]> git.ipfire.org Git - thirdparty/kernel/stable-queue.git/commitdiff
6.6-stable patches
authorGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Tue, 17 Mar 2026 09:28:26 +0000 (10:28 +0100)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Tue, 17 Mar 2026 09:28:26 +0000 (10:28 +0100)
added patches:
asoc-qcom-qdsp6-fix-q6apm-remove-ordering-during-adsp-stop-and-start.patch
ceph-fix-i_nlink-underrun-during-async-unlink.patch
ceph-fix-memory-leaks-in-ceph_mdsc_build_path.patch
kprobes-avoid-crash-when-rmmod-insmod-after-ftrace-killed.patch
libceph-admit-message-frames-only-in-ceph_con_s_open-state.patch
libceph-fix-potential-out-of-bounds-access-in-ceph_handle_auth_reply.patch
libceph-prevent-potential-out-of-bounds-reads-in-process_message_header.patch
libceph-reject-preamble-if-control-segment-is-empty.patch
libceph-use-u32-for-non-negative-values-in-ceph_monmap_decode.patch
mm-kfence-disable-kfence-upon-kasan-hw-tags-enablement.patch
mm-tracing-rss_stat-ensure-curr-is-false-from-kthread-context.patch
mmc-core-avoid-bitfield-rmw-for-claim-retune-flags.patch
mmc-mmci-fix-device_node-reference-leak-in-of_get_dml_pipe_index.patch
tipc-fix-divide-by-zero-in-tipc_sk_filter_connect.patch

15 files changed:
queue-6.6/asoc-qcom-qdsp6-fix-q6apm-remove-ordering-during-adsp-stop-and-start.patch [new file with mode: 0644]
queue-6.6/ceph-fix-i_nlink-underrun-during-async-unlink.patch [new file with mode: 0644]
queue-6.6/ceph-fix-memory-leaks-in-ceph_mdsc_build_path.patch [new file with mode: 0644]
queue-6.6/kprobes-avoid-crash-when-rmmod-insmod-after-ftrace-killed.patch [new file with mode: 0644]
queue-6.6/libceph-admit-message-frames-only-in-ceph_con_s_open-state.patch [new file with mode: 0644]
queue-6.6/libceph-fix-potential-out-of-bounds-access-in-ceph_handle_auth_reply.patch [new file with mode: 0644]
queue-6.6/libceph-prevent-potential-out-of-bounds-reads-in-process_message_header.patch [new file with mode: 0644]
queue-6.6/libceph-reject-preamble-if-control-segment-is-empty.patch [new file with mode: 0644]
queue-6.6/libceph-use-u32-for-non-negative-values-in-ceph_monmap_decode.patch [new file with mode: 0644]
queue-6.6/mm-kfence-disable-kfence-upon-kasan-hw-tags-enablement.patch [new file with mode: 0644]
queue-6.6/mm-tracing-rss_stat-ensure-curr-is-false-from-kthread-context.patch [new file with mode: 0644]
queue-6.6/mmc-core-avoid-bitfield-rmw-for-claim-retune-flags.patch [new file with mode: 0644]
queue-6.6/mmc-mmci-fix-device_node-reference-leak-in-of_get_dml_pipe_index.patch [new file with mode: 0644]
queue-6.6/series
queue-6.6/tipc-fix-divide-by-zero-in-tipc_sk_filter_connect.patch [new file with mode: 0644]

diff --git a/queue-6.6/asoc-qcom-qdsp6-fix-q6apm-remove-ordering-during-adsp-stop-and-start.patch b/queue-6.6/asoc-qcom-qdsp6-fix-q6apm-remove-ordering-during-adsp-stop-and-start.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..8299f27
--- /dev/null
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+From d6db827b430bdcca3976cebca7bd69cca03cde2c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ravi Hothi <ravi.hothi@oss.qualcomm.com>
+Date: Fri, 27 Feb 2026 20:15:34 +0530
+Subject: ASoC: qcom: qdsp6: Fix q6apm remove ordering during ADSP stop and start
+
+From: Ravi Hothi <ravi.hothi@oss.qualcomm.com>
+
+commit d6db827b430bdcca3976cebca7bd69cca03cde2c upstream.
+
+During ADSP stop and start, the kernel crashes due to the order in which
+ASoC components are removed.
+
+On ADSP stop, the q6apm-audio .remove callback unloads topology and removes
+PCM runtimes during ASoC teardown. This deletes the RTDs that contain the
+q6apm DAI components before their removal pass runs, leaving those
+components still linked to the card and causing crashes on the next rebind.
+
+Fix this by ensuring that all dependent (child) components are removed
+first, and the q6apm component is removed last.
+
+[   48.105720] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000000000d0
+[   48.114763] Mem abort info:
+[   48.117650]   ESR = 0x0000000096000004
+[   48.121526]   EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
+[   48.127010]   SET = 0, FnV = 0
+[   48.130172]   EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
+[   48.133415]   FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
+[   48.138446] Data abort info:
+[   48.141422]   ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000
+[   48.147079]   CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
+[   48.152354]   GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
+[   48.157859] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00000001173cf000
+[   48.164517] [00000000000000d0] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000
+[   48.171530] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1]  SMP
+[   48.177348] Modules linked in: q6prm_clocks q6apm_lpass_dais q6apm_dai snd_q6dsp_common q6prm snd_q6apm 8021q garp mrp stp llc snd_soc_hdmi_codec apr pdr_interface phy_qcom_edp fastrpc qcom_pd_mapper rpmsg_ctrl qrtr_smd rpmsg_char qcom_pdr_msg qcom_iris v4l2_mem2mem videobuf2_dma_contig ath11k_pci msm ubwc_config at24 ath11k videobuf2_memops mac80211 ocmem videobuf2_v4l2 libarc4 drm_gpuvm mhi qrtr videodev drm_exec snd_soc_sc8280xp gpu_sched videobuf2_common nvmem_qcom_spmi_sdam snd_soc_qcom_sdw drm_dp_aux_bus qcom_q6v5_pas qcom_spmi_temp_alarm snd_soc_qcom_common rtc_pm8xxx qcom_pon drm_display_helper cec qcom_pil_info qcom_stats soundwire_bus drm_client_lib mc dispcc0_sa8775p videocc_sa8775p qcom_q6v5 camcc_sa8775p snd_soc_dmic phy_qcom_sgmii_eth snd_soc_max98357a i2c_qcom_geni snd_soc_core dwmac_qcom_ethqos llcc_qcom icc_bwmon qcom_sysmon snd_compress qcom_refgen_regulator coresight_stm stmmac_platform snd_pcm_dmaengine qcom_common coresight_tmc stmmac coresight_replicator qcom_glink_smem coresight_cti stm_core
+[   48.177444]  coresight_funnel snd_pcm ufs_qcom phy_qcom_qmp_usb gpi phy_qcom_snps_femto_v2 coresight phy_qcom_qmp_ufs qcom_wdt gpucc_sa8775p pcs_xpcs mdt_loader qcom_ice icc_osm_l3 qmi_helpers snd_timer snd soundcore display_connector qcom_rng nvmem_reboot_mode drm_kms_helper phy_qcom_qmp_pcie sha256 cfg80211 rfkill socinfo fuse drm backlight ipv6
+[   48.301059] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 293 Comm: kworker/u32:2 Not tainted 6.19.0-rc6-dirty #10 PREEMPT
+[   48.310081] Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. Lemans EVK (DT)
+[   48.316782] Workqueue: pdr_notifier_wq pdr_notifier_work [pdr_interface]
+[   48.323672] pstate: 20400005 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
+[   48.330825] pc : mutex_lock+0xc/0x54
+[   48.334514] lr : soc_dapm_shutdown_dapm+0x44/0x174 [snd_soc_core]
+[   48.340794] sp : ffff800084ddb7b0
+[   48.344207] x29: ffff800084ddb7b0 x28: ffff00009cd9cf30 x27: ffff00009cd9cc00
+[   48.351544] x26: ffff000099610190 x25: ffffa31d2f19c810 x24: ffffa31d2f185098
+[   48.358869] x23: ffff800084ddb7f8 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: 00000000000000d0
+[   48.366198] x20: ffff00009ba6c338 x19: ffff00009ba6c338 x18: 00000000ffffffff
+[   48.373528] x17: 000000040044ffff x16: ffffa31d4ae6dca8 x15: 072007740775076f
+[   48.380853] x14: 0765076d07690774 x13: 00313a323a656369 x12: 767265733a637673
+[   48.388182] x11: 00000000000003f9 x10: ffffa31d4c7dea98 x9 : 0000000000000001
+[   48.395519] x8 : ffff00009a2aadc0 x7 : 0000000000000003 x6 : 0000000000000000
+[   48.402854] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000028 x3 : ffff000ef397a698
+[   48.410180] x2 : ffff00009a2aadc0 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 00000000000000d0
+[   48.417506] Call trace:
+[   48.420025]  mutex_lock+0xc/0x54 (P)
+[   48.423712]  snd_soc_dapm_shutdown+0x44/0xbc [snd_soc_core]
+[   48.429447]  soc_cleanup_card_resources+0x30/0x2c0 [snd_soc_core]
+[   48.435719]  snd_soc_bind_card+0x4dc/0xcc0 [snd_soc_core]
+[   48.441278]  snd_soc_add_component+0x27c/0x2c8 [snd_soc_core]
+[   48.447192]  snd_soc_register_component+0x9c/0xf4 [snd_soc_core]
+[   48.453371]  devm_snd_soc_register_component+0x64/0xc4 [snd_soc_core]
+[   48.459994]  apm_probe+0xb4/0x110 [snd_q6apm]
+[   48.464479]  apr_device_probe+0x24/0x40 [apr]
+[   48.468964]  really_probe+0xbc/0x298
+[   48.472651]  __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x12c
+[   48.477132]  driver_probe_device+0x40/0x160
+[   48.481435]  __device_attach_driver+0xb8/0x134
+[   48.486011]  bus_for_each_drv+0x80/0xdc
+[   48.489964]  __device_attach+0xa8/0x1b0
+[   48.493916]  device_initial_probe+0x50/0x54
+[   48.498219]  bus_probe_device+0x38/0xa0
+[   48.502170]  device_add+0x590/0x760
+[   48.505761]  device_register+0x20/0x30
+[   48.509623]  of_register_apr_devices+0x1d8/0x318 [apr]
+[   48.514905]  apr_pd_status+0x2c/0x54 [apr]
+[   48.519114]  pdr_notifier_work+0x8c/0xe0 [pdr_interface]
+[   48.524570]  process_one_work+0x150/0x294
+[   48.528692]  worker_thread+0x2d8/0x3d8
+[   48.532551]  kthread+0x130/0x204
+[   48.535874]  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
+[   48.539559] Code: d65f03c0 d5384102 d503201f d2800001 (c8e17c02)
+[   48.545823] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
+
+Fixes: 5477518b8a0e ("ASoC: qdsp6: audioreach: add q6apm support")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Ravi Hothi <ravi.hothi@oss.qualcomm.com>
+Reviewed-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla@oss.qualcomm.com>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260227144534.278568-1-ravi.hothi@oss.qualcomm.com
+Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ sound/soc/qcom/qdsp6/q6apm-dai.c        |    1 +
+ sound/soc/qcom/qdsp6/q6apm-lpass-dais.c |    1 +
+ sound/soc/qcom/qdsp6/q6apm.c            |    1 +
+ 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/sound/soc/qcom/qdsp6/q6apm-dai.c
++++ b/sound/soc/qcom/qdsp6/q6apm-dai.c
+@@ -841,6 +841,7 @@ static const struct snd_soc_component_dr
+       .ack            = q6apm_dai_ack,
+       .compress_ops   = &q6apm_dai_compress_ops,
+       .use_dai_pcm_id = true,
++      .remove_order   = SND_SOC_COMP_ORDER_EARLY,
+ };
+ static int q6apm_dai_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
+--- a/sound/soc/qcom/qdsp6/q6apm-lpass-dais.c
++++ b/sound/soc/qcom/qdsp6/q6apm-lpass-dais.c
+@@ -272,6 +272,7 @@ static const struct snd_soc_component_dr
+       .of_xlate_dai_name = q6dsp_audio_ports_of_xlate_dai_name,
+       .be_pcm_base = AUDIOREACH_BE_PCM_BASE,
+       .use_dai_pcm_id = true,
++      .remove_order   = SND_SOC_COMP_ORDER_FIRST,
+ };
+ static int q6apm_lpass_dai_dev_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
+--- a/sound/soc/qcom/qdsp6/q6apm.c
++++ b/sound/soc/qcom/qdsp6/q6apm.c
+@@ -732,6 +732,7 @@ static const struct snd_soc_component_dr
+       .name           = APM_AUDIO_DRV_NAME,
+       .probe          = q6apm_audio_probe,
+       .remove         = q6apm_audio_remove,
++      .remove_order   = SND_SOC_COMP_ORDER_LAST,
+ };
+ static int apm_probe(gpr_device_t *gdev)
diff --git a/queue-6.6/ceph-fix-i_nlink-underrun-during-async-unlink.patch b/queue-6.6/ceph-fix-i_nlink-underrun-during-async-unlink.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..8c52223
--- /dev/null
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+From ce0123cbb4a40a2f1bbb815f292b26e96088639f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Max Kellermann <max.kellermann@ionos.com>
+Date: Fri, 5 Sep 2025 23:15:30 +0200
+Subject: ceph: fix i_nlink underrun during async unlink
+
+From: Max Kellermann <max.kellermann@ionos.com>
+
+commit ce0123cbb4a40a2f1bbb815f292b26e96088639f upstream.
+
+During async unlink, we drop the `i_nlink` counter before we receive
+the completion (that will eventually update the `i_nlink`) because "we
+assume that the unlink will succeed".  That is not a bad idea, but it
+races against deletions by other clients (or against the completion of
+our own unlink) and can lead to an underrun which emits a WARNING like
+this one:
+
+ WARNING: CPU: 85 PID: 25093 at fs/inode.c:407 drop_nlink+0x50/0x68
+ Modules linked in:
+ CPU: 85 UID: 3221252029 PID: 25093 Comm: php-cgi8.1 Not tainted 6.14.11-cm4all1-ampere #655
+ Hardware name: Supermicro ARS-110M-NR/R12SPD-A, BIOS 1.1b 10/17/2023
+ pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
+ pc : drop_nlink+0x50/0x68
+ lr : ceph_unlink+0x6c4/0x720
+ sp : ffff80012173bc90
+ x29: ffff80012173bc90 x28: ffff086d0a45aaf8 x27: ffff0871d0eb5680
+ x26: ffff087f2a64a718 x25: 0000020000000180 x24: 0000000061c88647
+ x23: 0000000000000002 x22: ffff07ff9236d800 x21: 0000000000001203
+ x20: ffff07ff9237b000 x19: ffff088b8296afc0 x18: 00000000f3c93365
+ x17: 0000000000070000 x16: ffff08faffcbdfe8 x15: ffff08faffcbdfec
+ x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 45445f65645f3037 x12: 34385f6369706f74
+ x11: 0000a2653104bb20 x10: ffffd85f26d73290 x9 : ffffd85f25664f94
+ x8 : 00000000000000c0 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000002
+ x5 : 0000000000000081 x4 : 0000000000000481 x3 : 0000000000000000
+ x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff08727d3f91e8
+ Call trace:
+  drop_nlink+0x50/0x68 (P)
+  vfs_unlink+0xb0/0x2e8
+  do_unlinkat+0x204/0x288
+  __arm64_sys_unlinkat+0x3c/0x80
+  invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x54/0xe8
+  do_el0_svc+0xa4/0xc8
+  el0_svc+0x18/0x58
+  el0t_64_sync_handler+0x104/0x130
+  el0t_64_sync+0x154/0x158
+
+In ceph_unlink(), a call to ceph_mdsc_submit_request() submits the
+CEPH_MDS_OP_UNLINK to the MDS, but does not wait for completion.
+
+Meanwhile, between this call and the following drop_nlink() call, a
+worker thread may process a CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT, CEPH_CAP_OP_GRANT or
+just a CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_REPLY (the latter of which could be our own
+completion).  These will lead to a set_nlink() call, updating the
+`i_nlink` counter to the value received from the MDS.  If that new
+`i_nlink` value happens to be zero, it is illegal to decrement it
+further.  But that is exactly what ceph_unlink() will do then.
+
+The WARNING can be reproduced this way:
+
+1. Force async unlink; only the async code path is affected.  Having
+   no real clue about Ceph internals, I was unable to find out why the
+   MDS wouldn't give me the "Fxr" capabilities, so I patched
+   get_caps_for_async_unlink() to always succeed.
+
+   (Note that the WARNING dump above was found on an unpatched kernel,
+   without this kludge - this is not a theoretical bug.)
+
+2. Add a sleep call after ceph_mdsc_submit_request() so the unlink
+   completion gets handled by a worker thread before drop_nlink() is
+   called.  This guarantees that the `i_nlink` is already zero before
+   drop_nlink() runs.
+
+The solution is to skip the counter decrement when it is already zero,
+but doing so without a lock is still racy (TOCTOU).  Since
+ceph_fill_inode() and handle_cap_grant() both hold the
+`ceph_inode_info.i_ceph_lock` spinlock while set_nlink() runs, this
+seems like the proper lock to protect the `i_nlink` updates.
+
+I found prior art in NFS and SMB (using `inode.i_lock`) and AFS (using
+`afs_vnode.cb_lock`).  All three have the zero check as well.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Fixes: 2ccb45462aea ("ceph: perform asynchronous unlink if we have sufficient caps")
+Signed-off-by: Max Kellermann <max.kellermann@ionos.com>
+Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com>
+Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/ceph/dir.c |   15 ++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/fs/ceph/dir.c
++++ b/fs/ceph/dir.c
+@@ -1292,6 +1292,7 @@ static int ceph_unlink(struct inode *dir
+       struct ceph_fs_client *fsc = ceph_sb_to_fs_client(dir->i_sb);
+       struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc = fsc->mdsc;
+       struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
++      struct ceph_inode_info *ci = ceph_inode(inode);
+       struct ceph_mds_request *req;
+       bool try_async = ceph_test_mount_opt(fsc, ASYNC_DIROPS);
+       int err = -EROFS;
+@@ -1349,7 +1350,19 @@ retry:
+                        * We have enough caps, so we assume that the unlink
+                        * will succeed. Fix up the target inode and dcache.
+                        */
+-                      drop_nlink(inode);
++
++                      /*
++                       * Protect the i_nlink update with i_ceph_lock
++                       * to precent racing against ceph_fill_inode()
++                       * handling our completion on a worker thread
++                       * and don't decrement if i_nlink has already
++                       * been updated to zero by this completion.
++                       */
++                      spin_lock(&ci->i_ceph_lock);
++                      if (inode->i_nlink > 0)
++                              drop_nlink(inode);
++                      spin_unlock(&ci->i_ceph_lock);
++
+                       d_delete(dentry);
+               } else {
+                       spin_lock(&fsc->async_unlink_conflict_lock);
diff --git a/queue-6.6/ceph-fix-memory-leaks-in-ceph_mdsc_build_path.patch b/queue-6.6/ceph-fix-memory-leaks-in-ceph_mdsc_build_path.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..10d4520
--- /dev/null
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+From 040d159a45ded7f33201421a81df0aa2a86e5a0b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Max Kellermann <max.kellermann@ionos.com>
+Date: Tue, 24 Feb 2026 14:26:57 +0100
+Subject: ceph: fix memory leaks in ceph_mdsc_build_path()
+
+From: Max Kellermann <max.kellermann@ionos.com>
+
+commit 040d159a45ded7f33201421a81df0aa2a86e5a0b upstream.
+
+Add __putname() calls to error code paths that did not free the "path"
+pointer obtained by __getname().  If ownership of this pointer is not
+passed to the caller via path_info.path, the function must free it
+before returning.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Fixes: 3fd945a79e14 ("ceph: encode encrypted name in ceph_mdsc_build_path and dentry release")
+Fixes: 550f7ca98ee0 ("ceph: give up on paths longer than PATH_MAX")
+Signed-off-by: Max Kellermann <max.kellermann@ionos.com>
+Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com>
+Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/ceph/mds_client.c |    3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c
++++ b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c
+@@ -2672,6 +2672,7 @@ retry:
+                       if (ret < 0) {
+                               dput(parent);
+                               dput(cur);
++                              __putname(path);
+                               return ERR_PTR(ret);
+                       }
+@@ -2681,6 +2682,7 @@ retry:
+                               if (len < 0) {
+                                       dput(parent);
+                                       dput(cur);
++                                      __putname(path);
+                                       return ERR_PTR(len);
+                               }
+                       }
+@@ -2717,6 +2719,7 @@ retry:
+                * cannot ever succeed.  Creating paths that long is
+                * possible with Ceph, but Linux cannot use them.
+                */
++              __putname(path);
+               return ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG);
+       }
diff --git a/queue-6.6/kprobes-avoid-crash-when-rmmod-insmod-after-ftrace-killed.patch b/queue-6.6/kprobes-avoid-crash-when-rmmod-insmod-after-ftrace-killed.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..c9e18cc
--- /dev/null
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+From e113f0b46d19626ec15388bcb91432c9a4fd6261 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" <mhiramat@kernel.org>
+Date: Fri, 13 Mar 2026 23:14:14 +0900
+Subject: kprobes: avoid crash when rmmod/insmod after ftrace killed
+
+From: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
+
+commit e113f0b46d19626ec15388bcb91432c9a4fd6261 upstream.
+
+After we hit ftrace is killed by some errors, the kernel crash if
+we remove modules in which kprobe probes.
+
+BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfff805000d
+PGD 817fcc067 P4D 817fcc067 PUD 817fc8067 PMD 101555067 PTE 0
+Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
+CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 2012 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G        W  OE
+Tainted: [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
+RIP: 0010:kprobes_module_callback+0x89/0x790
+RSP: 0018:ffff88812e157d30 EFLAGS: 00010a02
+RAX: 1ffffffff805000d RBX: dffffc0000000000 RCX: ffffffff86a8de90
+RDX: ffffed1025c2af9b RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffffffc0280068
+RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed1025c2af9a
+R10: ffff88812e157cd7 R11: 205d323130325420 R12: 0000000000000002
+R13: ffffffffc0290488 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffffffffc0280040
+FS:  00007fbc450dd740(0000) GS:ffff888420331000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
+CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
+CR2: fffffbfff805000d CR3: 000000010f624000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
+Call Trace:
+ <TASK>
+ notifier_call_chain+0xc6/0x280
+ blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x60/0x90
+ __do_sys_delete_module.constprop.0+0x32a/0x4e0
+ do_syscall_64+0x5d/0xfa0
+ entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
+
+This is because the kprobe on ftrace does not correctly handles
+the kprobe_ftrace_disabled flag set by ftrace_kill().
+
+To prevent this error, check kprobe_ftrace_disabled in
+__disarm_kprobe_ftrace() and skip all ftrace related operations.
+
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/176473947565.1727781.13110060700668331950.stgit@mhiramat.tok.corp.google.com/
+
+Reported-by: Ye Bin <yebin10@huawei.com>
+Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251125020536.2484381-1-yebin@huaweicloud.com/
+Fixes: ae6aa16fdc16 ("kprobes: introduce ftrace based optimization")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
+Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ kernel/kprobes.c |    4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/kernel/kprobes.c
++++ b/kernel/kprobes.c
+@@ -1114,6 +1114,10 @@ static int __disarm_kprobe_ftrace(struct
+       int ret;
+       lockdep_assert_held(&kprobe_mutex);
++      if (unlikely(kprobe_ftrace_disabled)) {
++              /* Now ftrace is disabled forever, disarm is already done. */
++              return 0;
++      }
+       if (*cnt == 1) {
+               ret = unregister_ftrace_function(ops);
diff --git a/queue-6.6/libceph-admit-message-frames-only-in-ceph_con_s_open-state.patch b/queue-6.6/libceph-admit-message-frames-only-in-ceph_con_s_open-state.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..667cf53
--- /dev/null
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From a5a373705081d7cc6363e16990e2361b0b362314 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
+Date: Sun, 8 Mar 2026 17:57:23 +0100
+Subject: libceph: admit message frames only in CEPH_CON_S_OPEN state
+
+From: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
+
+commit a5a373705081d7cc6363e16990e2361b0b362314 upstream.
+
+Similar checks are performed for all control frames, but an early check
+for message frames was missing.  process_message() is already set up to
+terminate the loop in case the state changes while con->ops->dispatch()
+handler is being executed.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Alex Markuze <amarkuze@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/ceph/messenger_v2.c |    5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/net/ceph/messenger_v2.c
++++ b/net/ceph/messenger_v2.c
+@@ -2940,6 +2940,11 @@ static int __handle_control(struct ceph_
+       if (con->v2.in_desc.fd_tag != FRAME_TAG_MESSAGE)
+               return process_control(con, p, end);
++      if (con->state != CEPH_CON_S_OPEN) {
++              con->error_msg = "protocol error, unexpected message";
++              return -EINVAL;
++      }
++
+       ret = process_message_header(con, p, end);
+       if (ret < 0)
+               return ret;
diff --git a/queue-6.6/libceph-fix-potential-out-of-bounds-access-in-ceph_handle_auth_reply.patch b/queue-6.6/libceph-fix-potential-out-of-bounds-access-in-ceph_handle_auth_reply.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..3963561
--- /dev/null
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+From b282c43ed156ae15ea76748fc15cd5c39dc9ab72 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Raphael Zimmer <raphael.zimmer@tu-ilmenau.de>
+Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2026 15:28:15 +0100
+Subject: libceph: Fix potential out-of-bounds access in ceph_handle_auth_reply()
+
+From: Raphael Zimmer <raphael.zimmer@tu-ilmenau.de>
+
+commit b282c43ed156ae15ea76748fc15cd5c39dc9ab72 upstream.
+
+This patch fixes an out-of-bounds access in ceph_handle_auth_reply()
+that can be triggered by a message of type CEPH_MSG_AUTH_REPLY. In
+ceph_handle_auth_reply(), the value of the payload_len field of such a
+message is stored in a variable of type int. A value greater than
+INT_MAX leads to an integer overflow and is interpreted as a negative
+value. This leads to decrementing the pointer address by this value and
+subsequently accessing it because ceph_decode_need() only checks that
+the memory access does not exceed the end address of the allocation.
+
+This patch fixes the issue by changing the data type of payload_len to
+u32. Additionally, the data type of result_msg_len is changed to u32,
+as it is also a variable holding a non-negative length.
+
+Also, an additional layer of sanity checks is introduced, ensuring that
+directly after reading it from the message, payload_len and
+result_msg_len are not greater than the overall segment length.
+
+BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ceph_handle_auth_reply+0x642/0x7a0 [libceph]
+Read of size 4 at addr ffff88811404df14 by task kworker/20:1/262
+
+CPU: 20 UID: 0 PID: 262 Comm: kworker/20:1 Not tainted 6.19.2 #5 PREEMPT(voluntary)
+Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
+Workqueue: ceph-msgr ceph_con_workfn [libceph]
+Call Trace:
+ <TASK>
+ dump_stack_lvl+0x76/0xa0
+ print_report+0xd1/0x620
+ ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
+ ? kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x72/0x210
+ kasan_report+0xe7/0x130
+ ? ceph_handle_auth_reply+0x642/0x7a0 [libceph]
+ ? ceph_handle_auth_reply+0x642/0x7a0 [libceph]
+ __asan_report_load_n_noabort+0xf/0x20
+ ceph_handle_auth_reply+0x642/0x7a0 [libceph]
+ mon_dispatch+0x973/0x23d0 [libceph]
+ ? apparmor_socket_recvmsg+0x6b/0xa0
+ ? __pfx_mon_dispatch+0x10/0x10 [libceph]
+ ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30i
+ ? mutex_unlock+0x7f/0xd0
+ ? __pfx_mutex_unlock+0x10/0x10
+ ? __pfx_do_recvmsg+0x10/0x10 [libceph]
+ ceph_con_process_message+0x1f1/0x650 [libceph]
+ process_message+0x1e/0x450 [libceph]
+ ceph_con_v2_try_read+0x2e48/0x6c80 [libceph]
+ ? __pfx_ceph_con_v2_try_read+0x10/0x10 [libceph]
+ ? save_fpregs_to_fpstate+0xb0/0x230
+ ? raw_spin_rq_unlock+0x17/0xa0
+ ? finish_task_switch.isra.0+0x13b/0x760
+ ? __switch_to+0x385/0xda0
+ ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30
+ ? mutex_lock+0x8d/0xe0
+ ? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
+ ceph_con_workfn+0x248/0x10c0 [libceph]
+ process_one_work+0x629/0xf80
+ ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30
+ worker_thread+0x87f/0x1570
+ ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
+ ? __pfx_try_to_wake_up+0x10/0x10
+ ? kasan_print_address_stack_frame+0x1f7/0x280
+ ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
+ kthread+0x396/0x830
+ ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irq+0x10/0x10
+ ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
+ ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30
+ ? recalc_sigpending+0x180/0x210
+ ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
+ ret_from_fork+0x3f7/0x610
+ ? __pfx_ret_from_fork+0x10/0x10
+ ? __switch_to+0x385/0xda0
+ ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
+ ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
+ </TASK>
+
+[ idryomov: replace if statements with ceph_decode_need() for
+  payload_len and result_msg_len ]
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Raphael Zimmer <raphael.zimmer@tu-ilmenau.de>
+Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com>
+Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/ceph/auth.c |    6 ++++--
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/ceph/auth.c
++++ b/net/ceph/auth.c
+@@ -205,9 +205,9 @@ int ceph_handle_auth_reply(struct ceph_a
+       s32 result;
+       u64 global_id;
+       void *payload, *payload_end;
+-      int payload_len;
++      u32 payload_len;
+       char *result_msg;
+-      int result_msg_len;
++      u32 result_msg_len;
+       int ret = -EINVAL;
+       mutex_lock(&ac->mutex);
+@@ -217,10 +217,12 @@ int ceph_handle_auth_reply(struct ceph_a
+       result = ceph_decode_32(&p);
+       global_id = ceph_decode_64(&p);
+       payload_len = ceph_decode_32(&p);
++      ceph_decode_need(&p, end, payload_len, bad);
+       payload = p;
+       p += payload_len;
+       ceph_decode_need(&p, end, sizeof(u32), bad);
+       result_msg_len = ceph_decode_32(&p);
++      ceph_decode_need(&p, end, result_msg_len, bad);
+       result_msg = p;
+       p += result_msg_len;
+       if (p != end)
diff --git a/queue-6.6/libceph-prevent-potential-out-of-bounds-reads-in-process_message_header.patch b/queue-6.6/libceph-prevent-potential-out-of-bounds-reads-in-process_message_header.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..44bceed
--- /dev/null
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+From 69fb5d91bba44ecf7eb80530b85fa4fb028921d5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
+Date: Sun, 8 Mar 2026 17:38:00 +0100
+Subject: libceph: prevent potential out-of-bounds reads in process_message_header()
+
+From: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
+
+commit 69fb5d91bba44ecf7eb80530b85fa4fb028921d5 upstream.
+
+If the message frame is (maliciously) corrupted in a way that the
+length of the control segment ends up being less than the size of the
+message header or a different frame is made to look like a message
+frame, out-of-bounds reads may ensue in process_message_header().
+
+Perform an explicit bounds check before decoding the message header.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Reported-by: Raphael Zimmer <raphael.zimmer@tu-ilmenau.de>
+Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Alex Markuze <amarkuze@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/ceph/messenger_v2.c |    9 ++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/ceph/messenger_v2.c
++++ b/net/ceph/messenger_v2.c
+@@ -2868,12 +2868,15 @@ static int process_message_header(struct
+                                 void *p, void *end)
+ {
+       struct ceph_frame_desc *desc = &con->v2.in_desc;
+-      struct ceph_msg_header2 *hdr2 = p;
++      struct ceph_msg_header2 *hdr2;
+       struct ceph_msg_header hdr;
+       int skip;
+       int ret;
+       u64 seq;
++      ceph_decode_need(&p, end, sizeof(*hdr2), bad);
++      hdr2 = p;
++
+       /* verify seq# */
+       seq = le64_to_cpu(hdr2->seq);
+       if ((s64)seq - (s64)con->in_seq < 1) {
+@@ -2904,6 +2907,10 @@ static int process_message_header(struct
+       WARN_ON(!con->in_msg);
+       WARN_ON(con->in_msg->con != con);
+       return 1;
++
++bad:
++      pr_err("failed to decode message header\n");
++      return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ static int process_message(struct ceph_connection *con)
diff --git a/queue-6.6/libceph-reject-preamble-if-control-segment-is-empty.patch b/queue-6.6/libceph-reject-preamble-if-control-segment-is-empty.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..3440362
--- /dev/null
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+From c4c22b846eceff05b1129b8844a80310e55a7f87 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
+Date: Sun, 8 Mar 2026 20:01:27 +0100
+Subject: libceph: reject preamble if control segment is empty
+
+From: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
+
+commit c4c22b846eceff05b1129b8844a80310e55a7f87 upstream.
+
+While head_onwire_len() has a branch to handle ctrl_len == 0 case,
+prepare_read_control() always sets up a kvec for the CRC meaning that
+a non-empty control segment is effectively assumed.  All frames that
+clients deal with meet that assumption, so let's make it official and
+treat the preamble with an empty control segment as malformed.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Alex Markuze <amarkuze@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/ceph/messenger_v2.c |   17 ++++++++---------
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/ceph/messenger_v2.c
++++ b/net/ceph/messenger_v2.c
+@@ -392,7 +392,7 @@ static int head_onwire_len(int ctrl_len,
+       int head_len;
+       int rem_len;
+-      BUG_ON(ctrl_len < 0 || ctrl_len > CEPH_MSG_MAX_CONTROL_LEN);
++      BUG_ON(ctrl_len < 1 || ctrl_len > CEPH_MSG_MAX_CONTROL_LEN);
+       if (secure) {
+               head_len = CEPH_PREAMBLE_SECURE_LEN;
+@@ -401,9 +401,7 @@ static int head_onwire_len(int ctrl_len,
+                       head_len += padded_len(rem_len) + CEPH_GCM_TAG_LEN;
+               }
+       } else {
+-              head_len = CEPH_PREAMBLE_PLAIN_LEN;
+-              if (ctrl_len)
+-                      head_len += ctrl_len + CEPH_CRC_LEN;
++              head_len = CEPH_PREAMBLE_PLAIN_LEN + ctrl_len + CEPH_CRC_LEN;
+       }
+       return head_len;
+ }
+@@ -528,11 +526,16 @@ static int decode_preamble(void *p, stru
+               desc->fd_aligns[i] = ceph_decode_16(&p);
+       }
+-      if (desc->fd_lens[0] < 0 ||
++      /*
++       * This would fire for FRAME_TAG_WAIT (it has one empty
++       * segment), but we should never get it as client.
++       */
++      if (desc->fd_lens[0] < 1 ||
+           desc->fd_lens[0] > CEPH_MSG_MAX_CONTROL_LEN) {
+               pr_err("bad control segment length %d\n", desc->fd_lens[0]);
+               return -EINVAL;
+       }
++
+       if (desc->fd_lens[1] < 0 ||
+           desc->fd_lens[1] > CEPH_MSG_MAX_FRONT_LEN) {
+               pr_err("bad front segment length %d\n", desc->fd_lens[1]);
+@@ -549,10 +552,6 @@ static int decode_preamble(void *p, stru
+               return -EINVAL;
+       }
+-      /*
+-       * This would fire for FRAME_TAG_WAIT (it has one empty
+-       * segment), but we should never get it as client.
+-       */
+       if (!desc->fd_lens[desc->fd_seg_cnt - 1]) {
+               pr_err("last segment empty, segment count %d\n",
+                      desc->fd_seg_cnt);
diff --git a/queue-6.6/libceph-use-u32-for-non-negative-values-in-ceph_monmap_decode.patch b/queue-6.6/libceph-use-u32-for-non-negative-values-in-ceph_monmap_decode.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..904b0f2
--- /dev/null
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+From 770444611f047dbfd4517ec0bc1b179d40c2f346 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Raphael Zimmer <raphael.zimmer@tu-ilmenau.de>
+Date: Thu, 26 Feb 2026 16:07:31 +0100
+Subject: libceph: Use u32 for non-negative values in ceph_monmap_decode()
+
+From: Raphael Zimmer <raphael.zimmer@tu-ilmenau.de>
+
+commit 770444611f047dbfd4517ec0bc1b179d40c2f346 upstream.
+
+This patch fixes unnecessary implicit conversions that change signedness
+of blob_len and num_mon in ceph_monmap_decode().
+Currently blob_len and num_mon are (signed) int variables. They are used
+to hold values that are always non-negative and get assigned in
+ceph_decode_32_safe(), which is meant to assign u32 values. Both
+variables are subsequently used as unsigned values, and the value of
+num_mon is further assigned to monmap->num_mon, which is of type u32.
+Therefore, both variables should be of type u32. This is especially
+relevant for num_mon. If the value read from the incoming message is
+very large, it is interpreted as a negative value, and the check for
+num_mon > CEPH_MAX_MON does not catch it. This leads to the attempt to
+allocate a very large chunk of memory for monmap, which will most likely
+fail. In this case, an unnecessary attempt to allocate memory is
+performed, and -ENOMEM is returned instead of -EINVAL.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Raphael Zimmer <raphael.zimmer@tu-ilmenau.de>
+Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com>
+Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/ceph/mon_client.c |    6 +++---
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/ceph/mon_client.c
++++ b/net/ceph/mon_client.c
+@@ -72,8 +72,8 @@ static struct ceph_monmap *ceph_monmap_d
+       struct ceph_monmap *monmap = NULL;
+       struct ceph_fsid fsid;
+       u32 struct_len;
+-      int blob_len;
+-      int num_mon;
++      u32 blob_len;
++      u32 num_mon;
+       u8 struct_v;
+       u32 epoch;
+       int ret;
+@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ static struct ceph_monmap *ceph_monmap_d
+       }
+       ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, num_mon, e_inval);
+-      dout("%s fsid %pU epoch %u num_mon %d\n", __func__, &fsid, epoch,
++      dout("%s fsid %pU epoch %u num_mon %u\n", __func__, &fsid, epoch,
+            num_mon);
+       if (num_mon > CEPH_MAX_MON)
+               goto e_inval;
diff --git a/queue-6.6/mm-kfence-disable-kfence-upon-kasan-hw-tags-enablement.patch b/queue-6.6/mm-kfence-disable-kfence-upon-kasan-hw-tags-enablement.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..1f4fbdd
--- /dev/null
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+From 09833d99db36d74456a4d13eb29c32d56ff8f2b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
+Date: Fri, 13 Feb 2026 10:54:10 +0100
+Subject: mm/kfence: disable KFENCE upon KASAN HW tags enablement
+
+From: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
+
+commit 09833d99db36d74456a4d13eb29c32d56ff8f2b6 upstream.
+
+KFENCE does not currently support KASAN hardware tags.  As a result, the
+two features are incompatible when enabled simultaneously.
+
+Given that MTE provides deterministic protection and KFENCE is a
+sampling-based debugging tool, prioritize the stronger hardware
+protections.  Disable KFENCE initialization and free the pre-allocated
+pool if KASAN hardware tags are detected to ensure the system maintains
+the security guarantees provided by MTE.
+
+Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260213095410.1862978-1-glider@google.com
+Fixes: 0ce20dd84089 ("mm: add Kernel Electric-Fence infrastructure")
+Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
+Suggested-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
+Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
+Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
+Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
+Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
+Cc: Ernesto Martinez Garcia <ernesto.martinezgarcia@tugraz.at>
+Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+Cc: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
+Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ mm/kfence/core.c |   15 +++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/mm/kfence/core.c
++++ b/mm/kfence/core.c
+@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
+ #include <linux/hash.h>
+ #include <linux/irq_work.h>
+ #include <linux/jhash.h>
++#include <linux/kasan-enabled.h>
+ #include <linux/kcsan-checks.h>
+ #include <linux/kfence.h>
+ #include <linux/kmemleak.h>
+@@ -862,6 +863,20 @@ void __init kfence_alloc_pool_and_metada
+               return;
+       /*
++       * If KASAN hardware tags are enabled, disable KFENCE, because it
++       * does not support MTE yet.
++       */
++      if (kasan_hw_tags_enabled()) {
++              pr_info("disabled as KASAN HW tags are enabled\n");
++              if (__kfence_pool) {
++                      memblock_free(__kfence_pool, KFENCE_POOL_SIZE);
++                      __kfence_pool = NULL;
++              }
++              kfence_sample_interval = 0;
++              return;
++      }
++
++      /*
+        * If the pool has already been initialized by arch, there is no need to
+        * re-allocate the memory pool.
+        */
diff --git a/queue-6.6/mm-tracing-rss_stat-ensure-curr-is-false-from-kthread-context.patch b/queue-6.6/mm-tracing-rss_stat-ensure-curr-is-false-from-kthread-context.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..22ecdbd
--- /dev/null
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+From 079c24d5690262e83ee476e2a548e416f3237511 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com>
+Date: Thu, 19 Feb 2026 15:36:56 -0800
+Subject: mm/tracing: rss_stat: ensure curr is false from kthread context
+
+From: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com>
+
+commit 079c24d5690262e83ee476e2a548e416f3237511 upstream.
+
+The rss_stat trace event allows userspace tools, like Perfetto [1], to
+inspect per-process RSS metric changes over time.
+
+The curr field was introduced to rss_stat in commit e4dcad204d3a
+("rss_stat: add support to detect RSS updates of external mm").  Its
+intent is to indicate whether the RSS update is for the mm_struct of the
+current execution context; and is set to false when operating on a remote
+mm_struct (e.g., via kswapd or a direct reclaimer).
+
+However, an issue arises when a kernel thread temporarily adopts a user
+process's mm_struct.  Kernel threads do not have their own mm_struct and
+normally have current->mm set to NULL.  To operate on user memory, they
+can "borrow" a memory context using kthread_use_mm(), which sets
+current->mm to the user process's mm.
+
+This can be observed, for example, in the USB Function Filesystem (FFS)
+driver.  The ffs_user_copy_worker() handles AIO completions and uses
+kthread_use_mm() to copy data to a user-space buffer.  If a page fault
+occurs during this copy, the fault handler executes in the kthread's
+context.
+
+At this point, current is the kthread, but current->mm points to the user
+process's mm.  Since the rss_stat event (from the page fault) is for that
+same mm, the condition current->mm == mm becomes true, causing curr to be
+incorrectly set to true when the trace event is emitted.
+
+This is misleading because it suggests the mm belongs to the kthread,
+confusing userspace tools that track per-process RSS changes and
+corrupting their mm_id-to-process association.
+
+Fix this by ensuring curr is always false when the trace event is emitted
+from a kthread context by checking for the PF_KTHREAD flag.
+
+Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260219233708.1971199-1-kaleshsingh@google.com
+Link: https://perfetto.dev/ [1]
+Fixes: e4dcad204d3a ("rss_stat: add support to detect RSS updates of external mm")
+Signed-off-by: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com>
+Acked-by: Zi Yan <ziy@nvidia.com>
+Acked-by: SeongJae Park <sj@kernel.org>
+Reviewed-by: Pedro Falcato <pfalcato@suse.de>
+Cc: "David Hildenbrand (Arm)" <david@kernel.org>
+Cc: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org>
+Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
+Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
+Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
+Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
+Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>   [5.10+]
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ include/trace/events/kmem.h |    8 +++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/include/trace/events/kmem.h
++++ b/include/trace/events/kmem.h
+@@ -359,7 +359,13 @@ TRACE_EVENT(rss_stat,
+       TP_fast_assign(
+               __entry->mm_id = mm_ptr_to_hash(mm);
+-              __entry->curr = !!(current->mm == mm);
++              /*
++               * curr is true if the mm matches the current task's mm_struct.
++               * Since kthreads (PF_KTHREAD) have no mm_struct of their own
++               * but can borrow one via kthread_use_mm(), we must filter them
++               * out to avoid incorrectly attributing the RSS update to them.
++               */
++              __entry->curr = current->mm == mm && !(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD);
+               __entry->member = member;
+               __entry->size = (percpu_counter_sum_positive(&mm->rss_stat[member])
+                                                           << PAGE_SHIFT);
diff --git a/queue-6.6/mmc-core-avoid-bitfield-rmw-for-claim-retune-flags.patch b/queue-6.6/mmc-core-avoid-bitfield-rmw-for-claim-retune-flags.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..02c84f8
--- /dev/null
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+From 901084c51a0a8fb42a3f37d2e9c62083c495f824 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Penghe Geng <pgeng@nvidia.com>
+Date: Thu, 19 Feb 2026 15:29:54 -0500
+Subject: mmc: core: Avoid bitfield RMW for claim/retune flags
+
+From: Penghe Geng <pgeng@nvidia.com>
+
+commit 901084c51a0a8fb42a3f37d2e9c62083c495f824 upstream.
+
+Move claimed and retune control flags out of the bitfield word to
+avoid unrelated RMW side effects in asynchronous contexts.
+
+The host->claimed bit shared a word with retune flags. Writes to claimed
+in __mmc_claim_host() or retune_now in mmc_mq_queue_rq() can overwrite
+other bits when concurrent updates happen in other contexts, triggering
+spurious WARN_ON(!host->claimed). Convert claimed, can_retune,
+retune_now and retune_paused to bool to remove shared-word coupling.
+
+Fixes: 6c0cedd1ef952 ("mmc: core: Introduce host claiming by context")
+Fixes: 1e8e55b67030c ("mmc: block: Add CQE support")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Suggested-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Penghe Geng <pgeng@nvidia.com>
+Acked-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ include/linux/mmc/host.h |    9 +++++----
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/include/linux/mmc/host.h
++++ b/include/linux/mmc/host.h
+@@ -446,14 +446,12 @@ struct mmc_host {
+       struct mmc_ios          ios;            /* current io bus settings */
++      bool                    claimed;        /* host exclusively claimed */
++
+       /* group bitfields together to minimize padding */
+       unsigned int            use_spi_crc:1;
+-      unsigned int            claimed:1;      /* host exclusively claimed */
+       unsigned int            doing_init_tune:1; /* initial tuning in progress */
+-      unsigned int            can_retune:1;   /* re-tuning can be used */
+       unsigned int            doing_retune:1; /* re-tuning in progress */
+-      unsigned int            retune_now:1;   /* do re-tuning at next req */
+-      unsigned int            retune_paused:1; /* re-tuning is temporarily disabled */
+       unsigned int            retune_crc_disable:1; /* don't trigger retune upon crc */
+       unsigned int            can_dma_map_merge:1; /* merging can be used */
+       unsigned int            vqmmc_enabled:1; /* vqmmc regulator is enabled */
+@@ -461,6 +459,9 @@ struct mmc_host {
+       int                     rescan_disable; /* disable card detection */
+       int                     rescan_entered; /* used with nonremovable devices */
++      bool                    can_retune;     /* re-tuning can be used */
++      bool                    retune_now;     /* do re-tuning at next req */
++      bool                    retune_paused;  /* re-tuning is temporarily disabled */
+       int                     need_retune;    /* re-tuning is needed */
+       int                     hold_retune;    /* hold off re-tuning */
+       unsigned int            retune_period;  /* re-tuning period in secs */
diff --git a/queue-6.6/mmc-mmci-fix-device_node-reference-leak-in-of_get_dml_pipe_index.patch b/queue-6.6/mmc-mmci-fix-device_node-reference-leak-in-of_get_dml_pipe_index.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..22233f3
--- /dev/null
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+From af12e64ae0661546e8b4f5d30d55c5f53a11efe7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Felix Gu <ustc.gu@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 20 Jan 2026 22:26:46 +0800
+Subject: mmc: mmci: Fix device_node reference leak in of_get_dml_pipe_index()
+
+From: Felix Gu <ustc.gu@gmail.com>
+
+commit af12e64ae0661546e8b4f5d30d55c5f53a11efe7 upstream.
+
+When calling of_parse_phandle_with_args(), the caller is responsible
+to call of_node_put() to release the reference of device node.
+In of_get_dml_pipe_index(), it does not release the reference.
+
+Fixes: 9cb15142d0e3 ("mmc: mmci: Add qcom dml support to the driver.")
+Signed-off-by: Felix Gu <gu_0233@qq.com>
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/mmc/host/mmci_qcom_dml.c |    1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+--- a/drivers/mmc/host/mmci_qcom_dml.c
++++ b/drivers/mmc/host/mmci_qcom_dml.c
+@@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ static int of_get_dml_pipe_index(struct
+                                      &dma_spec))
+               return -ENODEV;
++      of_node_put(dma_spec.np);
+       if (dma_spec.args_count)
+               return dma_spec.args[0];
index 0e882198e364d6bef035a67c1d05d63ba0503f23..0340fe29de23f6a670dc882bc487a64287288e2c 100644 (file)
@@ -284,3 +284,17 @@ usb-class-cdc-wdm-fix-reordering-issue-in-read-code-path.patch
 usb-renesas_usbhs-fix-use-after-free-in-isr-during-device-removal.patch
 usb-mdc800-handle-signal-and-read-racing.patch
 usb-image-mdc800-kill-download-urb-on-timeout.patch
+mm-tracing-rss_stat-ensure-curr-is-false-from-kthread-context.patch
+mmc-mmci-fix-device_node-reference-leak-in-of_get_dml_pipe_index.patch
+mm-kfence-disable-kfence-upon-kasan-hw-tags-enablement.patch
+mmc-core-avoid-bitfield-rmw-for-claim-retune-flags.patch
+asoc-qcom-qdsp6-fix-q6apm-remove-ordering-during-adsp-stop-and-start.patch
+tipc-fix-divide-by-zero-in-tipc_sk_filter_connect.patch
+kprobes-avoid-crash-when-rmmod-insmod-after-ftrace-killed.patch
+libceph-fix-potential-out-of-bounds-access-in-ceph_handle_auth_reply.patch
+libceph-reject-preamble-if-control-segment-is-empty.patch
+libceph-prevent-potential-out-of-bounds-reads-in-process_message_header.patch
+libceph-use-u32-for-non-negative-values-in-ceph_monmap_decode.patch
+libceph-admit-message-frames-only-in-ceph_con_s_open-state.patch
+ceph-fix-i_nlink-underrun-during-async-unlink.patch
+ceph-fix-memory-leaks-in-ceph_mdsc_build_path.patch
diff --git a/queue-6.6/tipc-fix-divide-by-zero-in-tipc_sk_filter_connect.patch b/queue-6.6/tipc-fix-divide-by-zero-in-tipc_sk_filter_connect.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..96ed02e
--- /dev/null
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+From 6c5a9baa15de240e747263aba435a0951da8d8d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mehul Rao <mehulrao@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2026 13:07:30 -0400
+Subject: tipc: fix divide-by-zero in tipc_sk_filter_connect()
+
+From: Mehul Rao <mehulrao@gmail.com>
+
+commit 6c5a9baa15de240e747263aba435a0951da8d8d2 upstream.
+
+A user can set conn_timeout to any value via
+setsockopt(TIPC_CONN_TIMEOUT), including values less than 4.  When a
+SYN is rejected with TIPC_ERR_OVERLOAD and the retry path in
+tipc_sk_filter_connect() executes:
+
+    delay %= (tsk->conn_timeout / 4);
+
+If conn_timeout is in the range [0, 3], the integer division yields 0,
+and the modulo operation triggers a divide-by-zero exception, causing a
+kernel oops/panic.
+
+Fix this by clamping conn_timeout to a minimum of 4 at the point of use
+in tipc_sk_filter_connect().
+
+Oops: divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
+CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 119 Comm: poc-F144 Not tainted 7.0.0-rc2+
+RIP: 0010:tipc_sk_filter_rcv (net/tipc/socket.c:2236 net/tipc/socket.c:2362)
+Call Trace:
+ tipc_sk_backlog_rcv (include/linux/instrumented.h:82 include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:32 include/net/sock.h:2357 net/tipc/socket.c:2406)
+ __release_sock (include/net/sock.h:1185 net/core/sock.c:3213)
+ release_sock (net/core/sock.c:3797)
+ tipc_connect (net/tipc/socket.c:2570)
+ __sys_connect (include/linux/file.h:62 include/linux/file.h:83 net/socket.c:2098)
+
+Fixes: 6787927475e5 ("tipc: buffer overflow handling in listener socket")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Mehul Rao <mehulrao@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Tung Nguyen <tung.quang.nguyen@est.tech>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260310170730.28841-1-mehulrao@gmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/tipc/socket.c |    2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/net/tipc/socket.c
++++ b/net/tipc/socket.c
+@@ -2238,6 +2238,8 @@ static bool tipc_sk_filter_connect(struc
+               if (skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_write_queue))
+                       break;
+               get_random_bytes(&delay, 2);
++              if (tsk->conn_timeout < 4)
++                      tsk->conn_timeout = 4;
+               delay %= (tsk->conn_timeout / 4);
+               delay = msecs_to_jiffies(delay + 100);
+               sk_reset_timer(sk, &sk->sk_timer, jiffies + delay);