This reverts commit
1753d3021564671fba3d3196a84da657d15fb632.
Let's re-enable that feature now. As reported when the original commit
was merged, this causes some trouble on SELinux enabled systems. So,
in the subsequent commit, the feature will be disabled when SELinux is enabled.
But, anyway, this commit just re-enable that feature unconditionally.
<varname>SystemCallArchitectures=</varname>,
<varname>SystemCallFilter=</varname>, or
<varname>SystemCallLog=</varname> are specified. Note that even if this setting is overridden
- by them, <command>systemctl show</command> shows the original value of this setting. Also see
- <ulink url="https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/userspace-api/no_new_privs.html">No New
- Privileges Flag</ulink>.</para></listitem>
+ by them, <command>systemctl show</command> shows the original value of this setting. In case the
+ service will be run in a new mount namespace anyway, all file systems are mounted with MS_NOSUID
+ flag. Also see <ulink url="https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/userspace-api/no_new_privs.html">
+ No New Privileges Flag</ulink>.</para></listitem>
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
.protect_proc = context->protect_proc,
.proc_subset = context->proc_subset,
.private_ipc = context->private_ipc || context->ipc_namespace_path,
+ /* If NNP is on, we can turn on MS_NOSUID, since it won't have any effect anymore. */
+ .mount_nosuid = context->no_new_privileges,
};
} else if (!context->dynamic_user && root_dir)
/*
return 0;
}
+static int make_nosuid(const MountEntry *m, FILE *proc_self_mountinfo) {
+ bool submounts = false;
+ int r = 0;
+
+ assert(m);
+ assert(proc_self_mountinfo);
+
+ submounts = !IN_SET(m->mode, EMPTY_DIR, TMPFS);
+
+ if (submounts)
+ r = bind_remount_recursive_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), MS_NOSUID, MS_NOSUID, NULL, proc_self_mountinfo);
+ else
+ r = bind_remount_one_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), MS_NOSUID, MS_NOSUID, proc_self_mountinfo);
+ if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
+ return 0;
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to re-mount '%s'%s: %m", mount_entry_path(m),
+ submounts ? " and its submounts" : "");
+ return 0;
+}
+
static bool namespace_info_mount_apivfs(const NamespaceInfo *ns_info) {
assert(ns_info);
}
}
+ /* Fourth round, flip the nosuid bits without a deny list. */
+ if (ns_info->mount_nosuid)
+ for (MountEntry *m = mounts; m < mounts + *n_mounts; ++m) {
+ r = make_nosuid(m, proc_self_mountinfo);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ if (error_path && mount_entry_path(m))
+ *error_path = strdup(mount_entry_path(m));
+ return r;
+ }
+ }
+
return 1;
}
bool mount_apivfs;
bool protect_hostname;
bool private_ipc;
+ bool mount_nosuid;
ProtectHome protect_home;
ProtectSystem protect_system;
ProtectProc protect_proc;