Features:
+* lock down acceptable encrypted credentials at boot, via simple allowlist,
+ maybe on kernel command line:
+ systemd.import_encrypted_creds=foobar.waldo,tmpfiles.extra to protect locked
+ down kernels from credentials generated on the host with a weak kernel
+
+* tmpfiles: currently if we fail to create an inode, we stat it first, and only
+ then O_PATH open it. Reverse that.
+
* during the initrd → host transition measure a fixed value into TPM PCR 11
(where we already measure the UKI into), so that unlock policies for disk
enryption/credential encryption can be put together that only work in the
initrd or only on the host (or both).
-* Add support for extra verity configuration options to systemd-reart (FEC, hash type, etc)
+* Add support for extra verity configuration options to systemd-repart (FEC,
+ hash type, etc)
* chase_symlinks(): take inspiraton from path_extract_filename() and return
O_DIRECTORY if input path contains trailing slash.
-* chase_symlinks(): refuse resolution if trailing slash is specified on input, but final node is not a directory
+* chase_symlinks(): refuse resolution if trailing slash is specified on input,
+ but final node is not a directory
* chase_symlinks(): add new flag that simply refuses all symlink use in a path,
then use that for accessing XBOOTLDR/ESP
images, to configure this. Also, add a kernel cmdline option for this, to be
honoured by the gpt auto generator.
+ Alternative idea: add "systemd.gpt_auto_policy=rhvs" to allow gpt-auto to
+ only mount root dir, /home/ dir, /var/ and /srv/, but nothing else. And then
+ minor extension to this, insisting on encryption, for example
+ "systemd.gpt_auto_policy=r+v+h" to requre encryption for root and var but not
+ for /home/, and similar. Similar add --image-dissect-policy= to tools that
+ take --image= that take the same short string.
+
* nspawn: maybe optionally insert .nspawn file as GPT partition into images, so
that such container images are entirely stand-alone and can be updated as
one.