sandbox: Drop all capabilities that don't make sense in userns

When unsharing a user namespace, we get a full set of capabilities,
of which a ton don't make sense to keep. Why drop them? Because it's
possible that other tools check if they have the required capabilities
to run, like systing now checking if it is invoked with CAP_BPF. If
we don't drop CAP_BPF, systing will think it's able to attach BPF
programs even though in reality it can't as CAP_BPF in a user namespace
doesn't actually allow you to attach BPF programs.

While we're at it, let's be a bit more thorough with the capability
logic and make sure we modify all capability sets to only contain the
capabilities we want to keep.

diff --git a/mkosi/qemu.py b/mkosi/qemu.py
index 85eb88a6af750505c55a6f2653604a277ad070c6..63556e340c96ea2bce5138b77563712559a4632b 100644 (file)
--- a/mkosi/qemu.py
+++ b/mkosi/qemu.py
@@ -350,6 +350,7 @@ def start_virtiofsd(
         "--sandbox=chroot",
         f"--inode-file-handles={'prefer' if os.getuid() == 0 and not uidmap else 'never'}",
         "--log-level=error",
+        "--modcaps=-mknod",
     ]  # fmt: skip
 
     if selinux:

diff --git a/mkosi/sandbox.py b/mkosi/sandbox.py
index 34cbfaa576488c4230c65492f0674c611514a9aa..8d7047c4f7d485d99072f8c346b1ce76a2637afd 100755 (executable)
--- a/mkosi/sandbox.py
+++ b/mkosi/sandbox.py
@@ -22,8 +22,21 @@ AT_NO_AUTOMOUNT = 0x800
 AT_RECURSIVE = 0x8000
 AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW = 0x100
 BTRFS_SUPER_MAGIC = 0x9123683E
+CAP_CHOWN = 0
+CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE = 1
+CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH = 2
+CAP_FOWNER = 3
+CAP_FSETID = 4
+CAP_SETGID = 6
+CAP_SETUID = 7
+CAP_SETPCAP = 8
+CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE = 10
 CAP_NET_ADMIN = 12
+CAP_SYS_CHROOT = 18
+CAP_SYS_PTRACE = 19
 CAP_SYS_ADMIN = 21
+CAP_SYS_RESOURCE = 24
+CAP_SETFCAP = 31
 CLONE_NEWIPC = 0x08000000
 CLONE_NEWNET = 0x40000000
 CLONE_NEWNS = 0x00020000
@@ -59,7 +72,10 @@ OPEN_TREE_CLOEXEC = os.O_CLOEXEC
 OPEN_TREE_CLONE = 1
 OVERLAYFS_SUPER_MAGIC = 0x794C7630
 PR_CAP_AMBIENT = 47
+PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET = 1
 PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE = 2
+PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER = 3
+PR_CAPBSET_DROP = 24
 # These definitions are taken from the libseccomp headers
 SCMP_ACT_ALLOW = 0x7FFF0000
 SCMP_ACT_ERRNO = 0x00050000
@@ -171,41 +187,75 @@ def umount2(path: str, flags: int = 0) -> None:
         oserror("umount2", path)
 
 
-def cap_permitted_to_ambient() -> None:
-    """
-    When unsharing a user namespace and mapping the current user to itself, the user has a full
-    set of capabilities in the user namespace. This allows the user to do mounts after unsharing a
-    mount namespace for example. However, these capabilities are lost again when the user executes
-    a subprocess. As we also want subprocesses invoked by the user to be able to mount stuff, we
-    make sure the capabilities are inherited by adding all the user's capabilities to the inherited
-    and ambient capabilities set, which makes sure that they are passed down to subprocesses.
-    """
+def capability_mask(capabilities: list[int]) -> int:
+    mask = 0
+
+    for cap in capabilities:
+        mask |= 1 << cap
+
+    return mask
+
+
+def drop_capabilities(*, keep: list[int]) -> None:
+    # First, fetch the permitted capabilities and AND them
+    # with the ones with we want to keep to get the final list
+    # of capabilities.
+
     header = cap_user_header_t(LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3, 0)
     payload = (cap_user_data_t * LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3)()
 
     if libc.capget(ctypes.addressof(header), ctypes.byref(payload)) < 0:
         oserror("capget")
 
-    payload[0].inheritable = payload[0].permitted
-    payload[1].inheritable = payload[1].permitted
+    permitted = payload[1].permitted << 32 | payload[0].permitted
+    permitted &= capability_mask(keep)
 
-    if libc.capset(ctypes.addressof(header), ctypes.byref(payload)) < 0:
-        oserror("capset")
-
-    effective = payload[1].effective << 32 | payload[0].effective
+    # Next, drop unwanted capabilities from the bounding set as
+    # later we'll drop the capability that lets us do so (CAP_SETPCAP).
 
     with open("/proc/sys/kernel/cap_last_cap", "rb") as f:
         last_cap = int(f.read())
 
-    libc.prctl.argtypes = (ctypes.c_int, ctypes.c_ulong, ctypes.c_ulong, ctypes.c_ulong, ctypes.c_ulong)
+    libc.prctl.argtypes = (ctypes.c_int, ctypes.c_ulong)
 
     for cap in range(ctypes.sizeof(ctypes.c_uint64) * 8):
         if cap > last_cap:
             break
 
-        if effective & (1 << cap) and libc.prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE, cap, 0, 0) < 0:
+        if not (permitted & (1 << cap)) and libc.prctl(PR_CAPBSET_DROP, cap) < 0:
             oserror("prctl")
 
+    # Now, modify the permitted, effective and inheritable
+    # capability sets with capset().
+
+    payload[0].permitted = permitted
+    payload[1].permitted = permitted >> 32
+    payload[0].effective = permitted
+    payload[1].effective = permitted >> 32
+    payload[0].inheritable = permitted
+    payload[1].inheritable = permitted >> 32
+
+    if libc.capset(ctypes.addressof(header), ctypes.byref(payload)) < 0:
+        oserror("capset")
+
+    # Finally, modify the ambient set using the associated pcrtl()'s.
+
+    libc.prctl.argtypes = (ctypes.c_int, ctypes.c_ulong, ctypes.c_ulong, ctypes.c_ulong, ctypes.c_ulong)
+
+    for cap in range(ctypes.sizeof(ctypes.c_uint64) * 8):
+        if cap > last_cap:
+            break
+
+        if permitted & (1 << cap):
+            if libc.prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE, cap, 0, 0) < 0:
+                oserror("prctl")
+        else:
+            r = libc.prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET, cap, 0, 0)
+            if r < 0:
+                oserror("prctl")
+            if r > 0 and libc.prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER, cap, 0, 0) < 0:
+                oserror("prctl")
+
 
 def have_effective_cap(capability: int) -> bool:
     with open("/proc/self/status", "rb") as f:
@@ -464,7 +514,7 @@ def become_user(uid: int, gid: int) -> None:
         raise OSError(rc, os.strerror(rc))
 
 
-def acquire_privileges(*, become_root: bool = False) -> bool:
+def acquire_privileges(*, become_root: bool = False, network: bool = False) -> bool:
     if have_effective_cap(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) and (os.getuid() == 0 or not become_root):
         return False
 
@@ -472,7 +522,38 @@ def acquire_privileges(*, become_root: bool = False) -> bool:
         become_user(0, 0)
     else:
         become_user(os.getuid(), os.getgid())
-        cap_permitted_to_ambient()
+
+    # When unsharing a user namespace, the process user has a full set of capabilities in the new user
+    # namespace. This allows the process to do mounts after unsharing a mount namespace for example. However,
+    # these capabilities are lost again when the user executes a subprocess. As we also want subprocesses
+    # invoked by the user to be able to mount stuff, we make sure the capabilities we are interested in are
+    # inherited across execve() by adding all the these capabilities to the inherited and ambient capability
+    # sets, which makes sure that they are passed down to subprocesses, regardless if we're uid 0 in the user
+    # namespace or not.
+
+    caps = [
+        CAP_CHOWN,
+        CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE,
+        CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH,
+        CAP_FOWNER,
+        CAP_FSETID,
+        CAP_SETGID,
+        CAP_SETUID,
+        CAP_SETPCAP,
+        CAP_SYS_CHROOT,
+        CAP_SYS_PTRACE,
+        CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
+        CAP_SYS_RESOURCE,
+        CAP_SETFCAP,
+    ]
+    if network:
+        # If we're unsharing the network namespace, we want CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE and CAP_NET_ADMIN as well.
+        caps += [
+            CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE,
+            CAP_NET_ADMIN,
+        ]
+
+    drop_capabilities(keep=caps)
 
     return True
 
@@ -1031,7 +1112,7 @@ def main(argv: list[str] = sys.argv[1:]) -> None:
     if unshare_ipc:
         namespaces |= CLONE_NEWIPC
 
-    userns = acquire_privileges(become_root=become_root)
+    userns = acquire_privileges(become_root=become_root, network=bool(namespaces & CLONE_NEWNET))
 
     seccomp_suppress(
         # If we're root in a user namespace with a single user, we're still not going to be able to