From 12e20eb5f4881a5a69293491aa3d2addcd6b33e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wouter Wijngaards Date: Tue, 27 Apr 2010 13:00:48 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] - autotrust anchor file can be initialized with a ZSK key as well. git-svn-id: file:///svn/unbound/trunk@2100 be551aaa-1e26-0410-a405-d3ace91eadb9 --- doc/Changelog | 1 + testdata/autotrust_init_zsk.rpl | 180 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ validator/autotrust.c | 69 ++++++++++-- 3 files changed, 241 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) create mode 100644 testdata/autotrust_init_zsk.rpl diff --git a/doc/Changelog b/doc/Changelog index 333181fab..25321dade 100644 --- a/doc/Changelog +++ b/doc/Changelog @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ 27 April 2010: Wouter - unbound-control get_option domain-insecure shows config file items. - fix retry sequence if prime hints are recursion-lame. + - autotrust anchor file can be initialized with a ZSK key as well. 26 April 2010: Wouter - Compile fix using Sun Studio 12 compiler on Solaris 5.9, use diff --git a/testdata/autotrust_init_zsk.rpl b/testdata/autotrust_init_zsk.rpl new file mode 100644 index 000000000..5e72f2d23 --- /dev/null +++ b/testdata/autotrust_init_zsk.rpl @@ -0,0 +1,180 @@ +; config options +server: + target-fetch-policy: "0 0 0 0 0" + log-time-ascii: yes +stub-zone: + name: "." + stub-addr: 193.0.14.129 # K.ROOT-SERVERS.NET. +; initial content (say from dig example.com DNSKEY > example.com.key) +AUTOTRUST_FILE example.com +example.com. 10800 IN DNSKEY 256 3 5 AQPQ41chR9DEHt/aIzIFAqanbDlRflJoRs5yz1jFsoRIT7dWf0r+PeDuewdxkszNH6wnU4QL8pfKFRh5PIYVBLK3 ;{id = 30899 (zsk), size = 512b} +AUTOTRUST_END +CONFIG_END + +SCENARIO_BEGIN Test autotrust with initial trust anchor ZSK + +; K-ROOT +RANGE_BEGIN 0 100 + ADDRESS 193.0.14.129 +ENTRY_BEGIN +MATCH opcode qname qtype +ADJUST copy_id copy_query +REPLY QR AA +SECTION QUESTION +. IN NS +SECTION ANSWER +. IN NS k.root-servers.net. +SECTION ADDITIONAL +k.root-servers.net IN A 193.0.14.129 +ENTRY_END + +ENTRY_BEGIN +MATCH opcode subdomain +ADJUST copy_id copy_query +REPLY QR +SECTION QUESTION +com. IN NS +SECTION AUTHORITY +com. IN NS a.gtld-servers.net. +SECTION ADDITIONAL +a.gtld-servers.net. IN A 192.5.6.30 +ENTRY_END +RANGE_END + +; a.gtld-servers.net. +RANGE_BEGIN 0 100 + ADDRESS 192.5.6.30 +ENTRY_BEGIN +MATCH opcode subdomain +ADJUST copy_id copy_query +REPLY QR +SECTION QUESTION +example.com. IN NS +SECTION AUTHORITY +example.com. IN NS ns.example.com. +SECTION ADDITIONAL +ns.example.com. IN A 1.2.3.4 +ENTRY_END +RANGE_END + +; ns.example.com. +RANGE_BEGIN 0 100 + ADDRESS 1.2.3.4 +ENTRY_BEGIN +MATCH opcode qname qtype +ADJUST copy_id +REPLY QR AA +SECTION QUESTION +www.example.com. IN A +SECTION ANSWER +www.example.com. 3600 IN A 10.20.30.40 +www.example.com. 3600 IN RRSIG A 5 3 3600 20090924111500 20090821111500 30899 example.com. pYGxVLsWUvOp1wSf0iwPap+JnECfC5GAm1lRqy3YEqecNGld7U7x/5Imo3CerbdZrVptUQs2oH0lcjwYJXMnsw== ;{id = 30899} +SECTION AUTHORITY +example.com. 3600 IN NS ns.example.com. +example.com. 3600 IN RRSIG NS 5 2 3600 20090924111500 20090821111500 30899 example.com. J5wxRq0jgwQL6yy530kvo9cHqNAUHV8IF4dvaYZL0bNraO2Oe6dVXqlJl4+cxNHI2TMsstwFPr2Zz8tv6Az2mQ== ;{id = 30899} +SECTION ADDITIONAL +ns.example.com. 3600 IN A 1.2.3.4 +ns.example.com. 3600 IN RRSIG A 5 3 3600 20090924111500 20090821111500 30899 example.com. JsXbS18oyc0zkVaOWGSFdIQuOsZKflT0GraT9afDPoWLCgH4ApF7jNgfJV7Pqy1sTBRajME5IUAhpANwGBuW4A== ;{id = 30899} +ENTRY_END + +ENTRY_BEGIN +MATCH opcode qname qtype +ADJUST copy_id +REPLY QR AA +SECTION QUESTION +example.com. IN DNSKEY +SECTION ANSWER +; KSK 1 +example.com. 10800 IN DNSKEY 257 3 5 AwEAAc3Z5DQDJpH4oPdNtC4BUQHk50XMD+dHr4r8psHmivIa83hxR5CRgCtd9sENCW9Ae8OIO19xw9t/RPaEAqQa+OE= ;{id = 55582 (ksk), size = 512b} +; ZSK 1 +example.com. 10800 IN DNSKEY 256 3 5 AQPQ41chR9DEHt/aIzIFAqanbDlRflJoRs5yz1jFsoRIT7dWf0r+PeDuewdxkszNH6wnU4QL8pfKFRh5PIYVBLK3 ;{id = 30899 (ksk), size = 512b} +; signatures +example.com. 10800 IN RRSIG DNSKEY 5 2 10800 20090924111500 20090821111500 30899 example.com. b/HK231jIQLX8IhlZfup3r0yhpXaasbPE6LzxoEVVvWaTZWcLmeV8jDIcn0qO7Yvs7bIJN20lwVAV0GcHH3hWQ== ;{id = 30899} +example.com. 10800 IN RRSIG DNSKEY 5 2 10800 20090924111500 20090821111500 55582 example.com. PCHme1QLoULxqjhg5tMlpR0qJlBfstEUVq18TtNoKQe9le1YhJ9caheXcTWoK+boLhXxg9u6Yyvq8FboQh0OjA== ;{id = 55582} + +ENTRY_END +RANGE_END + +; set date/time to Aug 24 09:46:40 (2009). +STEP 5 TIME_PASSES ELAPSE 1251100000 +STEP 6 ASSIGN t0 = ${time} +; get probe time and check it. 4800 is about 10% less than 5400. And more than +; the 3600 that a failure timeout would have. +STEP 7 ASSIGN probe = ${range 4800 ${timeout} 5400} + + +; the auto probing should have been done now. +STEP 8 CHECK_AUTOTRUST example.com +FILE_BEGIN +; autotrust trust anchor file +;;id: example.com. 1 +;;last_queried: 1251100000 ;;Mon Aug 24 09:46:40 2009 +;;last_success: 1251100000 ;;Mon Aug 24 09:46:40 2009 +;;next_probe_time: ${$t0 + $probe} ;;${ctime $t0 + $probe} +;;query_failed: 0 +;;query_interval: 5400 +;;retry_time: 3600 +example.com. 10800 IN DNSKEY 257 3 5 AwEAAc3Z5DQDJpH4oPdNtC4BUQHk50XMD+dHr4r8psHmivIa83hxR5CRgCtd9sENCW9Ae8OIO19xw9t/RPaEAqQa+OE= ;{id = 55582 (ksk), size = 512b} ;;state=2 [ VALID ] ;;count=0 ;;lastchange=1251100000 ;;Mon Aug 24 09:46:40 2009 +FILE_END + + +STEP 10 QUERY +ENTRY_BEGIN +REPLY RD DO +SECTION QUESTION +www.example.com. IN A +ENTRY_END + +STEP 20 CHECK_ANSWER +ENTRY_BEGIN +MATCH all +REPLY QR RD RA AD NOERROR +SECTION QUESTION +www.example.com. IN A +SECTION ANSWER +www.example.com. 3600 IN A 10.20.30.40 +www.example.com. 3600 IN RRSIG A 5 3 3600 20090924111500 20090821111500 30899 example.com. pYGxVLsWUvOp1wSf0iwPap+JnECfC5GAm1lRqy3YEqecNGld7U7x/5Imo3CerbdZrVptUQs2oH0lcjwYJXMnsw== ;{id = 30899} +SECTION AUTHORITY +example.com. 3600 IN NS ns.example.com. +example.com. 3600 IN RRSIG NS 5 2 3600 20090924111500 20090821111500 30899 example.com. J5wxRq0jgwQL6yy530kvo9cHqNAUHV8IF4dvaYZL0bNraO2Oe6dVXqlJl4+cxNHI2TMsstwFPr2Zz8tv6Az2mQ== ;{id = 30899} +SECTION ADDITIONAL +ns.example.com. 3600 IN A 1.2.3.4 +ns.example.com. 3600 IN RRSIG A 5 3 3600 20090924111500 20090821111500 30899 example.com. JsXbS18oyc0zkVaOWGSFdIQuOsZKflT0GraT9afDPoWLCgH4ApF7jNgfJV7Pqy1sTBRajME5IUAhpANwGBuW4A== ;{id = 30899} +ENTRY_END + +; The autotrust anchor was probed due to the query. + +STEP 30 CHECK_AUTOTRUST example.com +FILE_BEGIN +; autotrust trust anchor file +;;id: example.com. 1 +;;last_queried: 1251100000 ;;Mon Aug 24 09:46:40 2009 +;;last_success: 1251100000 ;;Mon Aug 24 09:46:40 2009 +;;next_probe_time: ${$t0 + $probe} ;;${ctime $t0 + $probe} +;;query_failed: 0 +;;query_interval: 5400 +;;retry_time: 3600 +example.com. 10800 IN DNSKEY 257 3 5 AwEAAc3Z5DQDJpH4oPdNtC4BUQHk50XMD+dHr4r8psHmivIa83hxR5CRgCtd9sENCW9Ae8OIO19xw9t/RPaEAqQa+OE= ;{id = 55582 (ksk), size = 512b} ;;state=2 [ VALID ] ;;count=0 ;;lastchange=1251100000 ;;Mon Aug 24 09:46:40 2009 +FILE_END + +; wait and see if autotrust probes (the unchanged) domain again. +STEP 40 TIME_PASSES EVAL ${$probe} + +STEP 50 TRAFFIC + +STEP 65 ASSIGN probe2 = ${range 4800 ${timeout} 5400} + +STEP 70 CHECK_AUTOTRUST example.com +FILE_BEGIN +; autotrust trust anchor file +;;id: example.com. 1 +;;last_queried: ${time} ;;${ctime ${time}} +;;last_success: ${time} ;;${ctime ${time}} +;;next_probe_time: ${$t0 + $probe + $probe2} ;;${ctime $t0 + $probe + $probe2} +;;query_failed: 0 +;;query_interval: 5400 +;;retry_time: 3600 +example.com. 10800 IN DNSKEY 257 3 5 AwEAAc3Z5DQDJpH4oPdNtC4BUQHk50XMD+dHr4r8psHmivIa83hxR5CRgCtd9sENCW9Ae8OIO19xw9t/RPaEAqQa+OE= ;{id = 55582 (ksk), size = 512b} ;;state=2 [ VALID ] ;;count=0 ;;lastchange=1251100000 ;;Mon Aug 24 09:46:40 2009 +FILE_END + +SCENARIO_END diff --git a/validator/autotrust.c b/validator/autotrust.c index 578a63f46..0574b74b1 100644 --- a/validator/autotrust.c +++ b/validator/autotrust.c @@ -941,8 +941,8 @@ void autr_write_file(struct module_env* env, struct trust_anchor* tp) continue; if(ta->s == AUTR_STATE_REMOVED) continue; - /* only store SEP keys */ - if(!rr_is_dnskey_sep(ta->rr)) + /* only store keys */ + if(ldns_rr_get_type(ta->rr) != LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY) continue; str = ldns_rr2str(ta->rr); if(!str || !str[0]) { @@ -1578,6 +1578,37 @@ anchor_state_update(struct module_env* env, struct autr_ta* anchor, int* c) } } +/** if ZSK init then trust KSKs */ +static int +init_zsk_to_ksk(struct module_env* env, struct trust_anchor* tp, int* changed) +{ + /* search for VALID ZSKs */ + struct autr_ta* anchor; + int validzsk = 0; + int validksk = 0; + for(anchor = tp->autr->keys; anchor; anchor = anchor->next) { + /* last_change test makes sure it was manually configured */ + if (ldns_rr_get_type(anchor->rr) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY && + anchor->last_change == 0 && + !rr_is_dnskey_sep(anchor->rr) && + anchor->s == AUTR_STATE_VALID) + validzsk++; + } + if(validzsk == 0) + return 0; + for(anchor = tp->autr->keys; anchor; anchor = anchor->next) { + if (rr_is_dnskey_sep(anchor->rr) && + anchor->s == AUTR_STATE_ADDPEND) { + verbose_key(anchor, VERB_ALGO, "trust KSK from " + "ZSK(config)"); + set_trustanchor_state(env, anchor, changed, + AUTR_STATE_VALID); + validksk++; + } + } + return validksk; +} + /** Remove missing trustanchors so the list does not grow forever */ static void remove_missing_trustanchors(struct module_env* env, struct trust_anchor* tp, @@ -1586,8 +1617,6 @@ remove_missing_trustanchors(struct module_env* env, struct trust_anchor* tp, struct autr_ta* anchor; int exceeded; int valid = 0; - if(env->cfg->keep_missing == 0) - return; /* keep forever */ /* see if we have anchors that are valid */ for(anchor = tp->autr->keys; anchor; anchor = anchor->next) { /* Only do KSKs */ @@ -1596,16 +1625,38 @@ remove_missing_trustanchors(struct module_env* env, struct trust_anchor* tp, if (anchor->s == AUTR_STATE_VALID) valid++; } - if(valid == 0) - return; + /* if there are no SEP Valid anchors, see if we started out with + * a ZSK (last-change=0) anchor, which is VALID and there are KSKs + * now that can be made valid. Do this immediately because there + * is no guarantee that the ZSKs get announced long enough. Usually + * this is immediately after init with a ZSK trusted, unless the domain + * was not advertising any KSKs at all. In which case we perfectly + * track the zero number of KSKs. */ + if(valid == 0) { + valid = init_zsk_to_ksk(env, tp, changed); + if(valid == 0) + return; + } for(anchor = tp->autr->keys; anchor; anchor = anchor->next) { - /* Only do KSKs */ - if (!rr_is_dnskey_sep(anchor->rr)) + /* ignore ZSKs if newly added */ + if(anchor->s == AUTR_STATE_START) + continue; + /* remove ZSKs if a KSK is present */ + if (!rr_is_dnskey_sep(anchor->rr)) { + if(valid > 0) { + verbose_key(anchor, VERB_ALGO, "remove ZSK " + "[%d key(s) VALID]", valid); + set_trustanchor_state(env, anchor, changed, + AUTR_STATE_REMOVED); + } continue; + } /* Only do MISSING keys */ if (anchor->s != AUTR_STATE_MISSING) continue; + if(env->cfg->keep_missing == 0) + continue; /* keep forever */ exceeded = check_holddown(env, anchor, env->cfg->keep_missing); /* If keep_missing has exceeded and we still have more than @@ -1657,7 +1708,7 @@ autr_cleanup_keys(struct trust_anchor* tp) while(p) { /* do we want to remove this key? */ if(p->s == AUTR_STATE_START || p->s == AUTR_STATE_REMOVED || - !rr_is_dnskey_sep(p->rr)) { + ldns_rr_get_type(p->rr) != LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY) { struct autr_ta* np = p->next; /* remove */ ldns_rr_free(p->rr); -- 2.47.2