shim is often used as part of the EFI boot chain with Linux kernels.
shim has an option to disable all verification of binaries it loads.
This can be performed by end-user using mokutil / mokmanager EFI app,
which set BootServices only variable MokSBState. shim honors that, and
mirrors it as readonly MokSBStateRT for the post-ExitBootService access.
Thus presense of MokSBStateRT is an indicator that shim was used during
boot chain.
Some OEM vendors are known to set MokSBState variable, without user
having done so.
When verification is disabled, one should assume secureboot is insecure,
because any EFI binary was allowed to run, including but not limited to
unsigned or revoked:
- grub
- systemd-boot
- UKI
- linux kernel
Linux kernel also has code to check this variable, and correctly report
that Secure Boot is disabled, see:
-
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/
3a8660878839faadb4f1a6dd72c3179c1df56787/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c#L57
With this change bootctl output changes like this:
```diff
System:
Firmware: n/a (n/a)
Firmware Arch: x64
- Secure Boot: enabled (user)
+ Secure Boot: disabled (insecure)
TPM2 Support: yes
Measured UKI: no
Boot into FW: supported
```
This implementation is trying to mimic mokutil behaviour like this one:
```
$ mokutil --sb-state
SecureBoot enabled
SecureBoot validation is disabled in shim
```
As well as the linux kernel behavior of:
```
$ journalctl -b | grep 'Secure boot disabled'
kernel: Secure boot disabled
```
Note that MokSBState is extended into PCR7 as well as also into PCR14.
For more details see https://github.com/rhboot/shim/blob/main/README.tpm
int audit = read_flag(EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_STR("AuditMode"));
int deployed = read_flag(EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_STR("DeployedMode"));
int setup = read_flag(EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_STR("SetupMode"));
- log_debug("Secure boot variables: SecureBoot=%d AuditMode=%d DeployedMode=%d SetupMode=%d",
- secure, audit, deployed, setup);
+ int moksb = read_flag(EFI_SHIMLOCK_VARIABLE_STR("MokSBStateRT"));
+ log_debug("Secure boot variables: SecureBoot=%d AuditMode=%d DeployedMode=%d SetupMode=%d MokSBStateRT=%d",
+ secure, audit, deployed, setup, moksb);
- return (cache = decode_secure_boot_mode(secure, audit > 0, deployed > 0, setup > 0));
+ return (cache = decode_secure_boot_mode(secure, audit > 0, deployed > 0, setup > 0, moksb > 0));
}
#endif
#define EFI_VENDOR_DATABASE_STR SD_ID128_MAKE_UUID_STR(d7,19,b2,cb,3d,3a,45,96,a3,bc,da,d0,0e,67,65,6f)
#define EFI_VENDOR_SYSTEMD SD_ID128_MAKE(8c,f2,64,4b,4b,0b,42,8f,93,87,6d,87,60,50,dc,67)
#define EFI_VENDOR_SYSTEMD_STR SD_ID128_MAKE_UUID_STR(8c,f2,64,4b,4b,0b,42,8f,93,87,6d,87,60,50,dc,67)
+#define EFI_VENDOR_SHIMLOCK SD_ID128_MAKE(60,5d,ab,50,e0,46,43,00,ab,b6,3d,d8,10,dd,8b,23)
+#define EFI_VENDOR_SHIMLOCK_STR SD_ID128_MAKE_UUID_STR(60,5d,ab,50,e0,46,43,00,ab,b6,3d,d8,10,dd,8b,23)
#define EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE UINT32_C(0x00000001)
#define EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS UINT32_C(0x00000002)
#define EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_STR(name) EFI_VENDOR_VARIABLE_STR(EFI_VENDOR_GLOBAL_STR, name)
#define EFI_LOADER_VARIABLE_STR(name) EFI_VENDOR_VARIABLE_STR(EFI_VENDOR_LOADER_STR, name)
#define EFI_SYSTEMD_VARIABLE_STR(name) EFI_VENDOR_VARIABLE_STR(EFI_VENDOR_SYSTEMD_STR, name)
+#define EFI_SHIMLOCK_VARIABLE_STR(name) EFI_VENDOR_VARIABLE_STR(EFI_VENDOR_SHIMLOCK_STR, name)
#define EFIVAR_PATH(variable) "/sys/firmware/efi/efivars/" variable
#define EFIVAR_CACHE_PATH(variable) "/run/systemd/efivars/" variable
}
SecureBootMode secure_boot_mode(void) {
- bool secure, audit = false, deployed = false, setup = false;
+ bool secure, audit = false, deployed = false, setup = false, moksb = false;
EFI_STATUS err;
err = efivar_get_boolean_u8(MAKE_GUID_PTR(EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE), u"SecureBoot", &secure);
(void) efivar_get_boolean_u8(MAKE_GUID_PTR(EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE), u"AuditMode", &audit);
(void) efivar_get_boolean_u8(MAKE_GUID_PTR(EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE), u"DeployedMode", &deployed);
(void) efivar_get_boolean_u8(MAKE_GUID_PTR(EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE), u"SetupMode", &setup);
+ (void) efivar_get_boolean_u8(MAKE_GUID_PTR(SHIM_LOCK), u"MokSBStateRT", &moksb);
- return decode_secure_boot_mode(secure, audit, deployed, setup);
+ return decode_secure_boot_mode(secure, audit, deployed, setup, moksb);
}
/*
EFI_STATUS __sysv_abi__ (*read_header) (void *data, uint32_t datasize, void *context);
};
-#define SHIM_LOCK_GUID \
- { 0x605dab50, 0xe046, 0x4300, { 0xab, 0xb6, 0x3d, 0xd8, 0x10, 0xdd, 0x8b, 0x23 } }
-
#define SHIM_IMAGE_LOADER_GUID \
{ 0x1f492041, 0xfadb, 0x4e59, { 0x9e, 0x57, 0x7c, 0xaf, 0xe7, 0x3a, 0x55, 0xab } }
GUID_DEF(0xa5c059a1, 0x94e4, 0x4aa7, 0x87, 0xb5, 0xab, 0x15, 0x5c, 0x2b, 0xf0, 0x72)
#define EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID \
GUID_DEF(0x4aafd29d, 0x68df, 0x49ee, 0x8a, 0xa9, 0x34, 0x7d, 0x37, 0x56, 0x65, 0xa7)
+
+#define SHIM_LOCK_GUID \
+ GUID_DEF(0x605dab50, 0xe046, 0x4300 ,0xab, 0xb6, 0x3d, 0xd8, 0x10, 0xdd, 0x8b, 0x23)
[SECURE_BOOT_DEPLOYED] = STR_C("deployed"),
[SECURE_BOOT_SETUP] = STR_C("setup"),
[SECURE_BOOT_USER] = STR_C("user"),
+ [SECURE_BOOT_TAINTED] = STR_C("tainted"),
};
const sd_char *secure_boot_mode_to_string(SecureBootMode m) {
return (m >= 0 && m < _SECURE_BOOT_MAX) ? table[m] : NULL;
}
-SecureBootMode decode_secure_boot_mode(bool secure, bool audit, bool deployed, bool setup) {
+SecureBootMode decode_secure_boot_mode(bool secure, bool audit, bool deployed, bool setup, bool moksb) {
+ /* shim verification can be disabled by moksb, some OEMs set it */
+ if (secure && moksb)
+ return SECURE_BOOT_TAINTED;
/* See figure 32-4 Secure Boot Modes from UEFI Specification 2.9 */
if (secure && deployed && !audit && !setup)
return SECURE_BOOT_DEPLOYED;
SECURE_BOOT_DEPLOYED,
SECURE_BOOT_SETUP,
SECURE_BOOT_USER,
+ SECURE_BOOT_TAINTED,
_SECURE_BOOT_MAX,
_SECURE_BOOT_INVALID = -EINVAL,
} SecureBootMode;
const sd_char *secure_boot_mode_to_string(SecureBootMode m);
-SecureBootMode decode_secure_boot_mode(bool secure, bool audit, bool deployed, bool setup);
+SecureBootMode decode_secure_boot_mode(bool secure, bool audit, bool deployed, bool setup, bool moksb);