Jeremy Allison [Wed, 30 Sep 2009 12:21:56 +0000 (14:21 +0200)]
Fix for CVE-2009-2906.
Summary:
Specially crafted SMB requests on
authenticated SMB connections can send smbd
into a 100% CPU loop, causing a DoS on the
Samba server.
(cherry picked from commit dff54f716bdd76e3d167dc96bba6e168ef58cadd)
===========================================================
== Subject: Misconfigured /etc/passwd file may share folders unexpectedly
==
== CVE ID#: CVE-2009-2813
==
== Versions: All versions of Samba later than 3.0.11
==
== Summary: If a user in /etc/passwd is misconfigured to have
== an empty home directory then connecting to the home
== share of this user will use the root of the filesystem
== as the home directory.
===========================================================
(cherry picked from commit c1a4a99f8cc5803682a94060efee1adf330c4f02)
Jeff Layton [Fri, 25 Sep 2009 11:05:00 +0000 (07:05 -0400)]
mount.cifs: don't leak passwords with verbose option
When running mount.cifs with the --verbose option, it'll print out the
option string that it passes to the kernel...including the mount
password if there is one. Print a placeholder string instead to help
ensure that this info can't be used for nefarious purposes.
Also, the --verbose option printed the option string before it was
completely assembled anyway. This patch should also make sure that
the complete option string is printed out.
Finally, strndup passwords passed in on the command line to ensure that
they aren't shown by --verbose as well. Passwords used this way can
never be truly kept private from other users on the machine of course,
but it's simple enough to do it this way for completeness sake.
Reported-by: Ronald Volgers <r.c.volgers@student.utwente.nl> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Acked-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Part 2/2 of a fix for CVE-2009-2948.
(cherry picked from commit 1c2a816df9fd9e3a3839a679a72b3041b0217dc3)
Jeff Layton [Fri, 25 Sep 2009 11:05:00 +0000 (07:05 -0400)]
mount.cifs: check access of credential files before opening
It's possible for an unprivileged user to pass a setuid mount.cifs a
credential or password file to which he does not have access. This can cause
mount.cifs to open the file on his behalf and possibly leak the info in the
first few lines of the file.
Check the access permissions of the file before opening it.
Reported-by: Ronald Volgers <r.c.volgers@student.utwente.nl> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Acked-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Part 1/2 of a fix for CVE-2009-2948.
(cherry picked from commit 87fe29ca3239492126a99e1562db673ea7ca208b)
Volker Lendecke [Thu, 5 Mar 2009 23:14:27 +0000 (15:14 -0800)]
Complete the fix for bug 6100
According to [MS-RPCE].pdf, section 2.2.2.11:
----
A client or a server that (during composing of a PDU) has allocated more space
for the authentication token than the security provider fills in SHOULD fill in
the rest of the allocated space with zero octets. These zero octets are still
considered to belong to the authentication token part of the PDU.<36>
----
RPC implementations are allowed to send padding bytes at the end of an auth
footer. Windows 7 makes use of this.
Jeremy Allison [Wed, 25 Feb 2009 21:01:04 +0000 (13:01 -0800)]
Fix bug in processing of open modes in POSIX open.
Was missing case of "If file exists open. If file doesn't exist error."
Damn damn damn. CIFSFS client will have to have fallback cases
for this error for a long time.
Make test for open modes more robust against other bits.
Jeremy Allison [Mon, 16 Feb 2009 02:23:09 +0000 (18:23 -0800)]
Attempt to fix bug #6099. According to Microsoft
Windows 7 looks at the negotiate_flags
returned in this structure *even if the
call fails with access denied ! So in order
to allow Win7 to connect to a Samba NT style
PDC we set the flags before we know if it's
an error or not.
Jeremy.
Yasuma Takeda [Wed, 11 Feb 2009 22:10:21 +0000 (14:10 -0800)]
Fix bug #6098 - When the DNS server is invalid, the ads_find_dc() does not work correctly with "security = domain"
1. If DNS server is invalid, the get_sorted_dc_list() is called with
realm(FQDN) and it fails.
2. On the next step, the get_sorted_dc_list() is called with realm(FQDN) again.
I think "again" is wrong place.
On the 2nd step, get_sorted_dc_list() should be called with realm(WORKGROUP).
Jeremy Allison [Thu, 22 Jan 2009 22:31:27 +0000 (14:31 -0800)]
Second part of the attemt to fix #4308 - Excel save operation corrupts file ACLs.
If the chown succeeds then the ACL set should also. Ensure this is the case
(refactor some of this code to make it simpler to read also).
Jeremy.
Jeremy Allison [Thu, 22 Jan 2009 18:58:38 +0000 (10:58 -0800)]
Another attempt to fix bug #4308 - Excel save operation corrupts file ACLs.
Simo is completely correct. We should be doing the chown *first*, and fail the
ACL set if this fails. The long standing assumption I made when writing the
initial POSIX ACL code was that Windows didn't control who could chown a file
in the same was as POSIX. In POSIX only root can do this whereas I wasn't sure
who could do this in Windows at the time (I didn't understand the privilege
model). So the assumption was that setting the ACL was more important (early
tests showed many failed ACL set's due to inability to chown). But now we have
privileges in smbd, and we must always fail an ACL set when we can't chown
first. The key that Simo noticed is that the CREATOR_OWNER bits in the ACL
incoming are relative to the *new* owner, not the old one. This is why the old
user owner disappears on ACL set - their access was set via the USER_OBJ in the
creator POSIX ACL and when the ownership changes they lose their access.
Patch is simple - just ensure we do the chown first before evaluating the
incoming ACL re-read the owners. We already have code to do this it just wasn't
rigorously being applied.
Jeremy.
s3:libsmb: handle the smb signing states the same in the krb5 and ntlmssp cases
SMB signing works the same regardless of the used auth mech.
We need to start with the temp signing ("BSRSPYL ")
and the session setup response with NT_STATUS_OK
is the first signed packet.
Now we set the krb5 session key if we got the NT_STATUS_OK
from the server and then recheck the packet.
All this is needed to make the fallback from krb5 to
ntlmssp possible. This commit also resets the cli->vuid
value to 0, if the krb5 auth didn't succeed. Otherwise
the server handles NTLMSSP packets as krb5 packets.
The restructuring of the SMB signing code is needed to
make sure the krb5 code only starts the signing engine
on success. Otherwise the NTLMSSP fallback could not initialize
the signing engine (again).
Jeremy Allison [Thu, 8 Jan 2009 18:56:36 +0000 (10:56 -0800)]
Fix race condition in alarm lock processing noticed by Richard Sharpe <realrichardsharpe@gmail.com>.
"It seems to me that if the lock is already held by another process when we
enter this code, there is a race between the timeout and the granting. If
the lock is subsequently granted, the process releasing the lock will signal
the wait variable (or whatever) and our process will be scheduled. However,
if the timeout occurs before we are scheduled, the timeout will be delivered
first.
We will have the lock but will forget we have the lock, and never release
it."
Jeremy.
Karolin Seeger [Wed, 17 Dec 2008 14:53:51 +0000 (15:53 +0100)]
s3/loadparm.c: Change default value for "ldap ssl".
LDAP_SSL_ON is not defined at all. That's why the actual default value
was "" for a long time. Set a more sensible default value without chnging the
default behaviour.
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