that
now was also punted for simplicity and since the affected cloud provider
is scheduled to be retired with an on the fly change, but should be
addressed if that other change is not integrated further.
The discussion on the need to keep 2 radically different versions of
the binaries to be tested with Linux vs macOS or how to upgrade to
newer versions now that brew won't do that automatically for us has
been punted for now as well. On that line the now obsolete comment
about it in lib.sh was originally being updated by this change but
created conflicts as it is moved around by other on the fly changes,
so will be addressed independently as well.
ci: make failure to find perforce more user friendly
In preparation for a future change that will make perforce installation
optional in macOS, make sure that the check for it is done without
triggering scary looking errors and add a user friendly message instead.
All other existing uses of 'type <cmd>' in our shell scripts that
check the availability of a command <cmd> send both standard output
and error stream to /dev/null to squelch "<cmd> not found" diagnostic
output, but this script left the standard error stream shown.
Redirect it just like everybody else to squelch this error message that
we fully expect to see.
Helped-by: Eric Sunshine <sunshine@sunshineco.com> Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Fix code added in 8d84097f965 (commit-graph: expire commit-graph
files, 2019-06-18) to check the return value of the stat() system
call. Not doing so caused us to use uninitialized memory in the "Bloom
generation is limited by --max-new-filters" test in
t4216-log-bloom.sh:
+ rm -f trace.event
+ pwd
+ GIT_TRACE2_EVENT=[...]/t/trash directory.t4216-log-bloom/limits/trace.event git commit-graph write --reachable --split=replace --changed-paths --max-new-filters=2
==24835== Syscall param utimensat(times[0].tv_sec) points to uninitialised byte(s)
==24835== at 0x499E65A: __utimensat64_helper (utimensat.c:34)
==24835== by 0x4999142: utime (utime.c:36)
==24835== by 0x552BE0: mark_commit_graphs (commit-graph.c:2213)
==24835== by 0x550822: write_commit_graph (commit-graph.c:2424)
==24835== by 0x54E3A0: write_commit_graph_reachable (commit-graph.c:1681)
==24835== by 0x4374BB: graph_write (commit-graph.c:269)
==24835== by 0x436F7D: cmd_commit_graph (commit-graph.c:326)
==24835== by 0x407B9A: run_builtin (git.c:465)
==24835== by 0x406651: handle_builtin (git.c:719)
==24835== by 0x407575: run_argv (git.c:786)
==24835== by 0x406410: cmd_main (git.c:917)
==24835== by 0x511F09: main (common-main.c:56)
==24835== Address 0x1ffeffde70 is on thread 1's stack
==24835== in frame #1, created by utime (utime.c:25)
==24835== Uninitialised value was created by a stack allocation
==24835== at 0x552B50: mark_commit_graphs (commit-graph.c:2201)
==24835==
[...]
error: last command exited with $?=126
not ok 137 - Bloom generation is limited by --max-new-filters
This would happen as we stat'd the non-existing
".git/objects/info/commit-graph" file. Let's fix mark_commit_graphs()
to check the stat()'s return value, and while we're at it fix another
case added in the same commit to do the same.
The caller in expire_commit_graphs() would have been less likely to
run into this, as it's operating on files it just got from readdir(),
but it could still happen due to a race with e.g. a concurrent "rm
-rf" of the commit-graph files.
Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
object-file: fix a unpack_loose_header() regression in 3b6a8db3b03
Fix a regression in my 3b6a8db3b03 (object-file.c: use "enum" return
type for unpack_loose_header(), 2021-10-01) revealed both by running
the test suite with --valgrind, and with the amended "git fsck" test.
In practice this regression in v2.34.0 caused us to claim that we
couldn't parse the header, as opposed to not being able to unpack
it. Before the change in the C code the test_cmp added here would emit:
I.e. we'd proceed to call parse_loose_header() on the uninitialized
"hdr" value, and it would have been very unlikely for that
uninitialized memory to be a valid git object.
The other callers of unpack_loose_header() were already checking the
enum values exhaustively. See 3b6a8db3b03 and 5848fb11acd (object-file.c: return ULHR_TOO_LONG on "header too long",
2021-10-01).
Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
log test: skip a failing mkstemp() test under valgrind
Skip a test added in f1e3df31699 (t: increase test coverage of
signature verification output, 2020-03-04) when running under
valgrind. Due to valgrind's interception of mkstemp() this test will
fail with:
+ pwd
+ TMPDIR=[...]/t/trash directory.t4202-log/bogus git log --show-signature -n1 plain-fail
==7696== VG_(mkstemp): failed to create temp file: [...]/t/trash directory.t4202-log/bogus/valgrind_proc_7696_cmdline_d545ddcf
[... 10 more similar lines omitted ..]
valgrind: Startup or configuration error:
valgrind: Can't create client cmdline file in [...]/t/trash directory.t4202-log/bogus/valgrind_proc_7696_cmdline_6e542d1d
valgrind: Unable to start up properly. Giving up.
error: last command exited with $?=1
Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
tests: using custom GIT_EXEC_PATH breaks --valgrind tests
Fix a regression in b7d11a0f5d2 (tests: exercise the RUNTIME_PREFIX
feature, 2021-07-24) where tests that want to set up and test a "git"
wrapper in $PATH conflicted with the t/bin/valgrind wrapper(s) doing
the same.
Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Junio C Hamano [Thu, 12 May 2022 21:31:09 +0000 (14:31 -0700)]
archive: do not let on-disk mode leak to zip archives
When the "--add-file" option is used to add the contents from an
untracked file to the archive, the permission mode bits for these
files are sent to the archive-backend specific "write_entry()"
method as-is. We normalize the mode bits for tracked files way
before we pass them to the write_entry() method; we should do the
same here.
This is not strictly needed for "tar" archive-backend, as it has its
own code to further clean them up, but "zip" archive-backend is not
so well prepared.
detect-compiler: make detection independent of locale
`detect-compiler` has accumulated a few compiler dependent workarounds
lately for the more and more ubiquitious gcc12. This is intended to make
CI set-ups work across tool-chain updates, but also help those
developers who build with `DEVELOPER=1`.
Alas, `detect-compiler` uses the locale dependent output of `$(CC) -v`
to parse for the version string, which fails unless it literally
contains ` version`.
Use `LANG=C $(CC) -v` instead to grep for stable output.
Signed-off-by: Michael J Gruber <git@grubix.eu> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Junio C Hamano [Thu, 5 May 2022 21:36:25 +0000 (14:36 -0700)]
Merge branch 'rs/format-patch-pathspec-fix' into maint
"git format-patch <args> -- <pathspec>" lost the pathspec when
showing the second and subsequent commits, which has been
corrected.
source: <c36896a1-6247-123b-4fa3-b7eb24af1897@web.de>
Junio C Hamano [Thu, 5 May 2022 21:36:25 +0000 (14:36 -0700)]
Merge branch 'rs/fast-export-pathspec-fix' into maint
"git fast-export -- <pathspec>" lost the pathspec when showing the
second and subsequent commits, which has been corrected.
source: <2c988c7b-0efe-4222-4a43-8124fe1a9da6@web.de>
Junio C Hamano [Thu, 5 May 2022 21:36:24 +0000 (14:36 -0700)]
Merge branch 'jc/show-pathspec-fix' into maint
"git show <commit1> <commit2>... -- <pathspec>" lost the pathspec
when showing the second and subsequent commits, which has been
corrected.
source: <xmqqo80j87g0.fsf_-_@gitster.g>
Junio C Hamano [Thu, 5 May 2022 21:36:24 +0000 (14:36 -0700)]
Merge branch 'jc/diff-tree-stdin-fix' into maint
"diff-tree --stdin" has been broken for about a year, but 2.36
release broke it even worse by breaking running the command with
<pathspec>, which in turn broke "gitk" and got noticed. This has
been corrected by aligning its behaviour to that of "log".
This fixes a regression in 2.36 and is slate to go to 2.36.1
source: <xmqq7d7bsu2n.fsf@gitster.g>
Junio C Hamano [Sun, 1 May 2022 05:00:30 +0000 (22:00 -0700)]
cocci: drop bogus xstrdup_or_null() rule
13092a91 (cocci: refactor common patterns to use xstrdup_or_null(),
2016-10-12) introduced a rule to rewrite this conditional call to
xstrdup(E) and an assignment to variable V:
- if (E)
- V = xstrdup(E);
into an unconditional call to xstrdup_or_null(E) and an assignment
to variable V:
+ V = xstrdup_or_null(E);
which is utterly bogus. The original code may already have an
acceptable value in V and the conditional assignment may be to
improve the value already in V with a copy of a better value E when
(and only when) E is not NULL.
The rewritten construct unconditionally discards the existing value
of V and replaces it with a copy of E, even when E is NULL, which
changes the meaning of the program.
By the way, if it were
-if (E && !V)
- V = xstrdup(E);
+V = xstrdup_or_null(E);
it would probably have been correct. But there is no existing code
that would have been improved by such a rule, so let's just remove
the bogus one without replacing with the more specific one.
Junio C Hamano [Sun, 1 May 2022 05:17:15 +0000 (22:17 -0700)]
clone: plug a miniscule leak
The remote_name variable is first assigned a copy of the value of
the "clone.defaultremotename" configuration variable and then by the
value of the "--origin" command line option. The former is prepared
to see multiple instances of the configuration variable by freeing
the current value of the variable before a copy of the newly
discovered value gets assigned to it. The latter however blindly
assigned a copy of the new value to the variable, thereby leaking
the value read from the configuration variable.
René Scharfe [Sat, 30 Apr 2022 14:31:43 +0000 (16:31 +0200)]
2.36 fast-export regression fix
e900d494dc (diff: add an API for deferred freeing, 2021-02-11) added a
way to allow reusing diffopts: the no_free bit. 244c27242f (diff.[ch]:
have diff_free() call clear_pathspec(opts.pathspec), 2022-02-16) made
that mechanism mandatory.
git fast-export doesn't set no_free, so path limiting stopped working
after the first commit. Set the flag and add a basic test to make sure
only changes to the specified files are exported.
Signed-off-by: René Scharfe <l.s.r@web.de> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
René Scharfe [Sat, 30 Apr 2022 10:32:44 +0000 (12:32 +0200)]
2.36 format-patch regression fix
e900d494dc (diff: add an API for deferred freeing, 2021-02-11) added a
way to allow reusing diffopts: the no_free bit. 244c27242f (diff.[ch]:
have diff_free() call clear_pathspec(opts.pathspec), 2022-02-16) made
that mechanism mandatory.
git format-patch only sets no_free when --output is given, causing it to
forget pathspecs after the first commit. Set no_free unconditionally
instead.
The existing test was unable to detect this breakage because it checks
stderr for the absence of a certain string, but format-patch writes to
stdout. Also the test was not checking the case of one commit modifying
multiple files and a pathspec limiting the diff. Replace it with a more
thorough one.
Signed-off-by: René Scharfe <l.s.r@web.de> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Junio C Hamano [Sat, 30 Apr 2022 05:29:51 +0000 (22:29 -0700)]
2.36 show regression fix
This only surfaced as a regression after 2.36 release, but the
breakage was already there with us for at least a year.
e900d494 (diff: add an API for deferred freeing, 2021-02-11)
introduced a mechanism to delay freeing resources held in
diff_options struct that need to be kept as long as the struct will
be reused to compute diff. "git log -p" was taught to utilize the
mechanism but it was done with an incorrect assumption that the
underlying helper function, cmd_log_walk(), is called only once,
and it is OK to do the freeing at the end of it.
Alas, for "git show A B", the function is called once for each
commit given, so it is not OK to free the resources until we finish
calling it for all the commits given from the command line.
During 2.36 release cycle, we started clearing the <pathspec> as
part of this freeing, which made the bug a lot more visible.
Fix this breakage by tweaking how cmd_log_walk() frees the resources
at the end and using a variant of it that does not immediately free
the resources to show each commit object from the command line in
"git show".
Protect the fix with a few new tests.
Reported-by: Daniel Li <dan@danielyli.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
submodule--helper: fix initialization of warn_if_uninitialized
The .warn_if_uninitialized member was introduced by 48308681
(git submodule update: have a dedicated helper for cloning,
2016-02-29) to submodule_update_clone struct and initialized to
false. When c9911c93 (submodule--helper: teach update_data more
options, 2022-03-15) moved it to update_data struct, it started
to initialize it to true but this change was not explained in
its log message.
The member is set to true only when pathspec was given, and is
used when a submodule that matched the pathspec is found
uninitialized to give diagnostic message. "submodule update"
without pathspec is supposed to iterate over all submodules
(i.e. without pathspec limitation) and update only the
initialized submodules, and finding uninitialized submodules
during the iteration is a totally expected and normal thing that
should not be warned.
[jc: added tests]
Signed-off-by: Orgad Shaneh <orgads@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Junio C Hamano [Tue, 26 Apr 2022 16:11:44 +0000 (09:11 -0700)]
2.36 gitk/diff-tree --stdin regression fix
This only surfaced as a regression after 2.36 release, but the
breakage was already there with us for at least a year.
The diff_free() call is to be used after we completely finished with
a diffopt structure. After "git diff A B" finishes producing
output, calling it before process exit is fine. But there are
commands that prepares diff_options struct once, compares two sets
of paths, releases resources that were used to do the comparison,
then reuses the same diff_option struct to go on to compare the next
two sets of paths, like "git log -p".
After "git log -p" finishes showing a single commit, calling it
before it goes on to the next commit is NOT fine. There is a
mechanism, the .no_free member in diff_options struct, to help "git
log" to avoid calling diff_free() after showing each commit and
instead call it just one. When the mechanism was introduced in e900d494 (diff: add an API for deferred freeing, 2021-02-11),
however, we forgot to do the same to "diff-tree --stdin", which *is*
a moral equivalent to "git log".
During 2.36 release cycle, we started clearing the pathspec in
diff_free(), so programs like gitk that runs
git diff-tree --stdin -- <pathspec>
downstream of a pipe, processing one commit after another, started
showing irrelevant comparison outside the given <pathspec> from the
second commit. The same commit, by forgetting to teach the .no_free
mechanism, broke "diff-tree --stdin -I<regexp>" and nobody noticed
it for over a year, presumably because it is so seldom used an
option.
But <pathspec> is a different story. The breakage was very
prominently visible and was reported immediately after 2.36 was
released.
Fix this breakage by mimicking how "git log" utilizes the .no_free
member so that "diff-tree --stdin" behaves more similarly to "log".
Protect the fix with a few new tests.
Reported-by: Matthias Aßhauer <mha1993@live.de> Helped-by: René Scharfe <l.s.r@web.de> Helped-by: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood123@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
cache: use const char * for get_object_directory()
The get_object_directory() method returns the exact string stored at
the_repository->objects->odb->path. The return type of "char *" implies
that the caller must keep track of the buffer and free() it when
complete. This causes significant problems later when the ODB is
accessed.
Use "const char *" as the return type to avoid this confusion. There are
no current callers that care about the non-const definition.
Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <derrickstolee@github.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
projects / thirdparty / git.git / log
