If UseEntryGuards is set to 1, we will try to pick a total of NUM routers
as long-term entries for our circuits. (Default: 3)
+**HeartbeatPeriod** __N__ **days**|**weeks**|**months**::
+ If nonzero, and UseEntryGuards is set, minimum time to keep a guard before
+ picking a new one. If zero, we use the GuardLifetime parameter from the
+ consensus directory. No value here may be less than 2 months or greater
+ than 5 years; out-of-range values are clamped. (Default: 0)
+
**SafeSocks** **0**|**1**::
When this option is enabled, Tor will reject application connections that
use unsafe variants of the socks protocol -- ones that only provide an IP
* overflow. */
#define CEIL_DIV(a,b) (((a)+(b)-1)/(b))
+/* Return <b>v</b> if it's between <b>min</b> and <b>max</b>. Otherwise
+ * return <b>min</b> if <b>v</b> is smaller than <b>min</b>, or <b>max</b> if
+ * <b>b</b> is larger than <b>max</b>.
+ *
+ * Requires that <b>min</b> is no more than <b>max</b>. May evaluate any of
+ * its arguments more than once! */
+#define CLAMP(min,v,max) \
+ ( ((v) < (min)) ? (min) : \
+ ((v) > (max)) ? (max) : \
+ (v) )
+
/* String manipulation */
/** Allowable characters in a hexadecimal string. */
#endif
}
+/** Largest amount that we'll backdate chosen_on_date */
+#define CHOSEN_ON_DATE_SLOP (30*86400)
+
/** Add a new (preferably stable and fast) router to our
* entry_guards list. Return a pointer to the router if we succeed,
* or NULL if we can't find any more suitable entries.
* don't all select them on the same day, and b) avoid leaving a
* precise timestamp in the state file about when we first picked
* this guard. For details, see the Jan 2010 or-dev thread. */
- entry->chosen_on_date = time(NULL) - crypto_rand_int(3600*24*30);
+ entry->chosen_on_date = time(NULL) - crypto_rand_int(CHOSEN_ON_DATE_SLOP);
entry->chosen_by_version = tor_strdup(VERSION);
if (prepend)
smartlist_insert(entry_guards, 0, entry);
tor_free(e);
}
+/**
+ * Return the minimum lifetime of working entry guard, in seconds,
+ * as given in the consensus networkstatus.
+ */
+static int32_t
+guards_get_lifetime(void)
+{
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+#define DFLT_GUARD_LIFETIME (86400 * 60) /* Two months. */
+#define MIN_GUARD_LIFETIME (86400 * 60) /* Two months. */
+#define MAX_GUARD_LIFETIME (86400 * 1826) /* Five years. */
+
+ if (options->GuardLifetime >= 1) {
+ return CLAMP(MIN_GUARD_LIFETIME,
+ options->GuardLifetime,
+ MAX_GUARD_LIFETIME) + CHOSEN_ON_DATE_SLOP;
+ }
+
+ return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "GuardLifetime",
+ DFLT_GUARD_LIFETIME,
+ MIN_GUARD_LIFETIME,
+ MAX_GUARD_LIFETIME) + CHOSEN_ON_DATE_SLOP;
+}
+
/** Remove any entry guard which was selected by an unknown version of Tor,
* or which was selected by a version of Tor that's known to select
- * entry guards badly, or which was selected more 2 months ago. */
+ * entry guards badly, or which was selected a long time ago */
/* XXXX The "obsolete guards" and "chosen long ago guards" things should
* probably be different functions. */
static int
remove_obsolete_entry_guards(time_t now)
{
int changed = 0, i;
+ int32_t guard_lifetime = guards_get_lifetime();
for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(entry_guards); ++i) {
entry_guard_t *entry = smartlist_get(entry_guards, i);
}
tor_free(tor_ver);
}
- if (!version_is_bad && entry->chosen_on_date + 3600*24*60 < now) {
- /* It's been 2 months since the date listed in our state file. */
+ if (!version_is_bad && entry->chosen_on_date + guard_lifetime < now) {
+ /* It's been too long since the date listed in our state file. */
msg = "was selected several months ago";
date_is_bad = 1;
}
#endif
OBSOLETE("GiveGuardFlagTo_CVE_2011_2768_VulnerableRelays"),
OBSOLETE("Group"),
+ V(GuardLifetime, INTERVAL, "0 minutes"),
V(HardwareAccel, BOOL, "0"),
V(HeartbeatPeriod, INTERVAL, "6 hours"),
V(AccelName, STRING, NULL),