#include "gcrypt-util.h"
#include "hexdecoct.h"
#include "memory-util.h"
+#include "openssl-util.h"
#include "resolved-dns-dnssec.h"
#include "resolved-dns-packet.h"
#include "sort-util.h"
return sum & UINT32_C(0xFFFF);
}
-#if HAVE_GCRYPT
+#if HAVE_OPENSSL_OR_GCRYPT
static int rr_compare(DnsResourceRecord * const *a, DnsResourceRecord * const *b) {
const DnsResourceRecord *x = *a, *y = *b;
}
static int dnssec_rsa_verify_raw(
- const char *hash_algorithm,
+ hash_algorithm_t hash_algorithm,
const void *signature, size_t signature_size,
const void *data, size_t data_size,
const void *exponent, size_t exponent_size,
const void *modulus, size_t modulus_size) {
+#if PREFER_OPENSSL
+ _cleanup_(RSA_freep) RSA *rpubkey = NULL;
+ _cleanup_(EVP_PKEY_freep) EVP_PKEY *epubkey = NULL;
+ _cleanup_(EVP_PKEY_CTX_freep) EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ _cleanup_(BN_freep) BIGNUM *e = NULL, *m = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(hash_algorithm);
+
+ e = BN_bin2bn(exponent, exponent_size, NULL);
+ if (!e)
+ return -EIO;
+
+ m = BN_bin2bn(modulus, modulus_size, NULL);
+ if (!m)
+ return -EIO;
+
+ rpubkey = RSA_new();
+ if (!rpubkey)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (RSA_set0_key(rpubkey, BN_dup(m), BN_dup(e), NULL) <= 0)
+ return -EIO;
+
+ assert((size_t) RSA_size(rpubkey) == signature_size);
+
+ epubkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
+ if (!epubkey)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(epubkey, RSAPublicKey_dup(rpubkey)) <= 0)
+ return -EIO;
+
+ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(epubkey, NULL);
+ if (!ctx)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(ctx) <= 0)
+ return -EIO;
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) <= 0)
+ return -EIO;
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(ctx, hash_algorithm) <= 0)
+ return -EIO;
+
+ r = EVP_PKEY_verify(ctx, signature, signature_size, data, data_size);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO),
+ "Signature verification failed: 0x%lx", ERR_get_error());
+
+ return r;
+
+#else
gcry_sexp_t public_key_sexp = NULL, data_sexp = NULL, signature_sexp = NULL;
gcry_mpi_t n = NULL, e = NULL, s = NULL;
gcry_error_t ge;
ge = gcry_pk_verify(signature_sexp, data_sexp, public_key_sexp);
if (gpg_err_code(ge) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE)
r = 0;
- else if (ge != 0) {
- log_debug("RSA signature check failed: %s", gpg_strerror(ge));
- r = -EIO;
- } else
+ else if (ge != 0)
+ r = log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO),
+ "RSA signature check failed: %s", gpg_strerror(ge));
+ else
r = 1;
finish:
gcry_sexp_release(data_sexp);
return r;
+#endif
}
static int dnssec_rsa_verify(
- const char *hash_algorithm,
+ hash_algorithm_t hash_algorithm,
const void *hash, size_t hash_size,
DnsResourceRecord *rrsig,
DnsResourceRecord *dnskey) {
}
static int dnssec_ecdsa_verify_raw(
- const char *hash_algorithm,
- const char *curve,
+ hash_algorithm_t hash_algorithm,
+ elliptic_curve_t curve,
const void *signature_r, size_t signature_r_size,
const void *signature_s, size_t signature_s_size,
const void *data, size_t data_size,
const void *key, size_t key_size) {
+#if PREFER_OPENSSL
+ _cleanup_(EC_GROUP_freep) EC_GROUP *ec_group = NULL;
+ _cleanup_(EC_POINT_freep) EC_POINT *p = NULL;
+ _cleanup_(EC_KEY_freep) EC_KEY *eckey = NULL;
+ _cleanup_(BN_CTX_freep) BN_CTX *bctx = NULL;
+ _cleanup_(BN_freep) BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL;
+ _cleanup_(ECDSA_SIG_freep) ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
+ int k;
+
+ assert(hash_algorithm);
+
+ ec_group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve);
+ if (!ec_group)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ p = EC_POINT_new(ec_group);
+ if (!p)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ bctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ if (!bctx)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (EC_POINT_oct2point(ec_group, p, key, key_size, bctx) <= 0)
+ return -EIO;
+
+ eckey = EC_KEY_new();
+ if (!eckey)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (EC_KEY_set_group(eckey, ec_group) <= 0)
+ return -EIO;
+
+ if (EC_KEY_set_public_key(eckey, p) <= 0)
+ return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO),
+ "EC_POINT_bn2point failed: 0x%lx", ERR_get_error());
+
+ assert(EC_KEY_check_key(eckey) == 1);
+
+ r = BN_bin2bn(signature_r, signature_r_size, NULL);
+ if (!r)
+ return -EIO;
+
+ s = BN_bin2bn(signature_s, signature_s_size, NULL);
+ if (!s)
+ return -EIO;
+
+ /* TODO: We should eventually use use the EVP API once it supports ECDSA signature verification */
+
+ sig = ECDSA_SIG_new();
+ if (!sig)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (ECDSA_SIG_set0(sig, BN_dup(r), BN_dup(s)) <= 0)
+ return -EIO;
+
+ k = ECDSA_do_verify(data, data_size, sig, eckey);
+ if (k < 0)
+ return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO),
+ "Signature verification failed: 0x%lx", ERR_get_error());
+
+ return k;
+
+#else
gcry_sexp_t public_key_sexp = NULL, data_sexp = NULL, signature_sexp = NULL;
gcry_mpi_t q = NULL, r = NULL, s = NULL;
gcry_error_t ge;
gcry_sexp_release(data_sexp);
return k;
+#endif
}
static int dnssec_ecdsa_verify(
- const char *hash_algorithm,
+ hash_algorithm_t hash_algorithm,
int algorithm,
const void *hash, size_t hash_size,
DnsResourceRecord *rrsig,
DnsResourceRecord *dnskey) {
- const char *curve;
+ elliptic_curve_t curve;
size_t key_size;
uint8_t *q;
assert(dnskey);
if (algorithm == DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ECDSAP256SHA256) {
+ curve = OPENSSL_OR_GCRYPT(NID_X9_62_prime256v1, "NIST P-256"); /* NIST P-256 */
key_size = 32;
- curve = "NIST P-256";
} else if (algorithm == DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ECDSAP384SHA384) {
+ curve = OPENSSL_OR_GCRYPT(NID_secp384r1, "NIST P-384"); /* NIST P-384 */
key_size = 48;
- curve = "NIST P-384";
} else
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
q, key_size*2+1);
}
-#if GCRYPT_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x010600
static int dnssec_eddsa_verify_raw(
- const char *curve,
- const void *signature_r, size_t signature_r_size,
- const void *signature_s, size_t signature_s_size,
- const void *data, size_t data_size,
- const void *key, size_t key_size) {
+ elliptic_curve_t curve,
+ const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size,
+ const uint8_t *data, size_t data_size,
+ const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size) {
+
+#if PREFER_OPENSSL
+ _cleanup_(EVP_PKEY_freep) EVP_PKEY *evkey = NULL;
+ _cleanup_(EVP_PKEY_CTX_freep) EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
+ _cleanup_(EVP_MD_CTX_freep) EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(curve == NID_ED25519);
+ assert(signature_size == key_size * 2);
+
+ uint8_t *q = newa(uint8_t, signature_size + 1);
+ q[0] = 0x04; /* Prepend 0x04 to indicate an uncompressed key */
+ memcpy(q+1, signature, signature_size);
+
+ evkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key(EVP_PKEY_ED25519, NULL, key, key_size);
+ if (!evkey)
+ return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO),
+ "EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key failed: 0x%lx", ERR_get_error());
+ pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(evkey, NULL);
+ if (!pctx)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ if (!ctx)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* This prevents EVP_DigestVerifyInit from managing pctx and complicating our free logic. */
+ EVP_MD_CTX_set_pkey_ctx(ctx, pctx);
+
+ /* One might be tempted to use EVP_PKEY_verify_init, but see Ed25519(7ssl). */
+ if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx, &pctx, NULL, NULL, evkey) <= 0)
+ return -EIO;
+
+ r = EVP_DigestVerify(ctx, signature, signature_size, data, data_size);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO),
+ "Signature verification failed: 0x%lx", ERR_get_error());
+
+ return r;
+
+#elif GCRYPT_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x010600
gcry_sexp_t public_key_sexp = NULL, data_sexp = NULL, signature_sexp = NULL;
gcry_error_t ge;
int k;
+ assert(signature_size == key_size * 2);
+
ge = gcry_sexp_build(&signature_sexp,
NULL,
"(sig-val (eddsa (r %b) (s %b)))",
- (int) signature_r_size,
- signature_r,
- (int) signature_s_size,
- signature_s);
+ (int) key_size,
+ signature,
+ (int) key_size,
+ signature + key_size);
if (ge != 0) {
k = -EIO;
goto finish;
ge = gcry_pk_verify(signature_sexp, data_sexp, public_key_sexp);
if (gpg_err_code(ge) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE)
k = 0;
- else if (ge != 0) {
- log_debug("EdDSA signature check failed: %s", gpg_strerror(ge));
- k = -EIO;
- } else
+ else if (ge != 0)
+ k = log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO),
+ "EdDSA signature check failed: %s", gpg_strerror(ge));
+ else
k = 1;
finish:
if (public_key_sexp)
gcry_sexp_release(data_sexp);
return k;
+#else
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+#endif
}
static int dnssec_eddsa_verify(
const void *data, size_t data_size,
DnsResourceRecord *rrsig,
DnsResourceRecord *dnskey) {
- const char *curve;
+ elliptic_curve_t curve;
size_t key_size;
if (algorithm == DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ED25519) {
- curve = "Ed25519";
+ curve = OPENSSL_OR_GCRYPT(NID_ED25519, "Ed25519");
key_size = 32;
} else
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
return dnssec_eddsa_verify_raw(
curve,
- rrsig->rrsig.signature, key_size,
- (uint8_t*) rrsig->rrsig.signature + key_size, key_size,
+ rrsig->rrsig.signature, rrsig->rrsig.signature_size,
data, data_size,
dnskey->dnskey.key, key_size);
}
-#endif
static void md_add_uint8(gcry_md_hd_t md, uint8_t v) {
gcry_md_write(md, &v, sizeof(v));
return realtime < inception || realtime > expiration;
}
-static int algorithm_to_gcrypt_md(uint8_t algorithm) {
+static hash_md_t algorithm_to_implementation_id(uint8_t algorithm) {
- /* Translates a DNSSEC signature algorithm into a gcrypt
- * digest identifier.
+ /* Translates a DNSSEC signature algorithm into an openssl/gcrypt digest identifier.
*
- * Note that we implement all algorithms listed as "Must
- * implement" and "Recommended to Implement" in RFC6944. We
- * don't implement any algorithms that are listed as
- * "Optional" or "Must Not Implement". Specifically, we do not
- * implement RSAMD5, DSASHA1, DH, DSA-NSEC3-SHA1, and
- * GOST-ECC. */
+ * Note that we implement all algorithms listed as "Must implement" and "Recommended to Implement" in
+ * RFC6944. We don't implement any algorithms that are listed as "Optional" or "Must Not Implement".
+ * Specifically, we do not implement RSAMD5, DSASHA1, DH, DSA-NSEC3-SHA1, and GOST-ECC. */
switch (algorithm) {
case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA1:
case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA1_NSEC3_SHA1:
- return GCRY_MD_SHA1;
+ return OPENSSL_OR_GCRYPT(EVP_sha1(), GCRY_MD_SHA1);
case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA256:
case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ECDSAP256SHA256:
- return GCRY_MD_SHA256;
+ return OPENSSL_OR_GCRYPT(EVP_sha256(), GCRY_MD_SHA256);
case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ECDSAP384SHA384:
- return GCRY_MD_SHA384;
+ return OPENSSL_OR_GCRYPT(EVP_sha384(), GCRY_MD_SHA384);
case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA512:
- return GCRY_MD_SHA512;
+ return OPENSSL_OR_GCRYPT(EVP_sha512(), GCRY_MD_SHA512);
default:
- return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ return OPENSSL_OR_GCRYPT(NULL, -EOPNOTSUPP);
}
}
assert(sig_data);
assert(sig_size > 0);
+ hash_md_t md_algorithm;
+
+#if PREFER_OPENSSL
+ uint8_t hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned hash_size;
+#else
_cleanup_(gcry_md_closep) gcry_md_hd_t md = NULL;
void *hash;
size_t hash_size;
- int md_algorithm;
initialize_libgcrypt(false);
+#endif
switch (rrsig->rrsig.algorithm) {
case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ED25519:
-#if GCRYPT_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x010600
+#if PREFER_OPENSSL || GCRYPT_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x010600
return dnssec_eddsa_verify(
rrsig->rrsig.algorithm,
sig_data, sig_size,
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
default:
/* OK, the RRs are now in canonical order. Let's calculate the digest */
- md_algorithm = algorithm_to_gcrypt_md(rrsig->rrsig.algorithm);
+ md_algorithm = algorithm_to_implementation_id(rrsig->rrsig.algorithm);
+#if PREFER_OPENSSL
+ if (!md_algorithm)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ _cleanup_(EVP_MD_CTX_freep) EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ if (!ctx)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md_algorithm, NULL) <= 0)
+ return -EIO;
+
+ if (EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, sig_data, sig_size) <= 0)
+ return -EIO;
+
+ if (EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, hash, &hash_size) <= 0)
+ return -EIO;
+
+ assert(hash_size > 0);
+
+#else
if (md_algorithm < 0)
return md_algorithm;
hash = gcry_md_read(md, 0);
if (!hash)
return -EIO;
+#endif
}
switch (rrsig->rrsig.algorithm) {
case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA256:
case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA512:
return dnssec_rsa_verify(
- gcry_md_algo_name(md_algorithm),
+ OPENSSL_OR_GCRYPT(md_algorithm, gcry_md_algo_name(md_algorithm)),
hash, hash_size,
rrsig,
dnskey);
case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ECDSAP256SHA256:
case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ECDSAP384SHA384:
return dnssec_ecdsa_verify(
- gcry_md_algo_name(md_algorithm),
+ OPENSSL_OR_GCRYPT(md_algorithm, gcry_md_algo_name(md_algorithm)),
rrsig->rrsig.algorithm,
hash, hash_size,
rrsig,
projects / thirdparty / systemd.git / commitdiff
