--- /dev/null
+From 08389d888287c3823f80b0216766b71e17f0aba5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
+Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 22:35:17 +0200
+Subject: bpf: Add kconfig knob for disabling unpriv bpf by default
+
+From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
+
+commit 08389d888287c3823f80b0216766b71e17f0aba5 upstream.
+
+Add a kconfig knob which allows for unprivileged bpf to be disabled by default.
+If set, the knob sets /proc/sys/kernel/unprivileged_bpf_disabled to value of 2.
+
+This still allows a transition of 2 -> {0,1} through an admin. Similarly,
+this also still keeps 1 -> {1} behavior intact, so that once set to permanently
+disabled, it cannot be undone aside from a reboot.
+
+We've also added extra2 with max of 2 for the procfs handler, so that an admin
+still has a chance to toggle between 0 <-> 2.
+
+Either way, as an additional alternative, applications can make use of CAP_BPF
+that we added a while ago.
+
+Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
+Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/74ec548079189e4e4dffaeb42b8987bb3c852eee.1620765074.git.daniel@iogearbox.net
+[fllinden@amazon.com: backported to 4.14]
+Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
+ init/Kconfig | 10 ++++++++++
+ kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 3 ++-
+ kernel/sysctl.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----
+ 4 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
++++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
+@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel:
+ - sysctl_writes_strict
+ - tainted
+ - threads-max
++- unprivileged_bpf_disabled
+ - unknown_nmi_panic
+ - watchdog
+ - watchdog_thresh
+@@ -999,6 +1000,26 @@ available RAM pages threads-max is reduc
+
+ ==============================================================
+
++unprivileged_bpf_disabled:
++
++Writing 1 to this entry will disable unprivileged calls to bpf();
++once disabled, calling bpf() without CAP_SYS_ADMIN will return
++-EPERM. Once set to 1, this can't be cleared from the running kernel
++anymore.
++
++Writing 2 to this entry will also disable unprivileged calls to bpf(),
++however, an admin can still change this setting later on, if needed, by
++writing 0 or 1 to this entry.
++
++If BPF_UNPRIV_DEFAULT_OFF is enabled in the kernel config, then this
++entry will default to 2 instead of 0.
++
++ 0 - Unprivileged calls to bpf() are enabled
++ 1 - Unprivileged calls to bpf() are disabled without recovery
++ 2 - Unprivileged calls to bpf() are disabled
++
++==============================================================
++
+ unknown_nmi_panic:
+
+ The value in this file affects behavior of handling NMI. When the
+--- a/init/Kconfig
++++ b/init/Kconfig
+@@ -1378,6 +1378,16 @@ config ADVISE_SYSCALLS
+ applications use these syscalls, you can disable this option to save
+ space.
+
++config BPF_UNPRIV_DEFAULT_OFF
++ bool "Disable unprivileged BPF by default"
++ depends on BPF_SYSCALL
++ help
++ Disables unprivileged BPF by default by setting the corresponding
++ /proc/sys/kernel/unprivileged_bpf_disabled knob to 2. An admin can
++ still reenable it by setting it to 0 later on, or permanently
++ disable it by setting it to 1 (from which no other transition to
++ 0 is possible anymore).
++
+ config USERFAULTFD
+ bool "Enable userfaultfd() system call"
+ select ANON_INODES
+--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
++++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+@@ -37,7 +37,8 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(prog_idr_lock);
+ static DEFINE_IDR(map_idr);
+ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(map_idr_lock);
+
+-int sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled __read_mostly;
++int sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled __read_mostly =
++ IS_BUILTIN(CONFIG_BPF_UNPRIV_DEFAULT_OFF) ? 2 : 0;
+
+ static const struct bpf_map_ops * const bpf_map_types[] = {
+ #define BPF_PROG_TYPE(_id, _ops)
+--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
++++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
+@@ -242,6 +242,28 @@ static int sysrq_sysctl_handler(struct c
+
+ #endif
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
++static int bpf_unpriv_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
++ void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
++{
++ int ret, unpriv_enable = *(int *)table->data;
++ bool locked_state = unpriv_enable == 1;
++ struct ctl_table tmp = *table;
++
++ if (write && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
++ return -EPERM;
++
++ tmp.data = &unpriv_enable;
++ ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(&tmp, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
++ if (write && !ret) {
++ if (locked_state && unpriv_enable != 1)
++ return -EPERM;
++ *(int *)table->data = unpriv_enable;
++ }
++ return ret;
++}
++#endif
++
+ static struct ctl_table kern_table[];
+ static struct ctl_table vm_table[];
+ static struct ctl_table fs_table[];
+@@ -1201,10 +1223,9 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
+ .data = &sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled),
+ .mode = 0644,
+- /* only handle a transition from default "0" to "1" */
+- .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
+- .extra1 = &one,
+- .extra2 = &one,
++ .proc_handler = bpf_unpriv_handler,
++ .extra1 = &zero,
++ .extra2 = &two,
+ },
+ #endif
+ #if defined(CONFIG_TREE_RCU) || defined(CONFIG_PREEMPT_RCU)