]> git.ipfire.org Git - thirdparty/kernel/stable.git/commitdiff
x86/bugs: Qualify RETBLEED_INTEL_MSG
authorDavid Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Fri, 3 Oct 2025 17:19:36 +0000 (12:19 -0500)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Sun, 2 Nov 2025 13:18:03 +0000 (22:18 +0900)
[ Upstream commit 204ced4108f5d38f6804968fd9543cc69c3f8da6 ]

When retbleed mitigation is disabled, the kernel already prints an info
message that the system is vulnerable.  Recent code restructuring also
inadvertently led to RETBLEED_INTEL_MSG being printed as an error, which is
unnecessary as retbleed mitigation was already explicitly disabled (by config
option, cmdline, etc.).

Qualify this print statement so the warning is not printed unless an actual
retbleed mitigation was selected and is being disabled due to incompatibility
with spectre_v2.

Fixes: e3b78a7ad5ea ("x86/bugs: Restructure retbleed mitigation")
Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=220624
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251003171936.155391-1-david.kaplan@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c

index bf79ff6a1f6622f23b994937ac780b817bf4ae97..9750ce448e626b6bd56601f938a0899e1653637d 100644 (file)
@@ -1461,7 +1461,9 @@ static void __init retbleed_update_mitigation(void)
                        break;
                default:
                        if (retbleed_mitigation != RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF) {
-                               pr_err(RETBLEED_INTEL_MSG);
+                               if (retbleed_mitigation != RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE)
+                                       pr_err(RETBLEED_INTEL_MSG);
+
                                retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE;
                        }
                }