else:
return socket.sendto(self, data, flags_or_addr, addr)
+ def sendmsg(self, *args, **kwargs):
+ # Ensure programs don't send data unencrypted if they try to
+ # use this method.
+ raise NotImplementedError("sendmsg not allowed on instances of %s" %
+ self.__class__)
+
def sendall(self, data, flags=0):
self._checkClosed()
if self._sslobj:
else:
return socket.recvfrom_into(self, buffer, nbytes, flags)
+ def recvmsg(self, *args, **kwargs):
+ raise NotImplementedError("recvmsg not allowed on instances of %s" %
+ self.__class__)
+
+ def recvmsg_into(self, *args, **kwargs):
+ raise NotImplementedError("recvmsg_into not allowed on instances of "
+ "%s" % self.__class__)
+
def pending(self):
self._checkClosed()
if self._sslobj:
# consume data
s.read()
+ # Make sure sendmsg et al are disallowed to avoid
+ # inadvertent disclosure of data and/or corruption
+ # of the encrypted data stream
+ self.assertRaises(NotImplementedError, s.sendmsg, [b"data"])
+ self.assertRaises(NotImplementedError, s.recvmsg, 100)
+ self.assertRaises(NotImplementedError,
+ s.recvmsg_into, bytearray(100))
+
s.write(b"over\n")
s.close()
finally:
Library
-------
+- Issue #12835: Follow up to #6560 that unconditionally prevents use of the
+ unencrypted sendmsg/recvmsg APIs on SSL wrapped sockets. Patch by David
+ Watson.
+
- Issue #12803: SSLContext.load_cert_chain() now accepts a password argument
to be used if the private key is encrypted. Patch by Adam Simpkins.