ima: fix out-of-bounds read in xattr_verify()

The digest-length check in xattr_verify() mixes int and size_t:

	if (xattr_len - sizeof(xattr_value->type) - hash_start >=
			iint->ima_hash->length)

sizeof() yields size_t, so the usual arithmetic conversions promote
the whole left-hand side to unsigned 64-bit before the subtraction
runs. For a truncated xattr this underflows instead of going negative:
a 1-byte IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG xattr (xattr_len == 1, hash_start == 1)
turns "1 - 1 - 1" into SIZE_MAX, which is trivially >= ima_hash->length.
The check then passes and the following memcmp() reads
iint->ima_hash->length bytes starting past the end of the buffer
vfs_getxattr_alloc() allocated for it.

Nothing upstream clamps xattr_len back into a safe range first:
ima_get_hash_algo() only special-cases xattr_len < 2 to pick a default
algorithm, and evm_verifyxattr() returns INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN rather than
failing when no HMAC key is loaded, so a truncated security.ima value
reaches the length check as-is.

Rewrite the comparison so every operand stays a signed int and no
implicit conversion to size_t can occur.

Fixes: 3ea7a56067e6 ("ima: provide hash algo info in the xattr")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Lincoln Wallace <locnnil0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 18d0d9154317b8efe9a806760f7e8eca75cca692..ced2e131b061bff9d53a7ae607021629260d1f8e 100644 (file)
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -274,8 +274,13 @@ static int xattr_verify(enum ima_hooks func, struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
                } else {
                        set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags);
                }
-               if (xattr_len - sizeof(xattr_value->type) - hash_start >=
-                               iint->ima_hash->length)
+               /*
+                * Use addition, not subtraction: sizeof() forces unsigned
+                * math and a short xattr_len would wrap around, bypassing
+                * this bounds check.
+                */
+               if (xattr_len >= (int)sizeof(xattr_value->type) + hash_start +
+                               (int)iint->ima_hash->length)
                        /*
                         * xattr length may be longer. md5 hash in previous
                         * version occupied 20 bytes in xattr, instead of 16