* cache sd_event_now() result from before the first iteration...
-* remove Capabilities=, after all AmbientCapabilities= and CapabilityBoundingSet= should be enough.
-
* support for the new copy_file_range() syscall
* add systemctl stop --job-mode=triggering that follows TRIGGERED_BY deps and adds them to the same transaction
For processes that are not part of a session, returns -ENXIO.
</para>
- <para><function>sd_bus_creds_has_effective_cap()</function> will
- check whether the capability specified by
- <parameter>capability</parameter> was set in the effective
- capabilities mask. A positive return value means that is was
- set, zero means that it was not set, and a negative return
- value indicates an error. See
- <citerefentry project='man-pages'><refentrytitle>capabilities</refentrytitle><manvolnum>7</manvolnum></citerefentry>
- and <varname>Capabilities=</varname> and
- <varname>CapabilityBoundingSet=</varname> settings in
+ <para><function>sd_bus_creds_has_effective_cap()</function> will check whether the capability specified by
+ <parameter>capability</parameter> was set in the effective capabilities mask. A positive return value means that it
+ was set, zero means that it was not set, and a negative return value indicates an error. See <citerefentry
+ project='man-pages'><refentrytitle>capabilities</refentrytitle><manvolnum>7</manvolnum></citerefentry> and the
+ <varname>AmbientCapabilities=</varname> and <varname>CapabilityBoundingSet=</varname> settings in
<citerefentry><refentrytitle>systemd.exec</refentrytitle><manvolnum>5</manvolnum></citerefentry>.
</para>
<varlistentry>
<term><varname>CapabilityBoundingSet=</varname></term>
- <listitem><para>Controls which capabilities to include in the
- capability bounding set for the executed process. See
- <citerefentry project='man-pages'><refentrytitle>capabilities</refentrytitle><manvolnum>7</manvolnum></citerefentry>
- for details. Takes a whitespace-separated list of capability
- names as read by
- <citerefentry project='mankier'><refentrytitle>cap_from_name</refentrytitle><manvolnum>3</manvolnum></citerefentry>,
- e.g. <constant>CAP_SYS_ADMIN</constant>,
- <constant>CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE</constant>,
- <constant>CAP_SYS_PTRACE</constant>. Capabilities listed will
- be included in the bounding set, all others are removed. If
- the list of capabilities is prefixed with
- <literal>~</literal>, all but the listed capabilities will be
- included, the effect of the assignment inverted. Note that
- this option also affects the respective capabilities in the
- effective, permitted and inheritable capability sets, on top
- of what <varname>Capabilities=</varname> does. If this option
- is not used, the capability bounding set is not modified on
- process execution, hence no limits on the capabilities of the
- process are enforced. This option may appear more than once, in
- which case the bounding sets are merged. If the empty string
- is assigned to this option, the bounding set is reset to the
- empty capability set, and all prior settings have no effect.
- If set to <literal>~</literal> (without any further argument),
- the bounding set is reset to the full set of available
- capabilities, also undoing any previous
- settings.</para></listitem>
+ <listitem><para>Controls which capabilities to include in the capability bounding set for the executed
+ process. See <citerefentry
+ project='man-pages'><refentrytitle>capabilities</refentrytitle><manvolnum>7</manvolnum></citerefentry> for
+ details. Takes a whitespace-separated list of capability names as read by <citerefentry
+ project='mankier'><refentrytitle>cap_from_name</refentrytitle><manvolnum>3</manvolnum></citerefentry>,
+ e.g. <constant>CAP_SYS_ADMIN</constant>, <constant>CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE</constant>,
+ <constant>CAP_SYS_PTRACE</constant>. Capabilities listed will be included in the bounding set, all others are
+ removed. If the list of capabilities is prefixed with <literal>~</literal>, all but the listed capabilities
+ will be included, the effect of the assignment inverted. Note that this option also affects the respective
+ capabilities in the effective, permitted and inheritable capability sets. If this option is not used, the
+ capability bounding set is not modified on process execution, hence no limits on the capabilities of the
+ process are enforced. This option may appear more than once, in which case the bounding sets are merged. If the
+ empty string is assigned to this option, the bounding set is reset to the empty capability set, and all prior
+ settings have no effect. If set to <literal>~</literal> (without any further argument), the bounding set is
+ reset to the full set of available capabilities, also undoing any previous settings.</para></listitem>
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
for details.</para></listitem>
</varlistentry>
- <varlistentry>
- <term><varname>Capabilities=</varname></term>
- <listitem><para>Controls the
- <citerefentry project='man-pages'><refentrytitle>capabilities</refentrytitle><manvolnum>7</manvolnum></citerefentry>
- set for the executed process. Take a capability string
- describing the effective, permitted and inherited capability
- sets as documented in
- <citerefentry project='mankier'><refentrytitle>cap_from_text</refentrytitle><manvolnum>3</manvolnum></citerefentry>.
- Note that these capability sets are usually influenced (and
- filtered) by the capabilities attached to the executed file.
- Due to that <varname>CapabilityBoundingSet=</varname> is
- probably a much more useful setting.</para></listitem>
- </varlistentry>
-
<varlistentry>
<term><varname>ReadWriteDirectories=</varname></term>
<term><varname>ReadOnlyDirectories=</varname></term>
return sd_bus_message_append(reply, "t", c->capability_ambient_set);
}
-static int property_get_capabilities(
+static int property_get_empty_string(
sd_bus *bus,
const char *path,
const char *interface,
void *userdata,
sd_bus_error *error) {
- ExecContext *c = userdata;
- _cleanup_cap_free_charp_ char *t = NULL;
- const char *s;
-
assert(bus);
assert(reply);
- assert(c);
-
- if (c->capabilities)
- s = t = cap_to_text(c->capabilities, NULL);
- else
- s = "";
-
- if (!s)
- return -ENOMEM;
- return sd_bus_message_append(reply, "s", s);
+ return sd_bus_message_append(reply, "s", "");
}
static int property_get_syscall_filter(
SD_BUS_PROPERTY("SyslogLevelPrefix", "b", bus_property_get_bool, offsetof(ExecContext, syslog_level_prefix), SD_BUS_VTABLE_PROPERTY_CONST),
SD_BUS_PROPERTY("SyslogLevel", "i", property_get_syslog_level, 0, SD_BUS_VTABLE_PROPERTY_CONST),
SD_BUS_PROPERTY("SyslogFacility", "i", property_get_syslog_facility, 0, SD_BUS_VTABLE_PROPERTY_CONST),
- SD_BUS_PROPERTY("Capabilities", "s", property_get_capabilities, 0, SD_BUS_VTABLE_PROPERTY_CONST),
+ SD_BUS_PROPERTY("Capabilities", "s", property_get_empty_string, 0, SD_BUS_VTABLE_PROPERTY_CONST|SD_BUS_VTABLE_HIDDEN),
SD_BUS_PROPERTY("SecureBits", "i", bus_property_get_int, offsetof(ExecContext, secure_bits), SD_BUS_VTABLE_PROPERTY_CONST),
SD_BUS_PROPERTY("CapabilityBoundingSet", "t", property_get_capability_bounding_set, 0, SD_BUS_VTABLE_PROPERTY_CONST),
SD_BUS_PROPERTY("AmbientCapabilities", "t", property_get_ambient_capabilities, 0, SD_BUS_VTABLE_PROPERTY_CONST),
static int enforce_user(const ExecContext *context, uid_t uid) {
assert(context);
- /* Sets (but doesn't lookup) the uid and make sure we keep the
+ /* Sets (but doesn't look up) the uid and make sure we keep the
* capabilities while doing so. */
- if (context->capabilities || context->capability_ambient_set != 0) {
+ if (context->capability_ambient_set != 0) {
/* First step: If we need to keep capabilities but
* drop privileges we need to make sure we keep our
if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, sb) < 0)
return -errno;
}
-
- /* Second step: set the capabilities. This will reduce
- * the capabilities to the minimum we need. */
-
- if (context->capabilities) {
- _cleanup_cap_free_ cap_t d = NULL;
- static const cap_value_t bits[] = {
- CAP_SETUID, /* Necessary so that we can run setresuid() below */
- CAP_SETPCAP /* Necessary so that we can set PR_SET_SECUREBITS later on */
- };
-
- d = cap_dup(context->capabilities);
- if (!d)
- return -errno;
-
- if (cap_set_flag(d, CAP_EFFECTIVE, ELEMENTSOF(bits), bits, CAP_SET) < 0 ||
- cap_set_flag(d, CAP_PERMITTED, ELEMENTSOF(bits), bits, CAP_SET) < 0)
- return -errno;
-
- if (cap_set_proc(d) < 0)
- return -errno;
- }
}
- /* Third step: actually set the uids */
+ /* Second step: actually set the uids */
if (setresuid(uid, uid, uid) < 0)
return -errno;
*exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES;
return r;
}
-
- if (context->capabilities) {
-
- /* The capabilities in ambient set need to be also in the inherited
- * set. If they aren't, trying to get them will fail. Add the ambient
- * set inherited capabilities to the capability set in the context.
- * This is needed because if capabilities are set (using "Capabilities="
- * keyword), they will override whatever we set now. */
-
- r = capability_update_inherited_set(context->capabilities, context->capability_ambient_set);
- if (r < 0) {
- *exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES;
- return r;
- }
- }
}
if (context->user) {
return -errno;
}
- if (context->capabilities)
- if (cap_set_proc(context->capabilities) < 0) {
- *exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES;
- return -errno;
- }
-
if (context->no_new_privileges)
if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) < 0) {
*exit_status = EXIT_NO_NEW_PRIVILEGES;
c->pam_name = mfree(c->pam_name);
- if (c->capabilities) {
- cap_free(c->capabilities);
- c->capabilities = NULL;
- }
-
c->read_only_dirs = strv_free(c->read_only_dirs);
c->read_write_dirs = strv_free(c->read_write_dirs);
c->inaccessible_dirs = strv_free(c->inaccessible_dirs);
prefix, strna(lvl_str));
}
- if (c->capabilities) {
- _cleanup_cap_free_charp_ char *t;
-
- t = cap_to_text(c->capabilities, NULL);
- if (t)
- fprintf(f, "%sCapabilities: %s\n", prefix, t);
- }
-
if (c->secure_bits)
fprintf(f, "%sSecure Bits:%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
prefix,
unsigned long mount_flags;
uint64_t capability_bounding_set;
-
uint64_t capability_ambient_set;
-
- cap_t capabilities;
int secure_bits;
int syslog_priority;
$1.SyslogFacility, config_parse_log_facility, 0, offsetof($1, exec_context.syslog_priority)
$1.SyslogLevel, config_parse_log_level, 0, offsetof($1, exec_context.syslog_priority)
$1.SyslogLevelPrefix, config_parse_bool, 0, offsetof($1, exec_context.syslog_level_prefix)
-$1.Capabilities, config_parse_exec_capabilities, 0, offsetof($1, exec_context)
+$1.Capabilities, config_parse_warn_compat, DISABLED_LEGACY, offsetof($1, exec_context)
$1.SecureBits, config_parse_exec_secure_bits, 0, offsetof($1, exec_context)
$1.CapabilityBoundingSet, config_parse_capability_set, 0, offsetof($1, exec_context.capability_bounding_set)
$1.AmbientCapabilities, config_parse_capability_set, 0, offsetof($1, exec_context.capability_ambient_set)
return 0;
}
-int config_parse_exec_capabilities(const char *unit,
- const char *filename,
- unsigned line,
- const char *section,
- unsigned section_line,
- const char *lvalue,
- int ltype,
- const char *rvalue,
- void *data,
- void *userdata) {
-
- ExecContext *c = data;
- cap_t cap;
-
- assert(filename);
- assert(lvalue);
- assert(rvalue);
- assert(data);
-
- cap = cap_from_text(rvalue);
- if (!cap) {
- log_syntax(unit, LOG_ERR, filename, line, errno, "Failed to parse capabilities, ignoring: %s", rvalue);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (c->capabilities)
- cap_free(c->capabilities);
- c->capabilities = cap;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
int config_parse_exec_secure_bits(const char *unit,
const char *filename,
unsigned line,
{ config_parse_input, "INPUT" },
{ config_parse_log_facility, "FACILITY" },
{ config_parse_log_level, "LEVEL" },
- { config_parse_exec_capabilities, "CAPABILITIES" },
{ config_parse_exec_secure_bits, "SECUREBITS" },
{ config_parse_capability_set, "BOUNDINGSET" },
{ config_parse_limit, "LIMIT" },
int config_parse_exec_cpu_sched_policy(const char *unit, const char *filename, unsigned line, const char *section, unsigned section_line, const char *lvalue, int ltype, const char *rvalue, void *data, void *userdata);
int config_parse_exec_cpu_sched_prio(const char *unit, const char *filename, unsigned line, const char *section, unsigned section_line, const char *lvalue, int ltype, const char *rvalue, void *data, void *userdata);
int config_parse_exec_cpu_affinity(const char *unit, const char *filename, unsigned line, const char *section, unsigned section_line, const char *lvalue, int ltype, const char *rvalue, void *data, void *userdata);
-int config_parse_exec_capabilities(const char *unit, const char *filename, unsigned line, const char *section, unsigned section_line, const char *lvalue, int ltype, const char *rvalue, void *data, void *userdata);
int config_parse_exec_secure_bits(const char *unit, const char *filename, unsigned line, const char *section, unsigned section_line, const char *lvalue, int ltype, const char *rvalue, void *data, void *userdata);
int config_parse_capability_set(const char *unit, const char *filename, unsigned line, const char *section, unsigned section_line, const char *lvalue, int ltype, const char *rvalue, void *data, void *userdata);
int config_parse_limit(const char *unit, const char *filename, unsigned line, const char *section, unsigned section_line, const char *lvalue, int ltype, const char *rvalue, void *data, void *userdata);
projects / thirdparty / systemd.git / commitdiff
