Tor multiplexes multiple TCP streams along each virtual
circuit, to improve efficiency and anonymity.
+\item \textbf{Leaky-pipe circuit topology:} Through in-band signalling
+within the circuit, Tor initiators can direct traffic to nodes partway
+down the circuit. This allows for long-range padding to frustrate traffic
+shape and volume attacks at the initiator \cite{defensive-dropping}.
+Because circuits are used by more than one application, it also allows
+traffic to exit the circuit from the middle---thus frustrating traffic
+shape and volume attacks based on observing the end of the circuit.
+
\item \textbf{No mixing, padding, or traffic shaping:} The original
Onion Routing design called for batching and reordering the cells arriving
from each circuit. It also included padding between onion routers and,
will improve anonymity against a realistic adversary, we leave these
strategies out.
-\item \textbf{Leaky-pipe circuit topology:} Through in-band
- signalling within the
- circuit, Tor initiators can direct traffic to nodes partway down the
- circuit. This allows for long-range padding to frustrate traffic
- shape and volume attacks at the initiator \cite{defensive-dropping}.
- Because circuits are used by more than one application, it also
- allows traffic to exit the circuit from the middle---thus
- frustrating traffic shape and volume attacks based on observing the
- end of the circuit.
-
\item \textbf{Congestion control:} Earlier anonymity designs do not
address traffic bottlenecks. Unfortunately, typical approaches to load
balancing and flow control in overlay networks involve inter-node control