--- /dev/null
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */
+
+#include "alloc-util.h"
+#include "cryptsetup-tpm2.h"
+#include "fileio.h"
+#include "hexdecoct.h"
+#include "json.h"
+#include "parse-util.h"
+#include "random-util.h"
+#include "tpm2-util.h"
+
+int acquire_tpm2_key(
+ const char *volume_name,
+ const char *device,
+ uint32_t pcr_mask,
+ const char *key_file,
+ size_t key_file_size,
+ uint64_t key_file_offset,
+ const void *key_data,
+ size_t key_data_size,
+ const void *policy_hash,
+ size_t policy_hash_size,
+ void **ret_decrypted_key,
+ size_t *ret_decrypted_key_size) {
+
+ _cleanup_free_ void *loaded_blob = NULL;
+ _cleanup_free_ char *auto_device = NULL;
+ size_t blob_size;
+ const void *blob;
+ int r;
+
+ if (!device) {
+ r = tpm2_find_device_auto(LOG_DEBUG, &auto_device);
+ if (r == -ENODEV)
+ return -EAGAIN; /* Tell the caller to wait for a TPM2 device to show up */
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ device = auto_device;
+ }
+
+ if (key_data) {
+ blob = key_data;
+ blob_size = key_data_size;
+ } else {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *bindname = NULL;
+
+ /* If we read the salt via AF_UNIX, make this client recognizable */
+ if (asprintf(&bindname, "@%" PRIx64"/cryptsetup-tpm2/%s", random_u64(), volume_name) < 0)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ r = read_full_file_full(
+ AT_FDCWD, key_file,
+ key_file_offset == 0 ? UINT64_MAX : key_file_offset,
+ key_file_size == 0 ? SIZE_MAX : key_file_size,
+ READ_FULL_FILE_CONNECT_SOCKET,
+ bindname,
+ (char**) &loaded_blob, &blob_size);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ blob = loaded_blob;
+ }
+
+ return tpm2_unseal(device, pcr_mask, blob, blob_size, policy_hash, policy_hash_size, ret_decrypted_key, ret_decrypted_key_size);
+}
+
+int find_tpm2_auto_data(
+ struct crypt_device *cd,
+ uint32_t search_pcr_mask,
+ int start_token,
+ uint32_t *ret_pcr_mask,
+ void **ret_blob,
+ size_t *ret_blob_size,
+ void **ret_policy_hash,
+ size_t *ret_policy_hash_size,
+ int *ret_keyslot,
+ int *ret_token) {
+
+ _cleanup_free_ void *blob = NULL, *policy_hash = NULL;
+ size_t blob_size = 0, policy_hash_size = 0;
+ int r, keyslot = -1, token = -1;
+ uint32_t pcr_mask = 0;
+
+ assert(cd);
+
+ for (token = start_token; token < LUKS2_TOKENS_MAX; token++) {
+ _cleanup_(json_variant_unrefp) JsonVariant *v = NULL;
+ JsonVariant *w, *e;
+
+ r = cryptsetup_get_token_as_json(cd, token, "systemd-tpm2", &v);
+ if (IN_SET(r, -ENOENT, -EINVAL, -EMEDIUMTYPE))
+ continue;
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to read JSON token data off disk: %m");
+
+ w = json_variant_by_key(v, "tpm2-pcrs");
+ if (!w || !json_variant_is_array(w))
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
+ "TPM2 token data lacks 'tpm2-pcrs' field.");
+
+ assert(pcr_mask == 0);
+ JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY_FOREACH(e, w) {
+ uintmax_t u;
+
+ if (!json_variant_is_number(e))
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
+ "TPM2 PCR is not a number.");
+
+ u = json_variant_unsigned(e);
+ if (u >= TPM2_PCRS_MAX)
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
+ "TPM2 PCR number out of range.");
+
+ pcr_mask |= UINT32_C(1) << u;
+ }
+
+ if (search_pcr_mask != UINT32_MAX &&
+ search_pcr_mask != pcr_mask) /* PCR mask doesn't match what is configured, ignore this entry */
+ continue;
+
+ assert(!blob);
+ w = json_variant_by_key(v, "tpm2-blob");
+ if (!w || !json_variant_is_string(w))
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
+ "TPM2 token data lacks 'tpm2-blob' field.");
+
+ r = unbase64mem(json_variant_string(w), (size_t) -1, &blob, &blob_size);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
+ "Invalid base64 data in 'tpm2-blob' field.");
+
+ assert(!policy_hash);
+ w = json_variant_by_key(v, "tpm2-policy-hash");
+ if (!w || !json_variant_is_string(w))
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
+ "TPM2 token data lacks 'tpm2-policy-hash' field.");
+
+ r = unhexmem(json_variant_string(w), (size_t) -1, &policy_hash, &policy_hash_size);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
+ "Invalid base64 data in 'tpm2-policy-hash' field.");
+
+ assert(keyslot < 0);
+ keyslot = cryptsetup_get_keyslot_from_token(v);
+ if (keyslot < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(keyslot, "Failed to extract keyslot index from TPM2 JSON data: %m");
+
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!blob)
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENXIO),
+ "No valid TPM2 token data found.");
+
+ if (start_token <= 0)
+ log_info("Automatically discovered security TPM2 token unlocks volume.");
+
+ *ret_pcr_mask = pcr_mask;
+ *ret_blob = TAKE_PTR(blob);
+ *ret_blob_size = blob_size;
+ *ret_policy_hash = TAKE_PTR(policy_hash);
+ *ret_policy_hash_size = policy_hash_size;
+ *ret_keyslot = keyslot;
+ *ret_token = token;
+
+ return 0;
+}
--- /dev/null
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */
+#pragma once
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include "cryptsetup-util.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "time-util.h"
+
+#if HAVE_TPM2
+
+int acquire_tpm2_key(
+ const char *volume_name,
+ const char *device,
+ uint32_t pcr_mask,
+ const char *key_file,
+ size_t key_file_size,
+ uint64_t key_file_offset,
+ const void *key_data,
+ size_t key_data_size,
+ const void *policy_hash,
+ size_t policy_hash_size,
+ void **ret_decrypted_key,
+ size_t *ret_decrypted_key_size);
+
+int find_tpm2_auto_data(
+ struct crypt_device *cd,
+ uint32_t search_pcr_mask,
+ int start_token,
+ uint32_t *ret_pcr_mask,
+ void **ret_blob,
+ size_t *ret_blob_size,
+ void **ret_policy_hash,
+ size_t *ret_policy_hash_size,
+ int *ret_keyslot,
+ int *ret_token);
+
+#else
+
+static inline int acquire_tpm2_key(
+ const char *volume_name,
+ const char *device,
+ uint32_t pcr_mask,
+ const char *key_file,
+ size_t key_file_size,
+ uint64_t key_file_offset,
+ const void *key_data,
+ size_t key_data_size,
+ const void *policy_hash,
+ size_t policy_hash_size,
+ void **ret_decrypted_key,
+ size_t *ret_decrypted_key_size) {
+
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP),
+ "TPM2 support not available.");
+}
+
+static inline int find_tpm2_auto_data(
+ struct crypt_device *cd,
+ uint32_t search_pcr_mask,
+ int start_token,
+ uint32_t *ret_pcr_mask,
+ void **ret_blob,
+ size_t *ret_blob_size,
+ void **ret_policy_hash,
+ size_t *ret_policy_hash_size,
+ int *ret_keyslot,
+ int *ret_token) {
+
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP),
+ "TPM2 support not available.");
+}
+
+#endif
#include "cryptsetup-fido2.h"
#include "cryptsetup-keyfile.h"
#include "cryptsetup-pkcs11.h"
+#include "cryptsetup-tpm2.h"
#include "cryptsetup-util.h"
#include "device-util.h"
#include "escape.h"
#include "random-util.h"
#include "string-util.h"
#include "strv.h"
+#include "tpm2-util.h"
/* internal helper */
#define ANY_LUKS "LUKS"
static void *arg_fido2_cid = NULL;
static size_t arg_fido2_cid_size = 0;
static char *arg_fido2_rp_id = NULL;
+static char *arg_tpm2_device = NULL;
+static bool arg_tpm2_device_auto = false;
+static uint32_t arg_tpm2_pcr_mask = UINT32_MAX;
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_cipher, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_hash, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_fido2_device, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_fido2_cid, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_fido2_rp_id, freep);
+STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tpm2_device, freep);
/* Options Debian's crypttab knows we don't:
if (r < 0)
return log_oom();
+ } else if ((val = startswith(option, "tpm2-device="))) {
+
+ if (streq(val, "auto")) {
+ arg_tpm2_device = mfree(arg_tpm2_device);
+ arg_tpm2_device_auto = true;
+ } else {
+ r = free_and_strdup(&arg_tpm2_device, val);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ arg_tpm2_device_auto = false;
+ }
+
+ } else if ((val = startswith(option, "tpm2-pcrs="))) {
+
+ if (isempty(val))
+ arg_tpm2_pcr_mask = 0;
+ else {
+ uint32_t mask;
+
+ r = tpm2_parse_pcrs(val, &mask);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ if (arg_tpm2_pcr_mask == UINT32_MAX)
+ arg_tpm2_pcr_mask = mask;
+ else
+ arg_tpm2_pcr_mask |= mask;
+ }
+
} else if ((val = startswith(option, "try-empty-password="))) {
r = parse_boolean(val);
assert(name);
assert(key_file || key_data || !strv_isempty(passwords));
- if (arg_pkcs11_uri || arg_pkcs11_uri_auto || arg_fido2_device || arg_fido2_device_auto)
+ if (arg_pkcs11_uri || arg_pkcs11_uri_auto || arg_fido2_device || arg_fido2_device_auto || arg_tpm2_device || arg_tpm2_device_auto)
/* Ask for a regular password */
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN),
- "Sorry, but tcrypt devices are currently not supported in conjunction with pkcs11/fido2 support.");
+ "Sorry, but tcrypt devices are currently not supported in conjunction with pkcs11/fido2/tpm2 support.");
if (arg_tcrypt_hidden)
params.flags |= CRYPT_TCRYPT_HIDDEN_HEADER;
return 0;
}
+static int make_tpm2_device_monitor(sd_event *event, sd_device_monitor **ret) {
+ _cleanup_(sd_device_monitor_unrefp) sd_device_monitor *monitor = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(ret);
+
+ r = sd_device_monitor_new(&monitor);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to allocate device monitor: %m");
+
+ r = sd_device_monitor_filter_add_match_subsystem_devtype(monitor, "tpmrm", NULL);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to configure device monitor: %m");
+
+ r = sd_device_monitor_attach_event(monitor, event);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to attach device monitor: %m");
+
+ r = sd_device_monitor_start(monitor, NULL, NULL);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to start device monitor: %m");
+
+ *ret = TAKE_PTR(monitor);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_tpm2(
+ struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *name,
+ const char *key_file,
+ const void *key_data,
+ size_t key_data_size,
+ usec_t until,
+ uint32_t flags,
+ bool pass_volume_key) {
+
+ _cleanup_(sd_device_monitor_unrefp) sd_device_monitor *monitor = NULL;
+ _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *decrypted_key = NULL;
+ _cleanup_(sd_event_unrefp) sd_event *event = NULL;
+ _cleanup_free_ char *friendly = NULL;
+ int keyslot = arg_key_slot, r;
+ size_t decrypted_key_size;
+
+ assert(cd);
+ assert(name);
+ assert(arg_tpm2_device || arg_tpm2_device_auto);
+
+ friendly = friendly_disk_name(crypt_get_device_name(cd), name);
+ if (!friendly)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ for (;;) {
+ bool processed = false;
+
+ if (key_file || key_data) {
+ /* If key data is specified, use that */
+
+ r = acquire_tpm2_key(
+ name,
+ arg_tpm2_device,
+ arg_tpm2_pcr_mask == UINT32_MAX ? TPM2_PCR_MASK_DEFAULT : arg_tpm2_pcr_mask,
+ key_file, arg_keyfile_size, arg_keyfile_offset,
+ key_data, key_data_size,
+ NULL, 0, /* we don't know the policy hash */
+ &decrypted_key, &decrypted_key_size);
+ if (r >= 0)
+ break;
+ if (r != -EAGAIN) /* EAGAIN means: no tpm2 chip found */
+ return r;
+ } else {
+ _cleanup_free_ void *blob = NULL, *policy_hash = NULL;
+ size_t blob_size, policy_hash_size;
+ bool found_some = false;
+ int token = 0; /* first token to look at */
+
+ /* If no key data is specified, look for it in the header. In order to support
+ * software upgrades we'll iterate through all suitable tokens, maybe one of them
+ * works. */
+
+ for (;;) {
+ uint32_t pcr_mask;
+
+ r = find_tpm2_auto_data(
+ cd,
+ arg_tpm2_pcr_mask, /* if != UINT32_MAX we'll only look for tokens with this PCR mask */
+ token, /* search for the token with this index, or any later index than this */
+ &pcr_mask,
+ &blob, &blob_size,
+ &policy_hash, &policy_hash_size,
+ &keyslot,
+ &token);
+ if (r == -ENXIO) {
+ /* No futher TPM2 tokens found in the LUKS2 header.*/
+ if (found_some)
+ return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN),
+ "No TPM2 metadata matching the current system state found in LUKS2 header, falling back to traditional unlocking.");
+ else
+ return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN),
+ "No TPM2 metadata enrolled in LUKS2 header, falling back to traditional unlocking.");
+ }
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ found_some = true;
+
+ r = acquire_tpm2_key(
+ name,
+ arg_tpm2_device,
+ pcr_mask,
+ NULL, 0, 0, /* no key file */
+ blob, blob_size,
+ policy_hash, policy_hash_size,
+ &decrypted_key, &decrypted_key_size);
+ if (r != -EPERM)
+ break;
+
+ token++; /* try a different token next time */
+ }
+
+ if (r >= 0)
+ break;
+ if (r != -EAGAIN) /* EAGAIN means: no tpm2 chip found */
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ if (!monitor) {
+ /* We didn't find the TPM2 device. In this case, watch for it via udev. Let's create
+ * an event loop and monitor first. */
+
+ assert(!event);
+
+ r = sd_event_default(&event);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to allocate event loop: %m");
+
+ r = make_tpm2_device_monitor(event, &monitor);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ log_info("TPM2 device not present for unlocking %s, waiting for it to become available.", friendly);
+
+ /* Let's immediately rescan in case the device appeared in the time we needed
+ * to create and configure the monitor */
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ for (;;) {
+ /* Wait for one event, and then eat all subsequent events until there are no
+ * further ones */
+ r = sd_event_run(event, processed ? 0 : UINT64_MAX);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to run event loop: %m");
+ if (r == 0)
+ break;
+
+ processed = true;
+ }
+
+ log_debug("Got one or more potentially relevant udev events, rescanning for TPM2...");
+ }
+
+ if (pass_volume_key)
+ r = crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, decrypted_key, decrypted_key_size, flags);
+ else {
+ _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *base64_encoded = NULL;
+
+ /* Before using this key as passphrase we base64 encode it, for compat with homed */
+
+ r = base64mem(decrypted_key, decrypted_key_size, &base64_encoded);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, keyslot, base64_encoded, strlen(base64_encoded), flags);
+ }
+ if (r == -EPERM) {
+ log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with TPM2 decrypted key. (Key incorrect?)");
+ return -EAGAIN; /* log actual error, but return EAGAIN */
+ }
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with TPM2 acquired key: %m");
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_key_data(
struct crypt_device *cd,
const char *name,
crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd)*8,
crypt_get_device_name(cd));
+ if (arg_tpm2_device || arg_tpm2_device_auto)
+ return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_tpm2(cd, name, key_file, key_data, key_data_size, until, flags, pass_volume_key);
if (arg_fido2_device || arg_fido2_device_auto)
return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_fido2(cd, name, key_file, key_data, key_data_size, until, flags, pass_volume_key);
if (arg_pkcs11_uri || arg_pkcs11_uri_auto)
/* When we were able to acquire multiple keys, let's always process them in this order:
*
- * 1. A key acquired via PKCS#11 or FIDO2 token
+ * 1. A key acquired via PKCS#11 or FIDO2 token, or TPM2 chip
* 2. The discovered key: i.e. key_data + key_data_size
* 3. The configured key: i.e. key_file + arg_keyfile_offset + arg_keyfile_size
* 4. The empty password, in case arg_try_empty_password is set
* 5. We enquire the user for a password
*/
- if (!key_file && !key_data && !arg_pkcs11_uri && !arg_pkcs11_uri_auto && !arg_fido2_device && !arg_fido2_device_auto) {
+ if (!key_file && !key_data && !arg_pkcs11_uri && !arg_pkcs11_uri_auto && !arg_fido2_device && !arg_fido2_device_auto && !arg_tpm2_device && !arg_tpm2_device_auto) {
if (arg_try_empty_password) {
/* Hmm, let's try an empty password now, but only once */
arg_pkcs11_uri_auto = false;
arg_fido2_device = mfree(arg_fido2_device);
arg_fido2_device_auto = false;
+ arg_tpm2_device = mfree(arg_tpm2_device);
+ arg_tpm2_device_auto = false;
}
if (arg_tries != 0 && tries >= arg_tries)
projects / thirdparty / systemd.git / commitdiff
