]> git.ipfire.org Git - thirdparty/linux.git/commit
bpf: Do not audit capability check in do_jit()
authorOndrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Tue, 21 Oct 2025 12:27:58 +0000 (14:27 +0200)
committerAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Wed, 22 Oct 2025 01:22:47 +0000 (18:22 -0700)
commit881a9c9cb7856b24e390fad9f59acfd73b98b3b2
treea5b223d14b9f935648496722dbd53eadacebbc93
parent4e9077638301816a7d73fa1e1b4c1db4a7e3b59c
bpf: Do not audit capability check in do_jit()

The failure of this check only results in a security mitigation being
applied, slightly affecting performance of the compiled BPF program. It
doesn't result in a failed syscall, an thus auditing a failed LSM
permission check for it is unwanted. For example with SELinux, it causes
a denial to be reported for confined processes running as root, which
tends to be flagged as a problem to be fixed in the policy. Yet
dontauditing or allowing CAP_SYS_ADMIN to the domain may not be
desirable, as it would allow/silence also other checks - either going
against the principle of least privilege or making debugging potentially
harder.

Fix it by changing it from capable() to ns_capable_noaudit(), which
instructs the LSMs to not audit the resulting denials.

Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2369326
Fixes: d4e89d212d40 ("x86/bpf: Call branch history clearing sequence on exit")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251021122758.2659513-1-omosnace@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c