sctp: fix OOB write to userspace in sctp_getsockopt_peer_auth_chunks

sctp_getsockopt_peer_auth_chunks() checks that the caller's optval
buffer is large enough for the peer AUTH chunk list with

    if (len < num_chunks)
            return -EINVAL;

but then writes num_chunks bytes to p->gauth_chunks, which lives
at offset offsetof(struct sctp_authchunks, gauth_chunks) == 8
inside optval.  The check is missing the sizeof(struct
sctp_authchunks) = 8-byte header.  When the caller supplies
len == num_chunks (for any num_chunks > 0) the test passes but
copy_to_user() writes sizeof(struct sctp_authchunks) = 8 bytes
past the declared buffer.

The sibling function sctp_getsockopt_local_auth_chunks() at the
next line already has the correct check:

    if (len < sizeof(struct sctp_authchunks) + num_chunks)
            return -EINVAL;

Align the peer variant with its sibling.

Reproducer confirms on v7.0-13-generic: an unprivileged userspace
caller that opens a loopback SCTP association with AUTH enabled,
queries num_chunks with a short optval, then issues the real
getsockopt with len == num_chunks and sentinel bytes painted past
the buffer observes those sentinel bytes overwritten with the
peer's AUTH chunk type.  The bytes written are under the peer's
control but land in the caller's own userspace; this is not a
kernel memory corruption, but it is a kernel-side contract
violation that can silently corrupt adjacent userspace data.

Fixes: 65b07e5d0d09 ("[SCTP]: API updates to suport SCTP-AUTH extensions.")
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-6
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260416031903.1447072-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c
index d2665bbd41a294a8e993ade514a0b3c3673baf9c..f52fe90d3e00c8226666eb5bab57d75417812ff7 100644 (file)
--- a/net/sctp/socket.c
+++ b/net/sctp/socket.c
@@ -7033,7 +7033,7 @@ static int sctp_getsockopt_peer_auth_chunks(struct sock *sk, int len,
 
        /* See if the user provided enough room for all the data */
        num_chunks = ntohs(ch->param_hdr.length) - sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr);
-       if (len < num_chunks)
+       if (len < sizeof(struct sctp_authchunks) + num_chunks)
                return -EINVAL;
 
        if (copy_to_user(to, ch->chunks, num_chunks))