Job Snijders [Fri, 24 Nov 2023 09:46:37 +0000 (09:46 +0000)]
Don't set directory modtimes to match the source
When syncing against remote repositories, the modtimes of the
remote directories is irrelevant. In the RRDP protocol the directory
modtimes aren't signalled either. This should save some IOPS.
On closer inspection, none of the error messages logged in #98 imply a
problem, so I have reduced their severities, removed the stack traces
and improved the error messages.
Fixes the error messages half of #98. I still need to look into the
alleged discrepancies with Routinator and Cloudflare.
As discovered in 566835e8da0ce52b6bded39db72667eeb2e41001, this
validation was implemented incorrectly. Fort should locate the parent
certificate in the local cache by URI, not force-redownload by rsync.
The URI indexing will be implemented as part of #78. I'll reimplement
the validation properly then.
It's a collection of failed downloads, and it's two-purposed:
1. To list the failed downloads once the validation is over.
(Which is the functionality I deleted in the prevous commit.)
2. To clue the AIA validation code (through an EREQFAILED) not to...
uh... redownload... the AIA certificate's... parent.
Huh.
Yeah, I have a few issues with the implementation:
A. Purpose 1 is obsolete.
B. Regarding purpose 2: Fort should never redownload a file that was
already traversed in the same validation cycle. This purpose is
plainly wrong.
Oh, you know what? I get it.
The original coder was probably concerned that the parent might have
been downloaded via RRDP, yet the child's AIA is always an rsync URI...
and because RRDP and rsync are cached into separate namespaces, well,
Fort wasn't going to find the parent.
But the thing is, it's a URI, not a URL. RRDP also refers to these files
by way of their "rsync" *URI* in its snapshots and deltas. RRDP might
be HTTP, but there is no such thing as http://path.to/certificate.cer.
This should be fixed by way of clever local cache resolution, not an
awkward redownload.
C. The lifescope of this table should be a single validation run, not
Fort's lifetime.
I think the reason why it's global is so the code could warn if a
particular resource had been down for several iterations.
But I wouldn't say that's Fort's job, and even if it is, it's probably
best to move it to Prometheus somehow. We're relying too much on the
logs.
The "summary" was a list of failed downloads, and from what I gather,
it was intended to clue the admin of a possible disconnection problem.
Thing is, the implementation was rather bewilderingly large and
obtrusive, and now that we're going to have a Prometheus endpoint,
most likely replaceable by an elegant counter.
And I haven't implemented Prometheus yet, but I would definitely love to
stop running into this invasive code all over the place, thanks.
Trying to recover is incorrect because we don't want to advertise an
incomplete or outdated VRP table to the routers. We don't want to rely
on the OOM-killer; we NEED to die on memory allocation failures ASAP.
Though this doesn't have much to do with the RRDP refactor, I'm doing it
early to get plenty of time for testing and review.
Partially F1xes #40. (Still need to update some dependency usages.)
- Fort SHOULD die as soon as it realizes the VRP table is corrupted, as
we should not send garbage to the routers.
- Also, I'm not entirely sure the code would not crash later anyway,
since the table is, in fact, corrupted.
- Plus, if it doesn't crash, there would be no core dump to further
analyze the bug.
2. Point bug output to the currently active bug report
I was hesitant to put this on main because it seemed like a performance
tank, but truth be told, I'm being a wuss. these table iterations are
nothing compared to the amount of time Fort has to spend downloading.
And it looks like I'm never going to find this bug with the stack trace
alone.
Does not fix #83 nor #89, but prevents the crash at least.
Job Snijders [Sat, 21 Jan 2023 11:43:02 +0000 (11:43 +0000)]
Ensure X509 extensions are hashed & cached, before deciding a cert is CA or EE
If X509_check_ca() fails to cache X509v3 extension values, the return
value may be incorrect, leading to erroneously assuming a given certificate
is a CA or EE cert (while in reality it is the other, or neither).
This failure mode can arise because X509_check_ca() doesn't verify
whether libcrypto's (void)x509v3_cache_extensions(x) flipped the EXFLAG_INVALID
flag in x->ex_flags. Unfortunately, X509_check_ca() doesn't have a return code
to indicate an error, so this can't be fixed in libcrypto - the API is broken.
The workaround is to call X509_check_purpose(3) with a purpose argument of -1,
before calling X509_check_ca(), this ensures the X509v3 extensions are cached.
Since X509_check_purpose() does have a return code to indicate errors, we can
use that to supplement X509_check_ca()'s shortcomings.
OpenBSD's rpki-client also uses the above approach.
backtrace() is a glibc-only feature. Some systems, such as Alpine,
do not support glibc.
It seems one solution is to rely on community ports, but I imagine it'd
be best to offload such a decision to the user. Not the safest.
Instead, if backtrace() is not available, just delete stack traces from
the binary. It's going to be a pain to debug, but that's the world we
live in, I guess.
Turns libexec into an optional dependency. Fixes #87.
Also, the commit contains a review and update of the documentation's
Alpine dependency list. There was a lot of fat in there.
Certificate: Remove subject name uniqueness validation
RFC 6487:
> An issuer SHOULD use a different subject name if the subject's key
> pair has changed (i.e., when the CA issues a certificate as part of
> re-keying the subject.)
Fort's implementation was problematic. The code was comparing the
certificate's subject name and public key to siblings that had
potentially not been validated yet. It seems to me this would make it
possible for attackers to crash FORT (by posting invalid objects) or to
invalidate legitimate objects (by publishing siblings that contained
conflicting subject names and public keys, without having to worry about
the rest of the fields).
This would be somewhat difficult o fix. I asked on the mailing list and
Discord ("RPKI Community"), and it seems the concensus is "don't
validate it." Subject Names don't really matter that much, because
RPKI's primary concern is resource ownership, not identity. Furthermore,
I'm not convinced that chopping off branches off the tree because of a
clumsy key rollover is a good idea.
On the other hand, it looks like the notfatal hash table API was being
used incorrectly. HASH_ADD_KEYPTR can OOM, but `errno` wasn't being
catched.
Fixing this is nontrivial, however, because strange `reqs_error`
functions are in the way, and that's a spaggetti I decided to avoid.
Instead, I converted HASH_ADD_KEYPTR usage to the fatal hash table API.
That's the future according to #40, anyway.
I don't think this has anything to do with #83, though.
When the file didn't need to be downloaded, because the IMS header did
its job, nothing needs to be deleted. So Fort shouldn't be complaining.
Like the previous commit, this is not a great solution, because IMS is
not the only trigger of file deletes, and the error message might be
helpful in other cases. Then again, I don't really agree with this eager
repository cleaning technique; it complicates debugging.
The proper solution is a WIP in the rrdp-refactor branch.
Lots of error messages were referring to the wrong file, and several of
them printed the correct file manually as what I can only describe as a
quick workaround.
It's not perfect; not all the RRDP code has been patched. That'll have
to wait until the deep RRDP refactor.
HTTP: Warn if a download exceeds 50% of the file size limit
Requested by Ties de Kock:
> Since some RPs now includes an upper limit on object size (some use
> 2MB if I recall correctly) I would appreciate a warning if an object
> goes over "a large fraction" of this limit (and a sample of the
> warning in the changelog and metrics if possible) - so people know
> what they need to alert on. In this situation operators can monitor
> for "natural growth" of an object and intervene, while the case that
> this check prevents (maliciously large objects) is still covered.
>
> The largest object I could find in the wild is 1.2MB (APNIC AS0 ROA).
> The RIPE NCC's largest object is smaller at the moment (but the CRL
> grows quickly if we do member CA keyrolls - since it adds all object
> on it).
>
> In summary:
>
> - I would recommend a warning (and preferably a metric) when an object
> of 50% of the object size limit is encountered.
> - I would like it if the hard limit is "safe" - especially CRLs can
> grow in some cases.
The metric will be added later, as part of #50. The warning is eg.
File size exceeds 50% of the configured limit (10/20 bytes).
50% is hardcoded at the moment.
Notice that this is an HTTP-only patch. rsync does not warn.
Helps the code review. Some structs and functions (such as
struct delta_router_key and router_key_print()) were bleeding into
mostly unrelated modules, and there were a couple of data types (struct
v4_address and struct v6_address) that were only used once, and induced
needless copying.
Philip Paeps [Wed, 27 Oct 2021 07:41:28 +0000 (15:41 +0800)]
Documentation: update FreeBSD build instructions
While binary packages are available, some people like to build from
source. Update the instructions for building from a port, a release
tarball or a Git checkout.
- Increase default remote object file size limit, because RRDP snapshot
files can be very large. (Current: ~148 MB, double on key rollover)
- Treat HTTP redirects as errors.
- Before: Redirects were treated as successes, but Fort didn't
bother to follow the redirect. As a result, the code was either
not finding the file, or finding an empty file.
- Now: Redirects are treated as errors. (Not sure if I'm meant to do
something here; curl doesn't do it automatically, and RFCs are
silent. In particular, I'm not in the mood to have to deal with
redirect loops and whatnot.)
- Remove ROA database clone operation in the SLURM code.
According to the code, it was working on a clone "so that updates can
be reverted" (on error, I presume.) But it was never reverting them.
- Refactor SLURM cleanup code.
I don't remember this one very well. Starting from the clone removal,
I got distracted with some inconsistent cleanups. Patched a buggy
cleanup somewhere.
There's still more I want to do to the SLURM code; it looks somewhat
slow.
It seems the #58 and #59 problem is a stray defer separator pop.
The comment above x509stack_cancel() clearly states that the function
should only be called shortly after a x509stack_push(), but there's one
in certificate_traverse() that isn't.
Removing this x509stack_cancel() seems to prevent the crash. I'm still
investigating the original intent of this code.
HTTP: Patch CURLOPT_LOW_SPEED_LIMIT and CURLOPT_LOW_SPEED_TIME
Likely due to some misunderstanding, Fort was managing both of these
variables using one command-line argument (--http.idle-timeout). This
unnecessarily limited the configurability of minimum transfer speeds for
HTTP connections.
--http.idle-timeout is now deprecated, and has been replaced by
--http.low-speed-limit and --http.low-speed-time, which correlate
verbatim to the corresponding curl arguments (CURLOPT_LOW_SPEED_LIMIT
and CURLOPT_LOW_SPEED_TIME).
It was allocating the deltas array twice, for seemingly no reason.
Also, the array slots were pointers, and the two arrays pointed to
different instances of the same objects. For seemingly no reason.
Now there's only one array, and it stores the objects directly.
projects / thirdparty / FORT-validator.git / log
