uaccess: disallow > INT_MAX copy sizes

commit 6d13de1489b6bf539695f96d945de3860e6d5e17 upstream.

As we've done with VFS, string operations, etc, reject usercopy sizes
larger than INT_MAX, which would be nice to have for catching bugs
related to size calculation overflows[1].

This adds 10 bytes to x86_64 defconfig text and 1980 bytes to the data
section:

     text    data     bss     dec     hex filename
  19691167        5134320 1646664 26472151        193eed7 vmlinux.before
  19691177        5136300 1646664 26474141        193f69d vmlinux.after

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-s390&m=156631939010493&w=2

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/201908251612.F9902D7A@keescook
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Suggested-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

diff --git a/include/linux/thread_info.h b/include/linux/thread_info.h
index 659a4400517b2461802ec652bcd575007d18b790..e93e249a4e9bf303ecb322f40804847dde3ef4eb 100644 (file)
--- a/include/linux/thread_info.h
+++ b/include/linux/thread_info.h
@@ -147,6 +147,8 @@ check_copy_size(const void *addr, size_t bytes, bool is_source)
                        __bad_copy_to();
                return false;
        }
+       if (WARN_ON_ONCE(bytes > INT_MAX))
+               return false;
        check_object_size(addr, bytes, is_source);
        return true;
 }