x86/bugs: Remove uses of cpu_mitigations_off()

cpu_mitigations_off() is no longer needed because all bugs use attack
vector controls to select a mitigation, and cpu_mitigations_off() is
equivalent to no attack vectors being selected.

Remove the few remaining unnecessary uses of this function in this file.

Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 570de55485df53da882945f263340cafaac46db7..f28a7383b88bdbc54dd05f89149b0b12e287d154 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -687,8 +687,7 @@ static const char * const mmio_strings[] = {
 
 static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void)
 {
-       if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA) ||
-            cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+       if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA)) {
                mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF;
                return;
        }
@@ -3125,14 +3124,15 @@ ibpb_on_vmexit:
 
 static void __init srso_update_mitigation(void)
 {
+       if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRSO))
+               return;
+
        /* If retbleed is using IBPB, that works for SRSO as well */
        if (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB &&
            boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE))
                srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB;
 
-       if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRSO) &&
-           !cpu_mitigations_off())
-               pr_info("%s\n", srso_strings[srso_mitigation]);
+       pr_info("%s\n", srso_strings[srso_mitigation]);
 }
 
 static void __init srso_apply_mitigation(void)