ksmbd: transport_ipc: validate payload size before reading handle

handle_response() dereferences the payload as a 4-byte handle without
verifying that the declared payload size is at least 4 bytes. A malformed
or truncated message from ksmbd.mountd can lead to a 4-byte read past the
declared payload size. Validate the size before dereferencing.

This is a minimal fix to guard the initial handle read.

Fixes: 0626e6641f6b ("cifsd: add server handler for central processing and tranport layers")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Qianchang Zhao <pioooooooooip@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Qianchang Zhao <pioooooooooip@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>

diff --git a/fs/smb/server/transport_ipc.c b/fs/smb/server/transport_ipc.c
index 46f87fd1ce1cd8b5a2ed7adf02b446631bef21c3..2c08cccfa6809fe555e239b28022048f5622e63e 100644 (file)
--- a/fs/smb/server/transport_ipc.c
+++ b/fs/smb/server/transport_ipc.c
@@ -263,10 +263,16 @@ static void ipc_msg_handle_free(int handle)
 
 static int handle_response(int type, void *payload, size_t sz)
 {
-       unsigned int handle = *(unsigned int *)payload;
+       unsigned int handle;
        struct ipc_msg_table_entry *entry;
        int ret = 0;
 
+       /* Prevent 4-byte read beyond declared payload size */
+       if (sz < sizeof(unsigned int))
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       handle = *(unsigned int *)payload;
+
        ipc_update_last_active();
        down_read(&ipc_msg_table_lock);
        hash_for_each_possible(ipc_msg_table, entry, ipc_table_hlist, handle) {