From 1f9e4d029eb13db90644525ef366ae858ea15cdf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andreas Steffen Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2014 15:06:57 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] Fixed a minor vulnerability in which a malformed ASN.1 length field could cause a crash of the charon daemon if the verbose debug level 3 (raw hex dump) for the asn subsystem is enabled. --- src/libstrongswan/asn1/asn1_parser.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/src/libstrongswan/asn1/asn1_parser.c b/src/libstrongswan/asn1/asn1_parser.c index c31fb75f0b..e7b7a428d9 100644 --- a/src/libstrongswan/asn1/asn1_parser.c +++ b/src/libstrongswan/asn1/asn1_parser.c @@ -160,6 +160,7 @@ METHOD(asn1_parser_t, iterate, bool, DBG1(DBG_ASN, "L%d - %s: length of ASN.1 object invalid or too large", level, obj.name); this->success = FALSE; + goto end; } blob1->ptr = blob->ptr; -- 2.47.2