--- /dev/null
+From 5f5fa4cd35f707344f65ce9e225b6528691dbbaa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
+Date: Mon, 16 Mar 2026 15:03:27 -0400
+Subject: Bluetooth: MGMT: Fix dangling pointer on mgmt_add_adv_patterns_monitor_complete
+
+From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
+
+commit 5f5fa4cd35f707344f65ce9e225b6528691dbbaa upstream.
+
+This fixes the condition checking so mgmt_pending_valid is executed
+whenever status != -ECANCELED otherwise calling mgmt_pending_free(cmd)
+would kfree(cmd) without unlinking it from the list first, leaving a
+dangling pointer. Any subsequent list traversal (e.g.,
+mgmt_pending_foreach during __mgmt_power_off, or another
+mgmt_pending_valid call) would dereference freed memory.
+
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-bluetooth/20260315132013.75ab40c5@kernel.org/T/#m1418f9c82eeff8510c1beaa21cf53af20db96c06
+Fixes: 302a1f674c00 ("Bluetooth: MGMT: Fix possible UAFs")
+Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
+Reviewed-by: Paul Menzel <pmenzel@molgen.mpg.de>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/bluetooth/mgmt.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c
++++ b/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c
+@@ -5332,7 +5332,7 @@ static void mgmt_add_adv_patterns_monito
+ * hci_adv_monitors_clear is about to be called which will take care of
+ * freeing the adv_monitor instances.
+ */
+- if (status == -ECANCELED && !mgmt_pending_valid(hdev, cmd))
++ if (status == -ECANCELED || !mgmt_pending_valid(hdev, cmd))
+ return;
+
+ monitor = cmd->user_data;
--- /dev/null
+From 1b9c17fd0a7fdcbe69ec5d6fe8e50bc5ed7f01f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jianpeng Chang <jianpeng.chang.cn@windriver.com>
+Date: Wed, 21 Jan 2026 13:29:26 +0800
+Subject: Bluetooth: MGMT: Fix memory leak in set_ssp_complete
+
+From: Jianpeng Chang <jianpeng.chang.cn@windriver.com>
+
+commit 1b9c17fd0a7fdcbe69ec5d6fe8e50bc5ed7f01f2 upstream.
+
+Fix memory leak in set_ssp_complete() where mgmt_pending_cmd structures
+are not freed after being removed from the pending list.
+
+Commit 302a1f674c00 ("Bluetooth: MGMT: Fix possible UAFs") replaced
+mgmt_pending_foreach() calls with individual command handling but missed
+adding mgmt_pending_free() calls in both error and success paths of
+set_ssp_complete(). Other completion functions like set_le_complete()
+were fixed correctly in the same commit.
+
+This causes a memory leak of the mgmt_pending_cmd structure and its
+associated parameter data for each SSP command that completes.
+
+Add the missing mgmt_pending_free(cmd) calls in both code paths to fix
+the memory leak. Also fix the same issue in set_advertising_complete().
+
+Fixes: 302a1f674c00 ("Bluetooth: MGMT: Fix possible UAFs")
+Signed-off-by: Jianpeng Chang <jianpeng.chang.cn@windriver.com>
+Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/bluetooth/mgmt.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c
++++ b/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c
+@@ -1937,6 +1937,7 @@ static void set_ssp_complete(struct hci_
+ }
+
+ mgmt_cmd_status(cmd->sk, cmd->hdev->id, cmd->opcode, mgmt_err);
++ mgmt_pending_free(cmd);
+ return;
+ }
+
+@@ -1955,6 +1956,7 @@ static void set_ssp_complete(struct hci_
+ sock_put(match.sk);
+
+ hci_update_eir_sync(hdev);
++ mgmt_pending_free(cmd);
+ }
+
+ static int set_ssp_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data)
+@@ -6452,6 +6454,7 @@ static void set_advertising_complete(str
+ hci_dev_clear_flag(hdev, HCI_ADVERTISING);
+
+ settings_rsp(cmd, &match);
++ mgmt_pending_free(cmd);
+
+ new_settings(hdev, match.sk);
+
--- /dev/null
+From 344e6a4f7ff4756b9b3f75e0eb7eaec297e35540 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>
+Date: Wed, 11 Mar 2026 16:56:49 +0100
+Subject: crypto: nx - fix context leak in nx842_crypto_free_ctx
+
+From: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>
+
+commit 344e6a4f7ff4756b9b3f75e0eb7eaec297e35540 upstream.
+
+Since the scomp conversion, nx842_crypto_alloc_ctx() allocates the
+context separately, but nx842_crypto_free_ctx() never releases it. Add
+the missing kfree(ctx) to nx842_crypto_free_ctx(), and reuse
+nx842_crypto_free_ctx() in the allocation error path.
+
+Fixes: 980b5705f4e7 ("crypto: nx - Migrate to scomp API")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>
+Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/crypto/nx/nx-842.c | 6 ++----
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-842.c
++++ b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-842.c
+@@ -115,10 +115,7 @@ void *nx842_crypto_alloc_ctx(struct nx84
+ ctx->sbounce = (u8 *)__get_free_pages(GFP_KERNEL, BOUNCE_BUFFER_ORDER);
+ ctx->dbounce = (u8 *)__get_free_pages(GFP_KERNEL, BOUNCE_BUFFER_ORDER);
+ if (!ctx->wmem || !ctx->sbounce || !ctx->dbounce) {
+- kfree(ctx->wmem);
+- free_pages((unsigned long)ctx->sbounce, BOUNCE_BUFFER_ORDER);
+- free_pages((unsigned long)ctx->dbounce, BOUNCE_BUFFER_ORDER);
+- kfree(ctx);
++ nx842_crypto_free_ctx(ctx);
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ }
+
+@@ -133,6 +130,7 @@ void nx842_crypto_free_ctx(void *p)
+ kfree(ctx->wmem);
+ free_pages((unsigned long)ctx->sbounce, BOUNCE_BUFFER_ORDER);
+ free_pages((unsigned long)ctx->dbounce, BOUNCE_BUFFER_ORDER);
++ kfree(ctx);
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nx842_crypto_free_ctx);
+
--- /dev/null
+From e6e9faba8100628990cccd13f0f044a648c303cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Benjamin Cheng <benjamin.cheng@amd.com>
+Date: Mon, 13 Apr 2026 09:22:15 -0400
+Subject: drm/amdgpu/vcn3: Avoid overflow on msg bound check
+
+From: Benjamin Cheng <benjamin.cheng@amd.com>
+
+commit e6e9faba8100628990cccd13f0f044a648c303cf upstream.
+
+As pointed out by SDL, the previous condition may be vulnerable to
+overflow.
+
+Fixes: b193019860d6 ("drm/amdgpu/vcn3: Prevent OOB reads when parsing dec msg")
+Cc: SDL <sdl@nppct.ru>
+Signed-off-by: Benjamin Cheng <benjamin.cheng@amd.com>
+Reviewed-by: Ruijing Dong <ruijing.dong@amd.com>
+Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
+(cherry picked from commit db00257ac9e4a51eb2515aaea161a019f7125e10)
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/vcn_v3_0.c | 4 +++-
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/vcn_v3_0.c
++++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/vcn_v3_0.c
+@@ -1852,6 +1852,7 @@ static int vcn_v3_0_dec_msg(struct amdgp
+
+ for (i = 0, msg = &msg[6]; i < num_buffers; ++i, msg += 4) {
+ uint32_t offset, size, *create;
++ uint64_t buf_end;
+
+ if (msg[0] != RDECODE_MESSAGE_CREATE)
+ continue;
+@@ -1859,7 +1860,8 @@ static int vcn_v3_0_dec_msg(struct amdgp
+ offset = msg[1];
+ size = msg[2];
+
+- if (size < 4 || offset + size > end - addr) {
++ if (size < 4 || check_add_overflow(offset, size, &buf_end) ||
++ buf_end > end - addr) {
+ DRM_ERROR("VCN message buffer exceeds BO bounds!\n");
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
--- /dev/null
+From 65bce27ea6192320448c30267ffc17ffa094e713 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Benjamin Cheng <benjamin.cheng@amd.com>
+Date: Mon, 13 Apr 2026 09:22:15 -0400
+Subject: drm/amdgpu/vcn4: Avoid overflow on msg bound check
+
+From: Benjamin Cheng <benjamin.cheng@amd.com>
+
+commit 65bce27ea6192320448c30267ffc17ffa094e713 upstream.
+
+As pointed out by SDL, the previous condition may be vulnerable to
+overflow.
+
+Fixes: 0a78f2bac142 ("drm/amdgpu/vcn4: Prevent OOB reads when parsing dec msg")
+Cc: SDL <sdl@nppct.ru>
+Signed-off-by: Benjamin Cheng <benjamin.cheng@amd.com>
+Reviewed-by: Ruijing Dong <ruijing.dong@amd.com>
+Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 3c5367d950140d4ec7af830b2268a5a6fdaa3885)
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/vcn_v4_0.c | 4 +++-
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/vcn_v4_0.c
++++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/vcn_v4_0.c
+@@ -1731,6 +1731,7 @@ static int vcn_v4_0_dec_msg(struct amdgp
+
+ for (i = 0, msg = &msg[6]; i < num_buffers; ++i, msg += 4) {
+ uint32_t offset, size, *create;
++ uint64_t buf_end;
+
+ if (msg[0] != RDECODE_MESSAGE_CREATE)
+ continue;
+@@ -1738,7 +1739,8 @@ static int vcn_v4_0_dec_msg(struct amdgp
+ offset = msg[1];
+ size = msg[2];
+
+- if (size < 4 || offset + size > end - addr) {
++ if (size < 4 || check_add_overflow(offset, size, &buf_end) ||
++ buf_end > end - addr) {
+ DRM_ERROR("VCN message buffer exceeds BO bounds!\n");
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
--- /dev/null
+From 539bd20352832b9244238a055eb169ccf1c41ff6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Amit Kumar Mahapatra <amit.kumar-mahapatra@amd.com>
+Date: Thu, 13 Feb 2025 11:15:46 +0530
+Subject: mtd: spi-nor: sst: Fix SST write failure
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+From: Amit Kumar Mahapatra <amit.kumar-mahapatra@amd.com>
+
+commit 539bd20352832b9244238a055eb169ccf1c41ff6 upstream.
+
+'commit 18bcb4aa54ea ("mtd: spi-nor: sst: Factor out common write operation
+to `sst_nor_write_data()`")' introduced a bug where only one byte of data
+is written, regardless of the number of bytes passed to
+sst_nor_write_data(), causing a kernel crash during the write operation.
+Ensure the correct number of bytes are written as passed to
+sst_nor_write_data().
+
+Call trace:
+[ 57.400180] ------------[ cut here ]------------
+[ 57.404842] While writing 2 byte written 1 bytes
+[ 57.409493] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 737 at drivers/mtd/spi-nor/sst.c:187 sst_nor_write_data+0x6c/0x74
+[ 57.418464] Modules linked in:
+[ 57.421517] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 737 Comm: mtd_debug Not tainted 6.12.0-g5ad04afd91f9 #30
+[ 57.429517] Hardware name: Xilinx Versal A2197 Processor board revA - x-prc-02 revA (DT)
+[ 57.437600] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
+[ 57.444557] pc : sst_nor_write_data+0x6c/0x74
+[ 57.448911] lr : sst_nor_write_data+0x6c/0x74
+[ 57.453264] sp : ffff80008232bb40
+[ 57.456570] x29: ffff80008232bb40 x28: 0000000000010000 x27: 0000000000000001
+[ 57.463708] x26: 000000000000ffff x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000
+[ 57.470843] x23: 0000000000010000 x22: ffff80008232bbf0 x21: ffff000816230000
+[ 57.477978] x20: ffff0008056c0080 x19: 0000000000000002 x18: 0000000000000006
+[ 57.485112] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: ffff80008232b580
+[ 57.492246] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: ffff8000816d1530 x12: 00000000000004a4
+[ 57.499380] x11: 000000000000018c x10: ffff8000816fd530 x9 : ffff8000816d1530
+[ 57.506515] x8 : 00000000fffff7ff x7 : ffff8000816fd530 x6 : 0000000000000001
+[ 57.513649] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000
+[ 57.520782] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff0008049b0000
+[ 57.527916] Call trace:
+[ 57.530354] sst_nor_write_data+0x6c/0x74
+[ 57.534361] sst_nor_write+0xb4/0x18c
+[ 57.538019] mtd_write_oob_std+0x7c/0x88
+[ 57.541941] mtd_write_oob+0x70/0xbc
+[ 57.545511] mtd_write+0x68/0xa8
+[ 57.548733] mtdchar_write+0x10c/0x290
+[ 57.552477] vfs_write+0xb4/0x3a8
+[ 57.555791] ksys_write+0x74/0x10c
+[ 57.559189] __arm64_sys_write+0x1c/0x28
+[ 57.563109] invoke_syscall+0x54/0x11c
+[ 57.566856] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc0/0xe0
+[ 57.571557] do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
+[ 57.574868] el0_svc+0x30/0xcc
+[ 57.577921] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x12c
+[ 57.582276] el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194
+[ 57.585933] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Fixes: 18bcb4aa54ea ("mtd: spi-nor: sst: Factor out common write operation to `sst_nor_write_data()`")
+Signed-off-by: Amit Kumar Mahapatra <amit.kumar-mahapatra@amd.com>
+Reviewed-by: Pratyush Yadav <pratyush@kernel.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@linaro.org>
+Reviewed-by: Bence Csókás <csokas.bence@prolan.hu>
+[pratyush@kernel.org: add Cc stable tag]
+Signed-off-by: Pratyush Yadav <pratyush@kernel.org>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250213054546.2078121-1-amit.kumar-mahapatra@amd.com
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/mtd/spi-nor/sst.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/mtd/spi-nor/sst.c
++++ b/drivers/mtd/spi-nor/sst.c
+@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ static int sst_nor_write_data(struct spi
+ int ret;
+
+ nor->program_opcode = op;
+- ret = spi_nor_write_data(nor, to, 1, buf);
++ ret = spi_nor_write_data(nor, to, len, buf);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ WARN(ret != len, "While writing %zu byte written %i bytes\n", len, ret);
vsock-virtio-fix-accept-queue-count-leak-on-transport-mismatch.patch
vsock-virtio-fix-length-and-offset-in-tap-skb-for-split-packets.patch
vsock-virtio-fix-potential-unbounded-skb-queue.patch
+drm-amdgpu-vcn3-avoid-overflow-on-msg-bound-check.patch
+drm-amdgpu-vcn4-avoid-overflow-on-msg-bound-check.patch
+mtd-spi-nor-sst-fix-sst-write-failure.patch
+bluetooth-mgmt-fix-memory-leak-in-set_ssp_complete.patch
+crypto-nx-fix-context-leak-in-nx842_crypto_free_ctx.patch
+bluetooth-mgmt-fix-dangling-pointer-on-mgmt_add_adv_patterns_monitor_complete.patch
+smb-client-use-kzalloc-to-zero-initialize-security-descriptor-buffer.patch
--- /dev/null
+From 5e489c6c47a2ac15edbaca153b9348e42c1eacab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Bjoern Doebel <doebel@amazon.de>
+Date: Thu, 30 Apr 2026 08:57:17 +0000
+Subject: smb: client: use kzalloc to zero-initialize security descriptor buffer
+
+From: Bjoern Doebel <doebel@amazon.de>
+
+commit 5e489c6c47a2ac15edbaca153b9348e42c1eacab upstream.
+
+Commit 62e7dd0a39c2d ("smb: common: change the data type of num_aces
+to le16") split struct smb_acl's __le32 num_aces field into __le16
+num_aces and __le16 reserved. The reserved field corresponds to Sbz2
+in the MS-DTYP ACL wire format, which must be zero [1].
+
+When building an ACL descriptor in build_sec_desc(), we are using a
+kmalloc()'ed descriptor buffer and writing the fields explicitly using
+le16() writes now. This never writes to the 2 byte reserved field,
+leaving it as uninitialized heap data.
+
+When the reserved field happens to contain non-zero slab garbage,
+Samba rejects the security descriptor with "ndr_pull_security_descriptor
+failed: Range Error", causing chmod to fail with EINVAL.
+
+Change kmalloc() to kzalloc() to ensure the entire buffer is
+zero-initialized.
+
+Fixes: 62e7dd0a39c2d ("smb: common: change the data type of num_aces to le16")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+
+Signed-off-by: Bjoern Doebel <doebel@amazon.de>
+Assisted-by: Kiro:claude-opus-4.6
+[1] https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-dtyp/20233ed8-a6c6-4097-aafa-dd545ed24428
+Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/smb/client/cifsacl.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/fs/smb/client/cifsacl.c
++++ b/fs/smb/client/cifsacl.c
+@@ -1766,7 +1766,7 @@ id_mode_to_cifs_acl(struct inode *inode,
+ * descriptor parameters, and security descriptor itself
+ */
+ nsecdesclen = max_t(u32, nsecdesclen, DEFAULT_SEC_DESC_LEN);
+- pnntsd = kmalloc(nsecdesclen, GFP_KERNEL);
++ pnntsd = kzalloc(nsecdesclen, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!pnntsd) {
+ kfree(pntsd);
+ cifs_put_tlink(tlink);
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable-queue.git / commitdiff
