--- /dev/null
+From 8fe5ac9a1582f17788f340db22af9dc8e467f6f0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2024 11:22:08 -0400
+Subject: Bluetooth: hci_core: Fix LE quote calculation
+
+From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 932021a11805b9da4bd6abf66fe233cccd59fe0e ]
+
+Function hci_sched_le needs to update the respective counter variable
+inplace other the likes of hci_quote_sent would attempt to use the
+possible outdated value of conn->{le_cnt,acl_cnt}.
+
+Link: https://github.com/bluez/bluez/issues/915
+Fixes: 73d80deb7bdf ("Bluetooth: prioritizing data over HCI")
+Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ net/bluetooth/hci_core.c | 19 +++++++------------
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c
+index fc4e02b3f26ad..7dff3f1a2a9eb 100644
+--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c
++++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c
+@@ -4876,19 +4876,19 @@ static void hci_sched_le(struct hci_dev *hdev)
+ {
+ struct hci_chan *chan;
+ struct sk_buff *skb;
+- int quote, cnt, tmp;
++ int quote, *cnt, tmp;
+
+ BT_DBG("%s", hdev->name);
+
+ if (!hci_conn_num(hdev, LE_LINK))
+ return;
+
+- cnt = hdev->le_pkts ? hdev->le_cnt : hdev->acl_cnt;
++ cnt = hdev->le_pkts ? &hdev->le_cnt : &hdev->acl_cnt;
+
+- __check_timeout(hdev, cnt, LE_LINK);
++ __check_timeout(hdev, *cnt, LE_LINK);
+
+- tmp = cnt;
+- while (cnt && (chan = hci_chan_sent(hdev, LE_LINK, "e))) {
++ tmp = *cnt;
++ while (*cnt && (chan = hci_chan_sent(hdev, LE_LINK, "e))) {
+ u32 priority = (skb_peek(&chan->data_q))->priority;
+ while (quote-- && (skb = skb_peek(&chan->data_q))) {
+ BT_DBG("chan %p skb %p len %d priority %u", chan, skb,
+@@ -4903,7 +4903,7 @@ static void hci_sched_le(struct hci_dev *hdev)
+ hci_send_frame(hdev, skb);
+ hdev->le_last_tx = jiffies;
+
+- cnt--;
++ (*cnt)--;
+ chan->sent++;
+ chan->conn->sent++;
+
+@@ -4913,12 +4913,7 @@ static void hci_sched_le(struct hci_dev *hdev)
+ }
+ }
+
+- if (hdev->le_pkts)
+- hdev->le_cnt = cnt;
+- else
+- hdev->acl_cnt = cnt;
+-
+- if (cnt != tmp)
++ if (*cnt != tmp)
+ hci_prio_recalculate(hdev, LE_LINK);
+ }
+
+--
+2.43.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From cbaf7f005e45c39eb43c1a84ff634199d3d0094c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Wed, 30 Aug 2023 15:08:06 -0700
+Subject: Bluetooth: SMP: Fix assumption of Central always being Initiator
+
+From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 28cd47f75185c4818b0fb1b46f2f02faaba96376 ]
+
+SMP initiator role shall be considered the one that initiates the
+pairing procedure with SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ:
+
+BLUETOOTH CORE SPECIFICATION Version 5.3 | Vol 3, Part H
+page 1557:
+
+Figure 2.1: LE pairing phases
+
+Note that by sending SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ it doesn't change the role to
+be Initiator.
+
+Link: https://github.com/bluez/bluez/issues/567
+Fixes: b28b4943660f ("Bluetooth: Add strict checks for allowed SMP PDUs")
+Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ net/bluetooth/smp.c | 144 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
+ 1 file changed, 72 insertions(+), 72 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+index f688f941c40c4..629d25bc7f671 100644
+--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
++++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+@@ -913,7 +913,7 @@ static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
+ * Confirms and the responder Enters the passkey.
+ */
+ if (smp->method == OVERLAP) {
+- if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
++ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags))
+ smp->method = CFM_PASSKEY;
+ else
+ smp->method = REQ_PASSKEY;
+@@ -963,7 +963,7 @@ static u8 smp_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
+
+ smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cp), &cp);
+
+- if (conn->hcon->out)
++ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags))
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
+ else
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
+@@ -979,7 +979,8 @@ static u8 smp_random(struct smp_chan *smp)
+ int ret;
+
+ bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "conn %p %s", conn,
+- conn->hcon->out ? "initiator" : "responder");
++ test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags) ? "initiator" :
++ "responder");
+
+ ret = smp_c1(smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
+ hcon->init_addr_type, &hcon->init_addr,
+@@ -993,7 +994,7 @@ static u8 smp_random(struct smp_chan *smp)
+ return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
+ }
+
+- if (hcon->out) {
++ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) {
+ u8 stk[16];
+ __le64 rand = 0;
+ __le16 ediv = 0;
+@@ -1250,14 +1251,15 @@ static void smp_distribute_keys(struct smp_chan *smp)
+ rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
+
+ /* The responder sends its keys first */
+- if (hcon->out && (smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK)) {
++ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags) &&
++ (smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK)) {
+ smp_allow_key_dist(smp);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
+
+- if (hcon->out) {
++ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) {
+ keydist = &rsp->init_key_dist;
+ *keydist &= req->init_key_dist;
+ } else {
+@@ -1426,7 +1428,7 @@ static int sc_mackey_and_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 mackey[16], u8 ltk[16])
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
+ u8 *na, *nb, a[7], b[7];
+
+- if (hcon->out) {
++ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) {
+ na = smp->prnd;
+ nb = smp->rrnd;
+ } else {
+@@ -1454,7 +1456,7 @@ static void sc_dhkey_check(struct smp_chan *smp)
+ a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type;
+ b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type;
+
+- if (hcon->out) {
++ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) {
+ local_addr = a;
+ remote_addr = b;
+ memcpy(io_cap, &smp->preq[1], 3);
+@@ -1533,7 +1535,7 @@ static u8 sc_passkey_round(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 smp_op)
+ /* The round is only complete when the initiator
+ * receives pairing random.
+ */
+- if (!hcon->out) {
++ if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) {
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
+ sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
+ if (smp->passkey_round == 20)
+@@ -1561,7 +1563,7 @@ static u8 sc_passkey_round(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 smp_op)
+
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
+
+- if (hcon->out) {
++ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) {
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
+ sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
+ return 0;
+@@ -1572,7 +1574,7 @@ static u8 sc_passkey_round(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 smp_op)
+ case SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY:
+ default:
+ /* Initiating device starts the round */
+- if (!hcon->out)
++ if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags))
+ return 0;
+
+ bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "Starting passkey round %u",
+@@ -1617,7 +1619,7 @@ static int sc_user_reply(struct smp_chan *smp, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
+ }
+
+ /* Initiator sends DHKey check first */
+- if (hcon->out) {
++ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) {
+ sc_dhkey_check(smp);
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
+ } else if (test_and_clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING, &smp->flags)) {
+@@ -1740,7 +1742,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+ struct smp_cmd_pairing rsp, *req = (void *) skb->data;
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+ struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
+- struct smp_chan *smp;
++ struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+ u8 key_size, auth, sec_level;
+ int ret;
+
+@@ -1749,16 +1751,14 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+ if (skb->len < sizeof(*req))
+ return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
+
+- if (conn->hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_SLAVE)
++ if (smp && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags))
+ return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
+
+- if (!chan->data)
++ if (!smp) {
+ smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
+- else
+- smp = chan->data;
+-
+- if (!smp)
+- return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
++ if (!smp)
++ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
++ }
+
+ /* We didn't start the pairing, so match remote */
+ auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
+@@ -1940,7 +1940,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+ if (skb->len < sizeof(*rsp))
+ return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
+
+- if (conn->hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
++ if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags))
+ return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
+
+ skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rsp));
+@@ -2035,7 +2035,7 @@ static u8 sc_check_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
+ if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
+ return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
+
+- if (conn->hcon->out) {
++ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) {
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
+ smp->prnd);
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
+@@ -2057,7 +2057,7 @@ static int fixup_sc_false_positive(struct smp_chan *smp)
+ u8 auth;
+
+ /* The issue is only observed when we're in responder role */
+- if (hcon->out)
++ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags))
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+ if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY)) {
+@@ -2093,7 +2093,8 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+ struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
+
+ bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p %s", conn,
+- hcon->out ? "initiator" : "responder");
++ test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags) ? "initiator" :
++ "responder");
+
+ if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->pcnf))
+ return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
+@@ -2115,7 +2116,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+- if (conn->hcon->out) {
++ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) {
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
+ smp->prnd);
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
+@@ -2150,7 +2151,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+ if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
+ return smp_random(smp);
+
+- if (hcon->out) {
++ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) {
+ pkax = smp->local_pk;
+ pkbx = smp->remote_pk;
+ na = smp->prnd;
+@@ -2163,7 +2164,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+ }
+
+ if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
+- if (!hcon->out)
++ if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags))
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
+ sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
+@@ -2174,7 +2175,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+ if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
+ return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
+
+- if (hcon->out) {
++ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) {
+ u8 cfm[16];
+
+ err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->local_pk,
+@@ -2215,7 +2216,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+ if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
+- if (hcon->out) {
++ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) {
+ sc_dhkey_check(smp);
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
+ }
+@@ -2289,10 +2290,27 @@ bool smp_sufficient_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 sec_level,
+ return false;
+ }
+
++static void smp_send_pairing_req(struct smp_chan *smp, __u8 auth)
++{
++ struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
++
++ if (smp->conn->hcon->type == ACL_LINK)
++ build_bredr_pairing_cmd(smp, &cp, NULL);
++ else
++ build_pairing_cmd(smp->conn, &cp, NULL, auth);
++
++ smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
++ memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
++
++ smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
++ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
++
++ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags);
++}
++
+ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+ {
+ struct smp_cmd_security_req *rp = (void *) skb->data;
+- struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+ struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
+ struct smp_chan *smp;
+@@ -2341,16 +2359,20 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+
+ skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
+
+- memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
+- build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, auth);
++ smp_send_pairing_req(smp, auth);
+
+- smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
+- memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
++ return 0;
++}
+
+- smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
+- SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
++static void smp_send_security_req(struct smp_chan *smp, __u8 auth)
++{
++ struct smp_cmd_security_req cp;
+
+- return 0;
++ cp.auth_req = auth;
++ smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
++ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ);
++
++ clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags);
+ }
+
+ int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level)
+@@ -2421,23 +2443,11 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level)
+ authreq |= SMP_AUTH_MITM;
+ }
+
+- if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) {
+- struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
+-
+- build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, authreq);
+- smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
+- memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
+-
+- smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
+- SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
+- } else {
+- struct smp_cmd_security_req cp;
+- cp.auth_req = authreq;
+- smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
+- SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ);
+- }
++ if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
++ smp_send_pairing_req(smp, authreq);
++ else
++ smp_send_security_req(smp, authreq);
+
+- set_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags);
+ ret = 0;
+
+ unlock:
+@@ -2688,8 +2698,6 @@ static int smp_cmd_sign_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+
+ static u8 sc_select_method(struct smp_chan *smp)
+ {
+- struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
+- struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+ struct smp_cmd_pairing *local, *remote;
+ u8 local_mitm, remote_mitm, local_io, remote_io, method;
+
+@@ -2702,7 +2710,7 @@ static u8 sc_select_method(struct smp_chan *smp)
+ * the "struct smp_cmd_pairing" from them we need to skip the
+ * first byte which contains the opcode.
+ */
+- if (hcon->out) {
++ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) {
+ local = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
+ remote = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
+ } else {
+@@ -2771,7 +2779,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+ /* Non-initiating device sends its public key after receiving
+ * the key from the initiating device.
+ */
+- if (!hcon->out) {
++ if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) {
+ err = sc_send_public_key(smp);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+@@ -2833,7 +2841,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+ }
+
+ if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
+- if (hcon->out)
++ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags))
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
+ sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
+
+@@ -2842,7 +2850,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+- if (hcon->out)
++ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags))
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
+
+ if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY) {
+@@ -2857,7 +2865,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+ /* The Initiating device waits for the non-initiating device to
+ * send the confirm value.
+ */
+- if (conn->hcon->out)
++ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags))
+ return 0;
+
+ err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->remote_pk, smp->prnd,
+@@ -2891,7 +2899,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_dhkey_check(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+ a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type;
+ b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type;
+
+- if (hcon->out) {
++ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) {
+ local_addr = a;
+ remote_addr = b;
+ memcpy(io_cap, &smp->prsp[1], 3);
+@@ -2916,7 +2924,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_dhkey_check(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+ if (crypto_memneq(check->e, e, 16))
+ return SMP_DHKEY_CHECK_FAILED;
+
+- if (!hcon->out) {
++ if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) {
+ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags)) {
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING, &smp->flags);
+ return 0;
+@@ -2928,7 +2936,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_dhkey_check(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+
+ sc_add_ltk(smp);
+
+- if (hcon->out) {
++ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) {
+ hci_le_start_enc(hcon, 0, 0, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size);
+ hcon->enc_key_size = smp->enc_key_size;
+ }
+@@ -3077,7 +3085,6 @@ static void bredr_pairing(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
+ struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+ struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
+- struct smp_cmd_pairing req;
+ struct smp_chan *smp;
+
+ bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "chan %p", chan);
+@@ -3129,14 +3136,7 @@ static void bredr_pairing(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
+
+ bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "starting SMP over BR/EDR");
+
+- /* Prepare and send the BR/EDR SMP Pairing Request */
+- build_bredr_pairing_cmd(smp, &req, NULL);
+-
+- smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
+- memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &req, sizeof(req));
+-
+- smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(req), &req);
+- SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
++ smp_send_pairing_req(smp, 0x00);
+ }
+
+ static void smp_resume_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
+--
+2.43.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From 8b9f59f340d4054266b677a4a44a74a207185d3a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Fri, 16 Aug 2024 14:48:10 +0300
+Subject: bonding: fix bond_ipsec_offload_ok return type
+
+From: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org>
+
+[ Upstream commit fc59b9a5f7201b9f7272944596113a82cc7773d5 ]
+
+Fix the return type which should be bool.
+
+Fixes: 955b785ec6b3 ("bonding: fix suspicious RCU usage in bond_ipsec_offload_ok()")
+Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org>
+Reviewed-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c | 18 ++++++------------
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c
+index 6a91229b0e05b..61ff4bb22e647 100644
+--- a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c
++++ b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c
+@@ -592,34 +592,28 @@ static bool bond_ipsec_offload_ok(struct sk_buff *skb, struct xfrm_state *xs)
+ struct net_device *real_dev;
+ struct slave *curr_active;
+ struct bonding *bond;
+- int err;
++ bool ok = false;
+
+ bond = netdev_priv(bond_dev);
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ curr_active = rcu_dereference(bond->curr_active_slave);
+ real_dev = curr_active->dev;
+
+- if (BOND_MODE(bond) != BOND_MODE_ACTIVEBACKUP) {
+- err = false;
++ if (BOND_MODE(bond) != BOND_MODE_ACTIVEBACKUP)
+ goto out;
+- }
+
+- if (!xs->xso.real_dev) {
+- err = false;
++ if (!xs->xso.real_dev)
+ goto out;
+- }
+
+ if (!real_dev->xfrmdev_ops ||
+ !real_dev->xfrmdev_ops->xdo_dev_offload_ok ||
+- netif_is_bond_master(real_dev)) {
+- err = false;
++ netif_is_bond_master(real_dev))
+ goto out;
+- }
+
+- err = real_dev->xfrmdev_ops->xdo_dev_offload_ok(skb, xs);
++ ok = real_dev->xfrmdev_ops->xdo_dev_offload_ok(skb, xs);
+ out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+- return err;
++ return ok;
+ }
+
+ static const struct xfrmdev_ops bond_xfrmdev_ops = {
+--
+2.43.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From bc38e9ec8063279f30428a46fee2d5f8b65bddc0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Fri, 16 Aug 2024 14:48:11 +0300
+Subject: bonding: fix null pointer deref in bond_ipsec_offload_ok
+
+From: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org>
+
+[ Upstream commit 95c90e4ad89d493a7a14fa200082e466e2548f9d ]
+
+We must check if there is an active slave before dereferencing the pointer.
+
+Fixes: 18cb261afd7b ("bonding: support hardware encryption offload to slaves")
+Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org>
+Reviewed-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c
+index 61ff4bb22e647..177c90e9a4685 100644
+--- a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c
++++ b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c
+@@ -597,6 +597,8 @@ static bool bond_ipsec_offload_ok(struct sk_buff *skb, struct xfrm_state *xs)
+ bond = netdev_priv(bond_dev);
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ curr_active = rcu_dereference(bond->curr_active_slave);
++ if (!curr_active)
++ goto out;
+ real_dev = curr_active->dev;
+
+ if (BOND_MODE(bond) != BOND_MODE_ACTIVEBACKUP)
+--
+2.43.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From 49fa20a3dfbf1d42674c572590c0d5334e8ea621 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Fri, 16 Aug 2024 14:48:12 +0300
+Subject: bonding: fix xfrm real_dev null pointer dereference
+
+From: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org>
+
+[ Upstream commit f8cde9805981c50d0c029063dc7d82821806fc44 ]
+
+We shouldn't set real_dev to NULL because packets can be in transit and
+xfrm might call xdo_dev_offload_ok() in parallel. All callbacks assume
+real_dev is set.
+
+ Example trace:
+ kernel: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000000001030
+ kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): making interface the new active one
+ kernel: #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
+ kernel: #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
+ kernel: PGD 0 P4D 0
+ kernel: Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
+ kernel: CPU: 4 PID: 2237 Comm: ping Not tainted 6.7.7+ #12
+ kernel: Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014
+ kernel: RIP: 0010:nsim_ipsec_offload_ok+0xc/0x20 [netdevsim]
+ kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): bond_ipsec_add_sa_all: failed to add SA
+ kernel: Code: e0 0f 0b 48 83 7f 38 00 74 de 0f 0b 48 8b 47 08 48 8b 37 48 8b 78 40 e9 b2 e5 9a d7 66 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 86 80 02 00 00 <83> 80 30 10 00 00 01 b8 01 00 00 00 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 0f 1f
+ kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): making interface the new active one
+ kernel: RSP: 0018:ffffabde81553b98 EFLAGS: 00010246
+ kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): bond_ipsec_add_sa_all: failed to add SA
+ kernel:
+ kernel: RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9eb404e74900 RCX: ffff9eb403d97c60
+ kernel: RDX: ffffffffc090de10 RSI: ffff9eb404e74900 RDI: ffff9eb3c5de9e00
+ kernel: RBP: ffff9eb3c0a42000 R08: 0000000000000010 R09: 0000000000000014
+ kernel: R10: 7974203030303030 R11: 3030303030303030 R12: 0000000000000000
+ kernel: R13: ffff9eb3c5de9e00 R14: ffffabde81553cc8 R15: ffff9eb404c53000
+ kernel: FS: 00007f2a77a3ad00(0000) GS:ffff9eb43bd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
+ kernel: CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
+ kernel: CR2: 0000000000001030 CR3: 00000001122ab000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
+ kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): making interface the new active one
+ kernel: Call Trace:
+ kernel: <TASK>
+ kernel: ? __die+0x1f/0x60
+ kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): bond_ipsec_add_sa_all: failed to add SA
+ kernel: ? page_fault_oops+0x142/0x4c0
+ kernel: ? do_user_addr_fault+0x65/0x670
+ kernel: ? kvm_read_and_reset_apf_flags+0x3b/0x50
+ kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): making interface the new active one
+ kernel: ? exc_page_fault+0x7b/0x180
+ kernel: ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
+ kernel: ? nsim_bpf_uninit+0x50/0x50 [netdevsim]
+ kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): bond_ipsec_add_sa_all: failed to add SA
+ kernel: ? nsim_ipsec_offload_ok+0xc/0x20 [netdevsim]
+ kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): making interface the new active one
+ kernel: bond_ipsec_offload_ok+0x7b/0x90 [bonding]
+ kernel: xfrm_output+0x61/0x3b0
+ kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): bond_ipsec_add_sa_all: failed to add SA
+ kernel: ip_push_pending_frames+0x56/0x80
+
+Fixes: 18cb261afd7b ("bonding: support hardware encryption offload to slaves")
+Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org>
+Reviewed-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c | 1 -
+ 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c
+index 177c90e9a4685..fd0667e1d10ab 100644
+--- a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c
++++ b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c
+@@ -575,7 +575,6 @@ static void bond_ipsec_del_sa_all(struct bonding *bond)
+ } else {
+ slave->dev->xfrmdev_ops->xdo_dev_state_delete(ipsec->xs);
+ }
+- ipsec->xs->xso.real_dev = NULL;
+ }
+ spin_unlock_bh(&bond->ipsec_lock);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+--
+2.43.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From 2c9bafff042b6da7fbb4e69444f272ce2d959771 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Fri, 16 Aug 2024 14:48:13 +0300
+Subject: bonding: fix xfrm state handling when clearing active slave
+
+From: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org>
+
+[ Upstream commit c4c5c5d2ef40a9f67a9241dc5422eac9ffe19547 ]
+
+If the active slave is cleared manually the xfrm state is not flushed.
+This leads to xfrm add/del imbalance and adding the same state multiple
+times. For example when the device cannot handle anymore states we get:
+ [ 1169.884811] bond0: (slave eni0np1): bond_ipsec_add_sa_all: failed to add SA
+because it's filled with the same state after multiple active slave
+clearings. This change also has a few nice side effects: user-space
+gets a notification for the change, the old device gets its mac address
+and promisc/mcast adjusted properly.
+
+Fixes: 18cb261afd7b ("bonding: support hardware encryption offload to slaves")
+Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org>
+Reviewed-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/bonding/bond_options.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_options.c b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_options.c
+index 1f8f7537e8ebf..5da4599377e1e 100644
+--- a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_options.c
++++ b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_options.c
+@@ -893,7 +893,7 @@ static int bond_option_active_slave_set(struct bonding *bond,
+ /* check to see if we are clearing active */
+ if (!slave_dev) {
+ netdev_dbg(bond->dev, "Clearing current active slave\n");
+- RCU_INIT_POINTER(bond->curr_active_slave, NULL);
++ bond_change_active_slave(bond, NULL);
+ bond_select_active_slave(bond);
+ } else {
+ struct slave *old_active = rtnl_dereference(bond->curr_active_slave);
+--
+2.43.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From 256cdced4f6026c9dda17dc1257b39c2bce2d466 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Sat, 17 Aug 2024 09:52:46 +0300
+Subject: dpaa2-switch: Fix error checking in dpaa2_switch_seed_bp()
+
+From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
+
+[ Upstream commit c50e7475961c36ec4d21d60af055b32f9436b431 ]
+
+The dpaa2_switch_add_bufs() function returns the number of bufs that it
+was able to add. It returns BUFS_PER_CMD (7) for complete success or a
+smaller number if there are not enough pages available. However, the
+error checking is looking at the total number of bufs instead of the
+number which were added on this iteration. Thus the error checking
+only works correctly for the first iteration through the loop and
+subsequent iterations are always counted as a success.
+
+Fix this by checking only the bufs added in the current iteration.
+
+Fixes: 0b1b71370458 ("staging: dpaa2-switch: handle Rx path on control interface")
+Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
+Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
+Reviewed-by: Ioana Ciornei <ioana.ciornei@nxp.com>
+Tested-by: Ioana Ciornei <ioana.ciornei@nxp.com>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/eec27f30-b43f-42b6-b8ee-04a6f83423b6@stanley.mountain
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/dpaa2/dpaa2-switch.c | 7 ++++---
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/dpaa2/dpaa2-switch.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/dpaa2/dpaa2-switch.c
+index 175f15c46842e..2b6a6a997d75e 100644
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/dpaa2/dpaa2-switch.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/dpaa2/dpaa2-switch.c
+@@ -2585,13 +2585,14 @@ static int dpaa2_switch_refill_bp(struct ethsw_core *ethsw)
+
+ static int dpaa2_switch_seed_bp(struct ethsw_core *ethsw)
+ {
+- int *count, i;
++ int *count, ret, i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < DPAA2_ETHSW_NUM_BUFS; i += BUFS_PER_CMD) {
++ ret = dpaa2_switch_add_bufs(ethsw, ethsw->bpid);
+ count = ðsw->buf_count;
+- *count += dpaa2_switch_add_bufs(ethsw, ethsw->bpid);
++ *count += ret;
+
+- if (unlikely(*count < BUFS_PER_CMD))
++ if (unlikely(ret < BUFS_PER_CMD))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+--
+2.43.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From 210a03d04310f3be46040594cff617fcae1dcfa2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Wed, 7 Aug 2024 12:53:25 +0200
+Subject: ice: fix ICE_LAST_OFFSET formula
+
+From: Maciej Fijalkowski <maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit b966ad832942b5a11e002f9b5ef102b08425b84a ]
+
+For bigger PAGE_SIZE archs, ice driver works on 3k Rx buffers.
+Therefore, ICE_LAST_OFFSET should take into account ICE_RXBUF_3072, not
+ICE_RXBUF_2048.
+
+Fixes: 7237f5b0dba4 ("ice: introduce legacy Rx flag")
+Suggested-by: Luiz Capitulino <luizcap@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com>
+Tested-by: Chandan Kumar Rout <chandanx.rout@intel.com> (A Contingent Worker at Intel)
+Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_txrx.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_txrx.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_txrx.c
+index 6ee8e0032d52c..b09d89cdb001f 100644
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_txrx.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_txrx.c
+@@ -765,7 +765,7 @@ ice_can_reuse_rx_page(struct ice_rx_buf *rx_buf, int rx_buf_pgcnt)
+ return false;
+ #else
+ #define ICE_LAST_OFFSET \
+- (SKB_WITH_OVERHEAD(PAGE_SIZE) - ICE_RXBUF_2048)
++ (SKB_WITH_OVERHEAD(PAGE_SIZE) - ICE_RXBUF_3072)
+ if (rx_buf->page_offset > ICE_LAST_OFFSET)
+ return false;
+ #endif /* PAGE_SIZE < 8192) */
+--
+2.43.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From 24193ca51f1ab13d3e3cad739335289f0a550f06 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Thu, 15 Aug 2024 17:14:16 +0200
+Subject: ip6_tunnel: Fix broken GRO
+
+From: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tbogendoerfer@suse.de>
+
+[ Upstream commit 4b3e33fcc38f7750604b065c55a43e94c5bc3145 ]
+
+GRO code checks for matching layer 2 headers to see, if packet belongs
+to the same flow and because ip6 tunnel set dev->hard_header_len
+this check fails in cases, where it shouldn't. To fix this don't
+set hard_header_len, but use needed_headroom like ipv4/ip_tunnel.c
+does.
+
+Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
+Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tbogendoerfer@suse.de>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240815151419.109864-1-tbogendoerfer@suse.de
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c | 12 +++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c
+index d370a71c97520..5955fca601b3a 100644
+--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c
+@@ -1501,7 +1501,8 @@ static void ip6_tnl_link_config(struct ip6_tnl *t)
+ tdev = __dev_get_by_index(t->net, p->link);
+
+ if (tdev) {
+- dev->hard_header_len = tdev->hard_header_len + t_hlen;
++ dev->needed_headroom = tdev->hard_header_len +
++ tdev->needed_headroom + t_hlen;
+ mtu = min_t(unsigned int, tdev->mtu, IP6_MAX_MTU);
+
+ mtu = mtu - t_hlen;
+@@ -1729,7 +1730,9 @@ ip6_tnl_siocdevprivate(struct net_device *dev, struct ifreq *ifr,
+ int ip6_tnl_change_mtu(struct net_device *dev, int new_mtu)
+ {
+ struct ip6_tnl *tnl = netdev_priv(dev);
++ int t_hlen;
+
++ t_hlen = tnl->hlen + sizeof(struct ipv6hdr);
+ if (tnl->parms.proto == IPPROTO_IPV6) {
+ if (new_mtu < IPV6_MIN_MTU)
+ return -EINVAL;
+@@ -1738,10 +1741,10 @@ int ip6_tnl_change_mtu(struct net_device *dev, int new_mtu)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if (tnl->parms.proto == IPPROTO_IPV6 || tnl->parms.proto == 0) {
+- if (new_mtu > IP6_MAX_MTU - dev->hard_header_len)
++ if (new_mtu > IP6_MAX_MTU - dev->hard_header_len - t_hlen)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ } else {
+- if (new_mtu > IP_MAX_MTU - dev->hard_header_len)
++ if (new_mtu > IP_MAX_MTU - dev->hard_header_len - t_hlen)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ dev->mtu = new_mtu;
+@@ -1887,12 +1890,11 @@ ip6_tnl_dev_init_gen(struct net_device *dev)
+ t_hlen = t->hlen + sizeof(struct ipv6hdr);
+
+ dev->type = ARPHRD_TUNNEL6;
+- dev->hard_header_len = LL_MAX_HEADER + t_hlen;
+ dev->mtu = ETH_DATA_LEN - t_hlen;
+ if (!(t->parms.flags & IP6_TNL_F_IGN_ENCAP_LIMIT))
+ dev->mtu -= 8;
+ dev->min_mtu = ETH_MIN_MTU;
+- dev->max_mtu = IP6_MAX_MTU - dev->hard_header_len;
++ dev->max_mtu = IP6_MAX_MTU - dev->hard_header_len - t_hlen;
+
+ dev_hold(dev);
+ return 0;
+--
+2.43.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From 119502bd558ef283df5ca4c7cf93d214e7123843 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2024 16:08:58 +0000
+Subject: ipv6: fix possible UAF in ip6_finish_output2()
+
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit da273b377ae0d9bd255281ed3c2adb228321687b ]
+
+If skb_expand_head() returns NULL, skb has been freed
+and associated dst/idev could also have been freed.
+
+We need to hold rcu_read_lock() to make sure the dst and
+associated idev are alive.
+
+Fixes: 5796015fa968 ("ipv6: allocate enough headroom in ip6_finish_output2()")
+Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Cc: Vasily Averin <vasily.averin@linux.dev>
+Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240820160859.3786976-3-edumazet@google.com
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ net/ipv6/ip6_output.c | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
+index 1d06b71c1adad..8054a4a2f2a5e 100644
+--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
+@@ -69,11 +69,15 @@ static int ip6_finish_output2(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *
+
+ /* Be paranoid, rather than too clever. */
+ if (unlikely(hh_len > skb_headroom(skb)) && dev->header_ops) {
++ /* Make sure idev stays alive */
++ rcu_read_lock();
+ skb = skb_expand_head(skb, hh_len);
+ if (!skb) {
+ IP6_INC_STATS(net, idev, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS);
++ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
++ rcu_read_unlock();
+ }
+
+ hdr = ipv6_hdr(skb);
+--
+2.43.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From 1ecc9670ed3dfd9baef486be569102ae9e5d245b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2024 16:08:59 +0000
+Subject: ipv6: prevent possible UAF in ip6_xmit()
+
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 2d5ff7e339d04622d8282661df36151906d0e1c7 ]
+
+If skb_expand_head() returns NULL, skb has been freed
+and the associated dst/idev could also have been freed.
+
+We must use rcu_read_lock() to prevent a possible UAF.
+
+Fixes: 0c9f227bee11 ("ipv6: use skb_expand_head in ip6_xmit")
+Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Cc: Vasily Averin <vasily.averin@linux.dev>
+Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240820160859.3786976-4-edumazet@google.com
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ net/ipv6/ip6_output.c | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
+index 8054a4a2f2a5e..b37121f872bc9 100644
+--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
+@@ -273,11 +273,15 @@ int ip6_xmit(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi6 *fl6,
+ head_room += opt->opt_nflen + opt->opt_flen;
+
+ if (unlikely(head_room > skb_headroom(skb))) {
++ /* Make sure idev stays alive */
++ rcu_read_lock();
+ skb = skb_expand_head(skb, head_room);
+ if (!skb) {
+ IP6_INC_STATS(net, idev, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS);
++ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return -ENOBUFS;
+ }
++ rcu_read_unlock();
+ }
+
+ if (opt) {
+--
+2.43.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From 82e8c35da22d3774a030f6e765896f59a92776ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2024 16:08:57 +0000
+Subject: ipv6: prevent UAF in ip6_send_skb()
+
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit faa389b2fbaaec7fd27a390b4896139f9da662e3 ]
+
+syzbot reported an UAF in ip6_send_skb() [1]
+
+After ip6_local_out() has returned, we no longer can safely
+dereference rt, unless we hold rcu_read_lock().
+
+A similar issue has been fixed in commit
+a688caa34beb ("ipv6: take rcu lock in rawv6_send_hdrinc()")
+
+Another potential issue in ip6_finish_output2() is handled in a
+separate patch.
+
+[1]
+ BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ip6_send_skb+0x18d/0x230 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1964
+Read of size 8 at addr ffff88806dde4858 by task syz.1.380/6530
+
+CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6530 Comm: syz.1.380 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc3-syzkaller-00306-gdf6cbc62cc9b #0
+Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/06/2024
+Call Trace:
+ <TASK>
+ __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:93 [inline]
+ dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:119
+ print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
+ print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488
+ kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601
+ ip6_send_skb+0x18d/0x230 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1964
+ rawv6_push_pending_frames+0x75c/0x9e0 net/ipv6/raw.c:588
+ rawv6_sendmsg+0x19c7/0x23c0 net/ipv6/raw.c:926
+ sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
+ __sock_sendmsg+0x1a6/0x270 net/socket.c:745
+ sock_write_iter+0x2dd/0x400 net/socket.c:1160
+ do_iter_readv_writev+0x60a/0x890
+ vfs_writev+0x37c/0xbb0 fs/read_write.c:971
+ do_writev+0x1b1/0x350 fs/read_write.c:1018
+ do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
+ do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
+ entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
+RIP: 0033:0x7f936bf79e79
+Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
+RSP: 002b:00007f936cd7f038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000014
+RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f936c115f80 RCX: 00007f936bf79e79
+RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI: 0000000000000004
+RBP: 00007f936bfe7916 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
+R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
+R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007f936c115f80 R15: 00007fff2860a7a8
+ </TASK>
+
+Allocated by task 6530:
+ kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
+ kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
+ unpoison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:312 [inline]
+ __kasan_slab_alloc+0x66/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:338
+ kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:201 [inline]
+ slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3988 [inline]
+ slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4037 [inline]
+ kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x135/0x2a0 mm/slub.c:4044
+ dst_alloc+0x12b/0x190 net/core/dst.c:89
+ ip6_blackhole_route+0x59/0x340 net/ipv6/route.c:2670
+ make_blackhole net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3120 [inline]
+ xfrm_lookup_route+0xd1/0x1c0 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3313
+ ip6_dst_lookup_flow+0x13e/0x180 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1257
+ rawv6_sendmsg+0x1283/0x23c0 net/ipv6/raw.c:898
+ sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
+ __sock_sendmsg+0x1a6/0x270 net/socket.c:745
+ ____sys_sendmsg+0x525/0x7d0 net/socket.c:2597
+ ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2651 [inline]
+ __sys_sendmsg+0x2b0/0x3a0 net/socket.c:2680
+ do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
+ do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
+ entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
+
+Freed by task 45:
+ kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
+ kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
+ kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:579
+ poison_slab_object+0xe0/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:240
+ __kasan_slab_free+0x37/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:256
+ kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:184 [inline]
+ slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2252 [inline]
+ slab_free mm/slub.c:4473 [inline]
+ kmem_cache_free+0x145/0x350 mm/slub.c:4548
+ dst_destroy+0x2ac/0x460 net/core/dst.c:124
+ rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2569 [inline]
+ rcu_core+0xafd/0x1830 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2843
+ handle_softirqs+0x2c4/0x970 kernel/softirq.c:554
+ __do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:588 [inline]
+ invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:428 [inline]
+ __irq_exit_rcu+0xf4/0x1c0 kernel/softirq.c:637
+ irq_exit_rcu+0x9/0x30 kernel/softirq.c:649
+ instr_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1043 [inline]
+ sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xa6/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1043
+ asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:702
+
+Last potentially related work creation:
+ kasan_save_stack+0x3f/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:47
+ __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xac/0xc0 mm/kasan/generic.c:541
+ __call_rcu_common kernel/rcu/tree.c:3106 [inline]
+ call_rcu+0x167/0xa70 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3210
+ refdst_drop include/net/dst.h:263 [inline]
+ skb_dst_drop include/net/dst.h:275 [inline]
+ nf_ct_frag6_queue net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c:306 [inline]
+ nf_ct_frag6_gather+0xb9a/0x2080 net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c:485
+ ipv6_defrag+0x2c8/0x3c0 net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_defrag_ipv6_hooks.c:67
+ nf_hook_entry_hookfn include/linux/netfilter.h:154 [inline]
+ nf_hook_slow+0xc3/0x220 net/netfilter/core.c:626
+ nf_hook include/linux/netfilter.h:269 [inline]
+ __ip6_local_out+0x6fa/0x800 net/ipv6/output_core.c:143
+ ip6_local_out+0x26/0x70 net/ipv6/output_core.c:153
+ ip6_send_skb+0x112/0x230 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1959
+ rawv6_push_pending_frames+0x75c/0x9e0 net/ipv6/raw.c:588
+ rawv6_sendmsg+0x19c7/0x23c0 net/ipv6/raw.c:926
+ sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
+ __sock_sendmsg+0x1a6/0x270 net/socket.c:745
+ sock_write_iter+0x2dd/0x400 net/socket.c:1160
+ do_iter_readv_writev+0x60a/0x890
+
+Fixes: 0625491493d9 ("ipv6: ip6_push_pending_frames() should increment IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS")
+Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
+Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240820160859.3786976-2-edumazet@google.com
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ net/ipv6/ip6_output.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
+index ce37c83455796..1d06b71c1adad 100644
+--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
+@@ -1940,6 +1940,7 @@ int ip6_send_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
+ struct rt6_info *rt = (struct rt6_info *)skb_dst(skb);
+ int err;
+
++ rcu_read_lock();
+ err = ip6_local_out(net, skb->sk, skb);
+ if (err) {
+ if (err > 0)
+@@ -1949,6 +1950,7 @@ int ip6_send_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
+ IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS);
+ }
+
++ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return err;
+ }
+
+--
+2.43.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From c2fd1f443f3fc7488026ad20d07f7c36b35af76f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Thu, 15 Aug 2024 15:04:37 -0700
+Subject: kcm: Serialise kcm_sendmsg() for the same socket.
+
+From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 807067bf014d4a3ae2cc55bd3de16f22a01eb580 ]
+
+syzkaller reported UAF in kcm_release(). [0]
+
+The scenario is
+
+ 1. Thread A builds a skb with MSG_MORE and sets kcm->seq_skb.
+
+ 2. Thread A resumes building skb from kcm->seq_skb but is blocked
+ by sk_stream_wait_memory()
+
+ 3. Thread B calls sendmsg() concurrently, finishes building kcm->seq_skb
+ and puts the skb to the write queue
+
+ 4. Thread A faces an error and finally frees skb that is already in the
+ write queue
+
+ 5. kcm_release() does double-free the skb in the write queue
+
+When a thread is building a MSG_MORE skb, another thread must not touch it.
+
+Let's add a per-sk mutex and serialise kcm_sendmsg().
+
+[0]:
+BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __skb_unlink include/linux/skbuff.h:2366 [inline]
+BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __skb_dequeue include/linux/skbuff.h:2385 [inline]
+BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __skb_queue_purge_reason include/linux/skbuff.h:3175 [inline]
+BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __skb_queue_purge include/linux/skbuff.h:3181 [inline]
+BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in kcm_release+0x170/0x4c8 net/kcm/kcmsock.c:1691
+Read of size 8 at addr ffff0000ced0fc80 by task syz-executor329/6167
+
+CPU: 1 PID: 6167 Comm: syz-executor329 Tainted: G B 6.8.0-rc5-syzkaller-g9abbc24128bc #0
+Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/25/2024
+Call trace:
+ dump_backtrace+0x1b8/0x1e4 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:291
+ show_stack+0x2c/0x3c arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:298
+ __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
+ dump_stack_lvl+0xd0/0x124 lib/dump_stack.c:106
+ print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
+ print_report+0x178/0x518 mm/kasan/report.c:488
+ kasan_report+0xd8/0x138 mm/kasan/report.c:601
+ __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x20/0x2c mm/kasan/report_generic.c:381
+ __skb_unlink include/linux/skbuff.h:2366 [inline]
+ __skb_dequeue include/linux/skbuff.h:2385 [inline]
+ __skb_queue_purge_reason include/linux/skbuff.h:3175 [inline]
+ __skb_queue_purge include/linux/skbuff.h:3181 [inline]
+ kcm_release+0x170/0x4c8 net/kcm/kcmsock.c:1691
+ __sock_release net/socket.c:659 [inline]
+ sock_close+0xa4/0x1e8 net/socket.c:1421
+ __fput+0x30c/0x738 fs/file_table.c:376
+ ____fput+0x20/0x30 fs/file_table.c:404
+ task_work_run+0x230/0x2e0 kernel/task_work.c:180
+ exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:38 [inline]
+ do_exit+0x618/0x1f64 kernel/exit.c:871
+ do_group_exit+0x194/0x22c kernel/exit.c:1020
+ get_signal+0x1500/0x15ec kernel/signal.c:2893
+ do_signal+0x23c/0x3b44 arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c:1249
+ do_notify_resume+0x74/0x1f4 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:148
+ exit_to_user_mode_prepare arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:169 [inline]
+ exit_to_user_mode arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:178 [inline]
+ el0_svc+0xac/0x168 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:713
+ el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:730
+ el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:598
+
+Allocated by task 6166:
+ kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
+ kasan_save_track+0x40/0x78 mm/kasan/common.c:68
+ kasan_save_alloc_info+0x70/0x84 mm/kasan/generic.c:626
+ unpoison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:314 [inline]
+ __kasan_slab_alloc+0x74/0x8c mm/kasan/common.c:340
+ kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:201 [inline]
+ slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3813 [inline]
+ slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3860 [inline]
+ kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x204/0x4c0 mm/slub.c:3903
+ __alloc_skb+0x19c/0x3d8 net/core/skbuff.c:641
+ alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1296 [inline]
+ kcm_sendmsg+0x1d3c/0x2124 net/kcm/kcmsock.c:783
+ sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
+ __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline]
+ sock_sendmsg+0x220/0x2c0 net/socket.c:768
+ splice_to_socket+0x7cc/0xd58 fs/splice.c:889
+ do_splice_from fs/splice.c:941 [inline]
+ direct_splice_actor+0xec/0x1d8 fs/splice.c:1164
+ splice_direct_to_actor+0x438/0xa0c fs/splice.c:1108
+ do_splice_direct_actor fs/splice.c:1207 [inline]
+ do_splice_direct+0x1e4/0x304 fs/splice.c:1233
+ do_sendfile+0x460/0xb3c fs/read_write.c:1295
+ __do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1362 [inline]
+ __se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1348 [inline]
+ __arm64_sys_sendfile64+0x160/0x3b4 fs/read_write.c:1348
+ __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:37 [inline]
+ invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2b8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:51
+ el0_svc_common+0x130/0x23c arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:136
+ do_el0_svc+0x48/0x58 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:155
+ el0_svc+0x54/0x168 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:712
+ el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:730
+ el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:598
+
+Freed by task 6167:
+ kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
+ kasan_save_track+0x40/0x78 mm/kasan/common.c:68
+ kasan_save_free_info+0x5c/0x74 mm/kasan/generic.c:640
+ poison_slab_object+0x124/0x18c mm/kasan/common.c:241
+ __kasan_slab_free+0x3c/0x78 mm/kasan/common.c:257
+ kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:184 [inline]
+ slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2121 [inline]
+ slab_free mm/slub.c:4299 [inline]
+ kmem_cache_free+0x15c/0x3d4 mm/slub.c:4363
+ kfree_skbmem+0x10c/0x19c
+ __kfree_skb net/core/skbuff.c:1109 [inline]
+ kfree_skb_reason+0x240/0x6f4 net/core/skbuff.c:1144
+ kfree_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1244 [inline]
+ kcm_release+0x104/0x4c8 net/kcm/kcmsock.c:1685
+ __sock_release net/socket.c:659 [inline]
+ sock_close+0xa4/0x1e8 net/socket.c:1421
+ __fput+0x30c/0x738 fs/file_table.c:376
+ ____fput+0x20/0x30 fs/file_table.c:404
+ task_work_run+0x230/0x2e0 kernel/task_work.c:180
+ exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:38 [inline]
+ do_exit+0x618/0x1f64 kernel/exit.c:871
+ do_group_exit+0x194/0x22c kernel/exit.c:1020
+ get_signal+0x1500/0x15ec kernel/signal.c:2893
+ do_signal+0x23c/0x3b44 arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c:1249
+ do_notify_resume+0x74/0x1f4 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:148
+ exit_to_user_mode_prepare arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:169 [inline]
+ exit_to_user_mode arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:178 [inline]
+ el0_svc+0xac/0x168 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:713
+ el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:730
+ el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:598
+
+The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff0000ced0fc80
+ which belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 240
+The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
+ freed 240-byte region [ffff0000ced0fc80, ffff0000ced0fd70)
+
+The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
+page:00000000d35f4ae4 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x10ed0f
+flags: 0x5ffc00000000800(slab|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
+page_type: 0xffffffff()
+raw: 05ffc00000000800 ffff0000c1cbf640 fffffdffc3423100 dead000000000004
+raw: 0000000000000000 00000000000c000c 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
+page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
+
+Memory state around the buggy address:
+ ffff0000ced0fb80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
+ ffff0000ced0fc00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
+>ffff0000ced0fc80: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
+ ^
+ ffff0000ced0fd00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc
+ ffff0000ced0fd80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
+
+Fixes: ab7ac4eb9832 ("kcm: Kernel Connection Multiplexor module")
+Reported-by: syzbot+b72d86aa5df17ce74c60@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
+Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=b72d86aa5df17ce74c60
+Tested-by: syzbot+b72d86aa5df17ce74c60@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
+Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240815220437.69511-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ include/net/kcm.h | 1 +
+ net/kcm/kcmsock.c | 4 ++++
+ 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/include/net/kcm.h b/include/net/kcm.h
+index 2d704f8f49059..8e8252e08a9ce 100644
+--- a/include/net/kcm.h
++++ b/include/net/kcm.h
+@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ struct kcm_sock {
+ struct work_struct tx_work;
+ struct list_head wait_psock_list;
+ struct sk_buff *seq_skb;
++ struct mutex tx_mutex;
+ u32 tx_stopped : 1;
+
+ /* Don't use bit fields here, these are set under different locks */
+diff --git a/net/kcm/kcmsock.c b/net/kcm/kcmsock.c
+index 5457ca1909801..a3b281f7a99bc 100644
+--- a/net/kcm/kcmsock.c
++++ b/net/kcm/kcmsock.c
+@@ -911,6 +911,7 @@ static int kcm_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
+ !(msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE) : !!(msg->msg_flags & MSG_EOR);
+ int err = -EPIPE;
+
++ mutex_lock(&kcm->tx_mutex);
+ lock_sock(sk);
+
+ /* Per tcp_sendmsg this should be in poll */
+@@ -1059,6 +1060,7 @@ static int kcm_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
+ KCM_STATS_ADD(kcm->stats.tx_bytes, copied);
+
+ release_sock(sk);
++ mutex_unlock(&kcm->tx_mutex);
+ return copied;
+
+ out_error:
+@@ -1084,6 +1086,7 @@ static int kcm_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
+ sk->sk_write_space(sk);
+
+ release_sock(sk);
++ mutex_unlock(&kcm->tx_mutex);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+@@ -1326,6 +1329,7 @@ static void init_kcm_sock(struct kcm_sock *kcm, struct kcm_mux *mux)
+ spin_unlock_bh(&mux->lock);
+
+ INIT_WORK(&kcm->tx_work, kcm_tx_work);
++ mutex_init(&kcm->tx_mutex);
+
+ spin_lock_bh(&mux->rx_lock);
+ kcm_rcv_ready(kcm);
+--
+2.43.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From a8c546f8380a6406eb97f169e2b506b031e373bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Mon, 19 Aug 2024 19:52:50 -0400
+Subject: net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: Fix out-of-bound access
+
+From: Joseph Huang <Joseph.Huang@garmin.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 528876d867a23b5198022baf2e388052ca67c952 ]
+
+If an ATU violation was caused by a CPU Load operation, the SPID could
+be larger than DSA_MAX_PORTS (the size of mv88e6xxx_chip.ports[] array).
+
+Fixes: 75c05a74e745 ("net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: Fix counting of ATU violations")
+Signed-off-by: Joseph Huang <Joseph.Huang@garmin.com>
+Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240819235251.1331763-1-Joseph.Huang@garmin.com
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1_atu.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1_atu.c b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1_atu.c
+index 7c513a03789cf..17fd62616ce6d 100644
+--- a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1_atu.c
++++ b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1_atu.c
+@@ -453,7 +453,8 @@ static irqreturn_t mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_prob_irq_thread_fn(int irq, void *dev_id)
+ trace_mv88e6xxx_atu_full_violation(chip->dev, spid,
+ entry.portvec, entry.mac,
+ fid);
+- chip->ports[spid].atu_full_violation++;
++ if (spid < ARRAY_SIZE(chip->ports))
++ chip->ports[spid].atu_full_violation++;
+ }
+ mv88e6xxx_reg_unlock(chip);
+
+--
+2.43.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From 468f4b15c33443fbca652358e6d1a0b521feca4b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Fri, 9 Dec 2022 19:28:15 +0200
+Subject: net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: read FID when handling ATU violations
+
+From: Hans J. Schultz <netdev@kapio-technology.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 4bf24ad09bc0b05e97fb48b962b2c9246fc76727 ]
+
+When an ATU violation occurs, the switch uses the ATU FID register to
+report the FID of the MAC address that incurred the violation. It would
+be good for the driver to know the FID value for purposes such as
+logging and CPU-based authentication.
+
+Up until now, the driver has been calling the mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_op()
+function to read ATU violations, but that doesn't do exactly what we
+want, namely it calls mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_fid_write() with FID 0.
+(side note, the documentation for the ATU Get/Clear Violation command
+says that writes to the ATU FID register have no effect before the
+operation starts, it's only that we disregard the value that this
+register provides once the operation completes)
+
+So mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_fid_write() is not what we want, but rather
+mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_fid_read(). However, the latter doesn't exist, we need
+to write it.
+
+The remainder of mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_op() except for
+mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_fid_write() is still needed, namely to send a
+GET_CLR_VIOLATION command to the ATU. In principle we could have still
+kept calling mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_op(), but the MDIO writes to the ATU FID
+register are pointless, but in the interest of doing less CPU work per
+interrupt, write a new function called mv88e6xxx_g1_read_atu_violation()
+and call it.
+
+The FID will be the port default FID as set by mv88e6xxx_port_set_fid()
+if the VID from the packet cannot be found in the VTU. Otherwise it is
+the FID derived from the VTU entry associated with that VID.
+
+Signed-off-by: Hans J. Schultz <netdev@kapio-technology.com>
+Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com>
+Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Stable-dep-of: 528876d867a2 ("net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: Fix out-of-bound access")
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1_atu.c | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 61 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1_atu.c b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1_atu.c
+index 40bd67a5c8e93..4f689396fc402 100644
+--- a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1_atu.c
++++ b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1_atu.c
+@@ -114,6 +114,19 @@ static int mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_op_wait(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip)
+ return mv88e6xxx_g1_wait_bit(chip, MV88E6XXX_G1_ATU_OP, bit, 0);
+ }
+
++static int mv88e6xxx_g1_read_atu_violation(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip)
++{
++ int err;
++
++ err = mv88e6xxx_g1_write(chip, MV88E6XXX_G1_ATU_OP,
++ MV88E6XXX_G1_ATU_OP_BUSY |
++ MV88E6XXX_G1_ATU_OP_GET_CLR_VIOLATION);
++ if (err)
++ return err;
++
++ return mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_op_wait(chip);
++}
++
+ static int mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_op(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, u16 fid, u16 op)
+ {
+ u16 val;
+@@ -159,6 +172,41 @@ int mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_get_next(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, u16 fid)
+ return mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_op(chip, fid, MV88E6XXX_G1_ATU_OP_GET_NEXT_DB);
+ }
+
++static int mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_fid_read(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, u16 *fid)
++{
++ u16 val = 0, upper = 0, op = 0;
++ int err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
++
++ if (mv88e6xxx_num_databases(chip) > 256) {
++ err = mv88e6xxx_g1_read(chip, MV88E6352_G1_ATU_FID, &val);
++ val &= 0xfff;
++ if (err)
++ return err;
++ } else {
++ err = mv88e6xxx_g1_read(chip, MV88E6XXX_G1_ATU_OP, &op);
++ if (err)
++ return err;
++ if (mv88e6xxx_num_databases(chip) > 64) {
++ /* ATU DBNum[7:4] are located in ATU Control 15:12 */
++ err = mv88e6xxx_g1_read(chip, MV88E6XXX_G1_ATU_CTL,
++ &upper);
++ if (err)
++ return err;
++
++ upper = (upper >> 8) & 0x00f0;
++ } else if (mv88e6xxx_num_databases(chip) > 16) {
++ /* ATU DBNum[5:4] are located in ATU Operation 9:8 */
++ upper = (op >> 4) & 0x30;
++ }
++
++ /* ATU DBNum[3:0] are located in ATU Operation 3:0 */
++ val = (op & 0xf) | upper;
++ }
++ *fid = val;
++
++ return err;
++}
++
+ /* Offset 0x0C: ATU Data Register */
+
+ static int mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_data_read(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip,
+@@ -353,14 +401,12 @@ static irqreturn_t mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_prob_irq_thread_fn(int irq, void *dev_id)
+ {
+ struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip = dev_id;
+ struct mv88e6xxx_atu_entry entry;
+- int spid;
+- int err;
+- u16 val;
++ int err, spid;
++ u16 val, fid;
+
+ mv88e6xxx_reg_lock(chip);
+
+- err = mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_op(chip, 0,
+- MV88E6XXX_G1_ATU_OP_GET_CLR_VIOLATION);
++ err = mv88e6xxx_g1_read_atu_violation(chip);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+@@ -368,6 +414,10 @@ static irqreturn_t mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_prob_irq_thread_fn(int irq, void *dev_id)
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
++ err = mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_fid_read(chip, &fid);
++ if (err)
++ goto out;
++
+ err = mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_data_read(chip, &entry);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+@@ -386,22 +436,22 @@ static irqreturn_t mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_prob_irq_thread_fn(int irq, void *dev_id)
+
+ if (val & MV88E6XXX_G1_ATU_OP_MEMBER_VIOLATION) {
+ dev_err_ratelimited(chip->dev,
+- "ATU member violation for %pM portvec %x spid %d\n",
+- entry.mac, entry.portvec, spid);
++ "ATU member violation for %pM fid %u portvec %x spid %d\n",
++ entry.mac, fid, entry.portvec, spid);
+ chip->ports[spid].atu_member_violation++;
+ }
+
+ if (val & MV88E6XXX_G1_ATU_OP_MISS_VIOLATION) {
+ dev_err_ratelimited(chip->dev,
+- "ATU miss violation for %pM portvec %x spid %d\n",
+- entry.mac, entry.portvec, spid);
++ "ATU miss violation for %pM fid %u portvec %x spid %d\n",
++ entry.mac, fid, entry.portvec, spid);
+ chip->ports[spid].atu_miss_violation++;
+ }
+
+ if (val & MV88E6XXX_G1_ATU_OP_FULL_VIOLATION) {
+ dev_err_ratelimited(chip->dev,
+- "ATU full violation for %pM portvec %x spid %d\n",
+- entry.mac, entry.portvec, spid);
++ "ATU full violation for %pM fid %u portvec %x spid %d\n",
++ entry.mac, fid, entry.portvec, spid);
+ chip->ports[spid].atu_full_violation++;
+ }
+ mv88e6xxx_reg_unlock(chip);
+--
+2.43.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From e272d6bb7214e61309f4138d322cfb0894096083 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Fri, 9 Dec 2022 19:28:16 +0200
+Subject: net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: replace ATU violation prints with trace points
+
+From: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 8646384d80f3d3b4a66b3284dbbd8232d1b8799e ]
+
+In applications where the switch ports must perform 802.1X based
+authentication and are therefore locked, ATU violation interrupts are
+quite to be expected as part of normal operation. The problem is that
+they currently spam the kernel log, even if rate limited.
+
+Create a series of trace points, all derived from the same event class,
+which log these violations to the kernel's trace buffer, which is both
+much faster and much easier to ignore than printing to a serial console.
+
+New usage model:
+
+$ trace-cmd list | grep mv88e6xxx
+mv88e6xxx
+mv88e6xxx:mv88e6xxx_atu_full_violation
+mv88e6xxx:mv88e6xxx_atu_miss_violation
+mv88e6xxx:mv88e6xxx_atu_member_violation
+$ trace-cmd record -e mv88e6xxx sleep 10
+
+Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com>
+Reviewed-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeed@kernel.org>
+Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Stable-dep-of: 528876d867a2 ("net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: Fix out-of-bound access")
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/Makefile | 4 ++
+ drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1_atu.c | 19 +++----
+ drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/trace.c | 6 +++
+ drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/trace.h | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 4 files changed, 86 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/trace.c
+ create mode 100644 drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/trace.h
+
+diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/Makefile b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/Makefile
+index c8eca2b6f9594..49bf358b9c4fa 100644
+--- a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/Makefile
++++ b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/Makefile
+@@ -15,3 +15,7 @@ mv88e6xxx-objs += port_hidden.o
+ mv88e6xxx-$(CONFIG_NET_DSA_MV88E6XXX_PTP) += ptp.o
+ mv88e6xxx-objs += serdes.o
+ mv88e6xxx-objs += smi.o
++mv88e6xxx-objs += trace.o
++
++# for tracing framework to find trace.h
++CFLAGS_trace.o := -I$(src)
+diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1_atu.c b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1_atu.c
+index 4f689396fc402..7c513a03789cf 100644
+--- a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1_atu.c
++++ b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1_atu.c
+@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
+
+ #include "chip.h"
+ #include "global1.h"
++#include "trace.h"
+
+ /* Offset 0x01: ATU FID Register */
+
+@@ -435,23 +436,23 @@ static irqreturn_t mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_prob_irq_thread_fn(int irq, void *dev_id)
+ }
+
+ if (val & MV88E6XXX_G1_ATU_OP_MEMBER_VIOLATION) {
+- dev_err_ratelimited(chip->dev,
+- "ATU member violation for %pM fid %u portvec %x spid %d\n",
+- entry.mac, fid, entry.portvec, spid);
++ trace_mv88e6xxx_atu_member_violation(chip->dev, spid,
++ entry.portvec, entry.mac,
++ fid);
+ chip->ports[spid].atu_member_violation++;
+ }
+
+ if (val & MV88E6XXX_G1_ATU_OP_MISS_VIOLATION) {
+- dev_err_ratelimited(chip->dev,
+- "ATU miss violation for %pM fid %u portvec %x spid %d\n",
+- entry.mac, fid, entry.portvec, spid);
++ trace_mv88e6xxx_atu_miss_violation(chip->dev, spid,
++ entry.portvec, entry.mac,
++ fid);
+ chip->ports[spid].atu_miss_violation++;
+ }
+
+ if (val & MV88E6XXX_G1_ATU_OP_FULL_VIOLATION) {
+- dev_err_ratelimited(chip->dev,
+- "ATU full violation for %pM fid %u portvec %x spid %d\n",
+- entry.mac, fid, entry.portvec, spid);
++ trace_mv88e6xxx_atu_full_violation(chip->dev, spid,
++ entry.portvec, entry.mac,
++ fid);
+ chip->ports[spid].atu_full_violation++;
+ }
+ mv88e6xxx_reg_unlock(chip);
+diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/trace.c b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/trace.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000000..7833cb50ca5d7
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/trace.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
++// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
++/* Copyright 2022 NXP
++ */
++
++#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
++#include "trace.h"
+diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/trace.h b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/trace.h
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000000..d9ab5c8dee55d
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/trace.h
+@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
++/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */
++/* Copyright 2022 NXP
++ */
++
++#undef TRACE_SYSTEM
++#define TRACE_SYSTEM mv88e6xxx
++
++#if !defined(_MV88E6XXX_TRACE_H) || defined(TRACE_HEADER_MULTI_READ)
++#define _MV88E6XXX_TRACE_H
++
++#include <linux/device.h>
++#include <linux/if_ether.h>
++#include <linux/tracepoint.h>
++
++DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(mv88e6xxx_atu_violation,
++
++ TP_PROTO(const struct device *dev, int spid, u16 portvec,
++ const unsigned char *addr, u16 fid),
++
++ TP_ARGS(dev, spid, portvec, addr, fid),
++
++ TP_STRUCT__entry(
++ __string(name, dev_name(dev))
++ __field(int, spid)
++ __field(u16, portvec)
++ __array(unsigned char, addr, ETH_ALEN)
++ __field(u16, fid)
++ ),
++
++ TP_fast_assign(
++ __assign_str(name, dev_name(dev));
++ __entry->spid = spid;
++ __entry->portvec = portvec;
++ memcpy(__entry->addr, addr, ETH_ALEN);
++ __entry->fid = fid;
++ ),
++
++ TP_printk("dev %s spid %d portvec 0x%x addr %pM fid %u",
++ __get_str(name), __entry->spid, __entry->portvec,
++ __entry->addr, __entry->fid)
++);
++
++DEFINE_EVENT(mv88e6xxx_atu_violation, mv88e6xxx_atu_member_violation,
++ TP_PROTO(const struct device *dev, int spid, u16 portvec,
++ const unsigned char *addr, u16 fid),
++ TP_ARGS(dev, spid, portvec, addr, fid));
++
++DEFINE_EVENT(mv88e6xxx_atu_violation, mv88e6xxx_atu_miss_violation,
++ TP_PROTO(const struct device *dev, int spid, u16 portvec,
++ const unsigned char *addr, u16 fid),
++ TP_ARGS(dev, spid, portvec, addr, fid));
++
++DEFINE_EVENT(mv88e6xxx_atu_violation, mv88e6xxx_atu_full_violation,
++ TP_PROTO(const struct device *dev, int spid, u16 portvec,
++ const unsigned char *addr, u16 fid),
++ TP_ARGS(dev, spid, portvec, addr, fid));
++
++#endif /* _MV88E6XXX_TRACE_H */
++
++/* We don't want to use include/trace/events */
++#undef TRACE_INCLUDE_PATH
++#define TRACE_INCLUDE_PATH .
++#undef TRACE_INCLUDE_FILE
++#define TRACE_INCLUDE_FILE trace
++/* This part must be outside protection */
++#include <trace/define_trace.h>
+--
+2.43.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From 1750fad1012e6e524fd0c4d372f5f6e95d5c7fa4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Thu, 22 Aug 2024 11:40:55 -0400
+Subject: net: xilinx: axienet: Always disable promiscuous mode
+
+From: Sean Anderson <sean.anderson@linux.dev>
+
+[ Upstream commit 4ae738dfef2c0323752ab81786e2d298c9939321 ]
+
+If promiscuous mode is disabled when there are fewer than four multicast
+addresses, then it will not be reflected in the hardware. Fix this by
+always clearing the promiscuous mode flag even when we program multicast
+addresses.
+
+Fixes: 8a3b7a252dca ("drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx: added Xilinx AXI Ethernet driver")
+Signed-off-by: Sean Anderson <sean.anderson@linux.dev>
+Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240822154059.1066595-2-sean.anderson@linux.dev
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/xilinx_axienet_main.c | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/xilinx_axienet_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/xilinx_axienet_main.c
+index 63f33126d02fe..79f559178bb38 100644
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/xilinx_axienet_main.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/xilinx_axienet_main.c
+@@ -427,6 +427,10 @@ static void axienet_set_multicast_list(struct net_device *ndev)
+ } else if (!netdev_mc_empty(ndev)) {
+ struct netdev_hw_addr *ha;
+
++ reg = axienet_ior(lp, XAE_FMI_OFFSET);
++ reg &= ~XAE_FMI_PM_MASK;
++ axienet_iow(lp, XAE_FMI_OFFSET, reg);
++
+ i = 0;
+ netdev_for_each_mc_addr(ha, ndev) {
+ if (i >= XAE_MULTICAST_CAM_TABLE_NUM)
+--
+2.43.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From 4dfc9bd797dea5c903de44e115091b8cda93611b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Thu, 22 Aug 2024 11:40:56 -0400
+Subject: net: xilinx: axienet: Fix dangling multicast addresses
+
+From: Sean Anderson <sean.anderson@linux.dev>
+
+[ Upstream commit 797a68c9de0f5a5447baf4bd3bb9c10a3993435b ]
+
+If a multicast address is removed but there are still some multicast
+addresses, that address would remain programmed into the frame filter.
+Fix this by explicitly setting the enable bit for each filter.
+
+Fixes: 8a3b7a252dca ("drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx: added Xilinx AXI Ethernet driver")
+Signed-off-by: Sean Anderson <sean.anderson@linux.dev>
+Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240822154059.1066595-3-sean.anderson@linux.dev
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/xilinx_axienet.h | 1 +
+ .../net/ethernet/xilinx/xilinx_axienet_main.c | 21 ++++++++-----------
+ 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/xilinx_axienet.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/xilinx_axienet.h
+index cbf637078c38a..bdda836115095 100644
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/xilinx_axienet.h
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/xilinx_axienet.h
+@@ -169,6 +169,7 @@
+ #define XAE_UAW0_OFFSET 0x00000700 /* Unicast address word 0 */
+ #define XAE_UAW1_OFFSET 0x00000704 /* Unicast address word 1 */
+ #define XAE_FMI_OFFSET 0x00000708 /* Frame Filter Control */
++#define XAE_FFE_OFFSET 0x0000070C /* Frame Filter Enable */
+ #define XAE_AF0_OFFSET 0x00000710 /* Address Filter 0 */
+ #define XAE_AF1_OFFSET 0x00000714 /* Address Filter 1 */
+
+diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/xilinx_axienet_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/xilinx_axienet_main.c
+index 79f559178bb38..0ca350faa4848 100644
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/xilinx_axienet_main.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/xilinx_axienet_main.c
+@@ -409,7 +409,7 @@ static int netdev_set_mac_address(struct net_device *ndev, void *p)
+ */
+ static void axienet_set_multicast_list(struct net_device *ndev)
+ {
+- int i;
++ int i = 0;
+ u32 reg, af0reg, af1reg;
+ struct axienet_local *lp = netdev_priv(ndev);
+
+@@ -431,7 +431,6 @@ static void axienet_set_multicast_list(struct net_device *ndev)
+ reg &= ~XAE_FMI_PM_MASK;
+ axienet_iow(lp, XAE_FMI_OFFSET, reg);
+
+- i = 0;
+ netdev_for_each_mc_addr(ha, ndev) {
+ if (i >= XAE_MULTICAST_CAM_TABLE_NUM)
+ break;
+@@ -450,6 +449,7 @@ static void axienet_set_multicast_list(struct net_device *ndev)
+ axienet_iow(lp, XAE_FMI_OFFSET, reg);
+ axienet_iow(lp, XAE_AF0_OFFSET, af0reg);
+ axienet_iow(lp, XAE_AF1_OFFSET, af1reg);
++ axienet_iow(lp, XAE_FFE_OFFSET, 1);
+ i++;
+ }
+ } else {
+@@ -457,18 +457,15 @@ static void axienet_set_multicast_list(struct net_device *ndev)
+ reg &= ~XAE_FMI_PM_MASK;
+
+ axienet_iow(lp, XAE_FMI_OFFSET, reg);
+-
+- for (i = 0; i < XAE_MULTICAST_CAM_TABLE_NUM; i++) {
+- reg = axienet_ior(lp, XAE_FMI_OFFSET) & 0xFFFFFF00;
+- reg |= i;
+-
+- axienet_iow(lp, XAE_FMI_OFFSET, reg);
+- axienet_iow(lp, XAE_AF0_OFFSET, 0);
+- axienet_iow(lp, XAE_AF1_OFFSET, 0);
+- }
+-
+ dev_info(&ndev->dev, "Promiscuous mode disabled.\n");
+ }
++
++ for (; i < XAE_MULTICAST_CAM_TABLE_NUM; i++) {
++ reg = axienet_ior(lp, XAE_FMI_OFFSET) & 0xFFFFFF00;
++ reg |= i;
++ axienet_iow(lp, XAE_FMI_OFFSET, reg);
++ axienet_iow(lp, XAE_FFE_OFFSET, 0);
++ }
+ }
+
+ /**
+--
+2.43.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From 3fcc323953552e78ca143f38f82da2b18f4b58da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Mon, 19 Aug 2024 10:56:45 -0700
+Subject: netem: fix return value if duplicate enqueue fails
+
+From: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
+
+[ Upstream commit c07ff8592d57ed258afee5a5e04991a48dbaf382 ]
+
+There is a bug in netem_enqueue() introduced by
+commit 5845f706388a ("net: netem: fix skb length BUG_ON in __skb_to_sgvec")
+that can lead to a use-after-free.
+
+This commit made netem_enqueue() always return NET_XMIT_SUCCESS
+when a packet is duplicated, which can cause the parent qdisc's q.qlen
+to be mistakenly incremented. When this happens qlen_notify() may be
+skipped on the parent during destruction, leaving a dangling pointer
+for some classful qdiscs like DRR.
+
+There are two ways for the bug happen:
+
+- If the duplicated packet is dropped by rootq->enqueue() and then
+ the original packet is also dropped.
+- If rootq->enqueue() sends the duplicated packet to a different qdisc
+ and the original packet is dropped.
+
+In both cases NET_XMIT_SUCCESS is returned even though no packets
+are enqueued at the netem qdisc.
+
+The fix is to defer the enqueue of the duplicate packet until after
+the original packet has been guaranteed to return NET_XMIT_SUCCESS.
+
+Fixes: 5845f706388a ("net: netem: fix skb length BUG_ON in __skb_to_sgvec")
+Reported-by: Budimir Markovic <markovicbudimir@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
+Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240819175753.5151-1-stephen@networkplumber.org
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ net/sched/sch_netem.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
+ 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/net/sched/sch_netem.c b/net/sched/sch_netem.c
+index 08aaa6efc62c8..e0e16b0fdb179 100644
+--- a/net/sched/sch_netem.c
++++ b/net/sched/sch_netem.c
+@@ -437,12 +437,10 @@ static int netem_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *sch,
+ struct netem_sched_data *q = qdisc_priv(sch);
+ /* We don't fill cb now as skb_unshare() may invalidate it */
+ struct netem_skb_cb *cb;
+- struct sk_buff *skb2;
++ struct sk_buff *skb2 = NULL;
+ struct sk_buff *segs = NULL;
+ unsigned int prev_len = qdisc_pkt_len(skb);
+ int count = 1;
+- int rc = NET_XMIT_SUCCESS;
+- int rc_drop = NET_XMIT_DROP;
+
+ /* Do not fool qdisc_drop_all() */
+ skb->prev = NULL;
+@@ -471,19 +469,11 @@ static int netem_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *sch,
+ skb_orphan_partial(skb);
+
+ /*
+- * If we need to duplicate packet, then re-insert at top of the
+- * qdisc tree, since parent queuer expects that only one
+- * skb will be queued.
++ * If we need to duplicate packet, then clone it before
++ * original is modified.
+ */
+- if (count > 1 && (skb2 = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC)) != NULL) {
+- struct Qdisc *rootq = qdisc_root_bh(sch);
+- u32 dupsave = q->duplicate; /* prevent duplicating a dup... */
+-
+- q->duplicate = 0;
+- rootq->enqueue(skb2, rootq, to_free);
+- q->duplicate = dupsave;
+- rc_drop = NET_XMIT_SUCCESS;
+- }
++ if (count > 1)
++ skb2 = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
+
+ /*
+ * Randomized packet corruption.
+@@ -495,7 +485,8 @@ static int netem_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *sch,
+ if (skb_is_gso(skb)) {
+ skb = netem_segment(skb, sch, to_free);
+ if (!skb)
+- return rc_drop;
++ goto finish_segs;
++
+ segs = skb->next;
+ skb_mark_not_on_list(skb);
+ qdisc_skb_cb(skb)->pkt_len = skb->len;
+@@ -521,7 +512,24 @@ static int netem_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *sch,
+ /* re-link segs, so that qdisc_drop_all() frees them all */
+ skb->next = segs;
+ qdisc_drop_all(skb, sch, to_free);
+- return rc_drop;
++ if (skb2)
++ __qdisc_drop(skb2, to_free);
++ return NET_XMIT_DROP;
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * If doing duplication then re-insert at top of the
++ * qdisc tree, since parent queuer expects that only one
++ * skb will be queued.
++ */
++ if (skb2) {
++ struct Qdisc *rootq = qdisc_root_bh(sch);
++ u32 dupsave = q->duplicate; /* prevent duplicating a dup... */
++
++ q->duplicate = 0;
++ rootq->enqueue(skb2, rootq, to_free);
++ q->duplicate = dupsave;
++ skb2 = NULL;
+ }
+
+ qdisc_qstats_backlog_inc(sch, skb);
+@@ -592,9 +600,12 @@ static int netem_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *sch,
+ }
+
+ finish_segs:
++ if (skb2)
++ __qdisc_drop(skb2, to_free);
++
+ if (segs) {
+ unsigned int len, last_len;
+- int nb;
++ int rc, nb;
+
+ len = skb ? skb->len : 0;
+ nb = skb ? 1 : 0;
+--
+2.43.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From e3aeb086f278e12ce93ad1a5cbaca4f71181cf15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Tue, 13 Aug 2024 12:39:46 +0200
+Subject: netfilter: flowtable: validate vlan header
+
+From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
+
+[ Upstream commit 6ea14ccb60c8ab829349979b22b58a941ec4a3ee ]
+
+Ensure there is sufficient room to access the protocol field of the
+VLAN header, validate it once before the flowtable lookup.
+
+=====================================================
+BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in nf_flow_offload_inet_hook+0x45a/0x5f0 net/netfilter/nf_flow_table_inet.c:32
+ nf_flow_offload_inet_hook+0x45a/0x5f0 net/netfilter/nf_flow_table_inet.c:32
+ nf_hook_entry_hookfn include/linux/netfilter.h:154 [inline]
+ nf_hook_slow+0xf4/0x400 net/netfilter/core.c:626
+ nf_hook_ingress include/linux/netfilter_netdev.h:34 [inline]
+ nf_ingress net/core/dev.c:5440 [inline]
+
+Fixes: 4cd91f7c290f ("netfilter: flowtable: add vlan support")
+Reported-by: syzbot+8407d9bb88cd4c6bf61a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ net/netfilter/nf_flow_table_inet.c | 3 +++
+ net/netfilter/nf_flow_table_ip.c | 3 +++
+ 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_flow_table_inet.c b/net/netfilter/nf_flow_table_inet.c
+index 6783ea220f8fe..7f746acb4b027 100644
+--- a/net/netfilter/nf_flow_table_inet.c
++++ b/net/netfilter/nf_flow_table_inet.c
+@@ -17,6 +17,9 @@ nf_flow_offload_inet_hook(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
+
+ switch (skb->protocol) {
+ case htons(ETH_P_8021Q):
++ if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, skb_mac_offset(skb) + sizeof(*veth)))
++ return NF_ACCEPT;
++
+ veth = (struct vlan_ethhdr *)skb_mac_header(skb);
+ proto = veth->h_vlan_encapsulated_proto;
+ break;
+diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_flow_table_ip.c b/net/netfilter/nf_flow_table_ip.c
+index f3227f9316969..8fa16be0def2a 100644
+--- a/net/netfilter/nf_flow_table_ip.c
++++ b/net/netfilter/nf_flow_table_ip.c
+@@ -254,6 +254,9 @@ static bool nf_flow_skb_encap_protocol(struct sk_buff *skb, __be16 proto,
+
+ switch (skb->protocol) {
+ case htons(ETH_P_8021Q):
++ if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, skb_mac_offset(skb) + sizeof(*veth)))
++ return false;
++
+ veth = (struct vlan_ethhdr *)skb_mac_header(skb);
+ if (veth->h_vlan_encapsulated_proto == proto) {
+ *offset += VLAN_HLEN;
+--
+2.43.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From 003b800606c82615f4eecbf9ba9944e9073bcba9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2024 09:54:30 +0200
+Subject: netfilter: nft_counter: Disable BH in nft_counter_offload_stats().
+
+From: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
+
+[ Upstream commit 1eacdd71b3436b54d5fc8218c4bb0187d92a6892 ]
+
+The sequence counter nft_counter_seq is a per-CPU counter. There is no
+lock associated with it. nft_counter_do_eval() is using the same counter
+and disables BH which suggest that it can be invoked from a softirq.
+This in turn means that nft_counter_offload_stats(), which disables only
+preemption, can be interrupted by nft_counter_do_eval() leading to two
+writer for one seqcount_t.
+This can lead to loosing stats or reading statistics while they are
+updated.
+
+Disable BH during stats update in nft_counter_offload_stats() to ensure
+one writer at a time.
+
+Fixes: b72920f6e4a9d ("netfilter: nftables: counter hardware offload support")
+Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
+Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
+Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ net/netfilter/nft_counter.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_counter.c b/net/netfilter/nft_counter.c
+index 1b468a16b5237..f10d36c693b13 100644
+--- a/net/netfilter/nft_counter.c
++++ b/net/netfilter/nft_counter.c
+@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ static void nft_counter_offload_stats(struct nft_expr *expr,
+ struct nft_counter *this_cpu;
+ seqcount_t *myseq;
+
+- preempt_disable();
++ local_bh_disable();
+ this_cpu = this_cpu_ptr(priv->counter);
+ myseq = this_cpu_ptr(&nft_counter_seq);
+
+@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ static void nft_counter_offload_stats(struct nft_expr *expr,
+ this_cpu->packets += stats->pkts;
+ this_cpu->bytes += stats->bytes;
+ write_seqcount_end(myseq);
+- preempt_enable();
++ local_bh_enable();
+ }
+
+ static struct nft_expr_type nft_counter_type;
+--
+2.43.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From 7e577e6374b93a3098fc30d22d20116ecf24bee0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2024 09:54:31 +0200
+Subject: netfilter: nft_counter: Synchronize nft_counter_reset() against
+ reader.
+
+From: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
+
+[ Upstream commit a0b39e2dc7017ac667b70bdeee5293e410fab2fb ]
+
+nft_counter_reset() resets the counter by subtracting the previously
+retrieved value from the counter. This is a write operation on the
+counter and as such it requires to be performed with a write sequence of
+nft_counter_seq to serialize against its possible reader.
+
+Update the packets/ bytes within write-sequence of nft_counter_seq.
+
+Fixes: d84701ecbcd6a ("netfilter: nft_counter: rework atomic dump and reset")
+Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
+Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
+Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ net/netfilter/nft_counter.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_counter.c b/net/netfilter/nft_counter.c
+index f10d36c693b13..30b24d002c3d8 100644
+--- a/net/netfilter/nft_counter.c
++++ b/net/netfilter/nft_counter.c
+@@ -106,11 +106,16 @@ static void nft_counter_reset(struct nft_counter_percpu_priv *priv,
+ struct nft_counter *total)
+ {
+ struct nft_counter *this_cpu;
++ seqcount_t *myseq;
+
+ local_bh_disable();
+ this_cpu = this_cpu_ptr(priv->counter);
++ myseq = this_cpu_ptr(&nft_counter_seq);
++
++ write_seqcount_begin(myseq);
+ this_cpu->packets -= total->packets;
+ this_cpu->bytes -= total->bytes;
++ write_seqcount_end(myseq);
+ local_bh_enable();
+ }
+
+--
+2.43.0
+
dm-suspend-return-erestartsys-instead-of-eintr.patch
net-mana-fix-doorbell-out-of-order-violation-and-avo.patch
platform-surface-aggregator-fix-warning-when-control.patch
+bluetooth-hci_core-fix-le-quote-calculation.patch
+bluetooth-smp-fix-assumption-of-central-always-being.patch
+tc-testing-don-t-access-non-existent-variable-on-exc.patch
+kcm-serialise-kcm_sendmsg-for-the-same-socket.patch
+netfilter-nft_counter-disable-bh-in-nft_counter_offl.patch
+netfilter-nft_counter-synchronize-nft_counter_reset-.patch
+ip6_tunnel-fix-broken-gro.patch
+bonding-fix-bond_ipsec_offload_ok-return-type.patch
+bonding-fix-null-pointer-deref-in-bond_ipsec_offload.patch
+bonding-fix-xfrm-real_dev-null-pointer-dereference.patch
+bonding-fix-xfrm-state-handling-when-clearing-active.patch
+ice-fix-ice_last_offset-formula.patch
+dpaa2-switch-fix-error-checking-in-dpaa2_switch_seed.patch
+net-dsa-mv88e6xxx-read-fid-when-handling-atu-violati.patch
+net-dsa-mv88e6xxx-replace-atu-violation-prints-with-.patch
+net-dsa-mv88e6xxx-fix-out-of-bound-access.patch
+netem-fix-return-value-if-duplicate-enqueue-fails.patch
+ipv6-prevent-uaf-in-ip6_send_skb.patch
+ipv6-fix-possible-uaf-in-ip6_finish_output2.patch
+ipv6-prevent-possible-uaf-in-ip6_xmit.patch
+netfilter-flowtable-validate-vlan-header.patch
+net-xilinx-axienet-always-disable-promiscuous-mode.patch
+net-xilinx-axienet-fix-dangling-multicast-addresses.patch
--- /dev/null
+From a69418d2002a581a1245140fe0b87b59c58e193b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Thu, 15 Aug 2024 16:37:13 +0100
+Subject: tc-testing: don't access non-existent variable on exception
+
+From: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
+
+[ Upstream commit a0c9fe5eecc97680323ee83780ea3eaf440ba1b7 ]
+
+Since commit 255c1c7279ab ("tc-testing: Allow test cases to be skipped")
+the variable test_ordinal doesn't exist in call_pre_case().
+So it should not be accessed when an exception occurs.
+
+This resolves the following splat:
+
+ ...
+ During handling of the above exception, another exception occurred:
+
+ Traceback (most recent call last):
+ File ".../tdc.py", line 1028, in <module>
+ main()
+ File ".../tdc.py", line 1022, in main
+ set_operation_mode(pm, parser, args, remaining)
+ File ".../tdc.py", line 966, in set_operation_mode
+ catresults = test_runner_serial(pm, args, alltests)
+ File ".../tdc.py", line 642, in test_runner_serial
+ (index, tsr) = test_runner(pm, args, alltests)
+ File ".../tdc.py", line 536, in test_runner
+ res = run_one_test(pm, args, index, tidx)
+ File ".../tdc.py", line 419, in run_one_test
+ pm.call_pre_case(tidx)
+ File ".../tdc.py", line 146, in call_pre_case
+ print('test_ordinal is {}'.format(test_ordinal))
+ NameError: name 'test_ordinal' is not defined
+
+Fixes: 255c1c7279ab ("tc-testing: Allow test cases to be skipped")
+Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
+Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240815-tdc-test-ordinal-v1-1-0255c122a427@kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ tools/testing/selftests/tc-testing/tdc.py | 1 -
+ 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/tc-testing/tdc.py b/tools/testing/selftests/tc-testing/tdc.py
+index a3e43189d9400..d6a9d97f73c24 100755
+--- a/tools/testing/selftests/tc-testing/tdc.py
++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/tc-testing/tdc.py
+@@ -129,7 +129,6 @@ class PluginMgr:
+ except Exception as ee:
+ print('exception {} in call to pre_case for {} plugin'.
+ format(ee, pgn_inst.__class__))
+- print('test_ordinal is {}'.format(test_ordinal))
+ print('testid is {}'.format(caseinfo['id']))
+ raise
+
+--
+2.43.0
+
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable-queue.git / commitdiff
