--- /dev/null
+From 57054fe516d59d03a7bcf1888e82479ccc244f87 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Shawn.Shao" <shawn.shao@jaguarmicro.com>
+Date: Thu, 12 Jan 2023 13:58:02 +0800
+Subject: Add exception protection processing for vd in axi_chan_handle_err function
+
+From: Shawn.Shao <shawn.shao@jaguarmicro.com>
+
+commit 57054fe516d59d03a7bcf1888e82479ccc244f87 upstream.
+
+Since there is no protection for vd, a kernel panic will be
+triggered here in exceptional cases.
+
+You can refer to the processing of axi_chan_block_xfer_complete function
+
+The triggered kernel panic is as follows:
+
+[ 67.848444] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000060
+[ 67.848447] Mem abort info:
+[ 67.848449] ESR = 0x96000004
+[ 67.848451] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
+[ 67.848454] SET = 0, FnV = 0
+[ 67.848456] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
+[ 67.848458] Data abort info:
+[ 67.848460] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
+[ 67.848462] CM = 0, WnR = 0
+[ 67.848465] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00000800c4c0b000
+[ 67.848468] [0000000000000060] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000
+[ 67.848472] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
+[ 67.848475] Modules linked in: dmatest
+[ 67.848479] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.10.100-emu_x2rc+ #11
+[ 67.848483] pstate: 62000085 (nZCv daIf -PAN -UAO +TCO BTYPE=--)
+[ 67.848487] pc : axi_chan_handle_err+0xc4/0x230
+[ 67.848491] lr : axi_chan_handle_err+0x30/0x230
+[ 67.848493] sp : ffff0803fe55ae50
+[ 67.848495] x29: ffff0803fe55ae50 x28: ffff800011212200
+[ 67.848500] x27: ffff0800c42c0080 x26: ffff0800c097c080
+[ 67.848504] x25: ffff800010d33880 x24: ffff80001139d850
+[ 67.848508] x23: ffff0800c097c168 x22: 0000000000000000
+[ 67.848512] x21: 0000000000000080 x20: 0000000000002000
+[ 67.848517] x19: ffff0800c097c080 x18: 0000000000000000
+[ 67.848521] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
+[ 67.848525] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000
+[ 67.848529] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000040
+[ 67.848533] x11: ffff0800c0400248 x10: ffff0800c040024a
+[ 67.848538] x9 : ffff800010576cd4 x8 : ffff0800c0400270
+[ 67.848542] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff0800c04003e0
+[ 67.848546] x5 : ffff0800c0400248 x4 : ffff0800c4294480
+[ 67.848550] x3 : dead000000000100 x2 : dead000000000122
+[ 67.848555] x1 : 0000000000000100 x0 : ffff0800c097c168
+[ 67.848559] Call trace:
+[ 67.848562] axi_chan_handle_err+0xc4/0x230
+[ 67.848566] dw_axi_dma_interrupt+0xf4/0x590
+[ 67.848569] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x60/0x220
+[ 67.848573] handle_irq_event+0x64/0x120
+[ 67.848576] handle_fasteoi_irq+0xc4/0x220
+[ 67.848580] __handle_domain_irq+0x80/0xe0
+[ 67.848583] gic_handle_irq+0xc0/0x138
+[ 67.848585] el1_irq+0xc8/0x180
+[ 67.848588] arch_cpu_idle+0x14/0x2c
+[ 67.848591] default_idle_call+0x40/0x16c
+[ 67.848594] do_idle+0x1f0/0x250
+[ 67.848597] cpu_startup_entry+0x2c/0x60
+[ 67.848600] rest_init+0xc0/0xcc
+[ 67.848603] arch_call_rest_init+0x14/0x1c
+[ 67.848606] start_kernel+0x4cc/0x500
+[ 67.848610] Code: eb0002ff 9a9f12d6 f2fbd5a2 f2fbd5a3 (a94602c1)
+[ 67.848613] ---[ end trace 585a97036f88203a ]---
+
+Signed-off-by: Shawn.Shao <shawn.shao@jaguarmicro.com>
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230112055802.1764-1-shawn.shao@jaguarmicro.com
+Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/dma/dw-axi-dmac/dw-axi-dmac-platform.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/drivers/dma/dw-axi-dmac/dw-axi-dmac-platform.c
++++ b/drivers/dma/dw-axi-dmac/dw-axi-dmac-platform.c
+@@ -551,6 +551,11 @@ static noinline void axi_chan_handle_err
+
+ /* The bad descriptor currently is in the head of vc list */
+ vd = vchan_next_desc(&chan->vc);
++ if (!vd) {
++ dev_err(chan2dev(chan), "BUG: %s, IRQ with no descriptors\n",
++ axi_chan_name(chan));
++ goto out;
++ }
+ /* Remove the completed descriptor from issued list */
+ list_del(&vd->node);
+
+@@ -565,6 +570,7 @@ static noinline void axi_chan_handle_err
+ /* Try to restart the controller */
+ axi_chan_start_first_queued(chan);
+
++out:
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&chan->vc.lock, flags);
+ }
+
--- /dev/null
+From 7633355e5c7f29c049a9048e461427d1d8ed3051 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 5 Jan 2023 14:53:56 +0900
+Subject: nilfs2: fix general protection fault in nilfs_btree_insert()
+
+From: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
+
+commit 7633355e5c7f29c049a9048e461427d1d8ed3051 upstream.
+
+If nilfs2 reads a corrupted disk image and tries to reads a b-tree node
+block by calling __nilfs_btree_get_block() against an invalid virtual
+block address, it returns -ENOENT because conversion of the virtual block
+address to a disk block address fails. However, this return value is the
+same as the internal code that b-tree lookup routines return to indicate
+that the block being searched does not exist, so functions that operate on
+that b-tree may misbehave.
+
+When nilfs_btree_insert() receives this spurious 'not found' code from
+nilfs_btree_do_lookup(), it misunderstands that the 'not found' check was
+successful and continues the insert operation using incomplete lookup path
+data, causing the following crash:
+
+ general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
+ 0xdffffc0000000005: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
+ KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000028-0x000000000000002f]
+ ...
+ RIP: 0010:nilfs_btree_get_nonroot_node fs/nilfs2/btree.c:418 [inline]
+ RIP: 0010:nilfs_btree_prepare_insert fs/nilfs2/btree.c:1077 [inline]
+ RIP: 0010:nilfs_btree_insert+0x6d3/0x1c10 fs/nilfs2/btree.c:1238
+ Code: bc 24 80 00 00 00 4c 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 28 00 74 08 4c 89
+ ff e8 4b 02 92 fe 4d 8b 3f 49 83 c7 28 4c 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 80 3c
+ 28 00 74 08 4c 89 ff e8 2e 02 92 fe 4d 8b 3f 49 83 c7 02
+ ...
+ Call Trace:
+ <TASK>
+ nilfs_bmap_do_insert fs/nilfs2/bmap.c:121 [inline]
+ nilfs_bmap_insert+0x20d/0x360 fs/nilfs2/bmap.c:147
+ nilfs_get_block+0x414/0x8d0 fs/nilfs2/inode.c:101
+ __block_write_begin_int+0x54c/0x1a80 fs/buffer.c:1991
+ __block_write_begin fs/buffer.c:2041 [inline]
+ block_write_begin+0x93/0x1e0 fs/buffer.c:2102
+ nilfs_write_begin+0x9c/0x110 fs/nilfs2/inode.c:261
+ generic_perform_write+0x2e4/0x5e0 mm/filemap.c:3772
+ __generic_file_write_iter+0x176/0x400 mm/filemap.c:3900
+ generic_file_write_iter+0xab/0x310 mm/filemap.c:3932
+ call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2186 [inline]
+ new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:491 [inline]
+ vfs_write+0x7dc/0xc50 fs/read_write.c:584
+ ksys_write+0x177/0x2a0 fs/read_write.c:637
+ do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
+ do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
+ entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
+ ...
+ </TASK>
+
+This patch fixes the root cause of this problem by replacing the error
+code that __nilfs_btree_get_block() returns on block address conversion
+failure from -ENOENT to another internal code -EINVAL which means that the
+b-tree metadata is corrupted.
+
+By returning -EINVAL, it propagates without glitches, and for all relevant
+b-tree operations, functions in the upper bmap layer output an error
+message indicating corrupted b-tree metadata via
+nilfs_bmap_convert_error(), and code -EIO will be eventually returned as
+it should be.
+
+Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/000000000000bd89e205f0e38355@google.com
+Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230105055356.8811-1-konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
+Reported-by: syzbot+ede796cecd5296353515@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
+Tested-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
+Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/nilfs2/btree.c | 15 ++++++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/fs/nilfs2/btree.c
++++ b/fs/nilfs2/btree.c
+@@ -480,9 +480,18 @@ static int __nilfs_btree_get_block(const
+ ret = nilfs_btnode_submit_block(btnc, ptr, 0, REQ_OP_READ, 0, &bh,
+ &submit_ptr);
+ if (ret) {
+- if (ret != -EEXIST)
+- return ret;
+- goto out_check;
++ if (likely(ret == -EEXIST))
++ goto out_check;
++ if (ret == -ENOENT) {
++ /*
++ * Block address translation failed due to invalid
++ * value of 'ptr'. In this case, return internal code
++ * -EINVAL (broken bmap) to notify bmap layer of fatal
++ * metadata corruption.
++ */
++ ret = -EINVAL;
++ }
++ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (ra) {
btrfs-always-report-error-in-run_one_delayed_ref.patch
x86-asm-fix-an-assembler-warning-with-current-binuti.patch
f2fs-let-s-avoid-panic-if-extent_tree-is-not-created.patch
+wifi-brcmfmac-fix-regression-for-broadcom-pcie-wifi-devices.patch
+wifi-mac80211-sdata-can-be-null-during-ampdu-start.patch
+add-exception-protection-processing-for-vd-in-axi_chan_handle_err-function.patch
+zonefs-detect-append-writes-at-invalid-locations.patch
+nilfs2-fix-general-protection-fault-in-nilfs_btree_insert.patch
--- /dev/null
+From ed05cb177ae5cd7f02f1d6e7706ba627d30f1696 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
+Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2023 12:24:19 +0100
+Subject: wifi: brcmfmac: fix regression for Broadcom PCIe wifi devices
+
+From: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
+
+commit ed05cb177ae5cd7f02f1d6e7706ba627d30f1696 upstream.
+
+A sanity check was introduced considering maximum flowrings above
+256 as insane and effectively aborting the device probe. This
+resulted in regression for number of users as the value turns out
+to be sane after all.
+
+Fixes: 2aca4f3734bd ("brcmfmac: return error when getting invalid max_flowrings from dongle")
+Reported-by: chainofflowers <chainofflowers@posteo.net>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/4781984.GXAFRqVoOG@luna/
+Reported-by: Christian Marillat <marillat@debian.org>
+Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216894
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@kernel.org>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230111112419.24185-1-arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/pcie.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/pcie.c
++++ b/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/pcie.c
+@@ -1109,7 +1109,7 @@ static int brcmf_pcie_init_ringbuffers(s
+ BRCMF_NROF_H2D_COMMON_MSGRINGS;
+ max_completionrings = BRCMF_NROF_D2H_COMMON_MSGRINGS;
+ }
+- if (max_flowrings > 256) {
++ if (max_flowrings > 512) {
+ brcmf_err(bus, "invalid max_flowrings(%d)\n", max_flowrings);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From 69403bad97aa0162e3d7911b27e25abe774093df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de>
+Date: Fri, 30 Dec 2022 13:18:50 +0100
+Subject: wifi: mac80211: sdata can be NULL during AMPDU start
+
+From: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de>
+
+commit 69403bad97aa0162e3d7911b27e25abe774093df upstream.
+
+ieee80211_tx_ba_session_handle_start() may get NULL for sdata when a
+deauthentication is ongoing.
+
+Here a trace triggering the race with the hostapd test
+multi_ap_fronthaul_on_ap:
+
+(gdb) list *drv_ampdu_action+0x46
+0x8b16 is in drv_ampdu_action (net/mac80211/driver-ops.c:396).
+391 int ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+392
+393 might_sleep();
+394
+395 sdata = get_bss_sdata(sdata);
+396 if (!check_sdata_in_driver(sdata))
+397 return -EIO;
+398
+399 trace_drv_ampdu_action(local, sdata, params);
+400
+
+wlan0: moving STA 02:00:00:00:03:00 to state 3
+wlan0: associated
+wlan0: deauthenticating from 02:00:00:00:03:00 by local choice (Reason: 3=DEAUTH_LEAVING)
+wlan3.sta1: Open BA session requested for 02:00:00:00:00:00 tid 0
+wlan3.sta1: dropped frame to 02:00:00:00:00:00 (unauthorized port)
+wlan0: moving STA 02:00:00:00:03:00 to state 2
+wlan0: moving STA 02:00:00:00:03:00 to state 1
+wlan0: Removed STA 02:00:00:00:03:00
+wlan0: Destroyed STA 02:00:00:00:03:00
+BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffffffffffb48
+PGD 11814067 P4D 11814067 PUD 11816067 PMD 0
+Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
+CPU: 2 PID: 133397 Comm: kworker/u16:1 Tainted: G W 6.1.0-rc8-wt+ #59
+Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.0-20220807_005459-localhost 04/01/2014
+Workqueue: phy3 ieee80211_ba_session_work [mac80211]
+RIP: 0010:drv_ampdu_action+0x46/0x280 [mac80211]
+Code: 53 48 89 f3 be 89 01 00 00 e8 d6 43 bf ef e8 21 46 81 f0 83 bb a0 1b 00 00 04 75 0e 48 8b 9b 28 0d 00 00 48 81 eb 10 0e 00 00 <8b> 93 58 09 00 00 f6 c2 20 0f 84 3b 01 00 00 8b 05 dd 1c 0f 00 85
+RSP: 0018:ffffc900025ebd20 EFLAGS: 00010287
+RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: fffffffffffff1f0 RCX: ffff888102228240
+RDX: 0000000080000000 RSI: ffffffff918c5de0 RDI: ffff888102228b40
+RBP: ffffc900025ebd40 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001
+R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888118c18ec0
+R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffc900025ebd60 R15: ffff888018b7efb8
+FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88817a600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
+CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
+CR2: fffffffffffffb48 CR3: 0000000105228006 CR4: 0000000000170ee0
+Call Trace:
+ <TASK>
+ ieee80211_tx_ba_session_handle_start+0xd0/0x190 [mac80211]
+ ieee80211_ba_session_work+0xff/0x2e0 [mac80211]
+ process_one_work+0x29f/0x620
+ worker_thread+0x4d/0x3d0
+ ? process_one_work+0x620/0x620
+ kthread+0xfb/0x120
+ ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
+ ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
+ </TASK>
+
+Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221230121850.218810-2-alexander@wetzel-home.de
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/mac80211/agg-tx.c | 6 +++++-
+ net/mac80211/driver-ops.c | 3 +++
+ 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/mac80211/agg-tx.c
++++ b/net/mac80211/agg-tx.c
+@@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ void ieee80211_tx_ba_session_handle_star
+ {
+ struct tid_ampdu_tx *tid_tx;
+ struct ieee80211_local *local = sta->local;
+- struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = sta->sdata;
++ struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata;
+ struct ieee80211_ampdu_params params = {
+ .sta = &sta->sta,
+ .action = IEEE80211_AMPDU_TX_START,
+@@ -521,6 +521,7 @@ void ieee80211_tx_ba_session_handle_star
+ */
+ synchronize_net();
+
++ sdata = sta->sdata;
+ params.ssn = sta->tid_seq[tid] >> 4;
+ ret = drv_ampdu_action(local, sdata, ¶ms);
+ tid_tx->ssn = params.ssn;
+@@ -534,6 +535,9 @@ void ieee80211_tx_ba_session_handle_star
+ */
+ set_bit(HT_AGG_STATE_DRV_READY, &tid_tx->state);
+ } else if (ret) {
++ if (!sdata)
++ return;
++
+ ht_dbg(sdata,
+ "BA request denied - HW unavailable for %pM tid %d\n",
+ sta->sta.addr, tid);
+--- a/net/mac80211/driver-ops.c
++++ b/net/mac80211/driver-ops.c
+@@ -331,6 +331,9 @@ int drv_ampdu_action(struct ieee80211_lo
+
+ might_sleep();
+
++ if (!sdata)
++ return -EIO;
++
+ sdata = get_bss_sdata(sdata);
+ if (!check_sdata_in_driver(sdata))
+ return -EIO;
--- /dev/null
+From a608da3bd730d718f2d3ebec1c26f9865f8f17ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Damien Le Moal <damien.lemoal@opensource.wdc.com>
+Date: Fri, 6 Jan 2023 17:43:06 +0900
+Subject: zonefs: Detect append writes at invalid locations
+
+From: Damien Le Moal <damien.lemoal@opensource.wdc.com>
+
+commit a608da3bd730d718f2d3ebec1c26f9865f8f17ce upstream.
+
+Using REQ_OP_ZONE_APPEND operations for synchronous writes to sequential
+files succeeds regardless of the zone write pointer position, as long as
+the target zone is not full. This means that if an external (buggy)
+application writes to the zone of a sequential file underneath the file
+system, subsequent file write() operation will succeed but the file size
+will not be correct and the file will contain invalid data written by
+another application.
+
+Modify zonefs_file_dio_append() to check the written sector of an append
+write (returned in bio->bi_iter.bi_sector) and return -EIO if there is a
+mismatch with the file zone wp offset field. This change triggers a call
+to zonefs_io_error() and a zone check. Modify zonefs_io_error_cb() to
+not expose the unexpected data after the current inode size when the
+errors=remount-ro mode is used. Other error modes are correctly handled
+already.
+
+Fixes: 02ef12a663c7 ("zonefs: use REQ_OP_ZONE_APPEND for sync DIO")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal <damien.lemoal@opensource.wdc.com>
+Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/zonefs/super.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/fs/zonefs/super.c
++++ b/fs/zonefs/super.c
+@@ -394,6 +394,10 @@ static int zonefs_io_error_cb(struct blk
+ data_size = zonefs_check_zone_condition(inode, zone,
+ false, false);
+ }
++ } else if (sbi->s_mount_opts & ZONEFS_MNTOPT_ERRORS_RO &&
++ data_size > isize) {
++ /* Do not expose garbage data */
++ data_size = isize;
+ }
+
+ /*
+@@ -772,6 +776,24 @@ static ssize_t zonefs_file_dio_append(st
+
+ ret = submit_bio_wait(bio);
+
++ /*
++ * If the file zone was written underneath the file system, the zone
++ * write pointer may not be where we expect it to be, but the zone
++ * append write can still succeed. So check manually that we wrote where
++ * we intended to, that is, at zi->i_wpoffset.
++ */
++ if (!ret) {
++ sector_t wpsector =
++ zi->i_zsector + (zi->i_wpoffset >> SECTOR_SHIFT);
++
++ if (bio->bi_iter.bi_sector != wpsector) {
++ zonefs_warn(inode->i_sb,
++ "Corrupted write pointer %llu for zone at %llu\n",
++ wpsector, zi->i_zsector);
++ ret = -EIO;
++ }
++ }
++
+ zonefs_file_write_dio_end_io(iocb, size, ret, 0);
+
+ out_release:
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable-queue.git / commitdiff
