From 423044bed36af8792ea9e861a2fa33ed52a8fcbd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "David S. Miller" Date: Sat, 19 Jul 2008 23:30:57 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] sctp: Make sure N * sizeof(union sctp_addr) does not overflow. (CVE-2008-2826) As noticed by Gabriel Campana, the kmalloc() length arg passed in by sctp_getsockopt_local_addrs_old() can overflow if ->addr_num is large enough. Therefore, enforce an appropriate limit. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk --- net/sctp/socket.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c index 49f9305710305..8e1e20567c0cf 100644 --- a/net/sctp/socket.c +++ b/net/sctp/socket.c @@ -3958,7 +3958,9 @@ static int sctp_getsockopt_local_addrs_old(struct sock *sk, int len, if (copy_from_user(&getaddrs, optval, sizeof(struct sctp_getaddrs_old))) return -EFAULT; - if (getaddrs.addr_num <= 0) return -EINVAL; + if (getaddrs.addr_num <= 0 || + getaddrs.addr_num >= (INT_MAX / sizeof(union sctp_addr))) + return -EINVAL; /* * For UDP-style sockets, id specifies the association to query. * If the id field is set to the value '0' then the locally bound -- 2.47.2