This removes a dependency from the client code on feature/relay.
}
}
+/** Given a TTL (in seconds) from a DNS response or from a relay, determine
+ * what TTL clients and relays should actually use for caching it. */
+uint32_t
+clip_dns_ttl(uint32_t ttl)
+{
+ /* This logic is a defense against "DefectTor" DNS-based traffic
+ * confirmation attacks, as in https://nymity.ch/tor-dns/tor-dns.pdf .
+ * We only give two values: a "low" value and a "high" value.
+ */
+ if (ttl < MIN_DNS_TTL)
+ return MIN_DNS_TTL;
+ else
+ return MAX_DNS_TTL;
+}
+
/** Send a relay end cell from stream <b>conn</b> down conn's circuit, and
* remember that we've done so. If this is not a client connection, set the
* relay end cell's reason for closing as <b>reason</b>.
entry_connection_t *entry_conn,
const char *where);
+/** Lowest value for DNS ttl that a server should give or a client should
+ * believe. */
+#define MIN_DNS_TTL (5*60)
+/** Highest value for DNS ttl that a server should give or a client should
+ * believe. */
+#define MAX_DNS_TTL (60*60)
+/** How long do we keep DNS cache entries before purging them (regardless of
+ * their TTL)? */
+#define MAX_DNS_ENTRY_AGE (3*60*60)
+/** How long do we cache/tell clients to cache DNS records when no TTL is
+ * known? */
+#define DEFAULT_DNS_TTL (30*60)
+
+uint32_t clip_dns_ttl(uint32_t ttl);
+
int connection_half_edge_is_valid_data(const smartlist_t *half_conns,
streamid_t stream_id);
int connection_half_edge_is_valid_sendme(const smartlist_t *half_conns,
#include "app/config/config.h"
#include "core/or/connection_edge.h"
#include "feature/control/control_events.h"
-#include "feature/relay/dns.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/nodelist.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/routerset.h"
return nameserver_config_failed;
}
-/** Helper: Given a TTL from a DNS response, determine what TTL to give the
- * OP that asked us to resolve it, and how long to cache that record
- * ourselves. */
-uint32_t
-clip_dns_ttl(uint32_t ttl)
-{
- /* This logic is a defense against "DefectTor" DNS-based traffic
- * confirmation attacks, as in https://nymity.ch/tor-dns/tor-dns.pdf .
- * We only give two values: a "low" value and a "high" value.
- */
- if (ttl < MIN_DNS_TTL)
- return MIN_DNS_TTL;
- else
- return MAX_DNS_TTL;
-}
-
/** Helper: free storage held by an entry in the DNS cache. */
static void
free_cached_resolve_(cached_resolve_t *r)
#ifndef TOR_DNS_H
#define TOR_DNS_H
-/** Lowest value for DNS ttl that a server will give. */
-#define MIN_DNS_TTL (5*60)
-/** Highest value for DNS ttl that a server will give. */
-#define MAX_DNS_TTL (60*60)
-
-/** How long do we keep DNS cache entries before purging them (regardless of
- * their TTL)? */
-#define MAX_DNS_ENTRY_AGE (3*60*60)
-/** How long do we cache/tell clients to cache DNS records when no TTL is
- * known? */
-#define DEFAULT_DNS_TTL (30*60)
-
int dns_init(void);
int has_dns_init_failed(void);
void dns_free_all(void);
-uint32_t clip_dns_ttl(uint32_t ttl);
int dns_reset(void);
void connection_dns_remove(edge_connection_t *conn);
void assert_connection_edge_not_dns_pending(edge_connection_t *conn);
#endif /* defined(DNS_PRIVATE) */
#endif /* !defined(TOR_DNS_H) */
-