addresses/ports. See SocksPort for an explanation of isolation
flags. (Default: 0)
+[[ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses]] **ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses** **0**|**1**::
+ If true, Tor does not believe any anonymously retrieved DNS answer that
+ tells it that an address resolves to an internal address (like 127.0.0.1 or
+ 192.168.0.1). This option prevents certain browser-based attacks; don't
+ turn it off unless you know what you're doing. (Default: 1)
+
[[ClientRejectInternalAddresses]] **ClientRejectInternalAddresses** **0**|**1**::
If true, Tor does not try to fulfill requests to connect to an internal
address (like 127.0.0.1 or 192.168.0.1) __unless a exit node is
4 (for 40 seconds), 8, 16, 32, 60
ClientBootstrapConsensusMaxDownloadTries 80
ClientBootstrapConsensusAuthorityOnlyMaxDownloadTries 80
- TestingClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses 0
+ ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses 0
ClientRejectInternalAddresses 0
CountPrivateBandwidth 1
ExitPolicyRejectPrivate 0
we replace it and issue a new key?
(Default: 3 hours for link and auth; 1 day for signing.)
-[[ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses]] [[TestingClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses]] **TestingClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses** **0**|**1**::
- If true, Tor does not believe any anonymously retrieved DNS answer that
- tells it that an address resolves to an internal address (like 127.0.0.1 or
- 192.168.0.1). This option prevents certain browser-based attacks; don't
- turn it off unless you know what you're doing. (Default: 1)
-
-
NON-PERSISTENT OPTIONS
----------------------
{ "BridgeAuthoritativeDirectory", "BridgeAuthoritativeDir", 0, 0},
{ "HashedControlPassword", "__HashedControlSessionPassword", 1, 0},
{ "VirtualAddrNetwork", "VirtualAddrNetworkIPv4", 0, 0},
- { "ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses",
- "TestingClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses", 0, 1, },
{ NULL, NULL, 0, 0},
};
V(CircuitsAvailableTimeout, INTERVAL, "0"),
V(CircuitStreamTimeout, INTERVAL, "0"),
V(CircuitPriorityHalflife, DOUBLE, "-100.0"), /*negative:'Use default'*/
- V(TestingClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses, BOOL,"1"),
+ V(ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses, BOOL,"1"),
V(ClientOnly, BOOL, "0"),
V(ClientPreferIPv6ORPort, AUTOBOOL, "auto"),
V(ClientPreferIPv6DirPort, AUTOBOOL, "auto"),
"0, 1, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 8, 16, 32, 60"),
V(ClientBootstrapConsensusMaxDownloadTries, UINT, "80"),
V(ClientBootstrapConsensusAuthorityOnlyMaxDownloadTries, UINT, "80"),
- V(TestingClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses, BOOL,"0"),
+ V(ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses, BOOL,"0"), // deprecated in 0.2.9.2-alpha
V(ClientRejectInternalAddresses, BOOL, "0"),
V(CountPrivateBandwidth, BOOL, "1"),
V(ExitPolicyRejectPrivate, BOOL, "0"),
#undef OBSOLETE
static const config_deprecation_t option_deprecation_notes_[] = {
- /* Deprecated since 0.3.2.1-alpha. */
+ /* Deprecated since 0.2.9.2-alpha... */
+ { "AllowDotExit", "Unrestricted use of the .exit notation can be used for "
+ "a wide variety of application-level attacks." },
+ { "ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses", "Turning this on makes your client "
+ "easier to fingerprint, and may open you to esoteric attacks." },
+ /* End of options deprecated since 0.2.9.2-alpha. */
+
+ /* Deprecated since 0.3.2.0-alpha. */
{ "HTTPProxy", "It only applies to direct unencrypted HTTP connections "
"to your directory server, which your Tor probably wasn't using." },
{ "HTTPProxyAuthenticator", "HTTPProxy is deprecated in favor of HTTPSProxy "
CHECK_DEFAULT(TestingSigningKeySlop);
CHECK_DEFAULT(TestingAuthKeySlop);
CHECK_DEFAULT(TestingLinkKeySlop);
- CHECK_DEFAULT(TestingClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses);
#undef CHECK_DEFAULT
if (options->SigningKeyLifetime < options->TestingSigningKeySlop*2)
/* Hang on, did we find an answer saying that this is a reverse lookup for
* an internal address? If so, we should reject it if we're configured to
* do so. */
- if (options->TestingClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses) {
+ if (options->ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses) {
/* Don't let clients try to do a reverse lookup on 10.0.0.1. */
tor_addr_t addr;
int ok;
/** If true, do not believe anybody who tells us that a domain resolves
* to an internal address, or that an internal address has a PTR mapping.
* Helps avoid some cross-site attacks. */
- int TestingClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses;
+ int ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses;
/** If true, do not accept any requests to connect to internal addresses
* over randomly chosen exits. */
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
return 0;
}
- if (get_options()->TestingClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses &&
+ if (get_options()->ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses &&
tor_addr_is_internal(&addr, 0)) {
log_info(LD_APP,"Address '%s' resolved to internal. Closing,",
safe_str(conn->socks_request->address));
goto done;
}
- if (get_options()->TestingClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses) {
+ if (get_options()->ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses) {
int orig_len = smartlist_len(resolved_addresses);
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(resolved_addresses, address_ttl_t *, addr) {
if (addr->hostname == NULL && tor_addr_is_internal(&addr->addr, 0)) {
if (tor_addr_family(&addr) != AF_UNSPEC) {
const sa_family_t family = tor_addr_family(&addr);
if (tor_addr_is_null(&addr) ||
- (get_options()->TestingClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses &&
+ (get_options()->ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses &&
tor_addr_is_internal(&addr, 0))) {
log_info(LD_APP, "...but it claims the IP address was %s. Closing.",
fmt_addr(&addr));
MOCK(connection_mark_unattached_ap_, mark_unattached_mock);
MOCK(connection_ap_handshake_socks_resolved, socks_resolved_mock);
- options->TestingClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses = 0;
+ options->ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses = 0;
SET_CELL(/* IPv4: 127.0.1.2, ttl 256 */
"\x04\x04\x7f\x00\x01\x02\x00\x00\x01\x00"
/* But we may be discarding private answers. */
MOCK_RESET();
- options->TestingClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses = 1;
+ options->ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses = 1;
r = connection_edge_process_resolved_cell(edgeconn, &cell, &rh);
tt_int_op(r, OP_EQ, 0);
ASSERT_MARK_CALLED(END_STREAM_REASON_DONE|