From ad64a69e02f7dda422d0f4f53dce7b1278715380 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matt Caswell Date: Mon, 25 Apr 2016 17:06:56 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] Change usage of RAND_pseudo_bytes to RAND_bytes RAND_pseudo_bytes() allows random data to be returned even in low entropy conditions. Sometimes this is ok. Many times it is not. For the avoidance of any doubt, replace existing usage of RAND_pseudo_bytes() with RAND_bytes(). Reviewed-by: Rich Salz --- apps/enc.c | 2 +- apps/passwd.c | 4 ++-- apps/s_server.c | 2 +- crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c | 2 +- crypto/asn1/p5_pbe.c | 2 +- crypto/asn1/p5_pbev2.c | 4 ++-- crypto/bio/bf_nbio.c | 4 ++-- crypto/bn/bn_rand.c | 10 +++------- crypto/cms/cms_enc.c | 2 +- crypto/cms/cms_ess.c | 3 +-- crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c | 4 ++-- crypto/des/des.c | 2 +- crypto/des/enc_writ.c | 2 +- crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c | 4 ++-- crypto/evp/bio_ok.c | 2 +- crypto/ocsp/ocsp_ext.c | 2 +- crypto/pem/pem_lib.c | 2 +- crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c | 2 +- crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c | 2 +- crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c | 6 +++--- ssl/d1_both.c | 6 +++--- ssl/s23_clnt.c | 8 ++++---- ssl/s2_clnt.c | 4 ++-- ssl/s2_srvr.c | 12 ++++-------- ssl/s3_srvr.c | 7 ++----- ssl/ssl_lib.c | 2 +- ssl/ssl_sess.c | 2 +- ssl/t1_lib.c | 6 +++--- 28 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 61 deletions(-) diff --git a/apps/enc.c b/apps/enc.c index 7b7c70b132d..8e2ef27aca3 100644 --- a/apps/enc.c +++ b/apps/enc.c @@ -509,7 +509,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid hex salt value\n"); goto end; } - } else if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(salt, sizeof salt) < 0) + } else if (RAND_bytes(salt, sizeof salt) <= 0) goto end; /* * If -P option then don't bother writing diff --git a/apps/passwd.c b/apps/passwd.c index 5ff53b5743c..798a6d59361 100644 --- a/apps/passwd.c +++ b/apps/passwd.c @@ -416,7 +416,7 @@ static int do_passwd(int passed_salt, char **salt_p, char **salt_malloc_p, if (*salt_malloc_p == NULL) goto err; } - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes((unsigned char *)*salt_p, 2) < 0) + if (RAND_bytes((unsigned char *)*salt_p, 2) <= 0) goto err; (*salt_p)[0] = cov_2char[(*salt_p)[0] & 0x3f]; /* 6 bits */ (*salt_p)[1] = cov_2char[(*salt_p)[1] & 0x3f]; /* 6 bits */ @@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ static int do_passwd(int passed_salt, char **salt_p, char **salt_malloc_p, if (*salt_malloc_p == NULL) goto err; } - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes((unsigned char *)*salt_p, 8) < 0) + if (RAND_bytes((unsigned char *)*salt_p, 8) <= 0) goto err; for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) diff --git a/apps/s_server.c b/apps/s_server.c index d6c53d9476f..2c1e5ee9e69 100644 --- a/apps/s_server.c +++ b/apps/s_server.c @@ -3364,7 +3364,7 @@ static int generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id, { unsigned int count = 0; do { - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(id, *id_len) < 0) + if (RAND_bytes(id, *id_len) <= 0) return 0; /* * Prefix the session_id with the required prefix. NB: If our prefix diff --git a/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c b/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c index 96110c540f3..9fd5bef0fc9 100644 --- a/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c +++ b/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c @@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ int SMIME_write_ASN1(BIO *bio, ASN1_VALUE *val, BIO *data, int flags, if ((flags & SMIME_DETACHED) && data) { /* We want multipart/signed */ /* Generate a random boundary */ - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes((unsigned char *)bound, 32) < 0) + if (RAND_bytes((unsigned char *)bound, 32) <= 0) return 0; for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) { c = bound[i] & 0xf; diff --git a/crypto/asn1/p5_pbe.c b/crypto/asn1/p5_pbe.c index bdbfdcd67c0..e2a1def53f1 100644 --- a/crypto/asn1/p5_pbe.c +++ b/crypto/asn1/p5_pbe.c @@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ int PKCS5_pbe_set0_algor(X509_ALGOR *algor, int alg, int iter, sstr = ASN1_STRING_data(pbe->salt); if (salt) memcpy(sstr, salt, saltlen); - else if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(sstr, saltlen) < 0) + else if (RAND_bytes(sstr, saltlen) <= 0) goto err; if (!ASN1_item_pack(pbe, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PBEPARAM), &pbe_str)) { diff --git a/crypto/asn1/p5_pbev2.c b/crypto/asn1/p5_pbev2.c index 73ba4a3d67a..388053e0a1b 100644 --- a/crypto/asn1/p5_pbev2.c +++ b/crypto/asn1/p5_pbev2.c @@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ X509_ALGOR *PKCS5_pbe2_set_iv(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int iter, if (EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher)) { if (aiv) memcpy(iv, aiv, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher)); - else if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher)) < 0) + else if (RAND_bytes(iv, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher)) <= 0) goto err; } @@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ X509_ALGOR *PKCS5_pbkdf2_set(int iter, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, if (salt) memcpy(osalt->data, salt, saltlen); - else if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(osalt->data, saltlen) < 0) + else if (RAND_bytes(osalt->data, saltlen) <= 0) goto merr; if (iter <= 0) diff --git a/crypto/bio/bf_nbio.c b/crypto/bio/bf_nbio.c index a04f32a0081..4842bb4c82f 100644 --- a/crypto/bio/bf_nbio.c +++ b/crypto/bio/bf_nbio.c @@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ static int nbiof_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl) BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); #if 1 - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(&n, 1) < 0) + if (RAND_bytes(&n, 1) <= 0) return -1; num = (n & 0x07); @@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ static int nbiof_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl) num = nt->lwn; nt->lwn = 0; } else { - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(&n, 1) < 0) + if (RAND_bytes(&n, 1) <= 0) return -1; num = (n & 7); } diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c b/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c index f9fb2e9e45e..2266d22b66a 100644 --- a/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c @@ -145,13 +145,9 @@ static int bnrand(int pseudorand, BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom) time(&tim); RAND_add(&tim, sizeof(tim), 0.0); - if (pseudorand) { - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(buf, bytes) == -1) - goto err; - } else { - if (RAND_bytes(buf, bytes) <= 0) - goto err; - } + /* We ignore the value of pseudorand and always call RAND_bytes */ + if (RAND_bytes(buf, bytes) <= 0) + goto err; #if 1 if (pseudorand == 2) { diff --git a/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c b/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c index e282c9dd283..90b1fcc7507 100644 --- a/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c +++ b/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c @@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec) /* Generate a random IV if we need one */ ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx); if (ivlen > 0) { - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, ivlen) <= 0) + if (RAND_bytes(iv, ivlen) <= 0) goto err; piv = iv; } diff --git a/crypto/cms/cms_ess.c b/crypto/cms/cms_ess.c index 8631a2eb2b3..8212560628a 100644 --- a/crypto/cms/cms_ess.c +++ b/crypto/cms/cms_ess.c @@ -107,8 +107,7 @@ CMS_ReceiptRequest *CMS_ReceiptRequest_create0(unsigned char *id, int idlen, else { if (!ASN1_STRING_set(rr->signedContentIdentifier, NULL, 32)) goto merr; - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rr->signedContentIdentifier->data, 32) - <= 0) + if (RAND_bytes(rr->signedContentIdentifier->data, 32) <= 0) goto err; } diff --git a/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c b/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c index b91c01691fe..5c817caf2f0 100644 --- a/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c +++ b/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c @@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ CMS_RecipientInfo *CMS_add0_recipient_password(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); if (ivlen > 0) { - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, ivlen) <= 0) + if (RAND_bytes(iv, ivlen) <= 0) goto err; if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv) <= 0) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); @@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ static int kek_wrap_key(unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen, memcpy(out + 4, in, inlen); /* Add random padding to end */ if (olen > inlen + 4 - && RAND_pseudo_bytes(out + 4 + inlen, olen - 4 - inlen) < 0) + && RAND_bytes(out + 4 + inlen, olen - 4 - inlen) <= 0) return 0; /* Encrypt twice */ EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, &dummy, out, olen); diff --git a/crypto/des/des.c b/crypto/des/des.c index 586aed72378..d7374382d83 100644 --- a/crypto/des/des.c +++ b/crypto/des/des.c @@ -456,7 +456,7 @@ void doencryption(void) len = l - rem; if (feof(DES_IN)) { for (i = 7 - rem; i > 0; i--) { - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(buf + l++, 1) < 0) + if (RAND_bytes(buf + l++, 1) <= 0) goto problems; } buf[l++] = rem; diff --git a/crypto/des/enc_writ.c b/crypto/des/enc_writ.c index bfaabde516a..c2aaa8e98ca 100644 --- a/crypto/des/enc_writ.c +++ b/crypto/des/enc_writ.c @@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ int DES_enc_write(int fd, const void *_buf, int len, if (len < 8) { cp = shortbuf; memcpy(shortbuf, buf, len); - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(shortbuf + len, 8 - len) < 0) { + if (RAND_bytes(shortbuf + len, 8 - len) <= 0) { return -1; } rnum = 8; diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c index 15f3bb4f3f3..f6de68488cc 100644 --- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c +++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c @@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ int dsa_builtin_paramgen(DSA *ret, size_t bits, size_t qbits, goto err; if (!seed_len || !seed_in) { - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(seed, qsize) < 0) + if (RAND_bytes(seed, qsize) <= 0) goto err; seed_is_random = 1; } else { @@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ int dsa_builtin_paramgen2(DSA *ret, size_t L, size_t N, goto err; if (!seed_in) { - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(seed, seed_len) < 0) + if (RAND_bytes(seed, seed_len) <= 0) goto err; } /* step 2 */ diff --git a/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c b/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c index 5c32e35e17b..16e151f1101 100644 --- a/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c +++ b/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c @@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ static int sig_out(BIO *b) * FIXME: there's absolutely no guarantee this makes any sense at all, * particularly now EVP_MD_CTX has been restructured. */ - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(md->md_data, md->digest->md_size) < 0) + if (RAND_bytes(md->md_data, md->digest->md_size) <= 0) goto berr; memcpy(&(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_len]), md->md_data, md->digest->md_size); longswap(&(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_len]), md->digest->md_size); diff --git a/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_ext.c b/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_ext.c index c19648c7329..55af31b5734 100644 --- a/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_ext.c +++ b/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_ext.c @@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ static int ocsp_add1_nonce(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) **exts, ASN1_put_object(&tmpval, 0, len, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL); if (val) memcpy(tmpval, val, len); - else if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(tmpval, len) < 0) + else if (RAND_bytes(tmpval, len) <= 0) goto err; if (!X509V3_add1_i2d(exts, NID_id_pkix_OCSP_Nonce, &os, 0, X509V3_ADD_REPLACE)) diff --git a/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c b/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c index ac4faae0470..c82b3c0ae26 100644 --- a/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c +++ b/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c @@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ int PEM_ASN1_write_bio(i2d_of_void *i2d, const char *name, BIO *bp, } RAND_add(data, i, 0); /* put in the RSA key. */ OPENSSL_assert(enc->iv_len <= (int)sizeof(iv)); - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, enc->iv_len) < 0) /* Generate a salt */ + if (RAND_bytes(iv, enc->iv_len) <= 0) /* Generate a salt */ goto err; /* * The 'iv' is used as the iv and as a salt. It is NOT taken from diff --git a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c index a9277827ff2..cbf34da05ad 100644 --- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c +++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c @@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ int PKCS12_setup_mac(PKCS12 *p12, int iter, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, } p12->mac->salt->length = saltlen; if (!salt) { - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p12->mac->salt->data, saltlen) < 0) + if (RAND_bytes(p12->mac->salt->data, saltlen) <= 0) return 0; } else memcpy(p12->mac->salt->data, salt, saltlen); diff --git a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c index 946aaa65435..1ab6d5ae712 100644 --- a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c +++ b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c @@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataInit(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio) ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(evp_cipher); xalg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_CIPHER_type(evp_cipher)); if (ivlen > 0) - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, ivlen) <= 0) + if (RAND_bytes(iv, ivlen) <= 0) goto err; if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, evp_cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL, 1) <= 0) goto err; diff --git a/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c b/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c index 26ad3e07b4b..986babfd493 100644 --- a/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c +++ b/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c @@ -544,7 +544,7 @@ SRP_user_pwd *SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username) if (!SRP_user_pwd_set_ids(user, username, NULL)) goto err; - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(digv, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) < 0) + if (RAND_bytes(digv, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) <= 0) goto err; EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctxt); EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctxt, EVP_sha1(), NULL); @@ -597,7 +597,7 @@ char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt, } if (*salt == NULL) { - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN) < 0) + if (RAND_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN) <= 0) goto err; s = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN, NULL); @@ -670,7 +670,7 @@ int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt, srp_bn_print(g); if (*salt == NULL) { - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN) < 0) + if (RAND_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN) <= 0) goto err; salttmp = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN, NULL); diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c index 5d26c949265..b5900dea8f3 100644 --- a/ssl/d1_both.c +++ b/ssl/d1_both.c @@ -1469,7 +1469,7 @@ int dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s) memcpy(bp, pl, payload); bp += payload; /* Random padding */ - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding) < 0) { + if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) { OPENSSL_free(buffer); return -1; } @@ -1554,11 +1554,11 @@ int dtls1_heartbeat(SSL *s) /* Sequence number */ s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p); /* 16 random bytes */ - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16) < 0) + if (RAND_bytes(p, 16) <= 0) goto err; p += 16; /* Random padding */ - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding) < 0) + if (RAND_bytes(p, padding) <= 0) goto err; ret = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding); diff --git a/ssl/s23_clnt.c b/ssl/s23_clnt.c index f782010c478..6850dc0c670 100644 --- a/ssl/s23_clnt.c +++ b/ssl/s23_clnt.c @@ -289,9 +289,9 @@ int ssl_fill_hello_random(SSL *s, int server, unsigned char *result, int len) unsigned long Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL); unsigned char *p = result; l2n(Time, p); - return RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, len - 4); + return RAND_bytes(p, len - 4); } else - return RAND_pseudo_bytes(result, len); + return RAND_bytes(result, len); } static int ssl23_client_hello(SSL *s) @@ -466,8 +466,8 @@ static int ssl23_client_hello(SSL *s) i = ch_len; s2n(i, d); memset(&(s->s3->client_random[0]), 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes - (&(s->s3->client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - i]), i) <= 0) + if (RAND_bytes (&(s->s3->client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - i]), i) + <= 0) return -1; memcpy(p, &(s->s3->client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - i]), i); diff --git a/ssl/s2_clnt.c b/ssl/s2_clnt.c index 69da6b1421d..20de1a82178 100644 --- a/ssl/s2_clnt.c +++ b/ssl/s2_clnt.c @@ -581,7 +581,7 @@ static int client_hello(SSL *s) /* * challenge id data */ - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(s->s2->challenge, SSL2_CHALLENGE_LENGTH) <= 0) + if (RAND_bytes(s->s2->challenge, SSL2_CHALLENGE_LENGTH) <= 0) return -1; memcpy(d, s->s2->challenge, SSL2_CHALLENGE_LENGTH); d += SSL2_CHALLENGE_LENGTH; @@ -629,7 +629,7 @@ static int client_master_key(SSL *s) return -1; } if (i > 0) - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(sess->key_arg, i) <= 0) + if (RAND_bytes(sess->key_arg, i) <= 0) return -1; /* make a master key */ diff --git a/ssl/s2_srvr.c b/ssl/s2_srvr.c index 07e9df82820..d3b243c27e0 100644 --- a/ssl/s2_srvr.c +++ b/ssl/s2_srvr.c @@ -526,11 +526,8 @@ static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s) * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */ - /* - * should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. - */ - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, - (int)num_encrypted_key_bytes) <= 0) + if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, + (int)num_encrypted_key_bytes) <= 0) return 0; i = ssl_rsa_private_decrypt(s->cert, s->s2->tmp.enc, @@ -822,8 +819,7 @@ static int server_hello(SSL *s) /* make and send conn_id */ s2n(SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_LENGTH, p); /* add conn_id length */ s->s2->conn_id_length = SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_LENGTH; - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(s->s2->conn_id, (int)s->s2->conn_id_length) <= - 0) + if (RAND_bytes(s->s2->conn_id, (int)s->s2->conn_id_length) <= 0) return -1; memcpy(d, s->s2->conn_id, SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_LENGTH); d += SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_LENGTH; @@ -962,7 +958,7 @@ static int request_certificate(SSL *s) p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; *(p++) = SSL2_MT_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE; *(p++) = SSL2_AT_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION; - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(ccd, SSL2_MIN_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH) <= 0) + if (RAND_bytes(ccd, SSL2_MIN_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH) <= 0) return -1; memcpy(p, ccd, SSL2_MIN_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH); diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c index ab7f6900d2f..0c43c493ed6 100644 --- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c +++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c @@ -2229,11 +2229,8 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */ - /* - * should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. - */ - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, - sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) + if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, + sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) goto err; decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c index 714a31ec384..a707612fb0f 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c +++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c @@ -2000,7 +2000,7 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth) ret->tlsext_servername_callback = 0; ret->tlsext_servername_arg = NULL; /* Setup RFC4507 ticket keys */ - if ((RAND_pseudo_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16) <= 0) + if ((RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16) <= 0) || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16) <= 0) || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_aes_key, 16) <= 0)) ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET; diff --git a/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/ssl/ssl_sess.c index 54ee78350b5..ba5737f0061 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c +++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c @@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ static int def_generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id, { unsigned int retry = 0; do - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(id, *id_len) <= 0) + if (RAND_bytes(id, *id_len) <= 0) return 0; while (SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) && (++retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS)) ; diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c index cdac0118caf..8071b4ab7db 100644 --- a/ssl/t1_lib.c +++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c @@ -3906,7 +3906,7 @@ int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s) memcpy(bp, pl, payload); bp += payload; /* Random padding */ - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding) < 0) { + if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) { OPENSSL_free(buffer); return -1; } @@ -3992,13 +3992,13 @@ int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s) /* Sequence number */ s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p); /* 16 random bytes */ - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16) < 0) { + if (RAND_bytes(p, 16) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } p += 16; /* Random padding */ - if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding) < 0) { + if (RAND_bytes(p, padding) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } -- 2.47.2