]> git.ipfire.org Git - thirdparty/kernel/stable-queue.git/commitdiff
3.4-stable patches
authorGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Tue, 17 Jun 2014 23:40:43 +0000 (16:40 -0700)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Tue, 17 Jun 2014 23:40:43 +0000 (16:40 -0700)
added patches:
iscsi-target-reject-mutual-authentication-with-reflected-chap_c.patch

queue-3.4/iscsi-target-reject-mutual-authentication-with-reflected-chap_c.patch [new file with mode: 0644]
queue-3.4/series

diff --git a/queue-3.4/iscsi-target-reject-mutual-authentication-with-reflected-chap_c.patch b/queue-3.4/iscsi-target-reject-mutual-authentication-with-reflected-chap_c.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..016c761
--- /dev/null
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+From 1d2b60a5545942b1376cb48c1d55843d71e3a08f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
+Date: Thu, 5 Jun 2014 18:08:57 -0700
+Subject: iscsi-target: Reject mutual authentication with reflected CHAP_C
+
+From: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
+
+commit 1d2b60a5545942b1376cb48c1d55843d71e3a08f upstream.
+
+This patch adds an explicit check in chap_server_compute_md5() to ensure
+the CHAP_C value received from the initiator during mutual authentication
+does not match the original CHAP_C provided by the target.
+
+This is in line with RFC-3720, section 8.2.1:
+
+   Originators MUST NOT reuse the CHAP challenge sent by the Responder
+   for the other direction of a bidirectional authentication.
+   Responders MUST check for this condition and close the iSCSI TCP
+   connection if it occurs.
+
+Reported-by: Tejas Vaykole <tejas.vaykole@calsoftinc.com>
+Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c |   10 ++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c
++++ b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c
+@@ -342,6 +342,16 @@ static int chap_server_compute_md5(
+               goto out;
+       }
+       /*
++       * During mutual authentication, the CHAP_C generated by the
++       * initiator must not match the original CHAP_C generated by
++       * the target.
++       */
++      if (!memcmp(challenge_binhex, chap->challenge, CHAP_CHALLENGE_LENGTH)) {
++              pr_err("initiator CHAP_C matches target CHAP_C, failing"
++                     " login attempt\n");
++              goto out;
++      }
++      /*
+        * Generate CHAP_N and CHAP_R for mutual authentication.
+        */
+       tfm = crypto_alloc_hash("md5", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
index e69de29bb2d1d6434b8b29ae775ad8c2e48c5391..a2a1404f6047a5e23802cb28cd6fdea8ba5a1051 100644 (file)
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+iscsi-target-reject-mutual-authentication-with-reflected-chap_c.patch