iommufd_hwpt_invalidate() takes a user-controlled entry_num and entry_len,
each bounded only by U32_MAX. An entry_len beyond the kernel's struct size
makes the copy helper verify the extra bytes are zero, scanning that excess
in one uninterruptible pass; a multi-gigabyte value over zeroed user memory
trips the soft-lockup watchdog.
A large entry_num is the other half, driving the backend invalidation loop
with no reschedule. The VT-d nested handler, for one, copies each entry and
flushes caches per iteration, pinning the CPU on a non-preemptible kernel.
Cap both in the ioctl. entry_len is held under PAGE_SIZE, above any request
struct, and entry_num under 1 << 19, the order of a hardware invalidation
queue and well beyond any real batch, bounding the per-call loop length.
Fixes: 8c6eabae3807 ("iommufd: Add IOMMU_HWPT_INVALIDATE")
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/447fa93663f7526eb361719e83fa8b649464483d.1780521606.git.nicolinc@nvidia.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8
Signed-off-by: Nicolin Chen <nicolinc@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
return rc;
}
+/* An arbitrary entry_num cap, far above any realistic invalidation batch */
+#define IOMMU_HWPT_INVALIDATE_ENTRY_NUM_MAX (1U << 19)
+
int iommufd_hwpt_invalidate(struct iommufd_ucmd *ucmd)
{
struct iommu_hwpt_invalidate *cmd = ucmd->cmd;
goto out;
}
- if (cmd->entry_num && (!cmd->data_uptr || !cmd->entry_len)) {
+ /*
+ * Bound entry_num and entry_len so a single call cannot pin the CPU;
+ * entry_len also caps the copy_struct_from_user() trailing-zero scan.
+ */
+ if (cmd->entry_num &&
+ (!cmd->data_uptr || !cmd->entry_len || cmd->entry_len > PAGE_SIZE ||
+ cmd->entry_num > IOMMU_HWPT_INVALIDATE_ENTRY_NUM_MAX)) {
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}