Dave Mills: RSTR kiss+iburst retried too often

bk: 4137cbb1vBY7wG0nrGbWJzXJhdUrow

diff --git a/ntpd/ntp_proto.c b/ntpd/ntp_proto.c
index 9a17890626de6bf2a23d34783322dd415e0b5aa8..3ee7aaa333163a13d4d339030d62da259196271f 100644 (file)
--- a/ntpd/ntp_proto.c
+++ b/ntpd/ntp_proto.c
@@ -182,7 +182,9 @@ transmit(
                                if (peer->unreach < NTP_UNREACH) {
                                        peer->unreach++;
                                        if (peer->flags & FLAG_IBURST &&
-                                           !(peer->flash & TEST5))
+                                           !(peer->flash & TEST5) &&
+                                           !memcmp(&peer->refid, "INIT",
+                                           4))
                                                peer->burst = NTP_BURST;
                                } else if (!(peer->flags &
                                    FLAG_CONFIG)) {
@@ -221,29 +223,22 @@ transmit(
                                                hpoll = peer->maxpoll;
                                        else if (hpoll < peer->minpoll)
                                                hpoll = peer->minpoll;
-                                       if (peer->flags & FLAG_BURST)
+                                       if (peer->flags & FLAG_BURST &&
+                                           !memcmp(&peer->refid, "INIT",
+                                           4))
                                                peer->burst = NTP_BURST;
                                }
                        }
                } else {
+                       peer->burst--;
 
                        /*
-                        * Call-gap control. If we are restrained, each
-                        * burst consists of only one packet.
+                        * If a broadcast client at this point, the burst
+                        * has concluded, so we switch to client mode and
+                        * purge the keylist, since no further
+                        * transmissions will be made.
                         */
-                       if (memcmp(&peer->refid, "RSTR", 4) == 0)
-                               peer->burst = 0;
-                       else
-                               peer->burst--;
                        if (peer->burst == 0) {
-
-                               /*
-                                * If a broadcast client at this point,
-                                * the burst has concluded, so we switch
-                                * to client mode and purge the keylist,
-                                * since no further transmissions will
-                                * be made.
-                                */
                                if (peer->cast_flags & MDF_BCLNT) {
                                        peer->hmode = MODE_BCLIENT;
 #ifdef OPENSSL
@@ -620,6 +615,16 @@ receive(
 #endif
        }
 
+       /*
+        * If access control specifically rejects packets which are not
+        * cryptographically authenticated or not authenticated at all,
+        * drop those buggers here.
+        */
+       if (restrict_mask & RES_DONTTRUST) {
+               sys_restricted++;
+               return;
+       }
+
        /*
         * The association matching rules are implemented by a set of
         * routines and a table in ntp_peer.c. A packet matching an
@@ -698,10 +703,6 @@ receive(
                 * immediately. If the guy is already here, don't fire
                 * up a duplicate.
                 */
-               if (restrict_mask & RES_DONTTRUST) {
-                       sys_restricted++;
-                       return;                 /* no trust */
-               }
                if (sys_authenticate && !is_authentic)
                        return;                 /* bad auth */
 
@@ -729,10 +730,6 @@ receive(
                 * If authentication fails send a crypto-NAK; otherwise,
                 * kiss the frog.
                 */
-               if (restrict_mask & RES_DONTTRUST) {
-                       sys_restricted++;
-                       return;                 /* no trust */
-               }
                if (sys_authenticate && !is_authentic) {
                        fast_xmit(rbufp, MODE_PASSIVE, 0,
                            restrict_mask);
@@ -755,10 +752,6 @@ receive(
                 * mobilize a broadcast client association. We don't
                 * kiss any frogs here.
                 */
-               if (restrict_mask & RES_DONTTRUST) {
-                       sys_restricted++;
-                       return;                 /* no trust */
-               }
                if (sys_authenticate && !is_authentic)
                        return;                 /* bad auth */
 
@@ -826,8 +819,7 @@ receive(
                 * Seattle. If not authentic, leave a light on and
                 * continue.
                 */
-               if (restrict_mask & RES_DONTTRUST) {
-                       sys_restricted++;
+               if (has_mac && !is_authentic) {
                        if (peer->flags & FLAG_CONFIG)
                                peer_clear(peer, "RSTR");
                        else
@@ -1536,7 +1528,7 @@ peer_clear(
        char    *ident                  /* tally lights */
        )
 {
-       u_char  oreach, i;
+       u_char  i;
 
        /*
         * If cryptographic credentials have been acquired, toss them to
@@ -1547,7 +1539,6 @@ peer_clear(
         * purged, too. This makes it much harder to sneak in some
         * unauthenticated data in the clock filter.
         */
-       oreach = peer->reach;
 #ifdef OPENSSL
        key_expire(peer);
        if (peer->pkey != NULL)
@@ -1606,7 +1597,7 @@ peer_clear(
         * intervals.
         */
        peer->nextdate = peer->update = peer->outdate = current_time;
-       if (oreach)
+       if (strcmp(ident, "INIT"))
                poll_update(peer, peer->minpoll);
        else if (initializing)
                peer->nextdate = current_time + peer_associations;