random: always wake up entropy writers after extraction

commit 489c7fc44b5740d377e8cfdbf0851036e493af00 upstream.

Now that POOL_BITS == POOL_MIN_BITS, we must unconditionally wake up
entropy writers after every extraction. Therefore there's no point of
write_wakeup_threshold, so we can move it to the dustbin of unused
compatibility sysctls. While we're at it, we can fix a small comparison
where we were waking up after <= min rather than < min.

Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
index 8bd3b01539593a77cf630123ace4ff83aeb27278..950b0d6a630771a3bea8cfe49c0af401fb9ed8c9 100644 (file)
--- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
+++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
@@ -821,9 +821,49 @@ The kernel command line parameter printk.devkmsg= overrides this and is
 a one-time setting until next reboot: once set, it cannot be changed by
 this sysctl interface anymore.
 
-==============================================================
+pty
+===
+
+See Documentation/filesystems/devpts.rst.
+
+
+random
+======
+
+This is a directory, with the following entries:
+
+* ``boot_id``: a UUID generated the first time this is retrieved, and
+  unvarying after that;
+
+* ``entropy_avail``: the pool's entropy count, in bits;
+
+* ``poolsize``: the entropy pool size, in bits;
+
+* ``urandom_min_reseed_secs``: obsolete (used to determine the minimum
+  number of seconds between urandom pool reseeding). This file is
+  writable for compatibility purposes, but writing to it has no effect
+  on any RNG behavior.
+
+* ``uuid``: a UUID generated every time this is retrieved (this can
+  thus be used to generate UUIDs at will);
+
+* ``write_wakeup_threshold``: when the entropy count drops below this
+  (as a number of bits), processes waiting to write to ``/dev/random``
+  are woken up. This file is writable for compatibility purposes, but
+  writing to it has no effect on any RNG behavior.
+
+If ``drivers/char/random.c`` is built with ``ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH``
+defined, these additional entries are present:
+
+* ``add_interrupt_avg_cycles``: the average number of cycles between
+  interrupts used to feed the pool;
+
+* ``add_interrupt_avg_deviation``: the standard deviation seen on the
+  number of cycles between interrupts used to feed the pool.
+
 
-randomize_va_space:
+randomize_va_space
+==================
 
 This option can be used to select the type of process address
 space randomization that is used in the system, for architectures

diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 5284acf7a5e5fa4851bfe5b0260d489f13cba5f4..08a6f518d3bdeb3dc168be1c002034096caadb32 100644 (file)
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -296,12 +296,6 @@ enum {
  */
 static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_write_wait);
 static struct fasync_struct *fasync;
-/*
- * If the entropy count falls under this number of bits, then we
- * should wake up processes which are selecting or polling on write
- * access to /dev/random.
- */
-static int random_write_wakeup_bits = POOL_MIN_BITS;
 
 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(random_ready_list_lock);
 static LIST_HEAD(random_ready_list);
@@ -739,10 +733,8 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, bool use_input_pool)
                                return;
                } while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, entropy_count, 0) != entropy_count);
                extract_entropy(buf.key, sizeof(buf.key));
-               if (random_write_wakeup_bits) {
-                       wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait);
-                       kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT);
-               }
+               wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait);
+               kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT);
        } else {
                _extract_crng(&primary_crng, buf.block);
                _crng_backtrack_protect(&primary_crng, buf.block,
@@ -1471,7 +1463,7 @@ static __poll_t random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
        mask = 0;
        if (crng_ready())
                mask |= EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM;
-       if (input_pool.entropy_count < random_write_wakeup_bits)
+       if (input_pool.entropy_count < POOL_MIN_BITS)
                mask |= EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM;
        return mask;
 }
@@ -1556,7 +1548,10 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
                 */
                if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
                        return -EPERM;
-               input_pool.entropy_count = 0;
+               if (xchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, 0)) {
+                       wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait);
+                       kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT);
+               }
                return 0;
        case RNDRESEEDCRNG:
                if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
@@ -1631,9 +1626,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count, unsigned int,
 
 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
 
-static int min_write_thresh;
-static int max_write_thresh = POOL_BITS;
 static int random_min_urandom_seed = 60;
+static int random_write_wakeup_bits = POOL_MIN_BITS;
+static int sysctl_poolsize = POOL_BITS;
 static char sysctl_bootid[16];
 
 /*
@@ -1672,7 +1667,6 @@ static int proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
        return proc_dostring(&fake_table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
 }
 
-static int sysctl_poolsize = POOL_BITS;
 extern struct ctl_table random_table[];
 struct ctl_table random_table[] = {
        {
@@ -1694,9 +1688,7 @@ struct ctl_table random_table[] = {
                .data           = &random_write_wakeup_bits,
                .maxlen         = sizeof(int),
                .mode           = 0644,
-               .proc_handler   = proc_dointvec_minmax,
-               .extra1         = &min_write_thresh,
-               .extra2         = &max_write_thresh,
+               .proc_handler   = proc_dointvec,
        },
        {
                .procname       = "urandom_min_reseed_secs",
@@ -1877,13 +1869,13 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count,
        }
 
        /* Throttle writing if we're above the trickle threshold.
-        * We'll be woken up again once below random_write_wakeup_thresh,
-        * when the calling thread is about to terminate, or once
-        * CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL has lapsed.
+        * We'll be woken up again once below POOL_MIN_BITS, when
+        * the calling thread is about to terminate, or once
+        * CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL has elapsed.
         */
        wait_event_interruptible_timeout(random_write_wait,
                        !system_wq || kthread_should_stop() ||
-                       input_pool.entropy_count <= random_write_wakeup_bits,
+                       input_pool.entropy_count < POOL_MIN_BITS,
                        CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL);
        mix_pool_bytes(buffer, count);
        credit_entropy_bits(entropy);