/* ======
* IPv4 helpers
- * XXXX024 IPv6 deprecate some of these.
+ * XXXX IPv6 deprecate some of these.
*/
/** Given an address of the form "ip:port", try to divide it into its
/* This is required on rh7 to make strptime not complain.
* We also need it to make memmem get defined (where available)
*/
-/* XXXX024 We should just use AC_USE_SYSTEM_EXTENSIONS in our autoconf,
+
+/* XXXX We should just use AC_USE_SYSTEM_EXTENSIONS in our autoconf,
* and get this (and other important stuff!) automatically. Once we do that,
* make sure to also change the extern char **environ detection in
* configure.ac, because whether that is declared or not depends on whether
* periodically check whether the process we have a handle to has
* ended. */
HANDLE hproc;
- /* XXX023 We can and should have Libevent watch hproc for us,
- * if/when some version of Libevent 2.x can be told to do so. */
+ /* XXXX We should have Libevent watch hproc for us,
+ * if/when some version of Libevent can be told to do so. */
#endif
- /* XXX023 On Linux, we can and should receive the 22nd
+ /* XXXX On Linux, we can and should receive the 22nd
* (space-delimited) field (‘starttime’) of /proc/$PID/stat from the
* owning controller and store it, and poll once in a while to see
* whether it has changed -- if so, the kernel has *definitely*
* systems whose admins have mounted procfs, or the start-time field
* of the process-information structure returned by kvmgetprocs() on
* any system. The latter is ickier. */
- /* XXX023 On FreeBSD (and possibly other kqueue systems), we can and
+
+ /* XXXX On FreeBSD (and possibly other kqueue systems), we can and
* should arrange to receive EVFILT_PROC NOTE_EXIT notifications for
* pid, so we don't have to do such a heavyweight poll operation in
* order to avoid the PID-reassignment race condition. (We would
} else {
/* retransmit it */
/* Stop waiting for the timeout. No need to do this in
- * request_finished; that one already deletes the timeout event.
- * XXXX023 port this change to libevent. */
+ * request_finished; that one already deletes the timeout event. */
del_timeout_event(req);
evdns_request_transmit(req);
}
* (because of EOF), set *<b>reached_eof</b> to 1 and return 0. Return -1 on
* error; else return the number of bytes read.
*/
-/* XXXX024 indicate "read blocked" somehow? */
+/* XXXX indicate "read blocked" somehow? */
int
read_to_buf(tor_socket_t s, size_t at_most, buf_t *buf, int *reached_eof,
int *socket_error)
{
- /* XXXX024 It's stupid to overload the return values for these functions:
+ /* XXXX It's stupid to overload the return values for these functions:
* "error status" and "number of bytes read" are not mutually exclusive.
*/
int r = 0;
int
flush_buf(tor_socket_t s, buf_t *buf, size_t sz, size_t *buf_flushlen)
{
- /* XXXX024 It's stupid to overload the return values for these functions:
+ /* XXXX It's stupid to overload the return values for these functions:
* "error status" and "number of bytes flushed" are not mutually exclusive.
*/
int r;
DFLT_PATH_BIAS_NOTICE_PCT, 0, 100)/100.0;
}
-/* XXXX024 I'd like to have this be static again, but entrynodes.c needs it. */
/** The circuit success rate below which we issue a warn */
static double
pathbias_get_warn_rate(const or_options_t *options)
DFLT_PATH_BIAS_WARN_PCT, 0, 100)/100.0;
}
-/* XXXX024 I'd like to have this be static again, but entrynodes.c needs it. */
+/* XXXX I'd like to have this be static again, but entrynodes.c needs it. */
/**
* The extreme rate is the rate at which we would drop the guard,
* if pb_dropguard is also set. Otherwise we just warn.
DFLT_PATH_BIAS_EXTREME_PCT, 0, 100)/100.0;
}
-/* XXXX024 I'd like to have this be static again, but entrynodes.c needs it. */
+/* XXXX I'd like to have this be static again, but entrynodes.c needs it. */
/**
* If 1, we actually disable use of guards that fall below
* the extreme_pct.
uint16_t *handshake_type_out,
const extend_info_t *ei)
{
+ /* XXXX029 Remove support for deciding to use TAP. */
if (!tor_mem_is_zero((const char*)ei->curve25519_onion_key.public_key,
CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN) &&
circuits_can_use_ntor()) {
{
uint8_t t;
circuit_pick_create_handshake(&t, handshake_type_out, ei);
- /* XXXX024 The check for whether the node has a curve25519 key is a bad
- * proxy for whether it can do extend2 cells; once a version that
- * handles extend2 cells is out, remove it. */
+
+ /* XXXX029 Remove support for deciding to use TAP. */
if (node_prev &&
*handshake_type_out != ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP &&
(node_has_curve25519_onion_key(node_prev) ||
* If <b>state</b> is NULL, we're choosing a router to serve as an entry
* guard, not for any particular circuit.
*/
-/* XXXX024 I'd like to have this be static again, but entrynodes.c needs it. */
const node_t *
choose_good_entry_server(uint8_t purpose, cpath_build_state_t *state)
{
* This is an incomplete fix, but is no worse than the previous behaviour,
* and only applies to minimal, testing tor networks
* (so it's no less secure) */
- /*XXXX025 use the using_as_guard flag to accomplish this.*/
+ /*XXXX++ use the using_as_guard flag to accomplish this.*/
if (options->UseEntryGuards
&& (!options->TestingTorNetwork ||
smartlist_len(nodelist_get_list()) > smartlist_len(get_entry_guards())
timercmp(&a->timestamp_began, &b->timestamp_began, OP_GT))
return 1;
if (ob->build_state->is_internal)
- /* XXX023 what the heck is this internal thing doing here. I
+ /* XXXX++ what the heck is this internal thing doing here. I
* think we can get rid of it. circuit_is_acceptable() already
* makes sure that is_internal is exactly what we need it to
* be. -RD */
break;
}
- /* XXXX023 Maybe this check should get a higher priority to avoid
+ /* XXXX Maybe this check should get a higher priority to avoid
* using up circuits too rapidly. */
a_bits = connection_edge_update_circuit_isolation(conn,
return -1;
}
} else {
- /* XXXX024 Duplicates checks in connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit:
- * refactor into a single function? */
+ /* XXXX Duplicates checks in connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit:
+ * refactor into a single function. */
const node_t *node = node_get_by_nickname(conn->chosen_exit_name, 1);
int opt = conn->chosen_exit_optional;
if (node && !connection_ap_can_use_exit(conn, node)) {
/* find the circuit that we should use, if there is one. */
retval = circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(
conn, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL, &circ);
- if (retval < 1) // XXX023 if we totally fail, this still returns 0 -RD
+ if (retval < 1) // XXXX++ if we totally fail, this still returns 0 -RD
return retval;
log_debug(LD_APP|LD_CIRC,
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
tor_assert(circ);
- /* XXXX025 This is a kludge; we're only keeping it around in case there's
+ /* XXXX This is a kludge; we're only keeping it around in case there's
* something that doesn't check unusable_for_new_conns, and to avoid
* deeper refactoring of our expiration logic. */
if (! circ->base_.timestamp_dirty)
{ "BandwidthRateBytes", "BandwidthRate", 0, 0},
{ "BandwidthBurstBytes", "BandwidthBurst", 0, 0},
{ "DirFetchPostPeriod", "StatusFetchPeriod", 0, 0},
- { "DirServer", "DirAuthority", 0, 0}, /* XXXX024 later, make this warn? */
+ { "DirServer", "DirAuthority", 0, 0}, /* XXXX later, make this warn? */
{ "MaxConn", "ConnLimit", 0, 1},
{ "MaxMemInCellQueues", "MaxMemInQueues", 0, 0},
{ "ORBindAddress", "ORListenAddress", 0, 0},
{ "--list-fingerprint", TAKES_NO_ARGUMENT },
{ "--keygen", TAKES_NO_ARGUMENT },
{ "--newpass", TAKES_NO_ARGUMENT },
-#if 0
-/* XXXX028: This is not working yet in 0.2.7, so disabling with the
- * minimal code modification. */
- { "--master-key", ARGUMENT_NECESSARY },
-#endif
{ "--no-passphrase", TAKES_NO_ARGUMENT },
{ "--passphrase-fd", ARGUMENT_NECESSARY },
{ "--verify-config", TAKES_NO_ARGUMENT },
if (get_options()->EnforceDistinctSubnets == 0)
return 0;
if (tor_addr_family(addr) == AF_INET) {
- /*XXXX023 IP6 what corresponds to an /24? */
uint32_t ip = tor_addr_to_ipv4h(addr);
/* It's possible that this next check will hit before the first time
/** As addressmap_register(), but detect the wildcarded status of "from" and
* "to", and do not steal a reference to <b>to</b>. */
-/* XXXX024 move to connection_edge.c */
+/* XXXX move to connection_edge.c */
int
addressmap_register_auto(const char *from, const char *to,
time_t expires,
config_maybe_load_geoip_files_(const or_options_t *options,
const or_options_t *old_options)
{
- /* XXXX024 Reload GeoIPFile on SIGHUP. -NM */
+ /* XXXX Reload GeoIPFile on SIGHUP. -NM */
if (options->GeoIPFile &&
((!old_options || !opt_streq(old_options->GeoIPFile,
config_line_t **cmdline_result);
void config_register_addressmaps(const or_options_t *options);
-/* XXXX024 move to connection_edge.h */
+/* XXXX move to connection_edge.h */
int addressmap_register_auto(const char *from, const char *to,
time_t expires,
addressmap_entry_source_t addrmap_source,
/** The last addresses that our network interface seemed to have been
* binding to. We use this as one way to detect when our IP changes.
*
- * XXX024 We should really use the entire list of interfaces here.
+ * XXXX+ We should really use the entire list of interfaces here.
**/
static tor_addr_t *last_interface_ipv4 = NULL;
/* DOCDOC last_interface_ipv6 */
record_num_bytes_transferred(connection_t *conn,
time_t now, size_t num_read, size_t num_written)
{
- /* XXX024 check if this is necessary */
+ /* XXXX check if this is necessary */
if (num_written >= INT_MAX || num_read >= INT_MAX) {
log_err(LD_BUG, "Value out of range. num_read=%lu, num_written=%lu, "
"connection type=%s, state=%s",
connection_consider_empty_read_buckets(conn);
if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP) {
edge_connection_t *edge_conn = TO_EDGE_CONN(conn);
- /*XXXX024 check for overflow*/
+ /*XXXX++ check for overflow*/
edge_conn->n_read += (int)info->n_added;
}
}
connection_consider_empty_write_buckets(conn);
if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP) {
edge_connection_t *edge_conn = TO_EDGE_CONN(conn);
- /*XXXX024 check for overflow*/
+ /*XXXX++ check for overflow*/
edge_conn->n_written += (int)info->n_deleted;
}
}
or_conn->bytes_xmitted += result;
or_conn->bytes_xmitted_by_tls += n_written;
/* So we notice bytes were written even on error */
- /* XXXX024 This cast is safe since we can never write INT_MAX bytes in a
+ /* XXXX This cast is safe since we can never write INT_MAX bytes in a
* single set of TLS operations. But it looks kinda ugly. If we refactor
* the *_buf_tls functions, we should make them return ssize_t or size_t
* or something. */
-/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
+ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
* Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
* Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
* Copyright (c) 2007-2016, The Tor Project, Inc. */
/** Tell any AP streams that are waiting for a one-hop tunnel to
* <b>failed_digest</b> that they are going to fail. */
-/* XXX024 We should get rid of this function, and instead attach
+/* XXXX We should get rid of this function, and instead attach
* one-hop streams to circ->p_streams so they get marked in
* circuit_mark_for_close like normal p_streams. */
void
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
return -1;
}
- /* XXXX024-1090 Should we also allow foo.bar.exit if ExitNodes is set and
+ /* XXXX-1090 Should we also allow foo.bar.exit if ExitNodes is set and
Bar is not listed in it? I say yes, but our revised manpage branch
implies no. */
}
edge_conn->stream_id = get_unique_stream_id_by_circ(circ);
if (edge_conn->stream_id==0) {
- /* XXXX024 Instead of closing this stream, we should make it get
+ /* XXXX+ Instead of closing this stream, we should make it get
* retried on another circuit. */
connection_mark_unattached_ap(ap_conn, END_STREAM_REASON_INTERNAL);
edge_conn->stream_id = get_unique_stream_id_by_circ(circ);
if (edge_conn->stream_id==0) {
- /* XXXX024 Instead of closing this stream, we should make it get
+ /* XXXX+ Instead of closing this stream, we should make it get
* retried on another circuit. */
connection_mark_unattached_ap(ap_conn, END_STREAM_REASON_INTERNAL);
* check would otherwise just let data accumulate. It serves no purpose
* in 0.2.3.
*
- * XXX024 Remove this check once we verify that the above paragraph is
+ * XXXX Remove this check once we verify that the above paragraph is
* 100% true. */
if (buf_datalen(conn->base_.inbuf) > MAX_OR_INBUF_WHEN_NONOPEN) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_NET, "Accumulated too much data (%d bytes) "
*answer = tor_strndup(body, ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len);
}
} else if (!strcmpstart(question, "desc/name/")) {
- /* XXX023 Setting 'warn_if_unnamed' here is a bit silly -- the
+ /* XXX Setting 'warn_if_unnamed' here is a bit silly -- the
* warning goes to the user, not to the controller. */
node = node_get_by_nickname(question+strlen("desc/name/"), 1);
if (node)
*answer = tor_strndup(md->body, md->bodylen);
}
} else if (!strcmpstart(question, "md/name/")) {
- /* XXX023 Setting 'warn_if_unnamed' here is a bit silly -- the
+ /* XXX Setting 'warn_if_unnamed' here is a bit silly -- the
* warning goes to the user, not to the controller. */
const node_t *node = node_get_by_nickname(question+strlen("md/name/"), 1);
/* XXXX duplicated code */
* sort of dir fetch we'll be doing, so it won't return a bridge
* that can't answer our question.
*/
- /* XXX024 Not all bridges handle conditional consensus downloading,
- * so, for now, never assume the server supports that. -PP */
+ /* XXX+++++ Not all bridges handle conditional consensus downloading,
+ * so, for now, never assume the server supports that. -PP
+ * Is that assumption still so in 2016? -NM */
const node_t *node = choose_random_dirguard(type);
if (node && node->ri) {
/* every bridge has a routerinfo. */
ds->nickname);
/* XXXX use this information; be sure to upload next one
* sooner. -NM */
- /* XXXX023 On further thought, the task above implies that we're
+ /* XXXX++ On further thought, the task above implies that we're
* basing our regenerate-descriptor time on when we uploaded the
* last descriptor, not on the published time of the last
* descriptor. If those are different, that's a bad thing to
ssize_t estimated_len = 0;
smartlist_t *items = smartlist_new();
smartlist_t *dir_items = smartlist_new();
- int lifetime = 60; /* XXXX023 should actually use vote intervals. */
+ int lifetime = 60; /* XXXX?? should actually use vote intervals. */
url += strlen("/tor/status-vote/");
current = !strcmpstart(url, "current/");
url = strchr(url, '/');
void
dirserv_set_router_is_running(routerinfo_t *router, time_t now)
{
- /*XXXX024 This function is a mess. Separate out the part that calculates
+ /*XXXX This function is a mess. Separate out the part that calculates
whether it's reachable and the part that tells rephist that the router was
unreachable.
*/
{
if (need_uptime) {
if (!enough_mtbf_info) {
- /* XXX024 Once most authorities are on v3, we should change the rule from
+ /* XXXX We should change the rule from
* "use uptime if we don't have mtbf data" to "don't advertise Stable on
* v3 if we don't have enough mtbf data." Or maybe not, since if we ever
* hit a point where we need to reset a lot of authorities at once,
d = strmap_get(cached_consensuses, "ns");
} else if (memchr(fp, '\0', DIGEST_LEN) && cached_consensuses &&
(d = strmap_get(cached_consensuses, fp))) {
- /* this here interface is a nasty hack XXXX024 */;
+ /* this here interface is a nasty hack XXXX */;
}
return d;
}
if (consensus_method >= MIN_METHOD_FOR_P6_LINES &&
ri->ipv6_exit_policy) {
- /* XXXX024 This doesn't match proposal 208, which says these should
+ /* XXXX+++ This doesn't match proposal 208, which says these should
* be taken unchanged from the routerinfo. That's bogosity, IMO:
* the proposal should have said to do this instead.*/
char *p6 = write_short_policy(ri->ipv6_exit_policy);
*
* If <b>mark_relay_status</b>, also call router_set_status() on this
* relay.
- *
- * XXX024 change succeeded and mark_relay_status into 'int flags'.
+ */
+/* XXX We could change succeeded and mark_relay_status into 'int flags'.
+ * Too many boolean arguments is a recipe for confusion.
*/
int
entry_guard_register_connect_status(const char *digest, int succeeded,
}
entry_guards = new_entry_guards;
entry_guards_dirty = 0;
- /* XXX024 hand new_entry_guards to this func, and move it up a
+ /* XXX hand new_entry_guards to this func, and move it up a
* few lines, so we don't have to re-dirty it */
if (remove_obsolete_entry_guards(now))
entry_guards_dirty = 1;
connection_stop_writing(conn);
}
if (connection_is_reading(conn)) {
- /* XXXX024 We should make this code unreachable; if a connection is
+ /* XXXX+ We should make this code unreachable; if a connection is
* marked for close and flushing, there is no point in reading to it
* at all. Further, checking at this point is a bit of a hack: it
* would make much more sense to react in
return 0;
/* Otherwise, we decide that we'll use microdescriptors iff we are
* not a server, and we're not autofetching everything. */
- /* XXX023 what does not being a server have to do with it? also there's
+ /* XXXX++ what does not being a server have to do with it? also there's
* a partitioning issue here where bridges differ from clients. */
ret = !server_mode(options) && !options->FetchUselessDescriptors;
}
channel_set_cmux_policy_everywhere(NULL);
}
- /* XXXX024 this call might be unnecessary here: can changing the
+ /* XXXX this call might be unnecessary here: can changing the
* current consensus really alter our view of any OR's rate limits? */
connection_or_update_token_buckets(get_connection_array(), options);
static int num_ntors_per_tap(void);
static void onion_queue_entry_remove(onion_queue_t *victim);
-/* XXXX024 Check lengths vs MAX_ONIONSKIN_{CHALLENGE,REPLY}_LEN.
+/* XXXX Check lengths vs MAX_ONIONSKIN_{CHALLENGE,REPLY}_LEN.
*
* (By which I think I meant, "make sure that no
* X_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE/REPLY_LEN is greater than
/** When the circuit was first used, or 0 if the circuit is clean.
*
- * XXXX023 Note that some code will artifically adjust this value backward
+ * XXXX Note that some code will artifically adjust this value backward
* in time in order to indicate that a circuit shouldn't be used for new
* streams, but that it can stay alive as long as it has streams on it.
* That's a kludge we should fix.
*
- * XXX023 The CBT code uses this field to record when HS-related
+ * XXX The CBT code uses this field to record when HS-related
* circuits entered certain states. This usage probably won't
* interfere with this field's primary purpose, but we should
* document it more thoroughly to make sure of that.
*
- * XXX027 The SocksPort option KeepaliveIsolateSOCKSAuth will artificially
+ * XXX The SocksPort option KeepaliveIsolateSOCKSAuth will artificially
* adjust this value forward each time a suitable stream is attached to an
* already constructed circuit, potentially keeping the circuit alive
* indefinitely.
* INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_INTRODUCTIONS INTRODUCE2 cells, it may expire
* sooner.)
*
- * XXX023 Should this be configurable? */
+ * XXX Should this be configurable? */
#define INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_MIN_SECONDS (18*60*60)
/** The maximum number of seconds that an introduction point will last
* before expiring due to old age.
*
- * XXX023 Should this be configurable? */
+ * XXX Should this be configurable? */
#define INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_MAX_SECONDS (24*60*60)
/** The maximum number of circuit creation retry we do to an intro point
tor_snprintf(hsdir_desc_comb_id, sizeof(hsdir_desc_comb_id), "%s%s",
hsdir_id_base32,
desc_id_base32);
- /* XXX023 tor_assert(strlen(hsdir_desc_comb_id) ==
+ /* XXX++?? tor_assert(strlen(hsdir_desc_comb_id) ==
LAST_HID_SERV_REQUEST_KEY_LEN); */
if (set) {
time_t *oldptr;
const char *key;
void *val;
strmap_iter_get(iter, &key, &val);
- /* XXX023 tor_assert(strlen(key) == LAST_HID_SERV_REQUEST_KEY_LEN); */
+ /* XXX++?? tor_assert(strlen(key) == LAST_HID_SERV_REQUEST_KEY_LEN); */
if (tor_memeq(key + LAST_HID_SERV_REQUEST_KEY_LEN -
REND_DESC_ID_V2_LEN_BASE32,
desc_id_base32,
* service and never reply to the client's rend requests */
pathbias_mark_use_success(circ);
- /* XXXX This is a pretty brute-force approach. It'd be better to
+ /* XXXX++ This is a pretty brute-force approach. It'd be better to
* attach only the connections that are waiting on this circuit, rather
* than trying to attach them all. See comments bug 743. */
/* If we already have the introduction circuit built, make sure we send
int
rep_hist_have_measured_enough_stability(void)
{
- /* XXXX023 This doesn't do so well when we change our opinion
+ /* XXXX++ This doesn't do so well when we change our opinion
* as to whether we're tracking router stability. */
return started_tracking_stability < time(NULL) - 4*60*60;
}
server_mode,(const or_options_t *options))
{
if (options->ClientOnly) return 0;
- /* XXXX024 I believe we can kill off ORListenAddress here.*/
+ /* XXXX I believe we can kill off ORListenAddress here.*/
return (options->ORPort_set || options->ORListenAddress);
}
was_router_added_t inserted;
(void)from_fetch;
if (msg) *msg = NULL;
- /*XXXX023 Do something with msg */
+ /*XXXX Do something with msg */
inserted = extrainfo_insert(router_get_routerlist(), ei, !from_cache);
/** How often should we launch a server/authority request to be sure of getting
* a guess for our IP? */
-/*XXXX024 this info should come from netinfo cells or something, or we should
+/*XXXX+ this info should come from netinfo cells or something, or we should
* do this only when we aren't seeing incoming data. see bug 652. */
#define DUMMY_DOWNLOAD_INTERVAL (20*60)
const or_options_t *options)
{
static time_t last_dummy_download = 0;
- /* XXXX024 we could be smarter here; see notes on bug 652. */
+ /* XXXX+ we could be smarter here; see notes on bug 652. */
/* If we're a server that doesn't have a configured address, we rely on
* directory fetches to learn when our address changes. So if we haven't
* tried to get any routerdescs in a long time, try a dummy fetch now. */
struct in_addr in;
char *address = NULL;
tor_assert(tok->n_args);
- /* XXX024 use some tor_addr parse function below instead. -RD */
+ /* XXX++ use some tor_addr parse function below instead. -RD */
if (tor_addr_port_split(LOG_WARN, tok->args[0], &address,
&cert->dir_port) < 0 ||
tor_inet_aton(address, &in) == 0) {
eos = eos + 1;
/* Check length. */
if (eos-desc > REND_DESC_MAX_SIZE) {
- /* XXX023 If we are parsing this descriptor as a server, this
+ /* XXXX+ If we are parsing this descriptor as a server, this
* should be a protocol warning. */
log_warn(LD_REND, "Descriptor length is %d which exceeds "
"maximum rendezvous descriptor size of %d bytes.",
}
}
- /* XXX024 Remove the '=' here once versions of obfsproxy which
+ /* XXXX Remove the '=' here once versions of obfsproxy which
* assert that this env var exists are sufficiently dead.
*
* (If we remove this line entirely, some joker will stick this
tt_assert(!crypto_pk_write_public_key_to_string(pk2 , &pk2_str,
&pk2_str_len));
- /* XXXX025 router_dump_to_string should really take this from ri.*/
+ /* XXXX+++ router_dump_to_string should really take this from ri.*/
options->ContactInfo = tor_strdup("Magri White "
"<magri@elsewhere.example.com>");
/* Skip reachability checks for DirPort and tunnelled-dir-server */
projects / thirdparty / tor.git / commitdiff
