--- /dev/null
+From bfa993b355d33a438a746523e7129391c8664e8a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+Date: Wed, 8 Nov 2023 16:25:15 -0500
+Subject: acpi/processor: sanitize _OSC/_PDC capabilities for Xen dom0
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+From: Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+
+commit bfa993b355d33a438a746523e7129391c8664e8a upstream.
+
+The Processor capability bits notify ACPI of the OS capabilities, and
+so ACPI can adjust the return of other Processor methods taking the OS
+capabilities into account.
+
+When Linux is running as a Xen dom0, the hypervisor is the entity
+in charge of processor power management, and hence Xen needs to make
+sure the capabilities reported by _OSC/_PDC match the capabilities of
+the driver in Xen.
+
+Introduce a small helper to sanitize the buffer when running as Xen
+dom0.
+
+When Xen supports HWP, this serves as the equivalent of commit
+a21211672c9a ("ACPI / processor: Request native thermal interrupt
+handling via _OSC") to avoid SMM crashes. Xen will set bit
+ACPI_PROC_CAP_COLLAB_PROC_PERF (bit 12) in the capability bits and the
+_OSC/_PDC call will apply it.
+
+[ jandryuk: Mention Xen HWP's need. Support _OSC & _PDC ]
+Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Jason Andryuk <jandryuk@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Michal Wilczynski <michal.wilczynski@intel.com>
+Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231108212517.72279-1-jandryuk@gmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h | 14 ++++++++++++++
+ arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypervisor.h | 9 +++++++++
+ drivers/xen/pcpu.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 45 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h
++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h
+@@ -16,6 +16,9 @@
+ #include <asm/x86_init.h>
+ #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
+ #include <asm/irq_vectors.h>
++#include <asm/xen/hypervisor.h>
++
++#include <xen/xen.h>
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_ACPI_APEI
+ # include <asm/pgtable_types.h>
+@@ -127,6 +130,17 @@ static inline void arch_acpi_set_proc_ca
+ if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_MWAIT) ||
+ boot_option_idle_override == IDLE_NOMWAIT)
+ *cap &= ~(ACPI_PROC_CAP_C_C1_FFH | ACPI_PROC_CAP_C_C2C3_FFH);
++
++ if (xen_initial_domain()) {
++ /*
++ * When Linux is running as Xen dom0, the hypervisor is the
++ * entity in charge of the processor power management, and so
++ * Xen needs to check the OS capabilities reported in the
++ * processor capabilities buffer matches what the hypervisor
++ * driver supports.
++ */
++ xen_sanitize_proc_cap_bits(cap);
++ }
+ }
+
+ static inline bool acpi_has_cpu_in_madt(void)
+--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypervisor.h
++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypervisor.h
+@@ -100,4 +100,13 @@ static inline void leave_lazy(enum xen_l
+
+ enum xen_lazy_mode xen_get_lazy_mode(void);
+
++#if defined(CONFIG_XEN_DOM0) && defined(CONFIG_ACPI)
++void xen_sanitize_proc_cap_bits(uint32_t *buf);
++#else
++static inline void xen_sanitize_proc_cap_bits(uint32_t *buf)
++{
++ BUG();
++}
++#endif
++
+ #endif /* _ASM_X86_XEN_HYPERVISOR_H */
+--- a/drivers/xen/pcpu.c
++++ b/drivers/xen/pcpu.c
+@@ -47,6 +47,9 @@
+ #include <asm/xen/hypervisor.h>
+ #include <asm/xen/hypercall.h>
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI
++#include <acpi/processor.h>
++#endif
+
+ /*
+ * @cpu_id: Xen physical cpu logic number
+@@ -400,4 +403,23 @@ bool __init xen_processor_present(uint32
+
+ return online;
+ }
++
++void xen_sanitize_proc_cap_bits(uint32_t *cap)
++{
++ struct xen_platform_op op = {
++ .cmd = XENPF_set_processor_pminfo,
++ .u.set_pminfo.id = -1,
++ .u.set_pminfo.type = XEN_PM_PDC,
++ };
++ u32 buf[3] = { ACPI_PDC_REVISION_ID, 1, *cap };
++ int ret;
++
++ set_xen_guest_handle(op.u.set_pminfo.pdc, buf);
++ ret = HYPERVISOR_platform_op(&op);
++ if (ret)
++ pr_err("sanitize of _PDC buffer bits from Xen failed: %d\n",
++ ret);
++ else
++ *cap = buf[2];
++}
+ #endif
--- /dev/null
+From 47846d51348dd62e5231a83be040981b17c955fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+Date: Mon, 9 Oct 2023 13:18:49 -0400
+Subject: audit: don't take task_lock() in audit_exe_compare() code path
+
+From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+
+commit 47846d51348dd62e5231a83be040981b17c955fa upstream.
+
+The get_task_exe_file() function locks the given task with task_lock()
+which when used inside audit_exe_compare() can cause deadlocks on
+systems that generate audit records when the task_lock() is held. We
+resolve this problem with two changes: ignoring those cases where the
+task being audited is not the current task, and changing our approach
+to obtaining the executable file struct to not require task_lock().
+
+With the intent of the audit exe filter being to filter on audit events
+generated by processes started by the specified executable, it makes
+sense that we would only want to use the exe filter on audit records
+associated with the currently executing process, e.g. @current. If
+we are asked to filter records using a non-@current task_struct we can
+safely ignore the exe filter without negatively impacting the admin's
+expectations for the exe filter.
+
+Knowing that we only have to worry about filtering the currently
+executing task in audit_exe_compare() we can do away with the
+task_lock() and call get_mm_exe_file() with @current->mm directly.
+
+Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
+Fixes: 5efc244346f9 ("audit: fix exe_file access in audit_exe_compare")
+Reported-by: Andreas Steinmetz <anstein99@googlemail.com>
+Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johanse@canonical.com>
+Reviewed-by: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ kernel/audit_watch.c | 9 ++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/kernel/audit_watch.c
++++ b/kernel/audit_watch.c
+@@ -527,11 +527,18 @@ int audit_exe_compare(struct task_struct
+ unsigned long ino;
+ dev_t dev;
+
+- exe_file = get_task_exe_file(tsk);
++ /* only do exe filtering if we are recording @current events/records */
++ if (tsk != current)
++ return 0;
++
++ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!current->mm))
++ return 0;
++ exe_file = get_mm_exe_file(current->mm);
+ if (!exe_file)
+ return 0;
+ ino = file_inode(exe_file)->i_ino;
+ dev = file_inode(exe_file)->i_sb->s_dev;
+ fput(exe_file);
++
+ return audit_mark_compare(mark, ino, dev);
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From 969d90ec212bae4b45bf9d21d7daa30aa6cf055e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+Date: Tue, 14 Nov 2023 17:25:48 -0500
+Subject: audit: don't WARN_ON_ONCE(!current->mm) in audit_exe_compare()
+
+From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+
+commit 969d90ec212bae4b45bf9d21d7daa30aa6cf055e upstream.
+
+eBPF can end up calling into the audit code from some odd places, and
+some of these places don't have @current set properly so we end up
+tripping the `WARN_ON_ONCE(!current->mm)` near the top of
+`audit_exe_compare()`. While the basic `!current->mm` check is good,
+the `WARN_ON_ONCE()` results in some scary console messages so let's
+drop that and just do the regular `!current->mm` check to avoid
+problems.
+
+Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
+Fixes: 47846d51348d ("audit: don't take task_lock() in audit_exe_compare() code path")
+Reported-by: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ kernel/audit_watch.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/kernel/audit_watch.c
++++ b/kernel/audit_watch.c
+@@ -531,7 +531,7 @@ int audit_exe_compare(struct task_struct
+ if (tsk != current)
+ return 0;
+
+- if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!current->mm))
++ if (!current->mm)
+ return 0;
+ exe_file = get_mm_exe_file(current->mm);
+ if (!exe_file)
--- /dev/null
+From a30badfd7c13fc8763a9e10c5a12ba7f81515a55 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
+Date: Fri, 20 Oct 2023 17:15:29 +0100
+Subject: hvc/xen: fix console unplug
+
+From: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
+
+commit a30badfd7c13fc8763a9e10c5a12ba7f81515a55 upstream.
+
+On unplug of a Xen console, xencons_disconnect_backend() unconditionally
+calls free_irq() via unbind_from_irqhandler(), causing a warning of
+freeing an already-free IRQ:
+
+(qemu) device_del con1
+[ 32.050919] ------------[ cut here ]------------
+[ 32.050942] Trying to free already-free IRQ 33
+[ 32.050990] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 51 at kernel/irq/manage.c:1895 __free_irq+0x1d4/0x330
+
+It should be using evtchn_put() to tear down the event channel binding,
+and let the Linux IRQ side of it be handled by notifier_del_irq() through
+the HVC code.
+
+On which topic... xencons_disconnect_backend() should call hvc_remove()
+*first*, rather than tearing down the event channel and grant mapping
+while they are in use. And then the IRQ is guaranteed to be freed by
+the time it's torn down by evtchn_put().
+
+Since evtchn_put() also closes the actual event channel, avoid calling
+xenbus_free_evtchn() except in the failure path where the IRQ was not
+successfully set up.
+
+However, calling hvc_remove() at the start of xencons_disconnect_backend()
+still isn't early enough. An unplug request is indicated by the backend
+setting its state to XenbusStateClosing, which triggers a notification
+to xencons_backend_changed(), which... does nothing except set its own
+frontend state directly to XenbusStateClosed without *actually* tearing
+down the HVC device or, you know, making sure it isn't actively in use.
+
+So the backend sees the guest frontend set its state to XenbusStateClosed
+and stops servicing the interrupt... and the guest spins for ever in the
+domU_write_console() function waiting for the ring to drain.
+
+Fix that one by calling hvc_remove() from xencons_backend_changed() before
+signalling to the backend that it's OK to proceed with the removal.
+
+Tested with 'dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/hvc1' while telling Qemu to remove
+the console device.
+
+Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231020161529.355083-4-dwmw2@infradead.org
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_xen.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
+ 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_xen.c
++++ b/drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_xen.c
+@@ -377,18 +377,21 @@ void xen_console_resume(void)
+ #ifdef CONFIG_HVC_XEN_FRONTEND
+ static void xencons_disconnect_backend(struct xencons_info *info)
+ {
+- if (info->irq > 0)
+- unbind_from_irqhandler(info->irq, NULL);
+- info->irq = 0;
++ if (info->hvc != NULL)
++ hvc_remove(info->hvc);
++ info->hvc = NULL;
++ if (info->irq > 0) {
++ evtchn_put(info->evtchn);
++ info->irq = 0;
++ info->evtchn = 0;
++ }
++ /* evtchn_put() will also close it so this is only an error path */
+ if (info->evtchn > 0)
+ xenbus_free_evtchn(info->xbdev, info->evtchn);
+ info->evtchn = 0;
+ if (info->gntref > 0)
+ gnttab_free_grant_references(info->gntref);
+ info->gntref = 0;
+- if (info->hvc != NULL)
+- hvc_remove(info->hvc);
+- info->hvc = NULL;
+ }
+
+ static void xencons_free(struct xencons_info *info)
+@@ -553,10 +556,23 @@ static void xencons_backend_changed(stru
+ if (dev->state == XenbusStateClosed)
+ break;
+ fallthrough; /* Missed the backend's CLOSING state */
+- case XenbusStateClosing:
++ case XenbusStateClosing: {
++ struct xencons_info *info = dev_get_drvdata(&dev->dev);;
++
++ /*
++ * Don't tear down the evtchn and grant ref before the other
++ * end has disconnected, but do stop userspace from trying
++ * to use the device before we allow the backend to close.
++ */
++ if (info->hvc) {
++ hvc_remove(info->hvc);
++ info->hvc = NULL;
++ }
++
+ xenbus_frontend_closed(dev);
+ break;
+ }
++ }
+ }
+
+ static const struct xenbus_device_id xencons_ids[] = {
+@@ -616,7 +632,7 @@ static int __init xen_hvc_init(void)
+ list_del(&info->list);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&xencons_lock, flags);
+ if (info->irq)
+- unbind_from_irqhandler(info->irq, NULL);
++ evtchn_put(info->evtchn);
+ kfree(info);
+ return r;
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From 2704c9a5593f4a47620c12dad78838ca62b52f48 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
+Date: Fri, 20 Oct 2023 17:15:28 +0100
+Subject: hvc/xen: fix error path in xen_hvc_init() to always register frontend driver
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+From: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
+
+commit 2704c9a5593f4a47620c12dad78838ca62b52f48 upstream.
+
+The xen_hvc_init() function should always register the frontend driver,
+even when there's no primary console — as there may be secondary consoles.
+(Qemu can always add secondary consoles, but only the toolstack can add
+the primary because it's special.)
+
+Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
+Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231020161529.355083-3-dwmw2@infradead.org
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_xen.c | 5 +++--
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_xen.c
++++ b/drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_xen.c
+@@ -604,7 +604,7 @@ static int __init xen_hvc_init(void)
+ ops = &dom0_hvc_ops;
+ r = xen_initial_domain_console_init();
+ if (r < 0)
+- return r;
++ goto register_fe;
+ info = vtermno_to_xencons(HVC_COOKIE);
+ } else {
+ ops = &domU_hvc_ops;
+@@ -613,7 +613,7 @@ static int __init xen_hvc_init(void)
+ else
+ r = xen_pv_console_init();
+ if (r < 0)
+- return r;
++ goto register_fe;
+
+ info = vtermno_to_xencons(HVC_COOKIE);
+ info->irq = bind_evtchn_to_irq_lateeoi(info->evtchn);
+@@ -638,6 +638,7 @@ static int __init xen_hvc_init(void)
+ }
+
+ r = 0;
++ register_fe:
+ #ifdef CONFIG_HVC_XEN_FRONTEND
+ r = xenbus_register_frontend(&xencons_driver);
+ #endif
--- /dev/null
+From ef5dd8ec88ac11e8e353164407d55b73c988b369 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
+Date: Fri, 20 Oct 2023 17:15:27 +0100
+Subject: hvc/xen: fix event channel handling for secondary consoles
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+From: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
+
+commit ef5dd8ec88ac11e8e353164407d55b73c988b369 upstream.
+
+The xencons_connect_backend() function allocates a local interdomain
+event channel with xenbus_alloc_evtchn(), then calls
+bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irq_lateeoi() to bind to that port# on the
+*remote* domain.
+
+That doesn't work very well:
+
+(qemu) device_add xen-console,id=con1,chardev=pty0
+[ 44.323872] xenconsole console-1: 2 xenbus_dev_probe on device/console/1
+[ 44.323995] xenconsole: probe of console-1 failed with error -2
+
+Fix it to use bind_evtchn_to_irq_lateeoi(), which does the right thing
+by just binding that *local* event channel to an irq. The backend will
+do the interdomain binding.
+
+This didn't affect the primary console because the setup for that is
+special — the toolstack allocates the guest event channel and the guest
+discovers it with HVMOP_get_param.
+
+Fixes: fe415186b43d ("xen/console: harden hvc_xen against event channel storms")
+Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
+Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231020161529.355083-2-dwmw2@infradead.org
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_xen.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_xen.c
++++ b/drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_xen.c
+@@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ static int xencons_connect_backend(struc
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ info->evtchn = evtchn;
+- irq = bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irq_lateeoi(dev, evtchn);
++ irq = bind_evtchn_to_irq_lateeoi(evtchn);
+ if (irq < 0)
+ return irq;
+ info->irq = irq;
--- /dev/null
+From 19467a950b49432a84bf6dbadbbb17bdf89418b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: SeongJae Park <sj@kernel.org>
+Date: Sun, 22 Oct 2023 21:07:33 +0000
+Subject: mm/damon/sysfs: remove requested targets when online-commit inputs
+
+From: SeongJae Park <sj@kernel.org>
+
+commit 19467a950b49432a84bf6dbadbbb17bdf89418b7 upstream.
+
+damon_sysfs_set_targets(), which updates the targets of the context for
+online commitment, do not remove targets that removed from the
+corresponding sysfs files. As a result, more than intended targets of the
+context can exist and hence consume memory and monitoring CPU resource
+more than expected.
+
+Fix it by removing all targets of the context and fill up again using the
+user input. This could cause unnecessary memory dealloc and realloc
+operations, but this is not a hot code path. Also, note that damon_target
+is stateless, and hence no data is lost.
+
+[sj@kernel.org: fix unnecessary monitoring results removal]
+ Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20231028213353.45397-1-sj@kernel.org
+Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20231022210735.46409-2-sj@kernel.org
+Fixes: da87878010e5 ("mm/damon/sysfs: support online inputs update")
+Signed-off-by: SeongJae Park <sj@kernel.org>
+Cc: Brendan Higgins <brendanhiggins@google.com>
+Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [5.19.x]
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ mm/damon/sysfs.c | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/mm/damon/sysfs.c
++++ b/mm/damon/sysfs.c
+@@ -1150,58 +1150,60 @@ destroy_targets_out:
+ return err;
+ }
+
+-/*
+- * Search a target in a context that corresponds to the sysfs target input.
+- *
+- * Return: pointer to the target if found, NULL if not found, or negative
+- * error code if the search failed.
+- */
+-static struct damon_target *damon_sysfs_existing_target(
+- struct damon_sysfs_target *sys_target, struct damon_ctx *ctx)
++static int damon_sysfs_update_target(struct damon_target *target,
++ struct damon_ctx *ctx,
++ struct damon_sysfs_target *sys_target)
+ {
+ struct pid *pid;
+- struct damon_target *t;
++ struct damon_region *r, *next;
+
+- if (!damon_target_has_pid(ctx)) {
+- /* Up to only one target for paddr could exist */
+- damon_for_each_target(t, ctx)
+- return t;
+- return NULL;
+- }
++ if (!damon_target_has_pid(ctx))
++ return 0;
+
+- /* ops.id should be DAMON_OPS_VADDR or DAMON_OPS_FVADDR */
+ pid = find_get_pid(sys_target->pid);
+ if (!pid)
+- return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+- damon_for_each_target(t, ctx) {
+- if (t->pid == pid) {
+- put_pid(pid);
+- return t;
+- }
++ return -EINVAL;
++
++ /* no change to the target */
++ if (pid == target->pid) {
++ put_pid(pid);
++ return 0;
+ }
+- put_pid(pid);
+- return NULL;
++
++ /* remove old monitoring results and update the target's pid */
++ damon_for_each_region_safe(r, next, target)
++ damon_destroy_region(r, target);
++ put_pid(target->pid);
++ target->pid = pid;
++ return 0;
+ }
+
+ static int damon_sysfs_set_targets(struct damon_ctx *ctx,
+ struct damon_sysfs_targets *sysfs_targets)
+ {
+- int i, err;
++ struct damon_target *t, *next;
++ int i = 0, err;
+
+ /* Multiple physical address space monitoring targets makes no sense */
+ if (ctx->ops.id == DAMON_OPS_PADDR && sysfs_targets->nr > 1)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+- for (i = 0; i < sysfs_targets->nr; i++) {
++ damon_for_each_target_safe(t, next, ctx) {
++ if (i < sysfs_targets->nr) {
++ damon_sysfs_update_target(t, ctx,
++ sysfs_targets->targets_arr[i]);
++ } else {
++ if (damon_target_has_pid(ctx))
++ put_pid(t->pid);
++ damon_destroy_target(t);
++ }
++ i++;
++ }
++
++ for (; i < sysfs_targets->nr; i++) {
+ struct damon_sysfs_target *st = sysfs_targets->targets_arr[i];
+- struct damon_target *t = damon_sysfs_existing_target(st, ctx);
+
+- if (IS_ERR(t))
+- return PTR_ERR(t);
+- if (!t)
+- err = damon_sysfs_add_target(st, ctx);
+- else
+- err = damon_sysfs_set_regions(t, st->regions);
++ err = damon_sysfs_add_target(st, ctx);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From 9732336006764e2ee61225387e3c70eae9139035 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: SeongJae Park <sj@kernel.org>
+Date: Tue, 31 Oct 2023 17:01:31 +0000
+Subject: mm/damon/sysfs: update monitoring target regions for online input commit
+
+From: SeongJae Park <sj@kernel.org>
+
+commit 9732336006764e2ee61225387e3c70eae9139035 upstream.
+
+When user input is committed online, DAMON sysfs interface is ignoring the
+user input for the monitoring target regions. Such request is valid and
+useful for fixed monitoring target regions-based monitoring ops like
+'paddr' or 'fvaddr'.
+
+Update the region boundaries as user specified, too. Note that the
+monitoring results of the regions that overlap between the latest
+monitoring target regions and the new target regions are preserved.
+
+Treat empty monitoring target regions user request as a request to just
+make no change to the monitoring target regions. Otherwise, users should
+set the monitoring target regions same to current one for every online
+input commit, and it could be challenging for dynamic monitoring target
+regions update DAMON ops like 'vaddr'. If the user really need to remove
+all monitoring target regions, they can simply remove the target and then
+create the target again with empty target regions.
+
+Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20231031170131.46972-1-sj@kernel.org
+Fixes: da87878010e5 ("mm/damon/sysfs: support online inputs update")
+Signed-off-by: SeongJae Park <sj@kernel.org>
+Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [5.19+]
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ mm/damon/sysfs.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
+ 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/mm/damon/sysfs.c
++++ b/mm/damon/sysfs.c
+@@ -1150,34 +1150,47 @@ destroy_targets_out:
+ return err;
+ }
+
+-static int damon_sysfs_update_target(struct damon_target *target,
+- struct damon_ctx *ctx,
+- struct damon_sysfs_target *sys_target)
++static int damon_sysfs_update_target_pid(struct damon_target *target, int pid)
+ {
+- struct pid *pid;
+- struct damon_region *r, *next;
+-
+- if (!damon_target_has_pid(ctx))
+- return 0;
++ struct pid *pid_new;
+
+- pid = find_get_pid(sys_target->pid);
+- if (!pid)
++ pid_new = find_get_pid(pid);
++ if (!pid_new)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+- /* no change to the target */
+- if (pid == target->pid) {
+- put_pid(pid);
++ if (pid_new == target->pid) {
++ put_pid(pid_new);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+- /* remove old monitoring results and update the target's pid */
+- damon_for_each_region_safe(r, next, target)
+- damon_destroy_region(r, target);
+ put_pid(target->pid);
+- target->pid = pid;
++ target->pid = pid_new;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
++static int damon_sysfs_update_target(struct damon_target *target,
++ struct damon_ctx *ctx,
++ struct damon_sysfs_target *sys_target)
++{
++ int err;
++
++ if (damon_target_has_pid(ctx)) {
++ err = damon_sysfs_update_target_pid(target, sys_target->pid);
++ if (err)
++ return err;
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * Do monitoring target region boundary update only if one or more
++ * regions are set by the user. This is for keeping current monitoring
++ * target results and range easier, especially for dynamic monitoring
++ * target regions update ops like 'vaddr'.
++ */
++ if (sys_target->regions->nr)
++ err = damon_sysfs_set_regions(target, sys_target->regions);
++ return err;
++}
++
+ static int damon_sysfs_set_targets(struct damon_ctx *ctx,
+ struct damon_sysfs_targets *sysfs_targets)
+ {
--- /dev/null
+From 70b70a4307cccebe91388337b1c85735ce4de6ff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
+Date: Mon, 18 Sep 2023 14:48:01 +0200
+Subject: PCI/sysfs: Protect driver's D3cold preference from user space
+
+From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
+
+commit 70b70a4307cccebe91388337b1c85735ce4de6ff upstream.
+
+struct pci_dev contains two flags which govern whether the device may
+suspend to D3cold:
+
+* no_d3cold provides an opt-out for drivers (e.g. if a device is known
+ to not wake from D3cold)
+
+* d3cold_allowed provides an opt-out for user space (default is true,
+ user space may set to false)
+
+Since commit 9d26d3a8f1b0 ("PCI: Put PCIe ports into D3 during suspend"),
+the user space setting overwrites the driver setting. Essentially user
+space is trusted to know better than the driver whether D3cold is
+working.
+
+That feels unsafe and wrong. Assume that the change was introduced
+inadvertently and do not overwrite no_d3cold when d3cold_allowed is
+modified. Instead, consider d3cold_allowed in addition to no_d3cold
+when choosing a suspend state for the device.
+
+That way, user space may opt out of D3cold if the driver hasn't, but it
+may no longer force an opt in if the driver has opted out.
+
+Fixes: 9d26d3a8f1b0 ("PCI: Put PCIe ports into D3 during suspend")
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b8a7f4af2b73f6b506ad8ddee59d747cbf834606.1695025365.git.lukas@wunner.de
+Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
+Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
+Reviewed-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
+Reviewed-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.8+
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/pci/pci-acpi.c | 2 +-
+ drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c | 5 +----
+ 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/pci/pci-acpi.c
++++ b/drivers/pci/pci-acpi.c
+@@ -911,7 +911,7 @@ pci_power_t acpi_pci_choose_state(struct
+ {
+ int acpi_state, d_max;
+
+- if (pdev->no_d3cold)
++ if (pdev->no_d3cold || !pdev->d3cold_allowed)
+ d_max = ACPI_STATE_D3_HOT;
+ else
+ d_max = ACPI_STATE_D3_COLD;
+--- a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
++++ b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
+@@ -529,10 +529,7 @@ static ssize_t d3cold_allowed_store(stru
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ pdev->d3cold_allowed = !!val;
+- if (pdev->d3cold_allowed)
+- pci_d3cold_enable(pdev);
+- else
+- pci_d3cold_disable(pdev);
++ pci_bridge_d3_update(pdev);
+
+ pm_runtime_resume(dev);
+
--- /dev/null
+From 8001f49394e353f035306a45bcf504f06fca6355 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Krister Johansen <kjlx@templeofstupid.com>
+Date: Fri, 27 Oct 2023 14:46:40 -0700
+Subject: proc: sysctl: prevent aliased sysctls from getting passed to init
+
+From: Krister Johansen <kjlx@templeofstupid.com>
+
+commit 8001f49394e353f035306a45bcf504f06fca6355 upstream.
+
+The code that checks for unknown boot options is unaware of the sysctl
+alias facility, which maps bootparams to sysctl values. If a user sets
+an old value that has a valid alias, a message about an invalid
+parameter will be printed during boot, and the parameter will get passed
+to init. Fix by checking for the existence of aliased parameters in the
+unknown boot parameter code. If an alias exists, don't return an error
+or pass the value to init.
+
+Signed-off-by: Krister Johansen <kjlx@templeofstupid.com>
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Fixes: 0a477e1ae21b ("kernel/sysctl: support handling command line aliases")
+Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c | 7 +++++++
+ include/linux/sysctl.h | 6 ++++++
+ init/main.c | 4 ++++
+ 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
++++ b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
+@@ -1592,6 +1592,13 @@ static const char *sysctl_find_alias(cha
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
++bool sysctl_is_alias(char *param)
++{
++ const char *alias = sysctl_find_alias(param);
++
++ return alias != NULL;
++}
++
+ /* Set sysctl value passed on kernel command line. */
+ static int process_sysctl_arg(char *param, char *val,
+ const char *unused, void *arg)
+--- a/include/linux/sysctl.h
++++ b/include/linux/sysctl.h
+@@ -242,6 +242,7 @@ extern void __register_sysctl_init(const
+ extern struct ctl_table_header *register_sysctl_mount_point(const char *path);
+
+ void do_sysctl_args(void);
++bool sysctl_is_alias(char *param);
+ int do_proc_douintvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+ void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos,
+ int (*conv)(unsigned long *lvalp,
+@@ -287,6 +288,11 @@ static inline void setup_sysctl_set(stru
+ static inline void do_sysctl_args(void)
+ {
+ }
++
++static inline bool sysctl_is_alias(char *param)
++{
++ return false;
++}
+ #endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
+
+ int sysctl_max_threads(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void *buffer,
+--- a/init/main.c
++++ b/init/main.c
+@@ -530,6 +530,10 @@ static int __init unknown_bootoption(cha
+ {
+ size_t len = strlen(param);
+
++ /* Handle params aliased to sysctls */
++ if (sysctl_is_alias(param))
++ return 0;
++
+ repair_env_string(param, val);
+
+ /* Handle obsolete-style parameters */
--- /dev/null
+From 8b39d20eceeda6c4eb23df1497f9ed2fffdc8f69 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
+Date: Thu, 26 Oct 2023 12:41:14 -0400
+Subject: sched: psi: fix unprivileged polling against cgroups
+
+From: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
+
+commit 8b39d20eceeda6c4eb23df1497f9ed2fffdc8f69 upstream.
+
+519fabc7aaba ("psi: remove 500ms min window size limitation for
+triggers") breaks unprivileged psi polling on cgroups.
+
+Historically, we had a privilege check for polling in the open() of a
+pressure file in /proc, but were erroneously missing it for the open()
+of cgroup pressure files.
+
+When unprivileged polling was introduced in d82caa273565 ("sched/psi:
+Allow unprivileged polling of N*2s period"), it needed to filter
+privileges depending on the exact polling parameters, and as such
+moved the CAP_SYS_RESOURCE check from the proc open() callback to
+psi_trigger_create(). Both the proc files as well as cgroup files go
+through this during write(). This implicitly added the missing check
+for privileges required for HT polling for cgroups.
+
+When 519fabc7aaba ("psi: remove 500ms min window size limitation for
+triggers") followed right after to remove further restrictions on the
+RT polling window, it incorrectly assumed the cgroup privilege check
+was still missing and added it to the cgroup open(), mirroring what we
+used to do for proc files in the past.
+
+As a result, unprivileged poll requests that would be supported now
+get rejected when opening the cgroup pressure file for writing.
+
+Remove the cgroup open() check. psi_trigger_create() handles it.
+
+Fixes: 519fabc7aaba ("psi: remove 500ms min window size limitation for triggers")
+Reported-by: Luca Boccassi <bluca@debian.org>
+Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
+Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
+Acked-by: Luca Boccassi <bluca@debian.org>
+Acked-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.5+
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231026164114.2488682-1-hannes@cmpxchg.org
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c | 12 ------------
+ 1 file changed, 12 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c
++++ b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c
+@@ -3867,14 +3867,6 @@ static __poll_t cgroup_pressure_poll(str
+ return psi_trigger_poll(&ctx->psi.trigger, of->file, pt);
+ }
+
+-static int cgroup_pressure_open(struct kernfs_open_file *of)
+-{
+- if (of->file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE && !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
+- return -EPERM;
+-
+- return 0;
+-}
+-
+ static void cgroup_pressure_release(struct kernfs_open_file *of)
+ {
+ struct cgroup_file_ctx *ctx = of->priv;
+@@ -5275,7 +5267,6 @@ static struct cftype cgroup_psi_files[]
+ {
+ .name = "io.pressure",
+ .file_offset = offsetof(struct cgroup, psi_files[PSI_IO]),
+- .open = cgroup_pressure_open,
+ .seq_show = cgroup_io_pressure_show,
+ .write = cgroup_io_pressure_write,
+ .poll = cgroup_pressure_poll,
+@@ -5284,7 +5275,6 @@ static struct cftype cgroup_psi_files[]
+ {
+ .name = "memory.pressure",
+ .file_offset = offsetof(struct cgroup, psi_files[PSI_MEM]),
+- .open = cgroup_pressure_open,
+ .seq_show = cgroup_memory_pressure_show,
+ .write = cgroup_memory_pressure_write,
+ .poll = cgroup_pressure_poll,
+@@ -5293,7 +5283,6 @@ static struct cftype cgroup_psi_files[]
+ {
+ .name = "cpu.pressure",
+ .file_offset = offsetof(struct cgroup, psi_files[PSI_CPU]),
+- .open = cgroup_pressure_open,
+ .seq_show = cgroup_cpu_pressure_show,
+ .write = cgroup_cpu_pressure_write,
+ .poll = cgroup_pressure_poll,
+@@ -5303,7 +5292,6 @@ static struct cftype cgroup_psi_files[]
+ {
+ .name = "irq.pressure",
+ .file_offset = offsetof(struct cgroup, psi_files[PSI_IRQ]),
+- .open = cgroup_pressure_open,
+ .seq_show = cgroup_irq_pressure_show,
+ .write = cgroup_irq_pressure_write,
+ .poll = cgroup_pressure_poll,
kvm-x86-clear-bit12-of-icr-after-apic-write-vm-exit.patch
kvm-x86-fix-lapic-timer-interrupt-lost-after-loading-a-snapshot.patch
mmc-sdhci-pci-gli-gl9755-mask-the-replay-timer-timeout-of-aer.patch
+sched-psi-fix-unprivileged-polling-against-cgroups.patch
+audit-don-t-take-task_lock-in-audit_exe_compare-code-path.patch
+audit-don-t-warn_on_once-current-mm-in-audit_exe_compare.patch
+proc-sysctl-prevent-aliased-sysctls-from-getting-passed-to-init.patch
+tty-sysrq-replace-smp_processor_id-with-get_cpu.patch
+tty-serial-meson-fix-hard-lockup-on-crtscts-mode.patch
+acpi-processor-sanitize-_osc-_pdc-capabilities-for-xen-dom0.patch
+hvc-xen-fix-console-unplug.patch
+hvc-xen-fix-error-path-in-xen_hvc_init-to-always-register-frontend-driver.patch
+hvc-xen-fix-event-channel-handling-for-secondary-consoles.patch
+pci-sysfs-protect-driver-s-d3cold-preference-from-user-space.patch
+mm-damon-sysfs-remove-requested-targets-when-online-commit-inputs.patch
+mm-damon-sysfs-update-monitoring-target-regions-for-online-input-commit.patch
--- /dev/null
+From 2a1d728f20edeee7f26dc307ed9df4e0d23947ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Pavel Krasavin <pkrasavin@imaqliq.com>
+Date: Sat, 14 Oct 2023 11:39:26 +0000
+Subject: tty: serial: meson: fix hard LOCKUP on crtscts mode
+
+From: Pavel Krasavin <pkrasavin@imaqliq.com>
+
+commit 2a1d728f20edeee7f26dc307ed9df4e0d23947ab upstream.
+
+There might be hard lockup if we set crtscts mode on port without RTS/CTS configured:
+
+# stty -F /dev/ttyAML6 crtscts; echo 1 > /dev/ttyAML6; echo 2 > /dev/ttyAML6
+[ 95.890386] rcu: INFO: rcu_preempt detected stalls on CPUs/tasks:
+[ 95.890857] rcu: 3-...0: (201 ticks this GP) idle=e33c/1/0x4000000000000000 softirq=5844/5846 fqs=4984
+[ 95.900212] rcu: (detected by 2, t=21016 jiffies, g=7753, q=296 ncpus=4)
+[ 95.906972] Task dump for CPU 3:
+[ 95.910178] task:bash state:R running task stack:0 pid:205 ppid:1 flags:0x00000202
+[ 95.920059] Call trace:
+[ 95.922485] __switch_to+0xe4/0x168
+[ 95.925951] 0xffffff8003477508
+[ 95.974379] watchdog: Watchdog detected hard LOCKUP on cpu 3
+[ 95.974424] Modules linked in: 88x2cs(O) rtc_meson_vrtc
+
+Possible solution would be to not allow to setup crtscts on such port.
+
+Tested on S905X3 based board.
+
+Fixes: ff7693d079e5 ("ARM: meson: serial: add MesonX SoC on-chip uart driver")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Pavel Krasavin <pkrasavin@imaqliq.com>
+Reviewed-by: Neil Armstrong <neil.armstrong@linaro.org>
+Reviewed-by: Dmitry Rokosov <ddrokosov@salutedevices.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/tty/serial/meson_uart.c | 14 +++++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/tty/serial/meson_uart.c
++++ b/drivers/tty/serial/meson_uart.c
+@@ -380,10 +380,14 @@ static void meson_uart_set_termios(struc
+ else
+ val |= AML_UART_STOP_BIT_1SB;
+
+- if (cflags & CRTSCTS)
+- val &= ~AML_UART_TWO_WIRE_EN;
+- else
++ if (cflags & CRTSCTS) {
++ if (port->flags & UPF_HARD_FLOW)
++ val &= ~AML_UART_TWO_WIRE_EN;
++ else
++ termios->c_cflag &= ~CRTSCTS;
++ } else {
+ val |= AML_UART_TWO_WIRE_EN;
++ }
+
+ writel(val, port->membase + AML_UART_CONTROL);
+
+@@ -705,6 +709,7 @@ static int meson_uart_probe(struct platf
+ u32 fifosize = 64; /* Default is 64, 128 for EE UART_0 */
+ int ret = 0;
+ int irq;
++ bool has_rtscts;
+
+ if (pdev->dev.of_node)
+ pdev->id = of_alias_get_id(pdev->dev.of_node, "serial");
+@@ -732,6 +737,7 @@ static int meson_uart_probe(struct platf
+ return irq;
+
+ of_property_read_u32(pdev->dev.of_node, "fifo-size", &fifosize);
++ has_rtscts = of_property_read_bool(pdev->dev.of_node, "uart-has-rtscts");
+
+ if (meson_ports[pdev->id]) {
+ return dev_err_probe(&pdev->dev, -EBUSY,
+@@ -762,6 +768,8 @@ static int meson_uart_probe(struct platf
+ port->mapsize = resource_size(res_mem);
+ port->irq = irq;
+ port->flags = UPF_BOOT_AUTOCONF | UPF_LOW_LATENCY;
++ if (has_rtscts)
++ port->flags |= UPF_HARD_FLOW;
+ port->has_sysrq = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SERIAL_MESON_CONSOLE);
+ port->dev = &pdev->dev;
+ port->line = pdev->id;
--- /dev/null
+From dd976a97d15b47656991e185a94ef42a0fa5cfd4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Muhammad Usama Anjum <usama.anjum@collabora.com>
+Date: Mon, 9 Oct 2023 21:20:20 +0500
+Subject: tty/sysrq: replace smp_processor_id() with get_cpu()
+
+From: Muhammad Usama Anjum <usama.anjum@collabora.com>
+
+commit dd976a97d15b47656991e185a94ef42a0fa5cfd4 upstream.
+
+The smp_processor_id() shouldn't be called from preemptible code.
+Instead use get_cpu() and put_cpu() which disables preemption in
+addition to getting the processor id. Enable preemption back after
+calling schedule_work() to make sure that the work gets scheduled on all
+cores other than the current core. We want to avoid a scenario where
+current core's stack trace is printed multiple times and one core's
+stack trace isn't printed because of scheduling of current task.
+
+This fixes the following bug:
+
+[ 119.143590] sysrq: Show backtrace of all active CPUs
+[ 119.143902] BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible [00000000] code: bash/873
+[ 119.144586] caller is debug_smp_processor_id+0x20/0x30
+[ 119.144827] CPU: 6 PID: 873 Comm: bash Not tainted 5.10.124-dirty #3
+[ 119.144861] Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS 2023.05-1 07/22/2023
+[ 119.145053] Call trace:
+[ 119.145093] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1a0
+[ 119.145122] show_stack+0x18/0x70
+[ 119.145141] dump_stack+0xc4/0x11c
+[ 119.145159] check_preemption_disabled+0x100/0x110
+[ 119.145175] debug_smp_processor_id+0x20/0x30
+[ 119.145195] sysrq_handle_showallcpus+0x20/0xc0
+[ 119.145211] __handle_sysrq+0x8c/0x1a0
+[ 119.145227] write_sysrq_trigger+0x94/0x12c
+[ 119.145247] proc_reg_write+0xa8/0xe4
+[ 119.145266] vfs_write+0xec/0x280
+[ 119.145282] ksys_write+0x6c/0x100
+[ 119.145298] __arm64_sys_write+0x20/0x30
+[ 119.145315] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x78/0x1e4
+[ 119.145332] do_el0_svc+0x24/0x8c
+[ 119.145348] el0_svc+0x10/0x20
+[ 119.145364] el0_sync_handler+0x134/0x140
+[ 119.145381] el0_sync+0x180/0x1c0
+
+Cc: jirislaby@kernel.org
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Fixes: 47cab6a722d4 ("debug lockups: Improve lockup detection, fix generic arch fallback")
+Signed-off-by: Muhammad Usama Anjum <usama.anjum@collabora.com>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231009162021.3607632-1-usama.anjum@collabora.com
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/tty/sysrq.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/tty/sysrq.c
++++ b/drivers/tty/sysrq.c
+@@ -262,13 +262,14 @@ static void sysrq_handle_showallcpus(u8
+ if (in_hardirq())
+ regs = get_irq_regs();
+
+- pr_info("CPU%d:\n", smp_processor_id());
++ pr_info("CPU%d:\n", get_cpu());
+ if (regs)
+ show_regs(regs);
+ else
+ show_stack(NULL, NULL, KERN_INFO);
+
+ schedule_work(&sysrq_showallcpus);
++ put_cpu();
+ }
+ }
+
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable-queue.git / commitdiff
