virtio-fs.
* for vendor-built signed initrds:
+ - make sysext run in the initrd
- sysext should pick up sysext images from /.extra/ in the initrd, and insist
- on verification
+ on verification if in secureboot mode
- kernel-install should be able to install pre-built unified kernel images in
type #2 drop-in dir in the ESP.
- - kernel-install should be able encrypt creds automatically from machine id,
- root pw, rootfs uuid, resum partition uuid, and place next to EFI kernel,
- for sd-stub to pick them up
+ - kernel-install should be able install encrypted creds automatically for
+ machine id, root pw, rootfs uuid, resume partition uuid, and place next to
+ EFI kernel, for sd-stub to pick them up. These creds should be locked to
+ the TPM, and bind to the right PCR the kernel is measured to.
- systemd-fstab-generator should look for rootfs device to mount in creds
- pid 1 should look for machine ID in creds
- - make sysext run in the initrd
- - sd-stub: automatically pick up microcode from ESP and synthesize initrd from
+ - systemd-resume-generator should look for resume partition uuid in creds
+ - sd-stub: automatically pick up microcode from ESP (/loader/microcode/*) and synthesize initrd from
it, and measure it. Signing is not necessary, as microcode does that on its
own. Pass as first initrd to kernel.
+ - systemd-creds should have a fallback logic that uses neither TPM nor the
+ system key in /var for encryption and instead some fixed key. This should
+ be opt in (since it provides no security properties) but be used by
+ kernel-install when encrypting the creds it generates on systems that lack
+ a TPM, so that we can have very similar codepaths on TPM and TPM-less
+ systems. i.e. --with-key=tpm-graceful or so.
* Add a new service type very similar to Type=notify, that goes one step
further and extends the protocol to cover reloads. Specifically, SIGHUP will